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1. Introduction – The EU and the 
security-development nexus: 
setting the scene 
 Écartez les causes secondaires qui ont produit les grandes agitations des hommes, 
vous en arriverez presque toujours à l'inégalité. Ce sont les pauvres qui ont voulu 
ravir les biens des riches, ou les riches qui ont essayé d'enchaîner les pauvres. Si 
donc vous pouvez fonder un état de société où chacun ait quelque chose à garder 
et peu à prendre, vous aurez beaucoup fait pour la paix du monde. 
  
Alexis de Tocqueville, De la Démocratie en Amérique, 1850 
 
 
In the late 1990s the EU started embracing the idea that security and development policies should be 
intertwined and mutually reinforcing. This formula had since a couple of years been making strides in 
the international circles of the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB) and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Numerous EU policy declarations gradually gave 
traction to this concept and acknowledged the indivisibility of external policies that tackle insecurity, 
instability, poverty and development. An often recurring phrase is that “there cannot be sustainable 
development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will 
be no sustainable peace”.1 This progressively evolved into a commitment, expressed by the Council in 
November 2007, that the "nexus between development and security should inform EU strategies and 
policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU external action".2  
With its wide-ranging competences, covering the continuum between security and development 
policies, the Union portrays itself as ideally positioned to tackle the various interrelated causes of 
poverty and instability in third countries. Whereas the rationale of this rather intuitive commitment 
appears straightforward, its operationalisation is much less so. Efforts to fine-tune security and 
development initiatives constantly confront the EU with the limits of its constitutional system. This has 
long contained development cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – which 
includes the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – in two separate pillars, governed by 
essentially different rules, procedures and actors. The Treaty-rooted special treatment of the CFSP in 
                                                          
1 For instance: Council (S407/08) Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a 
Changing World, 11.12.2008, 8. 




essence served to shield it from the general dynamic of European integration. It was thereby designed 
to keep a distance along exactly those lines that the commitment to a security-development nexus 
aims to cohere. The Treaty of Lisbon3 brings this constitutional architecture significantly more in line 
with such an integrative policy commitment. It makes an end to the hampering pillar structure and 
scales up the duty of consistency across its entire external action system. Yet, while the EU’s legal order 
is now undeniably unified, the CFSP remains legally delimitated and subject to special rules and 
procedures.  
The EU’s efforts to enhance the security-development nexus form a key test case for understanding 
the impact of this altered constitutional reality. This research will hold this policy commitment up to 
the mirror of the Union’s evolving Treaty foundations, in order to unravel the full scope, effectiveness 
and challenges of this endeavour. The relation between EU security and development policies, actors 
and competences will be analysed along three different tracks, namely policy-making, institutional 
design and relations, and the judicial track of competence delimitation. This aims at establishing a 
comprehensive understanding, on each of these three dimensions, of the differences between security 
and development systems, the consequences for EU policy outcomes, the efforts that are taken to 
transcend these differences, and their effectiveness in maximising positive connections and avoiding 
counterproductive actions. 
This introductory chapter will first shed light on the origins of the concept of a security-development 
nexus in the global context (1.1.1.), unravel its meaning and draw up a concise state of affairs of the 
existing research on the topic (1.1.2.). This will be followed by a discussion of how this concept has 
been picked up by EU institutions (1.1.3.). The second part will enunciate on the research objectives 
that this PhD dissertation undertakes and the questions it aims to answer (1.2.). A final section will 
then shortly explain the chosen methodology as well as the research scope and design (1.3.).  
1.1. The conceptual framework of the security-development nexus 
1.1.1. Tracing the roots of the security-development link 
Many observers associate the rising awareness of the interdependence between security and 
development with the 1990s and the end of the Cold War. Yet, in fact the understanding of this link 
goes back further and can even be argued to be inherent to the concepts of development and security. 
On a very general level, if development is defined as "the movement upward of the entire social 
                                                          




system",4 and security as "a reasonable level of predictability at different levels of the social system",5 
then it is evident that both are interconnected. The meaning of these concepts is obviously contested, 
constantly changing and dependent on the context to which they are applied.  
Interestingly, Hettne situates this context a couple of centuries earlier than most scholars, namely in 
the emerging Westphalian order.6 He finds a first link between security and development in the 18th 
century thinking on the liberal peace ideology, equating commercial societies to peaceful societies. 
During the subsequent Napoleonic wars of the early 19th century, progress, in the form of the so-called 
Enlightenment, was "forced upon Europe through empire".7 The end of these wars meant the start of 
the European Concert, which lasted from 1815-1914, when the more stable rivalry between the great 
powers prompted industrial development for military needs. Unsurprisingly, such aggressive economic 
expansion was fragile, and eventually led to the disaster of the two World Wars.  
The connections between development and security grew considerably more explicit in the post-war 
period, through diverse efforts to reconstruct severely damaged countries, revive the international 
economy and ensure that such a devastating global war would never happen again. These efforts in 
turn lay at the basis of the creation of several international organisations that still dominate the debate 
on the security-development interface today, such as the WB, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the UN, the OECD and the EU. Of particular relevance in this regard are the United States Truman 
doctrine and the associated Marshall Plan consisting of emergency assistance for helping to rebuild 
Europe's war-torn economies in order to prevent "misery and want" from attracting the spread of 
communism.8 In his address outlining this plan at Harvard University, US Secretary of State George 
Marshall made one of the earliest plain policy references to what one calls today the security-
development nexus. He professed that “[t]he United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist 
in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability 
and no assured peace”.9 This also implies that the awareness about the security-development link lay 
at the basis of modern development aid, which is built on the legacy of Marshall's plan. 
The subsequent phases in the evolution of the security-development link are marked by three main 
events: the start of the Cold War, the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Rather than 
watersheds, these incidents provide loose demarcations signalling the completion of ongoing 
evolutions. In the Cold War period geostrategic motivations soon overshadowed the initial post-war 
                                                          
4 G. Myrdal, 'What is Development?' (1974) Journal of Economic Issues 8(4), 729. 
5 B. Hettne, 'Development and Security: Origins and Future' (2010) Security Dialogue 41(1), 33. 
6 Ibid. 35-41. 
7 Ibid. 37. 
8 US President Harry Truman, Address to Congress on Turkey and Greece, 12.03.1947. 
9 G. Marshall, Speech at Harvard University, 05.06.1947. 
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concerns of poverty eradication and post-conflict reconstruction. In the bipolar world, where the US 
and the Soviet Union dominated respectively the capitalist Western and communist Eastern Bloc, 
development aid became a tool to keep and obtain friends around the globe and prevent countries 
from falling prey to the opposing ideology. Hettne accurately dubbed this "the geopolitics of 
poverty".10 The importance hereof only increased with the decolonisation of the ‘Third World’ in the 
1950s, 60s and 70s, when the leaders of these newly independent states took their destiny in own 
hands and were able to choose their preferred partners. Cold War security policy, on the other hand, 
consisted mainly of building up and maintaining mutual military threats, which could be termed the 
‘geopolitics of insecurity’.  
Yet, the links between security paradigms and aid played mainly on a global level. It affected the 
distribution of aid resources across countries, but the in-country dynamics of both policy fields 
remained largely unaffected.11 Development actors were often working "in conflict and around conflict 
but they carefully avoided working on conflict".12 Moreover, Cold War motivations were not the only 
driving force of global development flows. Other factors included a kind of altruism stemming from 
feelings of post-colonial responsibility,13 the need for raw materials, the desire to hold on to overseas 
markets, etc. The increasing use of policy conditionality attached to aid envelopes made an end the in-
country separation of development and security. This was most pronounced in the IMF and WB-
managed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which put heavy demands on aid recipient and 
served to spread the free-market model.14  
When the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, the separation between both policy areas only became 
more blurred, the connections more explicit and complex, and the interpretations more diverse. At 
first, the downfall of the geopolitics of poverty and insecurity tended to create a renewed enthusiasm 
in both policy communities for a return to their core objectives of developing and securing. Yet, the 
end of superpower support also cut the ground beneath a great number of politically and economically 
ill-governed regimes. Many of them fell into decay, causing widespread instability, public unrest, 
rebellion and armed combat. Rather than on-off episodes of inter and intra-state conflict, this new 
                                                          
10 Hettne (2010) op.cit. note 5, 33. 
11 P. Uvin, 'Development and Security: Genealogy and Typology of an Evolving International Policy Area' in H.G. Brauch, et al. 
(eds), Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 
2008) 151. 
12 N. Tschirgi, 'Security and Development Policies: Untangling the Relationship' in S. Klingebiel (ed), New Interfaces Between 
Security and Development: Changing Concepts and Approaches (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn, 2006) 47. 
13 Ravenhill refers to “a certain psychological satisfaction from providing development assistance” to the world’s poorest (J. 
Ravenhill, Collective Clientelism: the Lomé Conventions and North-South Relations (Columbia University Press, New York, 
1985) 35). 
14 B.J. Riddell, 'Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa' (1992) The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 30(1), 53-68. 
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situation gave rise to a state of "durable disorder",15  challenging the common practices of both 
development and military actors.  
On the one hand, the failures of international security interventions in the first half of the 1990s, such 
as those in Somalia16 and Bosnia,17 painfully laid the limitations of a conventional military approach 
bare. This led to a growing realisation of the need to engage in civilian activities and with development 
actors. In the often revived words of former German Chancellor and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Willy 
Brandt: "development policy is the peace policy of the 21st century",18 or more bluntly stated by the 
former US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "[w]e can't kill our way to victory".19 Development 
practitioners, on the other hand, saw their costly efforts in no time undone by widespread political 
instability, weak governance and conflict.20 The tragedy of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, a model 
student on every development scale, shook up the world and debunked the believe that aid could 
remain blind for conflict dynamics.21 This myth of nonpartisan aid was wiped most influentially off the 
map in Anderson's book ‘Do No Harm’, wherein she argued that: 
[a]lthough aid agencies often seek to be neutral or nonpartisan toward the winners and losers of 
a war, the impact of their aid is not neutral regarding whether conflict worsens or abates. When 
given in conflict settings, aid can reinforce, exacerbate, and prolong the conflict; it can also help to 
reduce tensions and strengthen people's capacities to disengage from fighting and find peaceful 
options for solving problems.22 
This new environment of durable disorder unmistakably exposed the destructive vicious circle of 
poverty fuelling state erosion, instability, rebellion and (civil) war. This complicated and restrained the 
delivery and implementation of aid as well as the state’s provision of social, economic and security 
services, which consequently formed a breeding ground for further socio-economic deterioration and 
instability (cf. Figure 1). It moreover blurred the hitherto strictly circumscribed roles of military 
personnel, aid workers and diplomats. These unprecedented challenges required an entirely new 
policy approach that turned the covert Cold War connections between security and development 
                                                          
15 P.G. Cerny, 'Neomedievalism, Civil War and the New Security Dilemma: Globalization as Durable Disorder' (1998) Civil Wars 
1(1), 36-64. 
16 The UN intervention in Somalia (UNOSOM II) ended with a traumatic apotheosis in the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu where 20 
UN-troops were killed (after which their bodies were dragged by local crowds through Mogadishu's streets), leading to the 
withdrawal of the entire UN mission.  
17 The biggest stain on the record of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the 
failure to prevent the 1995 Srebrenica massacre of more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslims.   
18 As quoted in D. Buchner, Die Entwicklungshilfepolitik der BRD nach dem Regierungswechsel 1998 (GRIN Verlag, München, 
2001) 26. 
19 CNN, 'Admiral: Troops alone will not yield victory in Afghanistan', CNNPolitics.com, 10.09.2008. 
20  F.M. Alamir, 'The Complex Security-Development Nexus: Practical Challenges for Development Cooperation and the 
Military' (2012) Security and Peace 30(2), 70. 
21 See further: P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (Kumarian Press, Hartford, 1998) 275p. 
22 M.B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War (Lynne Rienner Pub, Boulder, 1999) 1. 
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policies into a more inclusive, organic and outspoken agenda. This set in motion an exercise of 
conceptual thinking in which the UN, the WB and the OECD took the lead. The overarching paradigm 
shift was the reorientation of both development and security policies from the state to the human 
level.23 A people-centred view was set to soften security and military approaches, with more attention 
for facilitating humanitarian aid, post-conflict reconstruction and winning the hearts and minds of local 
populations. It also caused a refocus of development cooperation on poverty reduction, culminating 
in the replacement of the IMF and WB SAPs by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the 
adoption in 2000 of the Millennium Development Goals.24  
Figure 1: The destructive vicious cycle of poverty and instability 
 
Because development workers became more involved in capacity-building and governance issues, and 
security actors expanded their portfolios with various civilian tasks, the interfaces between them 
naturally increased. This often caused coordination and cooperation challenges, requiring more policy 
guidance, which then further multiplied the interactions between security and development actors 
and policies.25 The result was a constant flow of conceptual adaptations that sometimes tended to 
make it difficult to see the wood for the trees. This post-national human shift also signalled a lack of 
confidence in the capacity of states leading to a transnational assumption of responsibility for human 
welfare. This is exemplified by the concept of Responsibility to Protect 26  and humanitarian 
                                                          
23 Some of the key documents regarding this new focus on human security and development are the series of Human 
Development Reports launched by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990; UN Secretary-General B. Boutros-Ghali, 
Report pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (A/47/277-
S/24111) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping (United Nations, New York, 1995) 
n.p.; OECD, Guidelines on Peace, Conflict and Development Cooperation (OECD/DAC, Paris, 1997) 80p.; D. Narayan, et al., 
Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us? (World Bank, New York, 2000) 343p.; and UN Commission on Human Security, 
Human Security Now (CHS, New York, 2003) 168p. 
24 UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/55/2) United Nations Millennium Declaration, New York, 08.09.2000. 
25 F.M. Alamir, 'Introduction: The Complex Security-Development Nexus - a Challenge and an Opportunity for Development 
Cooperation' (2011) digital-development-debates.org (5), n.p. 
26 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, Ottawa, 2001) 91p. 
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interventions on the security front, and democracy promotion and aid conditionality on the 
development front. Such evolutions gave rise to increasingly assertive policies, colliding with 
conventional standards of territorial sovereignty. 
The interventionist agenda got a significant leg up after the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 
2001 and the subsequent 'Global War on Terror'. 9/11 served the world with an inexorable wake-up 
call that 21st century global threats would not be stopped by borders or distance. The fact that 
terrorism, but also other (perceived) threats such as organised crime, diseases, piracy and mass 
population displacements, often originate in weak states has moreover led to a ‘re-problematisation’ 
of poverty.27 This has resulted in a range of new security frameworks which do not excel in clarity, but 
abounded in country categorisations, such as fragile states (US and EU), failed states (Fund for Peace), 
weak states (Brookings), countries at risk of instability (CRI – UK), low income countries under stress 
(LICUS – WB), etc. The US National Security Strategy tellingly summarises the new risk perception as 
follows: "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones".28 The main 
threats are no longer of a military nature but emerge from the 1.5 billion people living in a permanent 
state of insecurity, unremitted cycles of violence and pervasive lawlessness.29  
In the meanwhile famous words of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan: "there will be no development 
without security and no security without development".30 It is in this context and time frame of the 
early 2000s that the emergence of the term ‘security-development nexus’ is situated. There is no 
generally accepted definition, as it rather appears a catch-all phrase for the whole of connections 
between development and security challenges as well as the policies and concepts designed to address 
them. Many of these policies, such as conflict prevention, peace and state-building, and concepts such 
as fragility, resilience and instability, are in their turn loosely defined phrases, leading to a "conceptual 
chaos"31 which "has come to mean many things to many people".32 Another key characteristic of this 
changing landscape is the greater conceptual involvement of governmental actors, which "[i]nstead of 
acting as arms-length policy makers in a multilateral arena, … have become primary stakeholders (and 
‘stickholders’) in the security-development calculus".33  
                                                          
27  C. Büger and P. Vennesson, Security, Development and the EU's Development Policy (European University Institute, 
Florence, 2009) 20-21. 
28 US White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (White House, Washington, 2002) 1. 
29 W. Bank, World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development (World Bank, Washington, 2011) 2-6. 
30  UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan, Report to the UN General Assembly (A/59/2005) In Larger Freedom: towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All (UN, New York, 2005) 31p. 
31 Büger and Vennesson (2009) op.cit. note 27, 38. 
32 N. Tschirgi, M.S. Lund and F. Mancini, 'The Security-Development Nexus' in N. Tschirgi, M.S. Lund and F. Mancini (eds), 
Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2010) 6. 
33 Tschirgi (2006) op.cit. note 12, 50. 
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While this short historical overview has shown that “[t]here has never been a golden age in which 
development was a-political and shielded from security concerns",34 some argue that at present the 
balance has tilted excessively away from principled development towards an opportunistic use of aid.35 
Concepts like fragility, for instance, risk to (re-)instrumentalise or securitise aid, because they allow to 
portray an "an ever-widening range of social trends through the lens of security".36 In this context the 
NGO ActionAid described the global war on terror as "a return to the cold war days with terrorism 
replacing communism as the bogey".37  
1.1.2. Studying the security-development nexus: a coat with many pockets 
The study of the link between development and security is everything but new. Already in 1942 Quincy 
Wright wrote ‘A Study of War’ wherein he describes the vicious circle of poverty, despotism and 
bellicosity in great detail.38 In 1950 Lasswell connected such findings to practical recommendations 
that could just as well have been extracted from a present-day policy paper: "Our greatest security lies 
in the best balance of all instruments of foreign policy, and hence in the coordinated handling of arms, 
diplomacy, information and economics".39 It is however only since the early 2000s that this link is 
approached as a nexus, resulting in an ever more explicit policy commitment to enhance coherence. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary a nexus can refer to "a connection or series of connections 
linking two or more things", "a network" or "a means of connection".40 What then does the recognition 
of and commitment to a nexus between development and security mean and imply?  
An impressive range of econometric analyses provides more content to this connection and extensively 
documents the impact of security variables on development indicators and vice versa. On a global level, 
the fact that wealthier nations are significantly less affected by civil war provides preliminary evidence 
for this rather intuitive link (cf. Figure 2). On a more specific level, the devastating impact of conflict 
on a country's socio-economic situation is most famously documented by Paul Collier who describes it 
as "development in reverse".41 Besides the unsurprising destruction of infrastructure and diversion of 
                                                          
34 P. Vennesson and C. Büger, 'Coping with Insecurity in Fragile Situations', European Report on Development (European 
University Institute, Florence, 2009) 5. 
35  D. Trachsler and D. Möckli, 'Sicherheit un Entwicklung: Zwischen Konvergenz und Konkurrenz', CSS Analysen zur 
Sicherheitspolitik (Center for Security Studies (CSS) - ETH, Zurich, 2008) 1-2.  
36 J.-A. McNeish and J.H.S. Lie, 'Introduction: Hearts and Minds: A Security–Development Nexus?' in J.-A. McNeish and J.H.S. 
Lie (eds), Security and Development (Berghahn Books, New York, 2010) 3. 
37 J. Cosgrave, The Impact of the War on Terror on Aid Flows (ActionAid, London, 2004) 15; The opportunistic use of aid is 
confirmed by the fact that, between 2002 and 2010, two fifths of the entire USD 178 billion global increase could be attributed 
to Iraq and Afghanistan alone, where Western security concerns were particularly at stake (Oxfam, 'Whose Aid is it Anyway? 
Politicizing Aid in Conflicts and Crises', Briefing Paper No. 145 (Oxfam, Oxford, 2011) 2). 
38 Q. Wright, A Study of War (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942) for instance 313-314. 
39 H.D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1950) 75. 
40 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, Oxford University Press) <www.oed.com> (last accessed on 15.05.2015). 
41 P. Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2007) 27. 
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resources away from development, he finds evidence that violence reduces growth by about 2.3% a 
year.42 Other research calculates that armed conflict has cost Africa at least USD 284 billion between 
1990 and 2005, roughly the amount the continent received in Official Development Aid (ODA) during 
that same period.43 Yet another study points to the demolishing impact of civil war on a country's 
trading levels, which take decades to recover.44 The WB sums it up plainly: "people living in fragile and 
conflict-affected states are more than twice as likely to be undernourished as those in other developing 
countries, more than three times as likely to be unable to send their children to school, twice as likely 
to see their children die before age five, and more than twice as likely to lack clean water".45  
Figure 2: Incidence of civil war by country income per capita, 1960-2006 
 
Source: C. Blattman and E. Miguel, 'Civil War' (2010) Journal of Economic Literature 48(1), 7. 
Yet, it is not only conflict that has a destructive impact, various studies also find that socio-economic 
deterioration, such as youth unemployment, 46  commodity price shocks 47  or economic decline, 
                                                          
42 Ibid. 17-37. 
43 IANSA, OXFAM and Saferworld, 'Africa’s Missing Billions: International Arms Flows and the Cost of Conflict', Briefing Paper 
107 (Oxfam, Oxford, 2007) 8-9.  
44  P. Martin, T. Mayer and M. Thoenig, 'Civil Wars and International Trade' (2007) Journal of the European Economic 
Association 6(2-3), 1-9. 
45 World Bank (2011) op.cit. note 29, 5. 
46 For instance: T. Azeng and T. Yogo, 'Youth Unemployment and Political Instability in Selected Developing Countries', ADBG 
Working Paper Series No 171 (African Development Bank Group, Tunis, 2013) 25p. 
47 For instance: O. Dube and J. Vargas, 'Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia' (2013) The Review 
of Economic Studies 80(4), 1-38. 
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stimulates violence and instability. A negative growth drop of 5% would for instance increase the 
propensity for conflict by one-half the following year.48 Combined with the finding that low-income 
countries face a risk of civil war of around 14 per cent in any five-year period,49 this provides strong 
evidence for the above-mentioned vicious circle or "conflict trap".50  
The abundance of econometric analyses documenting this destructive chain reaction is mirrored by a 
variety of studies attempting to unravel and understand the connection. Various explanatory factors 
have emerged, such as horizontal inequality (particularly explosive if it is along ethnic, social, religious 
or political lines), demographics, environmental change, economic structures, democratic process, 
governance issues, the presence and use of natural resources, etc.51 Yet, contrary to the precision of 
the above numbers, these explanations remain rather blurred, with limited to no consensus on an 
overall elucidatory framework.  
While it is evident that challenges of insecurity and poverty are related, the exact causal connections 
are complex and difficult to establish. This results from a number of methodological problems. First, 
there is the evident struggle with counterfactuality, leaving the question of what would have happened 
in the absence of a certain war or a given period of peace subject to speculation. The answer to this 
question would be particularly insightful "because many countries at war have previously been doing 
badly both economically and with respect to social indicators, and their continued weak performance 
is not necessarily attributable to the conflict".52 A second difficulty arises in establishing the direction 
of any causal relationship between development and security. Rather than war putting a brake on 
development, it might for instance be that rich countries are rich, in part, because they did not witness 
recent episodes of conflict.53 Third, any relation between poverty and instability may be spurious due 
to hidden/confounding variables. Social unrest, for instance, "may lead to both civil conflict and less 
                                                          
48 E. Miguel, S. Satyanath and E. Sergenti, 'Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variable Approach' (2004) 
Journal of Political Economy 112(4), 741. 
49 Collier (2007) op.cit. note 41, 20. 
50 P. Collier, et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (World Bank, Washington, 2003) 221p. 
51 For instance: : R. Kanbur, 'Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link', Coping with Crisis: Working Paper Series (International 
Peace Academy, New York, 2007) 10p.; R. Cincotta, 'Demographic Challenges to the State' in N. Tschirgi, M.S. Lund and F. 
Mancini (eds), Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections (Lynne Reinner Publishers, Boulder, 2010) 77-98; 
S. Dalby, Security and Environmental Change (Polity, Cambridge, 2009) 200p.; M. Humphreys, Economics and Violent Conflict 
(Harvard University, 2003) 28p.; J. Snyder, From Voting to Violence (W.W. Norton, New York, 2000) 382p.; T. Addison and 
M.S. Murshed, 'From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract', WIDER Discussion Paper No. 48 (United Nations 
University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, 2001) 17p.; P. Le Billon, Fuelling War: Natural 
Resources and Armed Conflicts (Routledge, New York, 2006) 128p. 
52 F. Stewart, 'Development and Security' (2004) Conflict, Security & Development 4(3), 263-264. 
53 Humphreys (2003) op.cit. note 51, 2. 
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economic activity in ways that obscure the link between poverty and violence".54 This leads some 
authors to question the effect of poverty on conflict as such.55  
Unsurprisingly therefore, it has become common practice in many studies and policy papers on the 
topic to argue that more research on the security-development nexus is needed. This is indispensable 
for answering the key question of what a nexus between development and security implies and "what 
can and/or should be done, by whom and for whom in [its] name".56 While there is indeed no shortage 
of evidence on the destructive chain reaction of insecurity and underdevelopment, it proofs 
considerably more complicated to turn this into a positive policy guide.57 Research undertaken by 
leading experts in 2006 concluded that the different configurations of security and development "can 
be mutually supportive, mutually harmful or independent of each other […] Claiming the contrary can 
only lead to faulty diagnosis and inappropriate responses".58  
Yet, all too often the nexus serves as an empty and ready-made formula for policy-makers "trying to 
make sense of competing interpretations of the complex and pressing problems in [conflict-prone] 
societies".59 According to a 2013 Chatham House report "[t]here is a curious absence of attempts to 
understand what different people and policy texts mean when they talk of a nexus, and the familiar 
uneasy relationship between intellectual enquiry and policy formulation becomes particularly fraught 
in the ways in which it has become almost a mantra or catch-all phrase".60 That this generality stands 
in the way of designing effective policy approaches is clear from Chandler's critique on the above-
mentioned human shift: "[o]nce ‘well-being’ becomes the measurement of development — and 
security an important constituent of well-being — then … any policy initiative can be held to be 
contributing to the most ambitious of transformative objectives and yet have little observable impact 
on the ground".61  
                                                          
54 R. Fisman and E. Miguel, 'Do conflicts cause poverty, or vice-versa?', voxeu.org, 29.11.2008. 
55 Djankov and Reynal-Querol for instance argue that this effect disappears for ex-colonies once historic variables such 
European settler mortality and population density are included (S. Djankov and M. Reynal-Querol, 'Poverty and Civil War: 
Revisiting the Evidence' (2010) The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(4), 1035-1041). In this same line, Abadie provides 
evidence that any causal connection between poverty and hosting terrorism is indirect and can be better explained by political 
freedom indicators (A. Abadie, 'Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism' (2005) American Economic Review 
95(4), 50-56). 
56 M. Stern and J. Öjendal, 'Exploring the Security-Development Nexus' in R. Amer, A. Swain and J. Öjendal (eds), The Security-
Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development (Anthem Press, London, 2012) 15. 
57 Stewart (2003) op.cit. note 52, 376. 
58 IPA, 'The Security-Development Nexus: Research Finding and Policy Implications', Program Report (International Peace 
Academy, New York, 2006) 6. 
59 Tschirgi, Lund and Mancini (2010) op.cit. note 32, 6. 
60 Chatham House, 'Navigating the Nexus: The Interplay of EU Security and Development Policies in Africa', Africa Summary 
(Chatham House, London, 2013) 6. 
61  D. Chandler, 'The Security-Development Nexus and the Rise of 'Anti-Foreign Policy'' (2007) Journal of International 
Relations and Development 10(4), 377-378. 
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In this light, it is becoming increasingly clear that the nexus is not a "fixed reality",62 but a concept in 
motion subject to continuous doctoring as lessons are learned and evidence evolves. These evolutions 
do not only apply to the intricate connections between challenges of poverty, development, security 
and stability, but also between the policies designed to address them. Long gone are the days when 
one could still assume, against any better judgment, that advancements in the area of development 
would automatically lead to improved security and vice versa. External interference is never neutral 
and tends to create winners and losers in the targeted communities. While these patterns are relatively 
straightforward with regard to security interventions, they are more concealed and complex for 
development aid. Already in 1999 an OECD report noted that "[a]ll aid, at all times, creates incentives 
and disincentives, for peace or for war".63 Mary Anderson accurately sums up five general ways in 
which this can happen: "(1) aid resources are often stolen by warriors and used to support armies and 
buy weapons; (2) aid affects markets by reinforcing either the war economy or the peace economy; 
(3) the distributional impacts of aid affect inter-group relationships, either feeding tensions or 
reinforcing connections; (4) aid substitutes for local resources required to meet civilian needs, freeing 
them to support conflict; (5) aid legitimizes people and their actions or agendas, supporting the pursuit 
of either war or peace".64  
The manners in which these negative aid impacts manifest themselves are diverse and highly context-
specific, defying universal formulas. However, the failure to take them into account can lead to 
ineffective, counterproductive or even destructive policy outcomes. Keen for instance finds that 
externally encouraged liberalisation policies in Sierra Leone fed into the 1990s civil war by encouraging 
inflation, reducing state services in health and education, fuelling corruption and taking away attention 
for human rights abuses by the military.65 Another example is how the influx of aid to Somalia in the 
1980s incited widespread corruption by the Darood clan of late dictator Siad Barre, arousing the envy 
of other tribes and the perilous aversion to the international community.66 More recently, a 2011 OECD 
survey found that an uneven distribution of in-country aid is often perceived as contributing to the 
marginalisation of certain areas, risking to augment tensions and cause conflicts. 67  Conversely, 
knowledge of these mechanisms allows to design aid in ways that lessen the risk of social tension by 
satisfying peoples' basic needs, and thus reduce alienation.68 Yet, there are clearly risks attached to 
                                                          
62 M. Duffield, 'The Liberal Way of Development and the Development-Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance 
Divide' (2010) Security Dialogue 41(1), 62. 
63 P. Uvin, The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict (OECD, Paris, 1999) 4. 
64 Anderson (1999) op.cit. note 22, 39. 
65 D. Keen, 'Liberalization and Conflict' (2005) International Political Science Review 26(1), 73-89. 
66 K. Sabala, 'Regional and Extra-Regional Inputs in Promoting (In)Security in Somalia' in R. Sharamo and B. Mesfin (eds), 
Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa (Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2011) 97. 
67 OECD, International Engagement in Fragile States: Can’t We do Better? (OECD, Paris, 2011), 43. 
68 Duffield (2010) op.cit. note 62, 57. 
13 
  
the increased involvement of aid in conflict dynamics, or its use by military actors to win hearts and 
minds. Development practitioners are increasingly becoming the target of attacks,69 leading to an 
increased bunkering of aid that comes at the prize of losing touch with local populations.  
The security-development nexus is thus all but a clearly-circumscribed concept, let alone a 
straightforward policy exercise. Since the mid-1990s, a transitory phase took place of adapting the 20th 
century compartmentalised foreign policy machinery to the new all-embracing, interwoven and 
transboundary development and security challenges. The concept of a security-development nexus 
serves to bring more clarity and structure to this complexity but has also become "a commodity over 
which intellectual ownership [is] as unclear as important".70 In this light, some authors go as far as 
arguing that the security-development nexus is inherently biased and question its good intentions. As 
put by Stern and Öjendal, “the echoes of the harmonious plea for attention to ‘the nexus’, resonate as 
confusion, lack of conceptual clarity and ideological divisions at best, and as rhetorical facades, interest 
politics and shallow political correctness at worst”.71  One of the strongest criticisms comes from 
Chandler. He argues that the nexus is not based on any new or concrete scientific consensus or 
evidence as to what works. Rather, it results from a "desire to pass the buck for policy responsibility" 
by diffusing the policy-burden and stressing "the limits of what can be achieved by external policy-
making".72 McNeish and Lie question whether the promotion of the link between both policy areas 
does not serve to turn development into a "Trojan horse" legitimising military interventions.73 In the 
same vein, Sörensen and Söderbaum claim that it serves to reinvent the lost concept of development 
and to legitimise a more radical interventionist agenda.74 Duffield finally claims that "the current 
bunkering of the aid industry and increasing risk aversion on the part of aid workers … are more 
indicative of a deepening development-security impasse rather than a new beginning".75 While the 
concept of the security-development nexus is thus not undisputed, the practical challenges of fine-
tuning interventions in both areas persist. In order to remain relevant and lead to better results, this 
research therefore argues that policy-makers should make urgent work of concretising what they 
mean with this concept, how they plan to operationalise it and the manner in which this will address 
current shortcomings.  
                                                          
69 A. Stoddard, A. Harmer and K. Haver, 'Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations', ODI 
Humanitarian Policy Group Report 23 (Overseas Development Institute, London, 2009) 34p. 
70 R. Amer, A. Swain and J. Öjendal, 'Researching the Security-Development Nexus Through a Multi-Disciplinary Approach' in 
R. Amer, A. Swain and J. Öjendal (eds), The Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development (Anthem Press, 
London, 2012) 1. 
71 Stern and Öjendal (2012) op.cit. note 56, 16. 
72 Chandler (2007) op.cit. note 61, 364-365. 
73 McNeish and Lie (2010) op.cit. note 36, 2. 
74 J.S. Sörensen and F. Söderbaum, 'Introduction: The End of the Development-Security Nexus?' (2012) Development Dialogue 
58, 7. 
75 Duffield (2010) op.cit. note 62, 54. 
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1.1.3. The security-development nexus in an EU context 
The security-development link lies at the origins of the European integration project with its initial aim 
of eliminating the possibility of war through joint economic development. Yet, throughout the first 
decades, the predominant focus of this project remained very much economic. This expressed itself 
internally through the gradual creation of a single market, and externally through the development of 
a common trade policy. A genuine security component was only added with the 1993 Maastricht 
Treaty which created the CFSP, and further reinforced in 2001 when the Laeken European Council 
declared the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 76  operational. While development 
cooperation has always formed part of the EU’s policy arsenal, it also had to await the Maastricht 
Treaty for a formal recognition and basis in primary law.   
The fact that the EU lacked a strong security arm during the 1990s probably explains its initial absence 
from the international debate on the security-development nexus. The starting signal for a more 
comprehensive approach was given by the 2001 Göteborg European Council, adopting the EU 
Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts.77  This programme recognised both European 
Community (EC) and CSDP competence for conflict prevention and called to mainstream this objective 
in the work of all relevant institutions. It was followed by a whole range of documents recognising and 
fastening the link between CFSP, CSDP and development cooperation, in different gradations and from 
various angles. Essential in this regard are the 2003 European Security Strategy 78  and the 2006 
European Consensus on Development79 – the EU’s security and development ‘bibles’.  
Such statements represent more than mere rhetoric and have incited the development of an 
impressive institutional machinery in the Commission, Council General Secretariat (GSC) and more 
recently the European External Action Service (EEAS); a vast range of instruments, including innovative 
financial tools such as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the African Peace 
Facility (APF); as well as conflict and development-sensitive procedures and mechanisms. The diversity 
of these structures and policies enables the EU to span the continuum between security and 
development challenges, covering areas that range from security sector reform to conflict prevention, 
peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. Consequently, the EU holds great potential but at the 
                                                          
76 This was initially named European Security and Defence Policy or ESDP, with the C only introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to 
affirm its strengthened nature (cf. infra 2.3.); Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Laeken, 14-15.12.2001, para. 6 
77 Presidency Conclusions, EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, European Council, Göteborg, 15-16.06.2001. 
78 Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, 12.12 2003. 
79 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy, The European Consensus on 
Development, OJ C46/1, 24.02.2006. 
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same time faces considerable hurdles in ensuring that its various actions do not work at cross-
purposes. 
Another complexity is that the integration rationale of the security-development nexus collides with 
the EU’s constitutional system that subjects the CFSP (including the CSDP) to special rules of 
delimitation. Development cooperation and the CFSP may be linked together closely in policy rhetoric, 
they are governed by very different policy and legal regimes, complicating a coherent or unified 
approach. Development policy is set out in a specific chapter of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU),80 listing its principles and objectives as well as the applicable decision-making framework. 
It is governed by the ordinary legislative procedure, implying a formal proposal of the Commission and 
co-decision by the European Parliament (EP) and Council, with full judicial competence of the EU Court 
of Justice (CJEU).81 Despite the Lisbon Treaty's streamlining of EU external action, the CFSP, on the 
other hand, is excluded from the TFEU and governed by "specific rules and procedures" set out in 
Article 24(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). These are dominated by the Member States, as 
represented in the Council and the European Council, and accord only limited roles to the Commission, 
Parliament and CJEU. This makes the nexus at the same time legally complex as it requires difficult 
choices of legal basis, administratively challenging as these choices have to be made across very 
distinct policy-making communities, and politically sensitive as they affect the division of competences 
and balance of power between EU institutions and with Member States.  
While the Union has made great strides in targeting its efforts increasingly at the mutual challenges of 
insecurity and poverty, most observers agree that its track record is still mixed and fails to exploit the 
full potential of its diverse policy arsenal. An EU-commissioned assessment of the Commission’s 
support to peace-building and conflict prevention found in 2011 that the EU’s institutional set-up put 
important strains on the effectiveness and coherence of its actions.82 A 2012 OECD peer review of EU 
development cooperation moreover concluded that it does not succeed in matching its decade-old 
ambitions regarding this nexus with concrete and effective action on the ground.83 More recently, a 
2014 Parliament report lamented that institutional and procedural shortfalls still prevent coherent EU 
action in crisis and fragile areas.84 These various reports and criticisms will be analysed in more detail 
in the subsequent chapters. 
                                                          
80 Chapter 1 of Title III ‘Cooperation with Third Countries and Humanitarian Aid’ under Part V on ‘The Union's External Action’. 
81 Article 209(1) TFEU. 
82 ADE, Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building (Aide à la Décision 
Economique, Brussels, 2011) 100. 
83 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Peer Review: European Union (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), Paris, 2012) 33-34. 
84 European Parliament Report (2013/2146(INI)) on the EU comprehensive approach and its implications for the coherence 
of EU external action, 03.04.2014, para. 14. 
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In spite of the obvious challenges and complexity, the many statements on the nexus contain only the 
flimsiest of guidelines or instructions on how this commitment should be achieved in practice. A lot of 
faith is put in repeated, but rather generic, calls on all relevant actors to enhance coherence and 
coordination between their various development and security-related initiatives. This impromtu 
approach arguably serves to avoid the thorny issue of dividing labour between, and thus delineating, 
the separate policy realms of development cooperation and the CFSP/CSDP. On the one hand, leaving 
such a wide margin of appreciation to ad hoc decision-making allows a flexible policy approach that 
can easily capitalise on changing contexts and arising opportunities. On the other hand, it tends to hide 
the many complexities of implementing this nexus and risks to result in duplication, fragmentation and 
inter-institutional tensions. The classic example of the latter is a conflict between the Council and the 
Commission in 2005, which ended up before the EU Court of Justice, on whether disarmament support 
to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ought to be a development or a CFSP 
measure. (cf. infra 5.2.2.).85 Such tensions are evidently not beneficial for the EU’s commitment to 
enhance coherence between these policy fields. 
By interlinking the CFSP/CSDP and development cooperation both constitutionally and institutionally, 
the Lisbon Treaty opens significant opportunities to move beyond this ad hoc approach. In the first 
place by streamlining the EU`s external action system. This is most visible through the abolition of the 
pillar structure and dissolving the European Community into the EU.86 Moreover, all the EU’s external 
action principles and objectives are now grouped together in a single Treaty article with a reinforced 
duty to ensure consistency between them.87 This coherence rationale is reflected in the creation of 
institutional functions such as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy /Vice-President of the Commission, the EEAS and the EU Delegations. At the same time, and as 
mentioned above, the specific status of the CFSP as a more intergovernmental form of cooperation 
has survived the Treaty changes and will continue to challenge the strive for closer ties between 
security and development competences. This is most outspoken in Article 40 TEU stating that the 
implementation of both CFSP and TFEU competences shall not affect the other's procedures and 
institutional balance. Arguably, one of the main post-Lisbon challenges for EU external action will 
therefore be to solve this integration-delimitation paradox. In other words, how to reconcile the 
remaining plea for delimitation of the CFSP, with the equally strong call for coherence, integration and 
comprehensiveness. As the security-development nexus embodies the many hurdles of developing an 
                                                          
85 Case C-91/05, Commission v Council (Small Arms and Light Weapons - SALW), ECLI:EU:C:2008:288. 
86 Article 1 of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (hereafter: TEU). 
87 Article 21 TEU. 
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effective policy across institutional and procedural divides, it constitutes an important test-case for 
these recent Treaty changes. 
1.2. Research questions and design 
The Lisbon Treaty provides no details or hints on how to cope with its contradicting calls for integration 
and delimitation. This puts the onus on policy-makers and the judiciary that will have to demonstrate 
considerable tact and creativity to get round this integration-delimitation paradox. This research 
inserts this often underexposed legal dimension in the discourse and scholarly work on the EU’s 
commitment to the security-development nexus. It holds up the EU’s political rationale to the reality 
of its underlying constitutional structure, with its inherent limits and obstacles, in order to grasp the 
scale of this commitment and the usefulness and effectiveness of the EU’s current approach. This will 
moreover enable a better understanding of the actual impact of Treaty reform in the area of EU 
external action. 
This analysis is conducted along three interrelated tracks. First, the track of policy formulation, 
legislative design and implementation. This focusses on the political approach to the security-
development nexus, the process of adopting legal instruments to tackle the various challenges at stake, 
and their respective legal bases. Second, the institutional track analyses the diverging institutional 
balance under security and development competences, the past and present track record of 
cooperation and coordination between EU institutions and the Lisbon Treaty's innovations to their 
legal design. Third, the judicial track studies the EU Court of Justice’s approach in delineating security 
and development competences and how the constitutional seclusion of the CFSP affects the Court’s 
methodology in selecting appropriate legal bases. Along each of these three tracks four key questions 
are posed: (1) what are the differences between development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP in 
policy/legislative, institutional and judicial terms; (2) what obstacles and challenges result from these 
differences; (3) which efforts are taken to transcend them and maximise positive connections between 
both policy fields; and (4) how effective are these efforts in making full use of the EU’s diverse 
machinery? 
In order to make these analyses more susceptible and tangible, this research regularly draws examples 
from the design and implementation of the Union's development cooperation and CFSP activities in 
the Horn of Africa. The EU defines this region geographically as the member countries of the 
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), namely Djibouti, Eritrea (although suspended 
since 2007), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. The pervasive challenges of 
poverty, deprivation and instability that plague the Horn of Africa, make it an unfortunate but key test 
ground for the EU’s commitment to the nexus. Important with regard to this research is that these 
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challenges result in the activation of the full range of EU security and development policies, as well as 
a strong commitment to gear them closely together in the Union’s 2011 Strategic Framework for the 
Horn of Africa.88  
This first introductory chapter, which will wind up with a final part on the research scope and 
methodology, will be followed by a second chapter on the evolving relationship between development 
and security competences in the EU`s changing constitutional architecture. This advanced from 
prudent interaction between two policy fields without explicit legal bases under the Rome Treaty 
framework, over the “integrated but separate” legal orders of the Treaty of Maastricht, towards the 
paradox of the Lisbon Treaty where security and development competences hinge between 
integration and delimitation. The evolution of this constitutional framework sets out the legal 
boundaries within which the growing commitment to the security-development nexus has matured. 
This commitment forms the focus of the third chapter focussing on the policy track in cohering security 
and development. Starting from an overview of the EU’s evolving lexicon on the security-development 
nexus, it will be studied how these words match the legal framework for EU external action. The EU's 
attempts to overcome the spanners thrown by the latter serve as an ideal test-case for giving effect to 
the Lisbon Treaty’s coherence leitmotiv. A second main part of this chapter will go deeper into the 
Union's toolbox for tackling the security-development interface. The legal divide cutting across the 
latter has led both development and security instruments to gradually evolve towards the core of their 
interface, causing evident challenges of overlap and fragmentation.  
The fourth chapter treats the role of institutions and institutional design in interlinking development 
cooperation and CFSP/CSDP. It starts from an analysis of the traditional love-hate relationship between 
the Council and the Commission, condemned to close cooperation in the day-to-day management of 
CFSP and development aid. The two have taken various initiatives to smoothen interaction and 
cooperation, but this has not been able to avoid occasional collision over the location of the borderline 
between both policy fields. The Lisbon Treaty introduces a number of changes that could defuse this 
situation. Most visible are the creation and transformation of institutional functions transcending the 
CFSP-TFEU boundary, namely the High Representative, the EEAS and the EU Delegations. The practical 
translation of their vague Treaty mandates, competences and structures will in turn be anatomised in 
order to better understand their potential for aligning the EU's diverse policies spanning the nexus 
between development cooperation and CFSP.  
The fifth chapter sheds light on the role of the judiciary in drawing the line between the CFSP and 
development cooperation. After elucidating the complex and often puzzling case law on the choice of 
                                                          
88 Council, A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 3124th Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) meeting, 24.11.2011. 
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legal basis, the focus will turn to the Court’s evolving approach in setting the outer limits of 
development and security competences. Following a number of cases that abstractly touched upon 
their scope and nature, both policy areas were prepared for the perfect storm in the contentious SALW 
case. The Court delivered its ruling on the eve of the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification without specifying 
whether and how the latter’s profound changes would impact its current relevance. A constitutional 
examination of this question will therefore be followed by an analysis of a number of recent cases 
providing some preliminary indications of how the CJEU would strike the security-development 
balance at present.  
The sixth chapter focusses on recent policy evolutions that are absorbing the debate on the security-
development nexus in the talk of a comprehensive approach towards EU external action. This results 
from and takes into account the new institutional framework, put in place by the Lisbon Treaty, which 
is gradually leaving behind its growing pains. In a first section it will be analysed what is new about the 
so-called comprehensive approach and whether it has better prospects to succeed. A subsequent 
section will dissect the practical translation of this new approach in the form of regional and thematic 
strategies, with a particular focus on the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. With Article 
22 TEU the Lisbon Treaty inserted a provision specifically designed for such comprehensive strategies 
spanning the CFSP-TFEU divide. A final section will elaborate on the design and untapped potential of 
these ‘European Council decisions on strategic interests and objectives of the Union’.  
With the stock-in-trade of the six preceding chapters, the final concluding chapter draws the policy, 
institutional and judicial tracks together. It will summarise the evolutions and tendencies along each 
of them to understand similarities, differences and possible spill-over effects. This serves to generate 
broader insights about the current practices, main obstacles, challenges and prospects regarding the 
EU’s long-standing commitment to the security-development nexus.  
1.3. Research scope and methodology 
As mentioned above, this PhD research aims to analyse the impact, effectiveness, challenges and 
potential of the EU`s ambition to enhance coherence along the security-development nexus. The 
analysis is conducted with specific attention for the EU`s changing external action architecture, and in 
particular the constitutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. To date, there has not been a 
comprehensive study that lays bare the facts of this decade-old EU commitment across its entire 
institutional, political and legal system. While a number of authors have studied the political aspects 
of the security-development nexus in the context of the EU,89 the void is particularly remarkable on 
                                                          
89 For instance: K. Del Biondo, S. Oltsch and J. Orbie, 'Security and Development in EU External Relations: Converging, but in 
which Direction?' in S. Biscop and R. Whitman (eds), The Routledge Handbook of European Security (Routledge, New York, 
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the level of legal analysis, with Koutrakos, Hoffmeister, Martenczuk, Blockmans and Wessel as notable 
exceptions.90 Even separately, the policy fields of EU development cooperation and the CFSP have 
received rather limited attention from academic lawyers. With regard to the CFSP this is not surprising, 
given that law has long been kept out of European cooperation on foreign and security policy. In 
parallel with the growing CFSP activity in the 1990s and the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaty 
changes, legal analysis is catching up quickly. 91  This is much less the case with regard to EU 
development cooperation that, even if it only received a formal legal basis in the Maastricht Treaty, 
has from the outset developed in particularly legalistic terms (cf. infra Chapter 2).  
In delineating the scope of this research certain choices were made that unavoidably exclude a number 
of subjects from the intended scheme. Firstly, security and development are broad and deep-ranging 
issue areas. Therefore, the nexus between them touches upon a wide array of interrelated policies 
that all have an impact on the effectiveness of the EU`s approach. In order to enable a profound study 
the focus of this dissertation lies predominantly on the interrelation between development 
cooperation and the CFSP/CSDP. This implies that other fields – included by certain authors in their 
analysis of the nexus – such as humanitarian aid, justice and home affairs and trade, will only be 
touched upon in passing. Secondly, the wide fields of development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP could 
each easily be attributed a separate monograph. Therefore the choice was made to focus mainly on 
the grey area between them where the division of competences is obscure and interactions are 
manifold. Thirdly, the research concentrates on the impact of the security-development pledge with 
regard to the Union`s internal division of competences and labour. Evidently, the Member States’ 
separate development and security initiatives also have an important impact on policy outcomes. The 
internal organisation is however very different from country to country and it would lead us too far to 
treat all 28 Member States in the scope of this study. Therefore it was decided to treat the EU-Member 
States relationship only on a general level, combined with their collective representation in and by the 
Council of Ministers and the European Council. Finally, for these same reasons the relations of the EU 
                                                          
2012) 126-142; D. Sicurelli, 'Framing Security and Development in the EU Pillar Structure. How the Views of the Commission 
Affect EU Africa Policy' (2008) European Integration 30(2), 217-234; R. Youngs, 'Fusing Security and Development: Just 
another Euro-Platitude?' in M. Carbone (ed), Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy (Routledge, London, 2009) 95-113. 
90 See respectively: P. Koutrakos, 'The Nexus between the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy and 
Development' in A. Arnull, et al. (eds), A Constitutional Order of States: Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2011) 589-608; F. Hoffmeister, 'Inter-Pillar Coherence in the European Union's Civilian Crisis Management' 
in S. Blockmans (ed), The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (TMC Asser, The Hague, 2008) 
157-181; B. Martenczuk, 'Community Cooperation Policy and Conflict Prevention' in V. Kronenberger and J. Wouters (eds), 
The European Union and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects (TMC Asser, The Hague, 2004) 189-210; S. Blockmans 
and R.A. Wessel, 'The European Union and Crisis Management: Will the Lisbon Treaty Make the EU More Effective?', CLEER 
Working Papers 2009/1 (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, The Hague, 2009) 47p. 
91 See for instance: R.A. Wessel, The European Union's Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutionalist Perspective (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, 1999) 383p.; P. Koutrakos, The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (Oxford University 




with other international organisations in enhancing the security-development link, will not form the 
focus of analysis. 
This dissertation undertakes a law-in-context study, based mainly on a desk review of primary and 
secondary EU legislation, case law of the EU Court of Justice, academic analyses and research reports 
that cover the various aspects of the PhD topic. Throughout the research these various angles and 
approaches, straddling the fields of EU and international law as well as political sciences and 
international relations, have been bundled in a comprehensive manner in order to uncover critical 
(dis)connections and generate new insights. Whilst not losing sight of this overall subject, the author 
has regularly written articles and participated in conferences on specific subjects related to the general 
theme. In addition, a dozen of semi-structured in-depth interviews were undertaken with academic 
researchers and relevant stakeholders within the EU institutions, including the EEAS, DG EuropeAid 
Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) and the EU Delegations to the African Union and Ethiopia. In 
a rather informal setting, with guaranteed anonymity, questions were asked on inter-institutional 
relations, personal perceptions of the security-development nexus, EU coordination and the impact of 
the Lisbon Treaty on such issues, as well as on their respective positions and working environment. 
These interviews were not aimed at drawing general conclusions on EU staff perceptions, but rather 
at gaining better and real-time insights from the forefront of the PhD topic.   
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2. Security and development 
competences in the EU's 
evolving constitutional 
architecture 
 Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards. 
  
Søren Kierkegaard, 1843 
 
While EU development cooperation and the CFSP are today well-established policy areas with an 
extensive institutional machinery, this has not been self-evident and Member States have found it 
difficult to pool authority in these areas. It is therefore not surprising that both emerged largely outside 
the Treaty framework. It was not until 35 years after the initiation of European integration by the 1951 
Paris Treaty that an agreement could be reached on an explicit but limited Treaty basis for political 
cooperation on security issues in the Single European Act. It took even until 1993 before development 
cooperation was formally inserted in the Treaties. Both areas, as well as the interaction between them, 
consequently evolved in a pragmatic fashion. An outsider’s look at the EU’s current constitutional and 
institutional framework for security, defence and development policies therefore reveals a peculiar 
and complex design that has little in common with that of its Member States or any other international 
organisation.  
First, whereas the EU promotes itself as a global development actor building equal partnerships around 
the world,92 its development policies are in practice dominated by donor-recipient dynamics that are 
geographically tilted towards a strange coalition of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. The 
CFSP has despite its ambitious mandate covering “all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating 
to the Union’s security”93 a rather tight budget of EUR 2.3 billion for 2014-2020 and limited operational 
capacity. Second, even though they both form a constitutive part of the EU’s external action system, 
development cooperation and the CFSP, including the CSDP, are separately established in each of the 
                                                          
92 See for instance: Council (16344/07) The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 09.12.2007. 
93 Article 24(1) TEU.  
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Union’s two founding Treaties.94 Moreover, in what appears a rather confusing and contradictory 
design, the TEU first links their objectives closely together, only to draw a firm line between them in a 
subsequent provision. Indeed, Article 21 TEU instructs the Union to ensure consistency between the 
policies of poverty eradication and strengthening international security, while Article 40 subsequently 
prohibits the implementation of CFSP and TFEU policies from affecting each other’s Treaty-defined 
procedures and institutional balance. Finally, some of the EU’s institutional actors that play a central 
role in the policy-making process of development cooperation, are conspicuous by their absence in the 
CFSP. The Parliament acting as a co-legislator with the Council on development issues, the Court 
overseeing the application of law, and the Commission as a sort of budgetary and technical 
development agency, are each accorded very limited roles when operating under the CFSP. The latter 
evolves according to the pace set unanimously by the Member States represented in the European 
Council and the Council. 
Besides confusing observers and occupying lawyers, the institutional fragmentation and constitutional 
contradictions of EU security and development policies are illustrative for the bipolarity that has 
characterised the EU’s external action system ever since its creation. 95  Whereas the European 
integration project has gradually evolved – both out of necessity and out of a growing appreciation for 
economies of scale – towards increasing communality on the economic strands of external policy, such 
as development cooperation, trade and humanitarian aid, this was much less the case for the more 
political CFSP. With regard to the latter, Member States constantly balance between two gravitational 
forces. On the one hand, they are in varying gradations driven by a certain reluctance to give up their 
sovereignty in this sensitive area so closely connected with their existence as a state.96 On the other 
hand, the desire for more international leverage has cautiously pushed them towards political 
integration. The unavoidable interaction with economic aspects of EU foreign policy subsequently 
necessitated ever more efforts to enhance the coherence between them and steadily include political 
elements in mainstream European integration.  
This balancing exercise has arisen clearly in every EU Treaty reform exercise. At the constitutional level 
the constant driving force has been the preservation of separateness between political and economic 
aspects of foreign policy, while the acknowledgement of their practically unavoidable interaction led 
to a more political commitment to cohere. Confronted with the shortcomings of the EU’s system in the 
                                                          
94 Respectively in Chapter 1 of Title III "Cooperation with Third Countries and Humanitarian Aid" under Part V on "The Union's 
External Action” of the TFEU, and the TEU’s Title V on “General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific 
Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy”. 
95 A. Dashwood, 'The Continuing Bipolarity of EU External Action' in I. Govaere, et al. (eds), The European Union in the World: 
Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2014) 3-16. 
96 Markedly, it forms one of the four components to qualify as a state in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States. 
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face of global crises, these reforms have time and again departed from a grand – and from a historic 
perspective rather repetitive – commitment for a more effective and coherent EU foreign policy as 
well as for strengthening the famous single voice. Yet, the constant outcome has been to 
counterbalance steps towards more coherence and integration with safeguards for the Member States 
acquired foreign policy rights. The current EU constitutional framework must therefore be seen as the 
most recent step in this balancing exercise undertaken by the Member States as masters of the Treaties. 
It is shaped as much by the current equilibrium between safeguarding sovereignty and enhancing 
coherence, as it is by the lessons learned from past constitutional reforms and the expectations for the 
future. In order to understand the complexities of the present constellation for EU security and 
development cooperation, as well as the opportunities and limitations to transcend them, it is 
therefore necessary to first take a few steps back and learn how the EU gradually came to its current 
design. The aim of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s evolving 
constitutional structure, nor to summarise the many excellent writings on this topic.97 Rather, it will 
focus on the evolving place, scope and nature of EU development and security competences in the 
changing legal construction of the Union.  
First, the analysis will concentrate on the emergence of European cooperation in the fields of security 
and development (2.1.). In the absence of an extensive legal framework in the era of the Rome Treaty, 
this part will focus more on how the evolving practice and customs have impacted on legal 
developments. Second, the analysis will turn to the era of the Maastricht Treaty and its (in)famous 
pillar structure (2.2.). Besides a new legal bedding for the interaction between development and 
security policies, it provided both areas with a broader scope and focus. The rapid geopolitical changes 
of this period continuously challenged EU leaders to catch up with an ever-evolving reality, leading to 
the successive Treaty changes of Amsterdam and Nice, as well as constant engineering to the 
fundamentals of EU development policy. A final part will elaborate on the recent constitutional reform 
of the Lisbon Treaty (2.3.). With its strong focus on enhancing the coherence of EU external action, 
while nonetheless clinging to the delimitation of the CFSP within a unified legal order, this new 
constellation represents a genuine paradox that poses considerable challenges for today’s policy-
makers and the judiciary. Under these last two titles the analysis will focus on the impact of the EU’s 
                                                          
97 Some recent examples are: D. Curtin and I. Dekker, 'The European Union from Maastricht to Lisbon: Institutional and Legal 
Unity out of the Shadows' in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 
155-185; R.A. Wessel, 'The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order: An Increasingly Coherent Framework of Action and 
Interpretation' (2009) European Constitutional Law Review 5(1), 117-142; C. Herrmann, 'Much Ado about Pluto? The "Unity 
of the Legal Order of the European Union" Revisited' in M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: 
Constitutional Fundamentals - Essays in European Law (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2008) 19-51.  
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evolving constitutional order. The relevant policy, institutional and judicial aspects will be dealt with 
extensively in the succeeding chapters.  
2.1. The Rome era: security and development without legal basis 
The mainspring of the EU’s98 founding fathers lay in the link between common economic development 
and sustaining peace on the European continent. That this was not a mere inward-looking intuition, 
but represented a broader sense of responsibility for global peace and prosperity is clear from the 
famous Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. Therein the then French Foreign Minister professed that 
the pooled production of coal and steel “would be offered to the world as a whole, without distinction 
or exception, with the aim of raising living standards and promoting peace as well as fulfilling one of 
Europe’s essential tasks — the development of the African continent”.99 Such a provision did however 
not make it into the 1951 Paris Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC 
Treaty).100  
Six years later the European integration project took a major leap forward with the Rome Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). 101  With regard to external relations its 
provisions remained few and lapidary. The Treaty departed in its first preamble from the 
determination “to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe”, but shied 
away from any form of political cooperation. Even though this legal framework, which did not foresee 
legal bases for development, foreign policy or security actions, remained unaltered until 1986, both 
policy areas underwent a significant transformation in those 30 years. In the absence of law, this 
process was mainly driven by pragmatism, gradually adding layers and forms of integration, 
cooperation and coordination to the existing European policies. These first decades have left a clear 
mark on the current security and development system and it is therefore not surprising that both have 
recently been defined as a “policy patchwork”.102  
In chronological order this section will explore the emergence of the EU’s development policy (2.1.1.), 
followed by the start of political cooperation in the seventies and their ever-extending common ground 
                                                          
98  For the sake of clarity and cohesion, we will throughout this dissertation use the term EU to refer to the evolving 
organisation that was created in 1957 by the Rome Treaty as the EEC, became the umbrella for the EC and the 
intergovernmental pillars after the Treaty of Maastricht and evolved into the current unified constellation set out in the 
Lisbon Treaty. Only when referring to a specific state of this organisation in history, or to one of its subsystems, will we use 
the acronyms EEC or EC. 
99 R. Schuman, Declaration on the Birth of Europe, Paris, 09.05.1950. 
100 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Paris, 18.04.1951. 
101 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25.03.1957. 
102  See with regard to EU development cooperation: M. Holland, The European Union and the Third World (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Houndmills, 2002) 1; and for the CFSP: F. Bindi and I. Angelescu, 'The Open Question of an EU Foreign Policy' in F. 
Bindi and I. Angelescu (eds), The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World (Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington, 2012) 327. 
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(2.1.2.). This will illustrate how the EEC and intergovernmental political cooperation gradually grew 
closer, laying the basis for the anchorage of their connection in the Single European Act (2.1.3.).  
2.1.1. Rome and Yaoundé: the seeds of an EU development programme 
The roots of the EEC’s development programme lay in the 1950s and the then prevailing era of 
European colonialism. Article 3(k) of the Rome Treaty listed as one of the Community’s activities “the 
association of the overseas countries and territories in order to increase trade and to promote jointly 
economic and social development”.103 This policy of association was further developed in Part IV of 
the EEC Treaty and contained two central characteristics that still dominate EU development relations 
to date: market access and financial aid.104 First, Articles 131-136 EEC were tantamount to treating the 
associated countries and territories105 as EEC Member States regarding trade, investment and the 
reduction of custom duties. Given the experimental nature of this system the details were set out in a 
five-year Implementing Convention. This Convention contained the second main element, namely that 
of financial aid. It created the European Development Fund (EDF) to fulfil the Rome Treaty’s aim of 
furthering “the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in order 
to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire”.106 The EDF, which 
still exists at present and is thus one of the oldest EU instruments, was established outside the scope 
of the EEC budget, with a separate contribution key. This was mainly due to the limited enthusiasm 
among Member States to finance primarily French colonies.107  EDF project proposals were to be 
submitted by Member States “in agreement with the local authorities”, decided upon by the Council 
and administered by the Commission.108 The Fund was established as additional to the existing national 
aid programmes, and was not followed by a reduced responsibility from the part of the Member States. 
With this design the Convention laid the foundation of two other key elements of EU development 
policy, namely the central position of the Commission as a sort of EU development agency and the fact 
that European policy was not aimed at replacing, but at complementing Member States’ programmes.  
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Yet, only nine months after the entry into force of the Rome Treaty on 1 January 1958, Guinea was the 
first of the Treaty’s associated states to gain independence, soon followed by Mali and Senegal, in a 
whirlwind decolonisation process that was completed by 1962. The abrupt ending of Europe’s colonial 
era rendered Part IV of the Rome Treaty vacuous for a great number of previously associated states, 
leaving the EEC without a Treaty basis for general development policy. Remarkably, its development 
programme nonetheless evolved through legal rather than political commitments, grafted on three 
other Treaty provisions.109 First, Article 113 EEC (ex Article 133 EC, current Article 207 TFEU) granting 
the EEC exclusive competence on tariffs and trade in the context of the Common Commercial Policy 
(CCP), was used as legal basis for the conclusion of commodity agreements as well as the generalised 
system of preferences (GSP).110 In both cases this legal foundation was questioned and subsequently 
approved by the Court.111 Second, the flexibility clause of Article 235 EEC (ex Article 308 EC, current 
Article 352 TFEU) enabled the Council, in the absence of a specific legal basis, to take action necessary 
for the attainment of one of the EEC’s objectives in the course of the operation of the common market. 
This was used for the adoption of certain development-related Council Regulations, for instance those 
establishing technical and financial assistance and a food aid policy.112 Finally, Article 238 EEC (ex 
Article 310 EC, current Article 217 TFEU) provided the Union with a seemingly unlimited competence 
to conclude association agreements, only specifying that these may involve “reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedures”. This has proven to be the most important 
provision for the substantive expansion and concretisation of EU development policy, particularly 
through the successive agreements with the ACP group of states. 113 Especially in the early years, these 
conventions formed the testing ground, model and guide shaping much of the nature of the EU’s global 
development relations.  
Contrasting with the determined fashion in which African independence movements shook off the 
colonial yoke, the substantive direction of the Rome Treaty was largely continued in a post-colonial 
Convention concluded between the EEC and 18 ex-colonies on 20 July 1963 in Yaoundé.114 Whereas 
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the focus of the association remained on market access and financial aid, the fact that this now 
concerned government-to-government relations between independent states, supported by an 
entirely new institutional machinery, evidently changed its connotation. On the one hand, financial aid 
was diversified and rebranded as “financial and technical cooperation”.115 On the other hand, market 
access provisions were no longer about treating dependencies as EEC Member States, but about 
establishing explicitly reciprocal trade preferences. When this Convention came to an end in 1969 it 
was – despite mainly Dutch and German scepticism about these preferential relations with states with 
which they had only limited links116 – replaced by a second and similar Yaoundé Convention that ran 
for another five years.117  
2.1.2. The 70s and the growing calls for cooperation on foreign policy and 
development 
The discussion to balance Europe’s growing economic integration with a political dimension is as old 
the integration project itself and has always been contentious. After “a succession of crushes” and 
political squabbling in vainly trying to create a European Defence Community (EDC)118 and a European 
Political Community in the fifties, and the “Fouchet fiasco” of the sixties,119 EU Heads of State or 
Government considered in 1969 that the time was ripe for a new endeavour. They instructed their 
foreign ministers “to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification”,120 
resulting less than a year later in the adoption of the Davignon or Luxembourg Report. This represented 
the birth of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and instantaneously laid down two of its essential 
notions. First, it was acknowledged that the “[c]urrent developments in the European Communities 
make it necessary for the Member States to step up their political cooperation” and that “foreign policy 
concertation should be the object of the first practical endeavours to demonstrate” this vocation to 
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the world.121 The relationship with the Communities thus constituted the raison d’être of the EPC. 
Second, contrary to the Fouchet plan’s aim of controlling the Communities by superimposing an 
intergovernmental structure,122  the report confirms that “the European Communities remain the 
original nucleus from which European unity has been developed and intensified”.123  
Even though Member States were clearly aware of the potential for EPC-EEC interaction, the Report 
accorded only one short reference stating that the “Commission will be consulted if the activities of 
the European Communities are affected by the work of the Ministers”.124  This constituted a first 
incidence of the famous and contentious ‘affect-language’ that has ruled Treaty provisions on 
CFSP/non-CFSP relations from the SEA over Maastricht to Lisbon (cf. infra). Remarkably at this stage, 
affecting the EEC – the assessment of which was left to the discretion of EPC actors – only required 
Commission consultation, whereas since the SEA this has become a prohibition guarded by the Court. 
The Luxembourg report established a prudent system of consensual consultation, information 
exchange, harmonisation and joint action “when it appears feasible and desirable”.125 It contained only 
the flimsiest backing in terms of guidelines and institutions.126 The loose wording in the report signalled 
a game played by political rather than legal rules.127 This did however not mean that the EPC was 
entirely noncommittal. The continuous adoption of common positions and declarations formed a sort 
of “aquis politique” providing content to the initially rather empty EPC shell.128 This acquis had a de 
facto binding character as a kind of customary law that “naturally does not envisage any sanctions but 
which has nevertheless taken on the character of a recognized rule which can be occasionally broken 
but whose existence one still recognizes”.129  
In the absence of grand design, it was the manner in which the EPC reacted to events that determined 
its nature and evolution.130 The evolving customs were successively codified in ministerial reports that 
were never elevated to Treaty rank but formed a “morally binding non-legal foundation”.131  The 
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Luxembourg Report was followed in 1973 by a new Copenhagen Report formalising the “constructive 
and continuing dialogue” that had become a reality.132 One of the main driving forces behind this 
progressive adaptation was an early variation of the balancing exercise between the unworkable 
separation of the EPC and the EC, and the strong sensitivity regarding the intergovernmental nature of 
the former. While this implied that bridges between them could only be established prudently,133 it 
proofed difficult in practice to identify a single EPC topic that did in no way impinge upon EEC 
matters.134 This relation between the new-born EPC and the maturing EEC provoked considerable 
tensions in the early years with national diplomats “at best inclined to treat the Commission with the 
high courtesy of condescension”.135 
In parallel with this rising experimentation in the field of political, as well as economic, cooperation, 
the Commission found that also EEC development policy could not “remain as ill-equipped as it is 
now”.136 This call was quickly, but rather hesitantly, picked up by the EEC Heads of State that held their 
first-ever debate on development in October 1972. They affirmed their resolve to raise efforts in aid 
and cooperation, but added that special consideration would be due to “the countries towards whom 
historically, geographically and through signed commitments the Community has specific 
obligations”.137 It is therefore not surprising that it took until 1981 before development aid to non-
associated states formed the subject of a separate Regulation.138  
Things evolved quickly in the early 1970s and these advances in the fields of political and development 
cooperation were brought together in December 1973 in the Declaration on European Identity. With 
this notable initiative of forward-looking strategic thinking (which could therefore be seen as an early 
predecessor of the 2003 European Security Strategy) Member States aimed “to achieve a better 
definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they 
occupy in world affairs”.139 Most importantly in this context, it expressed the need for adequate means 
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of defence to guarantee Europe’s security and independence, as well as awareness that “[t]here can 
be no real peace if the developed countries do not pay more heed to the less favoured nations”.140 
However, this unbridled enthusiasm, also present in the commitment to convert Member States’ 
relations “into a European Union before the end of this decade”, vanished with the outbreak of the 
1973 oil crisis.141 The following era of Europessimism brought Member States back with both feet on 
the familiar ground of incrementalism. 
The next major evolution for coherence between the EEC and EPC was the formal creation of the 
European Council at the Paris Summit of 1974. Recognising the need for an overall approach to the 
internal and external problems facing Europe, the Heads of State or Government decided to formalise 
their meetings and conduct them simultaneously “in the Council of the Communities and in the context 
of political cooperation”.142 This made the European Council the first and only level where an overall 
EPC-EC approach could be formally discussed. While its raison d’être thus lay in cohering both strands 
of European integration, it was immediately added that “[t]hese arrangements do not in any way affect 
the rules and procedures laid down in the treaties or the provisions on political cooperation in the 
Luxembourg and Copenhagen reports”.143 This typical language, that has today become one of the 
trademarks of EU constitutional tinkering, represents another example of the traditional balancing 
exercise between legally delimiting and practically cohering EPC and Community policies. In practice, 
however, the European Council held only two significant discussions on EPC144  and never took a 
comprehensive approach that embraced both dimensions. In these early years of EPC-EEC interaction 
it was another provision of the Paris Summit that had most impact, namely the possibility for foreign 
ministers meeting in the EEC Council to “hold political cooperation meetings at the same time” for the 
purpose of consistency.145  This laid the basis for an increased blurring of the artificial distinction 
between foreign policy and economic issues, which was accompanied by the ever more common 
practice of Commission participation in EPC discussions.146 
With the second Yaoundé Convention expiring at the end of 1975, this period also provided the 
backdrop for negotiations on a new agreement with the associated states. Besides reckoning with the 
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enlarged EEC after the 1973 accession of Denmark, Ireland and particularly the United Kingdom with 
its Commonwealth,147 this agreement had to reconcile the Member States’ desire for “safe-guarding 
of what has been achieved”148 with the Commission’s push for a broader and deeper Community 
development policy. Development Commissioner Cheysson noted that “[i]f we are earnest about 
wanting these countries to develop we must realize that the development aid policies to be pursued 
will be part and parcel of our general policies and not a separate part of our action”.149 The 1975 Lomé 
Convention struck the balance mainly in the advantage of Member States. While considerably broader 
than its predecessors, it stuck to the old friends of aid and trade. Significantly, in the light of the call 
from developing countries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), preferences were made 
non-reciprocal and systems were set up for the stabilisation of export earnings (STABEX) as well as 
trade promotion. Despite the failure of the Yaoundé Conventions to significantly improve overall trade 
with the associates and the considerable problems of delayed aid,150 the Lomé Convention proofed 
sufficiently attractive to be joined by 21 Commonwealth states and 20 other sub-Saharan African 
countries, which were now addressed as the 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACPs).151  
The Lomé Convention was particularly successful in distancing itself from the discredited colonial past, 
while simultaneously drawing on traditional ties. 152  On the one hand, Commissioner Cheysson 
professed that “the Community does not meet the same allergies, the same inhibitions as some of our 
member countries, if not all, do meet. … we Europeans show clearly that we have decided not to 
interfere in internal policies, not to make our aid a means of pressure”.153 On the other hand, its 
apolitical nature became a political strategy of its own to promote this partnership as an alternative to 
superpower domination. Lister termed this system “welfare neo-colonialism”, which essentially boiled 
down to exchanging assistance for EEC influence.154 Indeed, contrary to the rhetoric of equality, the 
parameters of this partnership were set by the EEC. Whereas the exclusion of politics was highly 
appreciated by the associated partners, the system soon showed its first cracks.155 In the light of the 
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atrocities committed by the Amin regime of Uganda, the Council saw it necessary to ensure that its 
assistance "should on no account lead, with respect to the people of that country, to an increase in or 
prolongation of their being deprived of basic rights”.156 Aid to Uganda was discretely minimised and 
largely redirected from the government to international NGOs. Before long, these “Uganda Guidelines” 
were expanded to Equatorial Guinea in a manner that, although overstepping the Lomé mandate, 
could count on the approval of other ACP states.157 It was only when the EEC attempted to include a 
declaration on human rights in the 1979 revision of the Lomé Convention that it came up against a wall 
of ACP resistance, leading the EEC to quietly back down.158  
While the EPC thus remained a diplomatic reserve and the formal framework of EEC development 
cooperation purely economic, the interface between them started to expand in reaction to a growing 
European sensitivity for human rights. A first attempt to provide the EPC with a Treaty basis and the 
EPC-EEC interaction with a formalised constitutional bedding was undertaken by the 1975 Tindemans 
Report on European Union.159  It appeared more than one step too far for most Member States. 
Eventually, it took two major international crises – the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
1980 Iranian hostage crisis – to convince all leaders of the necessity to take a next stride in solidifying 
the EPC. Besides a number of important procedural changes, the 1981 London Report included several 
innovations for EPC-EEC relations. First, it tasked the Presidency with coordinating Community and 
political cooperation aspects of relevant subject-matters.160 Second, the Commission’s maturing role 
as a bridging actor was acknowledged by fully associating the latter with the EPC, at all levels.161 Even 
though it was not further specified what this implied, the language signalled a willingness to drop the 
remaining barriers and considerably expand the Commission’s role. Particularly the fact that the same 
Commission representatives attended the Political Committee and COREPER meetings,162  allowed 
them to exchange relevant information and implement EC policy with a completer picture in mind. Yet, 
the delineation of these roles remained ill-defined, requiring considerable tact from Commission 
representatives and emphasising the complexity resulting from the absence of a single institutional 
framework.163 A final important novelty of the report was the explicit recognition of the EPC’s role 
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regarding the political aspects of security. Even though Cold War security threats had from the outset 
been part of EPC discussions, this was never before mentioned so explicitly in a ministerial report.   
2.1.3. The Single European Act and the LAT-relation of security and 
development 
The London report provided the EPC with a more solid framework and a clear commitment to lift 
foreign policy coordination to a higher level. In its wake the EPC started taking an ever more active 
approach that did not steer clear of any subject of international importance. Also the Community’s 
external posture was continuously boosted through a combination of its increasing economic 
integration and the CJEU’s activity in developing its external competences.164 Not only did this imply 
that the EEC had become a bloc of importance that could no longer be disregarded in global affairs, 
also its separation from the EPC was increasingly untenable. Central and most eye-catching in the 
amplified intertwining during the 1980s were the increasing linkages between trade and foreign policy. 
The deepened economic integration meant that Member States could no longer go it alone regarding 
the export of dual-use goods165 and the application of economic sanctions. Particularly the latter 
became part of a rapidly evolving and pragmatic mechanism where political decisions in the EPC were 
coordinated with and followed by EEC action to restrict or disrupt economic ties with certain 
regimes.166  
Contrary to the extensive study of these rising ties between commercial and foreign policy, it is much 
less known that also EEC development policy and the EPC were increasingly faced with the fact that 
they could not be truly effective without the other. For one thing, in the midst of the Cold War, even 
the simple provision of development aid tended to imply a political decision to engage with a certain 
regime. In this context it became ever more obvious that development policy had political 
repercussions, and progressively – yet often tacitly – political objectives worked their way through in 
aid disbursement. Such objectives were increasingly defined in the context of the EPC. This remained 
however a purely declaratory policy area that was useful in deploring and welcoming developments, 
but lacked the means to give effect to such statements. In this respect development aid was of 
particular value as both carrot and stick. First, aid could provide incentives to help and convince 
partners of taking a certain course. Second, in the light of the limits to the EEC budget, disruptions of 
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or restrictions on development ties were even more straightforward. One example of how this drove 
the EPC and development policy into each other’s arms occurred in the context of the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan. EU foreign ministers meeting successively in the EPC and EEC framework 
on 15 January 1980 adopted an EPC declaration expressing grave concern at the military intervention, 
followed by a Council decision cancelling the 1979 food aid programme to Afghanistan.167 
Evidently, this only worked when the EPC and EEC development policy marched to the same tune. In 
spite of some good examples and few cases of blatant incoherence, the political control of aid has been 
a permanent source of friction between EPC actors and the Commission.168 Development experts 
denounced the pressure being exerted on autonomous Community policies and those responsible for 
foreign policy lamented the political blindness of development programmes. While such tensions are 
not specific to European governance and occur in all political systems, the former was unique in the 
absence of any coping mechanism. Development and foreign policy lacked a strong embracive 
structure, implying that divergences could not easily be cushioned by any high-level arbitration or 
policy guidance. Such complexities of fine-tuning the EPC with EEC development (as well as commercial) 
policy led to intensifying calls for tiding up their legal ties. The loudest call came from the German and 
Italian foreign ministers Genscher and Colombo, formulating a proposal to set up a European Union 
and abolish the institutional and procedural demarcation lines between the EC and the EPC. Yet, this 
proposal aimed “to do too many things at once in too sketchy a way” and resulted in two years of 
fierce discussions that eventually toned down most of the proposed innovations in the sober Solemn 
Declaration of 1983.169  
The first prudent steps across this divide were eventually taken by the third Lomé Convention, which 
entered the minefield of political dialogue on tiptoes. Contrary to their fierce opposition against any 
such inclusion in Lomé II, the initial impetus this time came from the ACP side. It was borne out of 
frustration that the EEC hid behind the Convention’s apolitical nature to avoid discussing South Africa’s 
apartheid regime at the May 1982 joint Council of Ministers. In this context, a Nigerian government 
minister argued that “it is unimaginable for an economic organ like the Lome Convention to exist and 
function and even be meaningful without political dimensions”. 170  The European Commission 
subsequently proposed to improve the impact of the Convention by better fine-tuning projects with 
the local context through a dialogue on policies. This would be situated “between the rigid 
conditionality imposed by financing bodies and the irresponsibility of non-conditionality”.171 Yet, it was 
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perceived by ACP partners as too much of an intrusion into their sovereignty, and the issue turned into 
the most contentious element of the Lomé III negotiations. The EEC was determined to avoid more 
“cathedrals in the desert”172 and consensus was finally reached on the establishment of “exchanges of 
views” aimed at ensuring maximum effectiveness of cooperation schemes.173 Although no full-blown 
political dialogue, this constituted a first step towards widening development cooperation beyond its 
aid and trade-components.  
At the June 1985 European Council it was finally agreed to convene an Inter-Governmental Conference 
(IGC) “to draft a treaty on a common foreign and security policy” and amend the EEC Treaty so as to 
add new momentum to the European construction process, and in particular the completion of the 
internal market.174 Although the mandate thus consisted of working on two separate Treaties, with no 
explicit mention of tackling their interrelation, all Member States’ drafts paid attention to this 
question.175 It was only at the eleventh hour that the IGC decided to merge both treaties in a Single 
European Act, which included the amendments to the EEC Treaty and squeezed the EPC provisions in 
a single Article 30.176 Given that the objective of a Union, mentioned as a future aim in the preamble, 
was not within reach, the singleness in itself constituted a significant achievement. According to Lak it 
translated “the consensus of all concerned to keep open a future option for a single system”.177 At the 
same time, the ‘Single’ European Act could also be seen as a misnomer because the EEC and the EPC 
remained very much separate. The only element of rapprochement was Article 30(5) SEA entrusting 
the Presidency and the Commission with the special responsibility for ensuring that the consistency 
between the Community and EPC was sought and maintained. Member States obtained the addition 
that each should, in this endeavour, stay “within its own spheres of competence". In this most legal, 
yet non-judiciable, of SEA provisions on the EPC, this aimed to ensure that the Commission would not 
acquire additional foreign policy competences.178  
As “a last-minute political compromise” between the proponents and opponents of including the 
separately drafted EEC amendments and EPC provisions in the same document, Article 32 SEA was 
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added. 179  It stated that “nothing in this Act shall affect the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities”. Article 31 SEA assigned the Court of Justice – despite its complete exclusion from EPC 
matters – as ultimate border guard. This served to guarantee that the new EPC provisions would not, 
in the sense of the lex posterior derogat legi priori rule of customary international law, be interpreted 
as derogating from or amending the older EEC Treaty.180 It could at that stage hardly be foreseen how 
much these few sentences would in the following decades occupy legal and academic scrutiny aimed 
at entangling the nature of the EU’s legal order.  
The SEA’s main relevance for the EPC consisted of codifying 15 years of pragmatism. This did however 
not come with a major substantive upgrade and the EPC remained without clear tasks and objectives. 
In remarkably noncommittal language the contracting parties purported to “inform and consult each 
other on any foreign policy matters of general interest”.181 National sovereignty was in no way ceded 
and in the words of Nuttall this boiled down to a commitment, unusual in a legal instrument, “to 
endeavour but not necessarily to succeed”. 182  The most important novelty was institutional and 
concerned the creation of a Secretariat, based in Brussels and tasked to assist the Presidency in the 
preparation, implementation and administration of EPC matters.183 This made an end to “[t]he fact 
that EPC archives had to be carried halfway across Europe in a suitcase”184 and provided for much-
needed “continuity and consistency beyond the debilitating rhythm of six-months Presidencies”.185 A 
subsequent Ministerial Decision added a second task for the EPC Secretariat, namely that of assisting 
the Presidency in ensuring consistency with Community provisions.186 This indicates that Member 
States foresaw a considerable workload resulting from this new duty. The practical impact of the SEA 
on EPC-EEC relations should in any case not be overrated. Its main value lies in the traces it has left on 
the further development of the EU legal order by anchoring the legal fragmentation of its external 
action system, combined with a political quest for coherence.187 In the framework of the SEA, EPC and 
EEC policies were living apart together: legally separate, but increasingly seen as “twin pillars of a 
European identity”.188  
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A conspicuous absentee in the SEA was development cooperation. In the light of the Community’s 
ever-growing engagement and the repeated calls for setting up an outright policy, it is mind-blowing 
that the opportunity was not taken to finally grant it a basis in law. This did however not stop 
development cooperation and the EPC from poaching into each other’s territory. Ethiopia was one of 
the places where this became most obvious by the diametrical collision of geostrategic interests, 
political apathy regarding the Marxist and atrocious Derg regime and the humanitarian concerns about 
its starving population. This incited a prudent yet authoritative statement on Ethiopia and the Horn of 
Africa in July 1986. Foreign Ministers simultaneously confirmed the EEC aid programme and warned 
to pay a close eye to the human rights situation, leaving the door open for aid conditionality.189 At this 
same meeting, the EPC and EEC adopted a Declaration on Human Rights, which constituted their first 
ever joint statement. In clear terms they affirmed that “in the administration of aid the European 
Community and its Member States will continue to promote fundamental rights”, without which 
lasting peace and security are unattainable.190   
2.2. The Maastricht era: the integrated but separate legal orders of CFSP 
and development cooperation 
The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty at the end of 1993 represented a significant constitutional 
landmark heralding the start of a new era for European integration. It meant the creation of the 
European Union based on three loosely connected pillars. The first encapsulated the three existing 
Communities and represented European cooperation in its most integrated form.191  Codifying its 
expansion beyond mere economic issues, the EEC was rechristened as European Community (EC). To 
this core the Treaty added two intergovernmental pillars: the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The Treaty of Maastricht also marked the first formal 
recognition of a European development policy, at last providing it with an authoritative legal source 
besides the geographically-biased ACP Conventions.  
In a first part the new constitutional era set in motion by the Maastricht Treaty will be analysed (2.2.1.). 
Besides a new legal bedding for the interaction between development and security policies, this 
provided both areas with a broader scope and focus, thereby increasing chances of overlap and 
interaction. A second part will explain how the inherently unfinished nature of this reform exercise, as 
well as rapid geopolitical changes, required further constitutional engineering (2.2.2.). In addition to 
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the reform exercises of Amsterdam and Nice, the fundamentals of EU development policy underwent 
significant transformations, determinatively leaving behind past attempts to stay clear of politics.  
2.2.1. Security and development firmly encapsulated in two separate pillars 
This section will first elaborate on the internal and external stimuli that incited the Maastricht Treaty 
changes. This will be followed by an exposition of the first ever Treaty bases for development 
cooperation and CFSP. A final subsection will then shed light on the complex tangle of constitutional 
push and pull factors regulating the relationship between both revamped competences. 
The route towards the pillar structure 
As with most of the EU’s leaps towards closer integration, the context in which the Maastricht Treaty 
saw the light of day was one of “good crises”192 pushing Member States towards action. This was 
mainly incited by the changes in the Eastern bloc under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Significantly, the European reaction took off much quicker in the EEC framework compared to the very 
cautious EPC attitude.193 In 1988, while foreign ministers were still busy “paying close attention to the 
developments currently taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe”,194 the EEC adopted a 
first ever joint declaration with COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) on the 
establishment of official relations.195 This was soon followed by EEC trade and cooperation agreements 
with Hungary and Czechoslovakia.  
The abrupt fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 provoked wide-ranging challenges and opportunities that 
were as much economic as political, as much foreign as domestic, requiring responses from both the 
EPC and the EEC that did not stop at the demarcation between them. This prompted the 1989 
European Council to affirm “the full validity of the comprehensive approach integrating political, 
economic and cooperation aspects” in relations with countries of central and Eastern Europe.196 The 
relevance of the EPC format was struck another important blow when a group of 24 Western states 
charged the Commission to coordinate their economic assistance to central and Eastern European 
countries under the major PHARE programme. This included the inherently political task of attaching 
and checking conditionality provisions. In the light of the ever more obvious inadequacy of the existing 
machinery, the European Council decided in June 1990 – when the preparations for the IGC on 
economic and monetary Union were already in full swing – to convene a second IGC on political 
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Union.197 The urgency of this exercise was only further underlined by Europe’s indecisiveness following 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. 
In the midst of these turbulent years, EEC Member States also had to negotiate a new Convention with 
the ACP group of states, to be signed by the end of 1989. Too early to fully grasp the impact of the 
relentless downfall of communism, Lomé IV nonetheless provided a first indication of the new 
direction European development policy would take. For one thing, in the new multipolar world, it 
suddenly came within the EEC’s reach to realise its longstanding ambition of becoming a significant 
international actor. Its considerable flows of development aid could evidently help to open doors in 
this undertaking. Second, “the end of the cold war exposed the previously unspoken disquiet about 
the value and effectiveness of aid given to undemocratic and corrupt regimes”. This cleared the way 
for intensified political interference under Lomé IV.198 The most drastic innovation in this regard was 
the inclusion of funds earmarked to support the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs).199 This went directly against the critical stance the EC had previously taken regarding this 
neoliberalist-inspired conditionality mechanism. The EEC’s move was criticised as a radical departure 
“from partnership to paternalism”.200 In spite of this, Lomé remained the only existing framework for 
interregional North-South cooperation based (although more rhetorically than effectively) on the 
pioneering model of equality and mutual respect. The magnetism of this model was clearly illustrated 
by the fact that not a single ACP state left the Convention and its membership even expanded from 46 
in Lomé I to 69 states in Lomé IV. 
Against the backdrop of collapsing regimes and rising intra-state tensions across the globe, the Rome 
European Council of December 1990 stressed “the vocation of the Union to deal with aspects of foreign 
and security policy, in accordance with a sustained evolutive process and in a unitary manner”.201 Yet, 
time was ticking and many essential questions were still to be answered before the Maastricht Treaty 
would finally be signed on 7 February 1992: what substance, objectives and means would be given to 
the still empty vessel of the CFSP, how would this new policy relate to the existing Communities, and 
whether and how should cooperation on defence be included? In March 1991 the Commission 
undertook a first attempt and proposed a far-reaching overhaul of the existing external relations 
system. Departing from the conviction that “it is not possible to affirm the identity of the Union and 
the consistency of its international personality simply by adding a foreign and security policy to existing 
policies”, it proposed a truly common foreign policy based on majority voting, close involvement of 
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the Commission and the Parliament and the absorption of the Community by the Union.202 Such 
proposals went much too far for Member States and eventually backfired on the Commission that 
remained on the side-lines of further discussions.  
Despite fierce criticism,203 the separation of the CFSP was eventually casted in the concrete of the 
Maastricht pillar structure. Even though this metaphor204 did not make its way into the Treaty, it has 
become so much engrained in the practice and analysis of the EU that observers are still struggling 
with a loss for words after its formal abolishment by the Lisbon Treaty. Around the “altar” of the 
existing Communities, the two intergovernmental pillars of the CFSP and JHA were erected, with as 
main attachment “a loose, tarpaulin-like structure … under the heading of an undefined ‘European 
Union’”, lacking legal personality.205 While acknowledging that foreign policy is an essential building 
block of European integration, this peculiar structure served to restrict the prerogatives of the 
Commission, Parliament and Court, and delimitate the CFSP as unequivocally alien to EC’s autonomous 
legal order.206 In this manner Member States could reap the benefits of scale and impact that go along 
with European cooperation without giving up their painstakingly guarded sovereignty. 
The long-awaited legal bases for development cooperation and security policy 
The Treaty of Maastricht signalled the formal start of EU development and security cooperation. In a 
separate Title XVII of the Treaty establishing a European Community (TEC) development cooperation 
was charged with very broad objectives, namely to foster:   
• the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more 
particularly the most disadvantaged among them; 
• the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; 
• the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.207  
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Moreover, in November 1991 Member States had adopted a resolution formally putting forth the 
observance of human rights and democracy as an essential element of development programming.208 
This was consolidated in Article 130u(2) (ex Article 177(2)) TEC affirming that Community development 
policy “shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the 
rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms”.  
The implementation of these objectives, by means of multiannual programmes and international 
agreements, was guided by the baselines of cooperation, coordination and coherence. The Treaty 
provisions on these 3 C’s signalled both their importance for the future of EU development cooperation 
and the inadequacy of previous policy frameworks.209 First, EC development policy was now explicitly 
established as a non-pre-emptive shared competence that was to be “complementary to the policies 
pursued by the Member States”.210 This bias towards action aimed to augment total development 
resources and European impact. Second, the coordination between EC and Member States aid 
programmes was established in Article 130x (ex Article 180) TEC, which also provided for the possibility 
of joint EC-Member State action. Finally, Article 130v TEC (ex Article 178 TEC) included an innovative 
mainstreaming clause to enhance coherence, obliging the Community to take account of development 
objectives in other policies that are likely to affect developing countries. The objectives of EU 
development policy were to be realised through multiannual programmes as well as by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB). These provisions were however not to “affect co-operation with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries in the framework of the ACP-EEC Convention”. This curiously worded 
exception did not mean that the new Treaty framework was not applicable to the largest group of 
developing countries. It rather aimed to safeguard the specific status of the EDF, as external to the 
Community budget.211 Nonetheless, rooting this exception in primary law was all but beneficial for 
developing a truly global and coherent development policy.212  
The area of political cooperation also underwent a major transformation. The ad hoc and informal 
travelling cooperation and consultation were turned into a more systematic policy with pre-defined 
objectives, with legal instruments and commitments, a firm foot in the Brussels-based EU machinery 
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and the seeds of a common defence policy. First, contrary to the prudent SEA language, it was 
determinatively stated that “[t]he Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common 
foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign 
and security policy”.213 This seemingly unlimited and “strikingly tautological” 214 scope was narrowed 
down in three main ways:215 vertically, because Member States kept a firm hand on the CFSP steering 
wheel driven by unanimity;216 horizontally, by means of the delimitation clause of Article M (ex Article 
47) TEU, which will be discussed below; and substantively, through the objectives set out in the five 
following indents of Article J.1(2) (ex Article 11(1)) TEU: 
• to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; 
• to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; 
• to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of 
the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives 
of the Paris Charter; 
• to promote international co-operation; 
• to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
Albeit still very broad, these objectives indicated that the CFSP covered the foreign policy of the Union 
“in a limited and specific sense, namely the political, security and defence aspects of external relations, 
as distinct from their economic and social aspects”.217 Several authors pointed to the exceptional 
nature of CFSP competence that was “defined in purely functional terms”218 and “characterized by an 
absence of the technique of detailed and specific attribution of competences”.219 Yet, their formulation 
is not so different from the Treaty objectives for development cooperation. The lack of a foreordained 
material content rather appears to be linked to external policy as such. Notably, reading the CFSP’s 
final aim of developing and consolidating human rights and democracy along the earlier mentioned 
Article 130u(2) TEC, reveals that the Maastricht Treaty (willingly or unwillingly) provided a first glimpse 
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of the close connection – or rather overlap and impossible separation – of security and development 
competences. 
Second, the new Title V on CFSP set out a more legalised form of cooperation based on the principles 
and general guidelines defined by the European Council. From the SEA the new Treaty took the 
instruments of joint actions and common positions, unfortunately without grasping the opportunity to 
better explain their scope and nature. The subsequent political decision to publish these CFSP 
instruments in the EU’s Official Journal was therefore key, as it confirmed their affinity to EC law. To 
these instruments the Treaty added the systematic co-operation between Member States, requiring 
them – in clear language – to “support the Union’s external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity [and] refrain from any action which is contrary 
to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations”.220 
Thirdly and crucially, the EU was accorded a single institutional framework (cf. infra).221 This meant 
that it was no longer a meeting of foreign ministers but the EU Council that set the course of the CFSP. 
As a direct consequence, the EPC Secretariat was included in the Council’s General Secretariat. This 
unequivocally rendered the CFSP part and parcel of the Brussels-based EU machinery and laid the basis 
for what would become an extensive foreign policy apparatus within the Council.  
Finally, in very cautious terms Article J.4 included “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, 
which might in time lead to a common defence”. It assigned the Western European Union (WEU) to 
elaborate and implement EU decisions and actions with defence implications.222 The main relevance 
of these highly conditional provisions lay in the fact that they were for the first time included in primary 
law.223 
The Treaty of Maastricht took political cooperation to a new level,224 but could not meet the high 
expectations that were raised by the new denomination of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. In 
fact, by explicit design the CFSP does not share the precision, regulatory nature and enforceable rights 
and obligations with the EU’s other common policies.225 Also on the level of decision-making the CFSP 
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scene was established completely different, with the European Council and the Council as leading 
characters, the European Parliament in a consultative role, the Court excluded and the Commission to 
remain ‘fully associated’. The exact meaning of that last phrase was again left to the common 
discretion of Member States. Problematically however, the CFSP was not equipped with the means or 
framework that would allow it to fulfil its essential goal, namely “to assert [the Union’s] identity on the 
international scene”. 226  The creation of this new Union policy was not accompanied by a 
commensurate expansion of tools and staff to move beyond a policy of declarations towards genuine 
operationability. Moreover, the Treaty did not provide for a CFSP budget. Administrative expenditure 
was to be charged to the EC budget, and with regard to operational costs the Council was left with a 
time-consuming choice to charge it either to Member States or the EC, on whose generosity it was 
thus made dependent.227  
An intricate tangle of constitutional push and pull factors 
The TEU connected the legal orders underlying the policies of development and CFSP in particularly 
complicated ways, based on a tangle of push and pull factors which have occupied and confused legal 
scholars ever since. Read in isolation, references to the EC-CFSP relationship may create false 
impressions, and it is essential to understand them in a holistic manner.  
The loudest call for consistency (or coherence) 228 was included in Article C (ex Article 3) TEU stating 
that the “Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the 
context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies”. This Herculean 
assignment was entrusted to the Council (no longer merely the Presidency) and the Commission, yet 
without practical guidelines, mechanisms to regulate disagreement or a possibility of legal 
enforcement before the Court. The central Treaty vehicle for ensuring consistency was the creation of 
the single institutional framework. This did not merely imply that CFSP and EC institutions were from 
now on legally required to interact, but essentially that the same institutions would act in both 
frameworks, applying variable rules and procedures.229 Certain authors were rather sceptic and called 
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it for instance more of “an institutional ‘géometrie variable’ than a single framework”.230 Curtin goes 
as far as depicting it “mere lip-service to an ideal [as i]t is single only in the sense that the 
intergovernmental pillars do not have institutions of their own”, only EC institutions generously put at 
their disposal.231  
Another key factor in this regard is the preservation of the acquis communautaire. It was established 
in Article B (ex Article 2) TEU as a central objective which the Union shall maintain in full and “build on 
it with a view to considering to what extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this 
Treaty may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the 
institutions of the Community”. The vanguard of its protection was Article M (ex Article 47) TEU: 
Subject to the provisions amending the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
with a view to establishing the European Community, the Treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and to 
these final provisions, nothing in this Treaty shall affect the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities or the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them. 
This phrase, which clearly built upon Article 32 SEA, became one of the most thoroughly dissected and 
discussed provisions in EU external relations law. At first sight this “Chinese wall”,232 seeking to avoid 
intrusion of the Community by the intergovernmental pillars, appears to stand in contrast with the 
requirement of consistency. Yet, it can also be seen as a specific expression hereof, aimed at avoiding 
policy contradictions under the supervision of the Court.233 In line with the above interpretation of 
Article 32 SEA, Herrmann convincingly argues that Member States, by virtue of ex Article 47 TEU, 
waived “their right to transfer competences to the EU which they had – even non-exclusively – already 
transferred to the EC”.234 It was a logical counterbalance to the broad functional scope of the CFSP that 
would otherwise provide Member States an escape route for their obligations under the EC framework. 
This is in line with the “vocation communautaire”235 established in Article A (ex Article 1 TEU) stating 
that “[t]he Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and 
forms of co-operation established by this Treaty”.  
Taken together these references to the EC-CFSP relationship expressed a balance or a tension – the 
views differ – between the duty of consistency and the protection of the evolving acquis 
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communautaire. On the one hand, Koutrakos notes that these provisions “flesh out the idea that the 
Community legal framework and the CFSP operate on the basis of a symbiotic relationship”. 236 
Eeckhout, on the other hand, submits that the CFSP supplementing the TEC with a less integrated 
policy, while nonetheless covering all areas of foreign and security policy, constitutes the “original sin 
of overall EU external action”.237  
The ambiguous interpretation of these provisions caused considerable confusion regarding the nature 
of the Union and its pillars. Particularly in the early days, this gave rise to a vehement, and often 
philosophical, debate between diametrically opposed camps speaking out either for the complete 
separation of the Union from the Community or the full absorption of the Communities in the single 
organisation of the Union.238 The edges of these extremes were gradually taken off with scholars 
conjuring up various denominations and metaphors in trying to grasp the complex reality of this new 
Union: from a “Staatenverbund” 239 (or an alliance of states) over a “Greek temple” or a “French Gothic 
Cathedral”240, to a “Russian doll” or “layered international organisation”.241 With the hindsight of time 
it is clear today that the initial bogey of a “Europe of bits and pieces” did not materialise.242 The EU’s 
pillars, while governed by inherently distinct policy regimes, were characterised more by their relation 
to the overall system of the Union, than by their mutual seclusion as isolated entities. That this was a 
complex reality to grasp is most clearly illustrated by the General Court that accurately, yet 
paradoxically, reverted to a contradictio in terminis to describe “the coexistence of Union and 
Community as integrated but separate legal orders”.243 This chasm is further reflected in the fact that 
the Maastricht Treaty foresaw a single procedure for accession and amendment, while nonetheless 
requiring an explicit bridge – nota bene the only one – to link the CFSP with EC trade policy for imposing 
sanctions on third countries.244 
The Union’s muddled constitutional design has unsurprisingly continued to attract fundamental 
criticism. Particularly the pillar structure has been described as an excessively intricate and formalistic 
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straightjacket that cannot be rhymed with the interconnected reality of everyday life.245 Curtin bluntly 
called this a case of “bricoleur’s amateurism”246 and De Baere concluded to “inherent constitutional 
messiness” resulting in a political system were the division of competences always prevailed over 
considerations of effectiveness.247 Yet, both the fog that hangs over this debate and the fragmentation 
of the Union’s external action system are no accident de parcours but a determined choice of the 
Treaty’s architects. The choice for fragmentation resulted from a meticulous attempt to enshrine the 
delicate balance between sovereignty and effectiveness in the Treaty framework. The choice for 
vagueness avoided setting the EU’s constitutional nature in stone, so as to keep all options on the table 
and avoid pushing the EU in an unmanageable direction. This implied that the European Union was per 
definition an unfinished project and it is therefore not surprising that further constitutional 
engineering would soon be underway. Indeed, Article N TEU called to convene an IGC in 1996 to 
examine the need for revising the new TEU so that it maintains in full the acquis communautaire and 
for improving the provisions on foreign, security and defence policy.  
2.2.2. Prolonged (constitutional) engineering: the Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaties  
The Amsterdam Treaty: what it did and did not do 
Scarcely had the ink of the Maastricht Treaty dried when the June 1994 European Council called the 
Westendorp Reflection Group in motion for preparing the approaching IGC. In familiar language the 
latter drew up a report expressing a strong commitment to guarantee a single European voice in 
external policy.248 Despite a broad foundation in the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP had failed to take off, 
mainly due to its lack of an operational arm. Ironically, while it was created partly in reaction to the 
EU’s impotence in the Balkans, the EU still reverted to the TEC flexibility clause to tackle instability in 
this region.249 A consensus for further constitutional reform soon emerged, but those who had insisted 
on the insertion of Article N in the Maastricht Treaty in order to efface the CFSP-EC divide, slinked off 
empty-handed.  
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The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force on 1 May 1999, kept up the much-maligned pillar 
structure in all its splendour. Arguably therefore, the amended Treaty was more relevant for what it 
did not, than for what it did do. In particular, it meant the definitive abandonment of hope that the 
division between EC external competences and the CFSP could be regarded as a temporary 
construction.250  This division was only indirectly tackled through a number of changes serving to 
slightly tone down the CFSP’s separate status. Some were textual and presented symbolical 
expressions of the Treaty drafters’ joint commitment. For one thing, ex Article 3 in the new TEU251 not 
only required the Commission and the Council to ensure the consistency of the Union’s external 
relations, security, economic and development policies, but also to “cooperate to this end”. Beyond 
symbolism, this has been interpreted as an extension of the duty of sincere cooperation between EU 
Institutions252 to EU external action as a whole, including the CFSP.253 Second, ex Article 11 TEU made 
the definition and implementation of the CFSP the sole responsibility of the Union, instead of the 
earlier reference to the ‘Union and its Member States’. This indicated that Member States do not have 
an identity separate from the Union when acting under Title V TEU, latently stressing that the CFSP 
should not be seen as purely intergovernmental. In this same line, a number of new possibilities for 
QMV were introduced in ex Article 23(2) TEU.254  
Most importantly, the Amsterdam Treaty gave the CFSP a much-needed operational servicing that 
allowed this policy to finally take off. This consisted of a number of improvements to its instruments, 
institutions and financing. First, the CFSP’s instruments were rationalised and expanded. Ex Article 12 
TEU inserted a clear listing, while subsequent provisions provided some useful – albeit still vague – 
clarifications on their nature and scope. The second pillar was moreover accorded Treaty-making 
powers,255  as a concession from those Member States that were reluctant to grant the EU legal 
personality. Despite this prudence, these new powers played a central role in enhancing the global 
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impact, visibility and recognition of the CFSP, in turn contributing to and presenting Member States 
with the “fait accompli” of the Union’s implied legal personality.256   
Second, on the institutional level the Amsterdam Treaty presented two innovations that have strongly 
impacted on the CFSP’s development. First, it introduced the function of High Representative for the 
CFSP. This was designed to “reconcile respect for sovereignty of States with the need for diplomatic 
and financial solidarity”.257 The CFSP High Representative was simultaneously made Secretary-General 
of the Council, among others to ensure that this figure would remain “a high-ranking civil servant 
rather than a political personality”.258 The Treaty prescribed that the High Representative should assist 
the Presidency and the Council in CFSP matters, “in particular through contributing to the formulation, 
preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of 
the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third 
parties”.259 As put by a former Council Director General for External Relations this made the High 
Representative in essence the “servant” of the Council.260 However, in the thick of the Kosovo war 
unfolding at the EU’s borders, the June 1999 Cologne European Council nonetheless opted for a top-
level political personality by appointing former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana.261  With his 
excellent contacts, diplomatic skills and status, Solana not only presented a much-needed “antidote to 
the excessive bureaucratization of CFSP processes”, 262  he arguably had a larger impact on the 
expansion of the CFSP than any other Amsterdam Treaty provision. Yet, he always remained like “a 
dog on the end of a lead, over time the lead has been let out but it is still there and could be pulled up 
at any time”.263 A second major institutional innovation was the creation of a Policy Planning and Early 
Warning Unit (PPEWU, more commonly referred to as the Policy Unit) in an attached Declaration.264 
The Policy Unit was established in the GSC under the responsibility of its Secretary-General/High 
Representative. Illustrative for a growing commitment to consistency, provision was made for 
appropriate cooperation with the Commission “in order to ensure full coherence with the Union's 
external economic and development policies”. These institutional innovations better equipped the 
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Council – that had before the Maastricht Treaty predominantly held legislative and administrative 
functions – for its new executive role in the CFSP. 
A final operational improvement of the CFSP occurred at the level of its financing. The Maastricht 
Treaty system (distinguishing between operational and administrative costs, and requiring unremitting 
choices between either Member States or EC financing) had unnecessarily prolonged decision-making. 
The solution found in the Amsterdam Treaty was to charge all CFSP expenditure to the EC budget, 
“except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases 
where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise”.265 The practical inappropriateness of this 
cross-pillar construction (cf. infra Chapter 3) clearly lost it from the Member States’ determination to 
avoid opening up a new bag of EU money.266  
One of the other main reasons for which the Amsterdam IGC was called in motion was the revision of 
the Treaty’s defence provisions. The upgrade remained however purely semantic. Treaty language was 
no longer about the eventual but about the “progressive framing” and the restraining reference to “in 
time” was dropped. 267 The Union would no longer request, but “will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate 
and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications”. Moreover, the 
European Council’s principles and general guidelines for the CFSP could now include matters with 
defence implications.268 The most pertinent innovation was the formal embracement of the Petersberg 
tasks, a list of policy responses to post-Cold War security threats adopted by the WEU in June 1992.269 
These consisted of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peace-making”.270  
In the field of development cooperation the Amsterdam Treaty made only one modification. From an 
area governed by the cooperation procedure it was moved to co-decision, putting the European 
Parliament on par with the Council as full-blown legislator. This raises the question as to whether more 
adjustments were not needed or not wanted. At least one argument pleading against the former was 
the remaining lack of legal bases for related areas like humanitarian and emergency aid and financial 
and technical assistance to non-developing countries. 271  The lacuna for humanitarian aid was 
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circumvented by reverting to the TEC’s Title XVII on development.272 This creativity was questionable 
as certain humanitarian activities sat uncomfortably with the Treaty’s socio-economic development 
objectives. For financial and technical assistance to non-developing countries EU lawmakers 
ambiguously reverted to the flexibility clause of ex Article 308 TEC.273 The latter required a unanimous 
Council vote and the consultation of the Parliament. These procedural differences were particularly 
equivocal in the light of another Treaty void, namely the absence of a definition exposing what exactly 
constitutes a developing country. Rather than on a substantive justification, the applicable legal regime 
for financial and technical cooperation with a certain country or region thus depended on arbitrary 
policy choices, causing legal uncertainty, unpredictability and potential inter-institutional tensions.274 
In the meantime, EU development policy did however not stand still. Essentially, the ever more 
prominent position of democratic principles and human rights resulted in 1995 in the adoption of an 
official policy to include their observance as a specific clause in all new trade and cooperation 
agreements.275 A couple of months later this was put in practice with the mid-term review of the Lomé 
Convention. This not only stressed their importance, but made democracy and human rights essential 
elements on which grounds the agreement could be suspended.276 It moreover introduced the by now 
famous notion of good governance and the practice of phased programming. The latter was aimed at 
making the whole process more flexible to respond to changes and needs regarding the executed 
projects and “the specific situation of the ACP State concerned”.277 Yet, it also implied that aid figures 
were no longer an entitlement but depended on the commitment and capacity of receiving countries. 
Presented with little fanfare, this EU policy turn quickly met the lukewarm response of scholars and 
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NGOs, united in their criticism on the erosion of the long-standing notion of partnership.278 That the 
EU was serious about its revamped ideals is illustrated by the impressive list of ACP countries that saw 
their cooperation with the EU suspended over human rights problems in the course of the 1990s, 
including Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Malawi, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Zaire, Niger and Nigeria.279 
The Nice Treaty: tinkering around the edges 
The three and a half years between the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in October 1997 and the Nice 
Treaty in February 2001 witnessed a rapid metamorphosis in the area of European security and 
defence cooperation. This was instigated less by Treaty changes than by “Europe’s military revolution” 
at the Saint-Malo Summit between France and the UK, the EU’s most powerful states in terms of 
military capabilities and global impact.280 Triggered by the persisting rumble in the Balkans, the two 
countries issued a declaration stressing in remarkably resolute terms – particularly in the light of the 
UK’s traditional reserve regarding deeper EU integration – that “the Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.281 This commitment was welcomed 
and repeated by the June 1999 European Council, expressing a willingness to provide the Union with 
“the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European 
policy on security and defence”.282 An attached Presidency Report called for the necessary decision-
making and institutional arrangements.283 In a swift course of events this was followed in December 
1999 by the adoption of an (over)ambitious headline goal to boost Europe’s “readily deployable 
military capabilities”.284 The initial focus on EU military crisis management capacity was soon extended 
with a Civilian Headline Goal to upgrade the Member States’ joint police, judicial and civil protection 
capacities.285  
In the light of these fundamental changes it is remarkable that the opportunity of the Nice Treaty was 
not taken to give the emerging European defence policy a firmer Treaty basis. The limited codifications 
could only be read between the lines of the amended TEU. First, all references to the EU availing itself 
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of the WEU in defence matters were revoked, implying that the EU was ready to assume its own 
responsibility. Second, the CFSP’s Political Committee was rechristened Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) with the new responsibility to “exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, 
political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations”. 286  Its specific role, 
modalities and functions were set out in a Council Decision, which was moreover the first official 
document mentioning the existence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).287 Notably, 
the reference to a “common policy”, cited in the Treaty and all preceding European Council conclusions 
on defence since Cologne, was quietly dropped.288 The ESDP was subsequently declared operational 
and “capable of conducting some crisis-management operations” at the 2001 Laeken European 
Council.289  
Further Nice Treaty changes were mainly targeted at preparing the Union institutionally for the 
upcoming big bang enlargement, and adaptations in the field of external relations were fairly limited. 
One of the main changes was the extension of the Treaty’s provisions on enhanced cooperation to the 
CFSP.290 Also noteworthy was the introduction of a Title XXI TEC on “Economic, Financial and Technical 
Cooperation with Third Countries”. Given that most – if not all – development measures under Title XX 
qualify as economic, financial and technical assistance, an effet utile reading reveals that the new Title 
must have be designed to specifically address developed countries.291 Contrary to the co-decision 
procedure applicable under the Treaty’s development cooperation provisions, ex Article 181a(2) only 
required the consultation of the Parliament. As there was still no EU definition for a developing country, 
these procedural differences were again bound to lead to confusion. It is for instance difficult to 
understand why South Africa is a recipient under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), 
while the TACIS programme, which includes cooperation with a number of Central Asian countries that 
rank below South Africa on every development scale, is governed by ex Article 181a TEC.  
International practice does not provide much guidance either as the definitions applied by instances 
as the WB, OECD, UNDP necessarily reflect the needs of the organisation that developed and maintains 
them.292 A 2000 Commission Communication references “by way of example” to the list of developing 
countries developed by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), but this is not 
consistently applied in other official documents.293 “Development is, what the master says it is” and 
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the absence of a formal definition gives the EU certain leeway that allows a political usage of the 
term.294 In the EIB case this question was presented to the Court. It recognised the particular attention 
accorded by EU institutions to the OECD’s list of ODA recipients, but found that “the concept of 
‘developing country’ must be given an autonomous Community interpretation. That is equally true in 
view also of the dynamic nature of the developing country category, in the sense that it is liable to 
evolve in response to events which are difficult to predict”. 295  Despite the absence of such an 
interpretation, the Court found reason to reject the Council’s argument that ex Article 181a EC was in 
itself broad enough to cover cooperation with both developing and other third countries.296 This was 
in its view contrary to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and would result in an unlawful restriction of 
Title XX on development cooperation.297   
The paradigmatic shift of the Cotonou Convention 
Contrary to these limited Treaty changes, it became ever more clear that the EU’s aid system was in 
dire need of reform. This was underlined by two sobering events at the end of the millennium: the 
resignation of the Santer Commission over allegations of fraud, nepotism and mismanagement of 
aid298 and the first ever official impact assessment of EU development assistance.299 The latter marked 
down EU development policy for its limited coordination, complementarity and consistency with other 
policy areas and Member States’ programmes. It criticised the delayed and inefficient implementation, 
weak monitoring and unsustainable impact on poverty alleviation. This led the freshly appointed 
Development Commissioner Poul Nielson to publicly conclude that the Commission machine was “was 
designed for producing directives, regulations, trade negotiations … For development assistance, it 
doesn’t work”.300 These events set in motion a reform process aimed at making the whole system more 
professional, efficient and expeditious.301 This revitalisation of EU development policy made an end to 
the “decade of non-decisions” that had followed the Maastricht Treaty.302 The most visible expression 
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hereof was the creation in 2001 of the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO). In one strike this aimed 
to improve the quality of aid disbursement and loosen the administrative burden on DG Development 
in order to transform it from a narrow technical agency into a comprehensive pool of expertise on 
development policy and strategy.  
Even though ACP became ever more known as an acronym for anachronism, the absence of a 
consensual EU framework document meant that the relations with this group continued to act as a 
gauge for EU development policy. To understand its changing fundamentals it is inescapable to analyse 
the new milestone in these relations that was reached with the signing of the Cotonou Agreement on 
23 June 2000.303 Departing from a more multi-faceted conception of poverty, the scope of the new 
Convention – which is after two revisions in 2005 and 2010 still applicable today304 – is considerably 
wider than that of its predecessors. It incorporates a number of cross-cutting themes, such as 
institutional development and capacity building, and new fields of cooperation, such as migration, 
arms control, drugs, organised crime and – particularly remarkable –peace and security. Article 1 
includes the latter among the central goals of the Convention, together with the promotion of a stable 
and democratic political environment. This new focus culminates in Article 11 on ‘peace-building 
policies, conflict prevention and resolution’, which is a striking insertion for an agreement widely 
portrayed as a development partnership (cf. infra 3.2.1.). The essential elements of human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law – the non-observance of which forms a basis for suspending 
the agreement – are extended from one cursory reference in Lomé IVb to an extensive exposition in 
Article 9 of the Cotonou Convention.305 To reconcile ACP resistance against adding good governance 
to this list with the EU’s insistence on its importance, the latter is added as a fundamental element, 
meaning that “only serious cases of corruption, including acts of bribery” constitute violations of the 
Agreement.306  
In addition to this fortified conditionality, Cotonou marks the paradigmatic end of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences for all but Least Development Countries (LDCs), and replaces this with a (controversial) 
push for free trade agreements based on regional integration.307 Other notable shifts include the 
emphasis on civil society, the centrality of political dialogue and the strengthening of phased 
programming with enhanced differentiation based on “a partner's level of development, its needs, its 
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performance and its long-term development strategy”.308 The thread in all these changes is that they 
put politics rather than economics, reform rather than assistance, at the centre EU-ACP relations. In 
this manner Cotonou is the culmination of a process that gradually moved from the Yaoundé 
Convention’s “automatic, no-strings-attached process of entitlement into assistance conditional upon 
accurately outlined needs and the attainment of economic and political performance indicators”.309 
Furthermore, the end to non-reciprocal trade preferences, the focus on regional integration and the 
upgraded conditionality, meant a normalisation of the ACPs’ position, bringing it more in line with the 
EU’s relations vis-à-vis the rest of the world.310 
This substantive broadening of the Agreement occurred in ways that often mismatched with its 
portrayed rhetoric. It is for instance not immediately clear how a stronger focus on poverty reduction 
and the fundamental principles of “equality of the partners and ownership of the development 
strategies … in all sovereignty” can be reconciled with tightened conditionality.311 This has sceptically 
been interpreted as a shift from “co-operation to coercion” with the partnership’s rhetoric only 
“designed for domestic consumption in Europe and for purposes of legitimation in ACP states”.312 
More generally, it signalled the end of the autonomous nature of development policy as well as of its 
pole position in EU relations with developing countries. From the early 2000s, EU development 
cooperation was increasingly perceived as only one of the EU’s various external instruments that can 
target development.313  
2.3. The Lisbon era: security and development hinging between 
integration and delimitation 
It was clear from the outset that the Nice Treaty had prepared the Union for its widening, but fell short 
on constitutional reforms to enable its deepening. Already one year before its entry into force the 
December 2001 Laeken European Council set in motion a debate about the future of the European 
Union, which had been called for in an annexed Declaration to the Nice Treaty. 314  The Laeken 
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Declaration expressed a clear desire to see “Europe more involved in foreign affairs, security and 
defence, in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with trouble spots in and 
around Europe and in the rest of the world”.315 This longest of Treaty reform exercises had to search 
its second wind after the Constitution’s inglorious demise.316 Yet, the push to strengthen the CFSP and 
streamline the whole external action system – with the watchwords of coherence, effectiveness and 
unity – never left the negotiating table. The general feeling that the artificial pillar demarcations held 
down the EU in realising its global ambitions dominated both the 2003-2004 IGC on the Constitution 
for Europe and the 2007 Lisbon IGC on the Reform Treaty. 
Not only Treaty amendments tempered the CFSP’s distinctiveness, also in practice the pillar struts lost 
ever more ground to the inescapable interaction of policies and actors struggling to transcend them. 
In a first part it will be shortly explained how the gradual erosion of the pillar structure had already 
been set in motion long before its formal abolition by the Lisbon Treaty (2.3.1.). A second part will then 
shed light on today’s complex reality of the EU’s unified but diverse legal order (2.3.2.). This has led to 
paradoxical demands of integrating and delimitating external policies, which will be set out with a focus 
on the renewed development and security competences. 
2.3.1. The gradual erosion of the pillar structure 
The Member States’ willingness to legally delimitate, while acknowledging the practical necessity of 
cohering the three pillars, was inscribed in the complex reality of the Maastricht Treaty system. Even 
though only the case for delimitation was legally enforceable, and thus appeared stronger, the 
overwhelming practice of interaction gradually sapped the pillar foundations from various directions. 
In line with the subsequent structure of this dissertation, three levels can be distinguished at which 
this took place, namely the policy, institutional and judicial level. An in-depth discussion of the 
interaction between development and security policies, actors and competences on these levels will 
be left for the respective chapters. The aim of this title is rather to give a concise and general overview 
of the evolutions that paved the way for the Lisbon Treaty’s unification of the EU’s constitutional 
system.  
Two tendencies played at the policy-making level. On the one hand, the fact that global challenges did 
not stop for pillar boundaries led to a rising cross-pillarisation of EU external action. The challenges of 
the 21st century fight against terrorism, climate change, poverty, etc. are so all-embracive that they do 
not allow neatly separated policy responses. Remarkably, in tackling these challenges, EU institutions 
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and Member States have appeared much less occupied with pillar demarcations than the Treaty’s 
obsession with competence delimitation might suggest. Only occasionally did outright incoherence or 
tensions occur, and motives of pragmatism and loyal cooperation generally held the upper hand. This 
is clearly illustrated by the above mentioned EU sanctions regime. Second, the differences between 
the pillars were much smaller than the misleading ‘supranational’ EC and ‘intergovernmental’ 
CFSP(/JHA) labels indicated. For one thing, the EC increasingly reverted to soft law instruments to get 
all Member States on board.317 For another, CFSP provisions were more restraining on Member States 
than often presented.318 Whereas its procedures were indeed designed so that all of them needed to 
consent, once adopted their very purpose was to limit the freedom for national action. Many Treaty 
provisions on CFSP were formulated in particularly resolute terms, and whilst not enforceable before 
the Court, they were undoubtedly legally binding.319 There would indeed be no interest in strictly 
defining the conditions that allow to deviate from joint actions, or to carefully formulate certain 
possibilities for QMV, if the CFSP had no obligatory character.320 Finally, the general tendency to work 
towards consensus in the Council softened the sharp contrast between the unanimity-governed 
second pillar and the frequent provision for majority voting in the EC. Yet, it should also be noted that 
it is often the possibility of QMV – and the associated risk for Member States to be outvoted – rather 
than its actual use that leads to more far-reaching decisions.  
At the institutional level the absence of a Community dimension in the CFSP was partly compensated 
by what has been variously termed by political scientists as “Europeanisation”, “socialization”, 
“brusselisation” or “going native”.321 In general terms this means that the growing interaction between 
Member States’ CFSP representatives gradually detaches them from their capitals and leads them to 
increasingly adhere to a common EU culture. The prodigious practice of the single institutional 
framework took a further swipe at the pillar walls. Rather than EU institutions operating in two 
separate constellations, they form part of a complex network with multiple variations in rules, 
procedures and interactions, both within and between the pillars. Resulting from a certain sense of 
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“Eigendynamik”,322 the Treaty-suggested Council-European Council duopoly over the CFSP ever less 
reflected reality. Incited by the growing cross-pillarisation, the Commission obtained a seat at the table 
in nearly all stages of CFSP decision-making and the Parliament got a foot in the door by exploiting its 
legal and budgetary powers to the fullest.  
A similar tendency occurred at the judicial level. Even though it was officially named “the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities”, the latter progressively acted as constitutional Court for the EU 
as a whole. The EU’s ‘integrated but separate legal orders’ provided the explanatory framework for an 
increasing number of cases that can be subdivided in two categories. First, the Court gradually 
developed a unified concept of EU law, most notably in its evolving jurisprudence on the cross-pillar 
choice of legal basis, which will be discussed extensively in Chapter 5. Second, the Court developed a 
practice of using EC analogy as a source of inspiration to interpret EU provisions.323 While this was 
applied mainly with regard to the third pillar, specifically in relation to the legal effect of common 
positions 324  and the duty of loyal cooperation, 325  this made clear that the pillar walls were not 
impermeable for principles of the autonomous EC legal order. Moreover, the Court extended the EC 
rules on transparency and access to documents to the EU as a whole.326  
The ever-growing practice of policy, institutional and judicial interaction transcending pillar walls 
boosted the EU’s image of a single actor. Certain authors have convincingly argued that “even the 
sacrosanct Community principles of direct effect and primacy over the law of the Member States 
cannot be said to be completely alien to the CFSP”.327 However, the latter remained a deliberately less 
integrated legal system that could not a priori and unconditionally be subjected to EC rules and 
principles. The key question is now if and to what extent the Lisbon Treaty’s streamlining of the EU’s 
constitutional system has altered this situation. 
2.3.2. The integration-delimitation paradox of the Lisbon Treaty 
A first part of this section will lay bare the various Treaty changes to the overall constitutional 
framework for EU external action. This depicts how the concomitant calls for cohering and detaching 
CFSP and TFEU dimensions of external policy have given rise to a genuine integration-delimitation 
paradox, posing significant challenges to policy-makers, institutional loyalty and the judiciary. Taking 
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into account this altered constitutional reality, a second part will discuss what changes the Lisbon 
Treaty brings for the scope and nature of CFSP and development cooperation.  
Untangling the Lisbon Treaty’s engineering to the EU’s constitutional system 
The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, was proudly presented as a thorough 
reform exercise that will “give the Union a single voice in external relations”328 and make it “work more 
efficiently and effectively”.329 In reforming EU external action the new Treaty resolutely plays the 
integration card. Chiefly, it dissolves the EC into the Union which “shall replace and succeed” it.330 With 
much relieve and even greater hope for the future, this so-called depillarisation is repeatedly put 
forward as one of the most notable Treaty changes.331 This move is confirmed and completed by 
assigning legal personality to the EU as whole,332 according the TEU and TFEU (which replaces the ex 
TEC) equal legal value,333 drawing up a unified framework for concluding international agreements,334 
expanding the provisions on enhanced cooperation to the CFSP as a whole,335 and rebranding the 
CFSP’s joint actions and common positions as ‘decisions’ in line with all other competences.336 
Article 21 TEU constitutes the centrepiece of the streamlined external action architecture (cf. Box 1). 
It calls on the Union to work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations in 
order to achieve the various EU external objectives that are now grouped together in this single 
provision. Article 21(3) TEU then calls on the Union to “ensure consistency between the different areas 
of its external action and between these and its other policies”. The Council and the Commission, 
assisted by the newly designed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(cf. infra), are entrusted with this task and shall cooperate to that effect. This duty now has an 
equivalent in Article 7 TFEU and falls under the supervision of the CJEU, boosting its status as 
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constitutional principle.337 Taken together these reforms establish a strong duty for EU institutions to 
interlink and integrate various external policies and objectives. In the light of the above-discussed 
erosion of the pillar structure, this does not represent a complete rupture with the past, but rather an 
attempt to catch up “with ‘living’ and sedimentary practices” that had gradually ripened.338 
Box 1: Article 21 TEU 
1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired 
its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. 
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and 
international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first 
subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the 
framework of the United Nations. 
2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of 
cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: 
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; 
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of 
international law; 
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and 
with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders; 
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, 
with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; 
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; 
(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and 
the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; 
(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and 
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(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global 
governance. 
3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the 
development and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external action covered by this 
Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external 
aspects of its other policies. 
The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between 
these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to 
that effect. 
Contrary to this often heralded integration rationale, a close look at the Lisbon Treaty reveals a 
continued strong delimitation of the CFSP, albeit within an undeniably unified legal order. A first 
element of separation results from the odd structure of and distinction between the Lisbon’s TEU and 
TFEU. This does not radiate legal logic, but results from its origins in the divided legacy of both the ill-
fated Constitution and the Maastricht Treaty structure. The Constitution had aimed to radically 
simplify the old legal architecture by turning two separate founding Treaties for two distinct but 
interconnected legal entities into a single legal organisation and Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty, on the other 
hand, unifies the legal nature of the Union, but spreads its provisions over two legally equivalent 
Treaties.339 This (incomplete) reversion to the old Treaty structure served as a symbolic return to 
incrementalism in an effort to meet popular discontent about the Constitution’s unbidden leap 
towards a European federation.340 Roughly, the current distinction between the two Treaties runs 
across the lines of separating primary from secondary EU rules. The TEU sets out the main 
constitutional and institutional structure, whereas the TFEU covers the organisation of the specific 
competences of the Union.341 This would have been a complex yet not illogical Treaty structure, were 
it not for the odd position of the CFSP, which is as only substantive policy confined to the TEU342 (with 
the notable exception of Article 215 TFEU establishing a bridge to the CFSP in relation to targeted 
sanctions).343 Consequently, the proclaimed unity of EU external action only extends to its general 
principles and objectives. The specific provisions remain inelegantly split as if the Union were no 
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integrated legal entity, but simply “a franchiser who organises the 'corporate identity'” of separated 
TFEU and CFSP legal regimes.344 
The Treaty structure is not the only remainder of the CFSP’s distinct nature, nor was it a necessary 
condition to achieve this. Article 24(1) TEU emphasises that the CFSP is still “subject to specific rules 
and procedures”. These largely stick to unanimous decision-making dominated by Member States in 
the Council and the European Council. Besides one addition to the list of QMV exceptions,345 Article 
31(3) TEU introduces the so-called ‘passerelle clause’. This empowers the European Council to 
unanimously adopt a decision stipulating new CFSP areas where the Council shall act by qualified 
majority. Notably, this makes it possible to gradually extend QMV in the CFSP without reverting to the 
heavy Treaty revision procedures of Article 48 TEU. Yet, both additions are consistent with the CFSP’s 
traditional philosophy that makes such exceptions dependent upon prior unanimous decisions. 
Thereby, they incongruously highlight the reluctance of Member States to soften their grip on the 
CFSP.346  The Parliament, for its part, is regularly consulted “on the main aspects and the basic choices” 
of the CFSP and CSDP.347 The Commission loses its status of full association and shared right of initiative 
to the new High Representative, but this is compensated by the latter’s double hat as Vice-President 
of the Commission (cf. infra 4.3.). Finally, Article 24(1) TEU emphasises the absence of the Court’s 
jurisdiction with respect to CFSP provisions. In addition to the exception of monitoring compliance with 
Article 40 TEU (the successor to the non-affect clause of ex Article 47 TEU which will be discussed 
further below), it extends jurisdiction towards reviewing the legality of restrictive measures against 
natural or legal persons.348 This is an important, yet not entirely new extension, as it essentially codifies 
the manner in which the Court had filled this legal gap in the Kadi and Al-Barakaat cases.349 In essence 
the CFSP thus remains an area for which the Treaty formulates strong legal discipline, which is to a 
great extent left to Member States’ benevolence.  
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Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU? (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 77). 
346 I. Govaere, 'Multi-faceted Single Legal Personality and a Hidden Horizontal Pillar: EU External Relations post-Lisbon' (2011) 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 13, 102.  
347 Article 36 TEU. 
348 These restrictive measures, and particularly targeted sanctions, raise specific issues regarding the CFSP-TFEU interface (cf. 
infra 5.3.2. and further: I. Cameron (ed), EU Sanctions: Law and Policy Issues concerning Restrictive Measures (Intersentia, 
Cambridge, 2013) 266p; P. Van Elsuwege, 'The Adoption of "Targeted Sanctions" and the Potential for Inter-institutional 
Litigation after Lisbon' (2011) Journal of Contemporary European Research 7(4) 488-499). 
349 Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, Kadi and Al Barakaat, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, paras 234-236; See further: P.J. Cardwell, 
D. French and N.D. White, 'Annotation Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, Kadi and Al Barakaat' (2009) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 58(1), 229-240. 
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Other hints of what these “specific rules and procedures” imply are given throughout the Treaties. 
Articles 2-6 TFEU list and clarify the different categories of EU competences but make no mention of 
the CFSP. Various ideas have been put forward regarding its exact nature.350 In any case, this explicit 
exclusion after a Treaty reform process that was set to deliver a “better division and definition of 
competence”,351 serves to emphasise the CFSP’s distinctness. Further reminders are the exclusion of 
the CFSP from the flexibility clause of Article 352 TFEU, 352  the separate procedural rules for 
international agreements that relate to the CFSP in Article 218 TFEU (cf. infra 5.3.2.), the exclusion of 
legislative acts, 353  the CFSP-specific duty of loyalty in Article 24(3) TEU, 354  and several attached 
Declarations that repeat ad nauseam that the CFSP and TEU provisions do not affect the Member 
States existing powers and responsibilities.355  
 
Box 2: Article 40 TEU 
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the 
procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise 
of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of 
the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the 
exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter. 
This belt-and-braces approach of underlining the normative distinctiveness of the CFSP is elevated to 
the level of a constitutional principle in Article 40 TEU. The meaning of its two paragraphs (cf. Box 2) 
has set many academic tongues wagging. On the one hand, Article 40 TEU can be seen as a 
confirmation of the streamlined external action system, balancing the old provision by putting CFSP 
and TFEU competences on an equal footing. On the other hand, it also stresses the delimitation of CFSP 
                                                          
350 CFSP competence has alternately been categorised as non pre-emptively shared (M. Cremona, 'The Union's External 
Action: Constitutional Perspectives' in G. Amato, H. Bribosia and B. de Witte (eds), Genèse et Destinée de la Constitution 
Européenne : Commentaire du Traité Etablissant une Constitution pour l'Europe à la Lumière des Travaux Préparatoires et 
Perspectives d'Avenir (Bruylant, Brussels, 2007) para. 31), shared or concurrent (Gosalbo Bono (2006) op.cit. note 327, 364) 
and sui generis (De Baere (2008) op.cit. note 164, 112). 
351 Laeken Declaration (2001) op.cit. note 315, Title II. 
352 This is literally repeated in Declaration No. 41 on Article 352 TFEU annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
353 Article 24(1) TEU. This new and undefined terminology causes confusion. Eeckhout argues that the exclusion of legislative 
acts in the CFSP results from the absence of full parliamentary and judicial supervision, therefore implying the exclusion of 
normative action imposing obligations on individuals (Eeckhout (2011) op.cit. note 113, 478-483). 
354 The general duty of loyalty set out in Article 4(3) TEU in essence applies to the whole range of EU competences. Yet, the 
at first sight redundant repetition for the CFSP entrusts supervision specifically to the High Representative and the Council, 
instead of the Court (see further: P. Van Elsuwege and H. Merket, 'The Role of the Court of Justice in Ensuring the Unity of 
the EU’s External Representation' in S. Blockmans and R.A. Wessel (eds), Principles and Practices of EU External 
Representation, CLEER Working Papers 2012/5 (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, The Hague, 2012) 52-56). 
355 See in particular Declarations No. 13 and 14 concerning the CFSP and Declaration No. 24 concerning the legal personality 
of the EU, annexed to the Lisbon Treaty.  
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and TFEU competences by according its predecessor a Janus-face to prevent mutual contamination. 
Curiously, it was at a very late stage of the Convention’s proceedings that it was decided to include a 
successor to ex Article 47 TEU in the new constitutional text. Ricardo Passos of the Parliament’s legal 
service notes that it was only when it became clear that depillarisation would not translate into a 
general judicial competence for the CJEU, that the need for such an article was felt.356 Its main purpose 
was thus to ensure that the continued exclusion of the CJEU from the CFSP, would not prevent it from 
adjudicating this policy’s delimitation from TFEU external competences.  
It has been argued that this Article stands for a new “creeping pillarization” because there should be 
no room for such a clause in an integrated Treaty system.357 Taking into account the specific nature of 
foreign affairs allows to smoothen off the rough edges from this view. This helps to avoid the 
“irresistible habit of regarding those innovations through the prism of a zero-sum game between two 
opposing models of integration [that] leads to an almost insoluble dilemma”.358 The CFSP’s distinctness 
fits to a certain extent in the broader global context of foreign policy, which is throughout most political 
systems characterised by an exceptional dominance of executive power, typically according less 
prominent positions to judicial and legislative actors.359 This results from the fact that foreign affairs 
are more strategic than regulatory, and require more speed, flexibility and confidentiality than a 
traditional system of checks and balances allows. Combining these insights, it can be argued that 
Article 40 TEU, rather than setting up mutual lines of defence, reflects the desire of placing the CFSP 
in a separate subsystem that evolves on its own rhythm, yet in harmony with TFEU competences as 
part of the Union’s unitary legal order.360  
In a way, the Lisbon Treaty has thus undertaken to reduce the appearance but not the substance of 
primary law complexity. Consequently, “[t]he CFSP framework retains its different characteristics, 
albeit within a constitutional context which lacks obvious signs of division”.361 For all the talk about 
simplifying the constitutional system, the debate on the nature of the EU legal order is therefore still 
open. Legal unity is undoubtedly the order of the day, but with regard to the CFSP it seems still 
                                                          
356 R. Passos, 'Le Système Jurisdictionnel de l'Union' in G. Amato, H. Bribosia and B. De Witte (eds), Genèse et Destinée de la 
Constitution Européenne : Commentaire du Traité Etablissant une Constitution pour l'Europe à la Lumière des Travaux 
Préparatoires et Perspectives d'Avenir. (Bruylant, Brussels, 2007) para. 16. 
357 Cannizzaro (2007) op.cit. note 214, 230-232. 
358 Van Elsuwege (2010) op.cit. note 337, 998-999. 
359 Gosalbo Bono (2006) op.cit. note 327, 378-379. 
360 This interpretation of Article 40 TEU is in line with an evolution in international Treaty law where the conflictual lex 
posterior derogat legi priori is being replaced by a clause of “mutual supportiveness” between legal regimes, expressing a 
relationship of co-existence, consistency, and complementarity. For an analysis of this shift in international law: R. Pavoni, 
'Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: a Watershed for the 'WTO-and-Competing-Regimes' 
Debate?' (2010) The European Journal of International Law 21(3), 649-679. An example of such a clause can be found in Article 
22(1) of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, UNTS vol. 1760, p. 79, 05.06.1992. 
361 Koutrakos (2013) op.cit. note 91, 29-30. 
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fragile.362 In the good tradition of EU legal scholarship various metaphors have again popped up: from 
a “marbling effect” of loose fragments to the CFSP as a “hidden horizontal pillar”.363  
One important novelty of the Lisbon Treaty is that it better arms the duty of consistency to attenuate 
the remaining delimitation of the CFSP. It does so by fortifying and extending institutional bridges that 
facilitate efforts to give effect to it. First, the European Council, which was long the only institution that 
could approach the political and economic aspects of foreign policy in an integrated manner, has been 
accorded a permanent President. This enables a more stable, visible and accountable input of this ‘light 
house’ institution to develop the general political directions and priorities of the Union.364 A second 
institutional bridging function is established in the person of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (hereafter: High Representative or HR), who combines the three 
hats of High Representative for the CFSP, Vice-President of the Commission responsible for external 
relations and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). 365  The leitmotiv in each of these three 
mandates is to better interlink, cohere and coordinate the various dimensions of EU foreign policy.366 
This integrative function trickles further down to the European External Action Service (EEAS), which 
assists the High Representative in her/his vast range of responsibilities and mirrors the hats of its 
principle in both composition and responsibilities. In turn, this bundling of competences is translated 
to the field level by transforming the old Commission Delegations into EU Delegations representing 
the entire range of EU competences. The details of these new functions will be thoroughly analysed in 
Chapter 4. 
By improving the EU’s ability to bridge the different compartments of external action, these 
institutional upgrades attach weight to the Lisbon Treaty’s widely praised call for coherence. However, 
as mentioned, the compartmentalisation itself has survived the Treaty changes and many questions 
about how to reconcile this with the Treaty’s coherence rationale are left unanswered. Clearly, the 
Member States could only find “unity within obscurity”367 and intentionally left many key elements 
regarding the structure and function of its most significant innovations to political discretion. Against 
the background of this constitutional confusion, the main question for this research is how these 
changes and this complexity can and do impact on the practice of EU external action, and the security-
development nexus in particular. In the Union’s founding Treaties there has always been a tension 
between the Member States’ clench to sovereignty in foreign affairs and the need to cooperate and 
                                                          
362 Curtin and Dekker (2011) op.cit. note 97, 156 and 173. 
363 Respectively: Ibid., 185; Govaere (2011) op.cit. note 346, 87-111. 
364 Article 15(1) TEU. 
365 Article 18 TEU. 
366 See particularly Articles 18(4), 21(3), 26(2), 16(6) and 32 TEU. 
367 J. Wouters, D. Coppens and B. De Meester, 'The European Union’s External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty' in S. Griller 
and J. Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty (Springer, Vienna, 2008) 198. 
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integrate in order to play a role of importance on the global stage. Yet, the Treaty of Lisbon, by 
formulating the loudest ever call for coherence, while sticking to the delimitation of the CFSP, has 
turned this tension into a genuine integration-delimitation paradox. With all the public rhetoric 
focussed on integrating the whole spectrum of foreign policies, and the underlying legal framework 
still in delimitation mode, the EU risks to get itself into a fix.  
On the level of policy-making, the merger of legal personalities considerably simplifies the conduct of 
foreign relations and strengthens the external identity of the EU, but does not eliminate the need to 
delimitate between CFSP and TFEU competences.368 Failing to fully value the heterogeneity of the EU’s 
legal system and the intricacy of such an undertaking might engender duplication and fragmentation. 
This might in its turn result in substandard policy outcomes that do not fully exploit the potential of 
the Lisbon Treaty reforms. On the institutional level the paradox between integrating and delimitating 
the CFSP might seriously put the loyalty and accountability of the new institutional bridging bodies to 
the test. Rather than smoothening institutional divides this holds the risk of adding fuel to the fire of 
old inter-institutional tensions. It is therefore not surprising that Van Elsuwege expects the delimitation 
between CFSP and non-CFSP external action “to become a major battlefield for inter-institutional 
conflicts in the post-Lisbon era”.369 Some of these conflicts will undoubtedly end up before the Court, 
which has, given the unification of external action objectives and the equal value of CFSP and TFEU 
competences, been deprived of much means to objectively choose between legal bases. In the 
subsequent chapters we will analyse the impact of this integration-delimitation paradox along these 
three trajectories of policy-making, institutional design and judicial supervision, through a focus on the 
nexus between EU development cooperation and the CFSP.  
Security and development in the unified EU legal order 
The Lisbon Treaty constitutionally connects development cooperation and the CFSP in the horizontal 
external action objectives of Article 21 TEU. Whereas they previously only touched/overlapped in the 
common Treaty goal of consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law and human rights, 
this is today only one of the various shared objectives governing their implementation. This is explicitly 
confirmed in Article 23 TEU for the CFSP and Article 208(1) TFEU for development cooperation.370 
                                                          
368 B. de Witte, 'Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union's Foreign Relations?' in M. Cremona and B. de Witte 
(eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals - Essays in European Law (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2008) 9. 
369 P. Van Elsuwege, 'The Potential for Inter-Institutional Conflicts before the Court of Justice: Impact of the Lisbon Treaty' in 
M. Cremona and A. Thies (eds), The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2013) 119. 
370 In this same spirit, Article 3(5) TEU presribes that “[i]n its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and 
promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the 
sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of 
poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the 
development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”. 
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Consequently, the eradication of poverty is under a legal obligation to contribute to preserving peace, 
preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, and vice-versa. This is however not made 
so explicit as the enumeration of objectives does not concretise specific interfaces, prioritise between 
them or reconcile potentially conflicting goals.  
The reshuffling of principles and aims is not the only Treaty change to both policy areas. With regard 
to development cooperation the Convention’s Working Group on External Action professed a clear 
commitment to make this policy more effective.371 Comparing the three main objectives that were put 
forward there with the eventual outcome in the Lisbon Treaty delivers good insights into the 
profundity of this reform. First, the Convention stressed the need to clarify the purpose, role and added 
value of EU development cooperation in relation to Member States. Some participants went as far as 
arguing that “decision-making at EU level should extend to the use of aid at national level”.372 The 
result on this first commitment is rather mixed. On the positive side the Treaty clarifies that 
development cooperation is a shared competence and adds that – contrary to the general principle of 
pre-emption – “the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented 
from exercising theirs”.373 This confirms the principle of complementarity, which is also made more 
explicit under the development title. It clarifies that “[t]he Union’s development policy and that of the 
Member States shall complement and reinforce each other”.374  For this purpose and in order to 
promote the efficiency of their action, they shall coordinate their policies and consult each other on 
their aid programmes.375 On the negative side, the Treaty does not specify the added value and fails to 
break “the deafening silence in answer to the questions of Europe’s distinctive development role and 
what policy elements are best coordinated at the EU level”.376  
A second commitment was to clarify the purpose and role of EU development cooperation with regard 
to other policy areas and include it “as an element of the global strategy of the Union vis-à-vis third 
countries”.377 This commitment is often termed Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). For one 
thing, it is of course addressed by the streamlining provisions of EU external action set out above. For 
another, the development title repeats the pledge to “take account of the objectives of development 
cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.378 This 
was already included in the previous Treaty framework and can thus hardly be seen as a further 
                                                          
371 European Convention (CONV 459/02) Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, 16.12.2002, paras. 53-57. 
372 Ibid., para. 54. 
373 Article 4(4) TFEU.  
374 A literal reading of ex Article 177 TEC might have suggested a subordination of EC development cooperation to Member 
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378 Article 208(1) TFEU. 
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clarification and integration of the role and objectives of development cooperation within EU external 
action as a whole. Moreover, the relation to the chapter on economic, financial and technical 
cooperation measures with third countries remains unclear. Even though it is now explicitly specified 
that the latter covers cooperation “with third countries other than developing countries”,379 that last 
term is still nowhere defined. Yet, given that both areas are now covered by the ordinary legislative 
procedure, this fuzzy differentiation will no longer cause procedural complications. 
A third commitment consisted of establishing poverty eradication as the central aim of EU 
development policy. This is realised in Article 208(1) TFEU,380 and also Article 21(2)(d) expresses that 
the EU shall “foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing 
countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty”. This represents in fact the only element of 
prioritisation in the EU’s external action objectives. It can be seen as a return to the core business of 
development cooperation and counterbalances the potential instrumentalisation of aid which might 
result from its inclusion in the unified external action toolbox. Schütze argues that this serves to narrow 
the scope of development cooperation to measures aimed directly at poverty eradication.381 Yet, 
Article 208(1) TFEU simultaneously places development policy “within the framework of the principles 
and objectives of the Union’s external action”. Also for development cooperation agreements, set out 
in Article 209(2) TFEU, it is provided that these can pursue the objectives of Article 208 TFEU as well as 
those set out in Article 21 TEU. Arguably therefore, the new Treaty provisions – crucial with regard to 
the security-development nexus – integrate development cooperation in the EU’s foreign policy 
spectrum, while ensuring that development policies shall only pursue the other external action 
objectives to the extent that they are secondary (not primary) to eradicating poverty (cf. infra 5.3.2. 
on the Philippines PCA case).  
As set out above, the changes to the CFSP mainly result from its altered position in the EU legal order. 
A central question in this regard is how to reconcile the horizontal EU external action objectives with 
the CFSP’s ‘ring-fenced’ nature.382 Particular confusion arises in the light of the deprivation of its own 
specific objectives, with only the deceiving elucidation that it shall cover “all areas of foreign policy and 
all questions relating to the Union’s security”.383 While preserving peace, preventing conflicts and 
strengthening international security is now a common goal of EU external as a whole, TFEU 
competences such as trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid do retain their own 
                                                          
379 Article 212(1) TFEU.  
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eradication of poverty”. 
381 R. Schütze, 'EU Development Policy: Constitutional and Legislative Foundation(s)' (2013) Cambridge Yearbook of European 
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382 P.J. Cardwell, 'On "ring-fencing" the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Legal Order of the European Union' (2013) 
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71 
  
specific objectives.384 This can however not mean that the CFSP is devoid of substance, nor that it has 
an unlimited scope. On the first account, the single list of objectives must not be interpreted as 
nullifying the principle of conferral, but rather as symbolising and emphasising “the diverse, albeit 
indivisible, whole, which the totality of the Union’s external policies form”.385 On the other hand, the 
CFSP is certainly not unlimited either. Article 40 TEU read in combination with the TFEU’s attribution 
of external competences indicates that the CFSP can only be defined by default. Detracting the TFEU’s 
external competences from ‘all areas of foreign policy’ reveals its traditional focus on the political, 
security and defence aspects of EU external relations.  
Compared to the rather modest modifications to the CFSP, the area of security and defence was 
tackled more thoroughly. Most of the reforms served to catch up with the rapidly evolving dynamics 
that soon outdated ex Article 17 TEU in the variety of activities and the rapid institutionalisation. This 
is reflected in the upgrade from a single Article to a whole Treaty section, its formal inclusion as an 
integral part of the CFSP and the label change from ESDP to C(“Common”)SDP.386 Yet, if the common 
nature of the CFSP is already a point of debate, this is definitely the case for this area where decision-
making remains “hyperintergovernmental”.387 The changed denomination must therefore be seen as 
a symbolic status upgrade, and getting carried away about the possible implications hereof amounts 
to “putting the cart before the horse”.388 Furthermore, the conditional mood has been removed from 
the scope of this policy. From now on the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy “will” 
(not ‘might’) lead to a common defence, “when” (not ‘should’) the European Council, acting 
unanimously, so decide.389 Yet, one should be careful not to over-interpret semantics, particularly in 
an area that has evolved to a great extent outside the Treaty framework. Moreover, the primary law 
wording gives rise to terminological confusion. Besides the CSDP, Article 42(2) TEU mentions the 
“common Union defence policy”, which is being progressively framed, and the yet-to-be decided 
“common defence”. A close reading suggests that the CSDP is the umbrella term for the common Union 
defence policy, referring to “missions outside the Union”,390 and the common defence, relating to the 
EU’s own security and military protection. 
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First, with regard to the common Union defence policy, it is important that the Treaty codifies the 
growing variety of external missions by extending the Petersburg tasks. In particular, joint 
disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and post-conflict 
stabilisation are added to this non-exhaustive list. All these tasks may moreover contribute to the fight 
against terrorism.391 Since this is the only occasion where EU primary law explicitly refers to activities 
in the grey area between security and development, a literal reading of the TEU may create the false 
impression that the security-development nexus is a CSDP preserve. A number of other changes aim 
to smoothen the implementation of the CSDP. First, Articles 42(5) and 44 TEU enable the Council to 
entrust the implementation of a CSDP initiative to a group of Member States, which are willing and 
capable to carry it out.392 Further, Article 41(3) TEU inserted two novelties to speed up the financing 
of CSDP missions and operations, the effectiveness of which essentially depends on a swift reaction. 
With regard to CFSP initiatives and non-military preparatory activities for carrying out Petersberg tasks, 
the Council shall adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to 
EU budget appropriations. For those tasks with military or defence implications, the Council shall adopt 
by QMV, on a proposal from the High Representative, a start-up fund for the urgent financing of 
preparative initiatives.393 While these novelties, which have not been operationalised yet, allow to 
accelerate decision-making once the necessary funds are committed, they do nothing to ease the 
difficult quest for civilian and military capabilities. The Treaty does not allow the EU to develop its own 
capabilities and the CSDP thus continues to depend on national means.394 Even though Article 42(3) 
appears to promulgate in fierce terms that the Member States “shall” make these available, this 
obligation is “vague in its scope, and silent in its implications”.395 Rather than Member States being 
bound by the CSDP, it is the CSDP that remains prisoner of their political will. Declarations 13 and 14 
confirm that CSDP provisions “do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy 
of the Member States”.  
Second, the common defence, whilst still conditional upon a unanimous European Council decision, is 
no longer an entirely distant concept. Important steps towards military integration are the inclusion of 
a NATO-like396 collective defence clause in Article 42(7) TEU and the solidarity clause of Article 222 
TFEU. The latter provides for joint action when a Member State is object of a terrorist attack or victim 
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of a natural or man-made disaster.397 Moreover, in the absence of unanimity among Member States 
to proceed further in the direction of a common defence, the Treaty provides the possibility of creating 
a ‘Schengen/Eurozone of Defence’ 398  through the new provisions on Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PeSCo) in Article 42(6) and 46 TEU. Compared to the ad hoc nature of enhanced 
cooperation, which seeks to establish coalitions of the willing for specific policy initiatives, PeSCo – as 
its name indicates – aims to set up a more permanent mechanism. It is targeted at Member States that 
fulfil higher criteria for military capabilities and are willing to make more binding commitments to 
develop their defence capacities.399 In a final effort to catch up with reality, the European Defence 
Agency (EDA), which was called in motion by the 2003 Thessaloniki European Council, receives a firm 
basis in Article 42(3) and 45 TEU.400 Its tasks and responsibilities, which mainly aim at creating a level 
playing field between the Member States’ Defence Ministers, the Commission, the market and the 
industry, are outlined in noticeable detail.  
Together with the specific Petersberg tasks this constitutes a considerable level of precision that is 
alien to the rest of the CFSP. Whereas this may seem at first sight remarkable in an area that is so 
strictly guarded by the Member States, it is precisely this last element that might provide the 
explanatory factor. Indeed, there is no risk for Member States to be bound against their will by CSDP 
decisions as none of the CFSP’s QMV exceptions applies in this specific area.401 Yet, given that political 
considerations still prevail over legal commitment, one may wonder whether this anchorage of the 
CSDP in the Treaty was really necessary and will change anything in practice.402 It is in this regard 
illustrative that few of the major novelties, such as the start-up fund, Article 44 TEU or PeSCo, have yet 
been put in practice.403  
2.4. Conclusion 
EU development and security competences have trodden long and peculiar paths in the EU’s evolving 
legal order(s). The result is a particularly intricate legal system based on a number of inherent 
paradoxes. EU development cooperation evolved throughout most of its existence without explicit 
basis in the founding Treaties. Legal creativity nonetheless ensured that it was from the start part and 
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parcel of Europe’s integration project. Paradoxically, it held a more prominent position in the EU’s 
system when it had no direct basis in primary law and gradually moved out of the picture after its 
codification in the Treaty of Maastricht. The common description as a “cornerstone” of European 
integration from the 1950s to the early 1980s,404 contrasts sharply with the limited policy and public 
attention it receives today.  
From a substantive point of view, the Maastricht Treaty presented a quantum leap for EU development 
policy. Contrary to the struggle of inserting a simple ‘exchange of views’ on policy issues and a 
reference to human rights in the 1984 Lomé III Convention, the new Treaty professed in the clearest 
of terms that this policy ‘shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating 
democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’. 
This cleared the path for a less secluded policy, more sensitive to prevailing political issues and in line 
with the whole EU foreign policy spectrum. Yet, this simultaneously opened the EU up to criticism of 
how its partnership approach to North-South relations gradually changed to ‘paternalism’ or even 
‘coercion’. Increasingly, the EU’s geared-up political role came to usurp the external spotlights, 
resulting in the dethroning of development cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty aims to turn this tide by 
uprating the eradication of poverty as a central aim of the EU’s external action framework. However, 
it fails to answer key questions regarding the added value, position and role of EU development 
cooperation vis-à-vis other policies and Member States’ programmes, which might endanger the 
realisation of its primary aim. 
Although it is often the scapegoat for the EU’s low stance on the global scene, the CFSP has from a 
historical perspective made great strides. After a number of failed attempts and associated traumas, 
it evolved from largely non-committal political consultation in the 1970s to a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, firmly rooted in the Treaties, with an expanding operational arm in the form of the 
CSDP. In the light of the traditional executive dominance of foreign affairs, as well as the close 
connection to state sovereignty, the CFSP differs from all other EU policy areas in that compliance with 
its decisions is monitored by Member States, as represented in the Council and the European Council, 
rather than by the Commission or the Court. The inherent paradox of the CFSP is that it is designed to 
form the heart and beacon of EU external action, yet can only be defined by default.  
The legal framework underlying the EU’s security and development competences has evolved from 
complete separation in the Rome era, over prudent bonds under the Maastricht pillar structure, to a 
subsequent tightening in policy practice that was confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty’s unified legal order. 
Rather than by grand design, this evolution was mostly driven through a two-way process of matter-
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of-fact necessity. On the one hand, the advanced economic integration of the Union made it impossible 
for Member States to go it alone for inherently political decisions such as the imposition of sanctions 
or the disruption of aid flows. On the other hand, the interconnected challenges of foreign policy 
shattered the illusion that primarily economic areas such as development and trade could be 
decoupled from politics. This gradually evolving awareness of unavoidable interaction resulted in “a 
legal order in which different layers have been successively added, in line with the functional method 
of achieving what was possible – where the logic of compromise marking intergovernmental 
agreements took precedence over the need for systematic consistency”.405 This led to a particularly 
intricate constitutional structure that reflects a delicate balance between the growing need for 
integration and the desire of Member States “to control exactly how much competence they give to 
the EU and how much power they give to its institutions to exercise these competences”.406 This is 
expressed in a meticulous system of vertical and horizontal division of powers, counterbalanced with 
an ever more ambitious but amorphous call for consistency.407 
The Lisbon Treaty more than ever tilts this call to a constitutional level by placing it under the 
supervision of the Court, dissolving the EC into the Union, unifying the external action system and 
assigning new institutional functions with a clear mandate to unite EU foreign policy. After decades of 
constitutional confusion regarding its position it can today no longer be doubted that the CFSP is an 
inherent part of the Union’s single legal order. Nonetheless, the Lisbon Treaty is still only “a suspended 
step towards integration”, 408 and retains the CFSP’s particularity in full glory. This approach of running 
with the hare of integration and hunting with the hounds of delimitation resulted in a strong paradox. 
The Lisbon Treaty is particularly sparing of detail on how to solve this, but all the more generous in the 
room of manoeuvre for policy-makers and the judiciary. Drawing inspiration from biology, the 
challenge on the policy, institutional and judicial tracks is thus to ensure that the symbiosis of the CFSP 
and TFEU organisms does not turn into a situation of parasitism, where the benefit of the one is to the 
harm of the other, or even a synnecrosis, meaning that interaction is detrimental to both of them. The 
optimal scenario is one of mutualism, ensuring that close association is beneficial to TFEU and CFSP 
external activities.  
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3. The security-development 
nexus on the policy track 
 Our plans miscarry because they have no aim. When a man does not know what 
harbour he is making for, no wind is the right wind. 
  
Lucius Annaeus Seneca, 4 BC – AD 65 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter the TEU and TFEU provide the CFSP and development cooperation 
with wide-ranging mandates. The Lisbon Treaty constitutionally connects their objectives in Article 21 
TEU and renders them an organic part of the indissoluble whole which the EU’s external action now 
forms.409 Primary law has however never specified how to deal with connections or the grey area 
between them. Consequently, the EU’s pledge to enhance the security-development interface has 
matured entirely in policy statements and declarations based on these extensive Treaty objectives as 
well as the responsibility of the Commission, the Council and (more recently) the High Representative 
for ensuring the consistency of EU external action.   
The key challenge in this undertaking is that the EU’s constitutional system firmly divides – as most 
clearly expressed in Article 40 TEU – what this policy nexus aims to unite. This obviously complicates 
the choice of legal basis in the grey area between security and development, and resulted in two very 
separate sets of policy instruments on both sides of the legal fracture. These have gradually evolved 
towards the core of the security-development interface, with the ever-present risk of missing synergy 
opportunities, duplication and fragmentation. Under the first title of this chapter, the EU’s evolving 
lexicon on the security-development nexus will be compared and contrasted with the reality of its 
complex and fragmented legal framework (3.1.). A second part will set out what this implies for the 
Union’s range of instruments, with specific attention for fine-tuning and coordinating the respective 
development and security toolboxes (3.2.).  
3.1. The EU's commitment to the security-development nexus: about 
words and deeds 
The need for coherence between security and development policies, which is stressed in policy 
declarations nearly to the point of monotony, did not arrive out of the blue on the policy agenda of EU 
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institutions. As for the motives to undertake development cooperation and security missions, also the 
drive to enhance their interface is not a matter of unrestrained altruism, but results from a variety of 
interrelated factors. First, the EU’s philanthropic intentions are closely related to so-called ‘enlightened 
self-interest’. This means that breaking the vicious cycle of socio-economic deterioration and instability 
in faraway places is necessary to guarantee the European way life. In the words of former External 
Relations Commissioner Patten: the “idea of an inter-relationship between peace and development is 
not new … [b]ut the scale of the problem and the appalling repercussions of recent conflicts have made 
this a matter of self-preservation”.410 Second, the security-development nexus is about an optimal use, 
and averting the waste, of scarce resources. Development efforts take significant time to yield results, 
which can be wiped out in the blink of an eye through the psychological and physical damage done by 
violence and war. The CFSP and particularly the CSDP, on the other hand, “can promote but seldom 
achieve decisive progress”. 411  Sustainable results require sequenced follow-up by longer-term 
(development) programmes. Finally, discussions on the security-development nexus not seldom have 
a hidden agenda relating to political power and influence. Security and development competences are 
governed by diverging procedures and an essentially different institutional balance. This implies that 
determining the borderline and division of labour between them is not a mere theoretical or technical 
exercise, but has an inherently political nature. Given their differentiated involvement, the 
Commission, the Parliament and possibly even the Court of Justice can be said to have an interest in 
activities being framed as development cooperation, whereas the balance tips towards the Member 
States under the CFSP framework.  
Since the late 1990s, these motivations have in varying gradations influenced the rising policy agenda 
of EU institutions promoting coherence between security and development actors, policies and 
initiatives. This process has not been univocal, but resembles a conceptual chaos of ever-changing 
terminology, reminiscent of a kid that cannot choose which toy to play with. The security-development 
nexus is an all-purpose concept relating to and touching upon numerous EU documents. The aim of 
this section is therefore not to give a complete overview, but rather to set out concisely the key policy 
statements and main evolutions in the EU’s lexicon on this topic (3.1.1.). A second section will then 
explore their feasibility in the light of the Union’s disjointed constitutional structure (3.1.2.). 
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3.1.1. The evolving lexicon of EU institutions  
The awareness about the interrelation of security and development was not alien to the EU in its early 
years, as evidenced by the above references to the 1950 Schuman Declaration or the 1973 Document 
on European Identity.412 It is however only since the late 1990s that this linkage is progressively put 
forward as an explicit policy guide. Prompted by its disappointment in the 1995 Council Conclusions 
on ‘Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and peace-keeping in Africa’413 – which offered little 
decisiveness in the aftermath of the 1993 Rwanda-trauma – the Commission came forth as pioneer for 
a more integrated approach. The initial impetus was given in a Communication on ‘The European Union 
and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa’. 414  With notable precision, this innovative policy document 
undertakes a rare attempt at defining the by now typical, but increasingly obscured, terminology of 
conflict prevention and root causes of conflicts. With the introduction of ‘structural stability’ it makes 
a first attempt to conceptualise the security-development linkage. This term refers to a “situation 
involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political 
structures and healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change 
without to resort to violent conflict”. 415  In the Commission’s view, achieving structural stability 
requires a comprehensive and pro-active approach maximising the Union’s leverage through an 
optimal use of its available instruments. A subsequent Green Paper cautioned that “[a]ny 
subordination of cooperation policy to foreign policy measures could jeopardize development 
objectives, which are medium and long-term and hence require continuity of action”.416 
Box 3: Selected key EU documents relating to the security-development nexus 
1996 Commission Communication on The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa  
2001 EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (Göteborg Programme) 
2003 European Security Strategy 
2004 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe 
2004 Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP 
2005 Commission Communication on Policy Coherence for Development 
2006 European Consensus on Development 
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414 Commission Communication (COM(1996) 332 final) on the European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: peace-
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2007 Joint Africa-Europe Strategy 
2007 Council Conclusions on Security and Development 
2007 Council Conclusions Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility 
2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy 
2011 Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention 
2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States 
2012 The Agenda for Change 
2013 Joint Commission and High Representative Communication on the EU's comprehensive 
approach to external conflict and crises 
2014 Council Conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach 
Initially, this approach only found limited hearing with the Council, wary of Commission intrusion in 
the Member States-dominated security domain.417 Yet, the Commission stood firm, with Development 
Commissioner Pinheiro professing in 1999 that “development co-operation is indisputably the single 
most important instrument for an effective policy of peace-building”. 418  A final push in 2001 419 
eventually prompted the adoption by the Göteborg European Council of the ‘EU Programme for the 
Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ (also: Göteborg Programme). This represents a clear commitment to 
move away from pigeonholing security and development. It introduces a multi-dimensional approach 
through an integrated use of the EU’s structural long-term instruments – including “development co-
operation, trade, arms control, human rights and environment policies as well as political dialogue” – 
and short-term preventive actions by a broad range of diplomatic and humanitarian tools.420 While still 
kept separate, the CSDP structures for civilian and military crisis management were moreover to 
contribute to the EU’s conflict prevention capabilities.  
These connections are further cultivated in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), drafted by then 
High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana. While recognising the need for fine-tuning the EU’s 
external toolbox, the ESS gears the latter firmly towards security objectives that mainly serve to 
counter threats to the EU’s own safety.421 These are said to result from terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs), organised crime and state failure. This philosophy of equating security challenges 
abroad with the EU’s own safety is continued in the 2004 Barcelona Report on a ‘Human Security 
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Doctrine for Europe’. This report, commissioned by Solana and drafted by a group of distinguished 
practitioners and academics, focussed on implementing the ESS. One of the starting points was that 
“Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity”.422 In line with the 
emerging UN lexicon,423 it conceptualises human security as departure from state security towards 
“freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations”.424 A 2007 
follow-up Madrid Report 425  complements this rather theoretical approach with operational 
instructions for the CFSP and CSDP operations, which were however only limitedly picked up by EU 
institutions.426 In this sense it is telling that the call in the Madrid Report on Member States to “agree 
a public declaration of their commitment to principles which put Human Security at the heart of the 
European Union’s external operations” was never realised.427 
The launch of the first CSDP missions in 2003 further contributed to the emerging security-bias of EU 
external action. Ex Article 17(2) TEU formally limited the Petersberg list to “humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making”. 
Yet, this initial focus on military and defence aspects was soon extended with a civilian dimension, 
bringing the CSDP irrevocably within the radius of development activity. This led the European Council 
to convey, in its 2004 Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, that “synergy between EU development 
assistance activities and civilian crisis management under ESDP should be elaborated and better 
developed, including in post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction”.428 This plan was part of broader 
efforts to improve civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and coordination (CMCO) in EU external action. 
There exists some confusion regarding the exact differences between these two concepts. In general 
terms, CIMIC is not specific to the EU and emerged in the context of NATO to improve the interaction 
of military and civilian actors at field/tactical level. CMCO is a politico-strategic concept developed in 
the context of the CFSP/CSDP to improve coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved 
in the planning and subsequent implementation of crisis response. 429  In this context a draft 
Comprehensive Planning Concept was developed “as a living document” to be enhanced on the basis 
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of lessons learned in operational experience.430 It aims to ensure “a systematic approach designed to 
address the need for effective intra-pillar and inter-pillar co-ordination” in EU crisis management 
planning”.431 However, this concept remained rather light on cross-pillar guidance and was never 
formally approved.   
If the ESS is the bible of European security, then the 2006 European Consensus on Development (ECD) 
is its counterpart for the EU’s aid and cooperation policies. In a notable sign of resoluteness, unity and 
cohesion this statement was adopted jointly by the Council, Member States, Parliament and 
Commission. Departing from the conviction that “insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the 
biggest obstacles to achieving the [Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)]” it expresses a more 
cyclical view on the security-development connection. It regards both as “important and 
complementary aspects” that “[w]ithin their respective actions … contribute to creating a secure 
environment and breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing 
economic, social and political structures”.432 Unfortunately this balanced link is not continued in the 
2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted by European and African Heads of States or Government. The 
importance attached to “peace and security as preconditions for political, economic and social 
development” is reflected in a particularly vibrant partnership on Peace and Security. However, its 
MDG partnership remains entirely isolated from security concerns.433  
The ECD remains to date “the compass” for actions under the EU’s development policy, as expressed 
by European Parliament President Schulz and High Representative Ashton who signed and gave new 
impetus to the Consensus on 3 April 2014.434 In relation to the security-development nexus it does not 
excel in vision and precision, but embraces a number of concepts that left indelible traces on this 
continuously evolving policy debate. First, it affirms the Union’s commitment to promote Policy 
Coherence for Development (PCD), meaning that it “shall take account of the objectives of 
development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing 
countries, and that these policies support development objectives”.435 Rooted in Article 208(1) TFEU, 
PCD departs from the realisation that improving development cooperation is important, but “in itself 
not sufficient to enable the developing world to reach the [MDGs]”.436 Consequently, five focal areas 
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are to contribute to this objective: trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration and – 
most importantly for this research – security. A second important trace left by the ECD is the focus on 
‘fragile states’ or ‘state fragility’.437 Although it is still included alongside the concept of ‘failed states’, 
it incited a move away from this ideologically more disparaging term that saw the light of day in the 
context of the ESS and the global war on terror.  
It was most authoritatively picked up by the November 2007 General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) which organised the first ever joint meeting of EU Development and Defence 
Ministers. Symptomising the EU’s anomaly of conceptual multiplication, the Council adopted two sets 
of related – and arguably unnecessarily separated – Conclusions, one on ‘an EU Response to Situations 
of Fragility’ and another on ‘Security and Development’. The first situates itself “within the framework 
of the European Consensus on Development” and seeks to establish a more comprehensive and 
forward-looking use of all EU and Member States development instruments in fragile states.438 The 
Conclusions on Security and Development are broader and build on both the ECD and the ESS. This 
took the security-development nexus to a new level by expressing a firm belief that it “should inform 
EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU external action”.439 Typically 
for EU jargon, it is added “that the responsibilities and roles of development and security actors are 
complementary but remain specific”. These Conclusions constitute the first time that the Council 
addresses the security-development inter-linkage beyond the level of generalist rhetoric. It is therefore 
useful to reproduce in full the relevant provisions on ‘pragmatic actions’.  
2007 Council Conclusions on Security and Development 
Strategic Planning 
8. The EU is addressing insecurity, and conflicts and their root causes, through a wide range of 
instruments. Inter-linkage between security and development should be seen as an integral part of 
the ongoing EU efforts, including those to enhance Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) in order to 
address complex crises in a coherent manner. 
9. To enhance coherence and consistency, the Council calls for further intensified cooperation within 
and between Council bodies, Commission services and Member States, in particular by improving the 
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sequencing in the strategic planning of their short term and longer-term actions. This should be 
promoted by: 
• a more systematic consideration by the relevant Council bodies of the potential synergies 
between security and development, for example through joint meetings where appropriate, 
including across pillars;  
• systematically carrying out security/conflict sensitive assessments and conflict analysis, where 
appropriate, in the preparation of country and regional strategies and programmes;  
• taking into account the development dimension in the preparation of CFSP/ESDP activities, 
and taking into account security aspects, including the CFSP/ESDP dimension, in the 
preparation of development activities; 
• engaging in in-depth consultations, strategic political and conflict analyses and screenings with 
a view to planning and acting consistently on early signs of tension, instability and fragility; 
• ensuring coordination across the pillars through consistent planning arrangements (Member 
States, Commission and General Secretariat of the Council (GSC)), sequencing and 
implementation arrangements, including joint Fact Finding Missions and the joint 
establishment of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a given crisis, where appropriate; 
• promoting joint training courses and joint Assessment Missions;  
• intensifying cooperation with international institutions, in particular the UN, during the 
strategic planning process, especially on the basis of the Joint Statement on EU-UN 
Cooperation in Crisis Management. 
The uncertain future of the Lisbon Treaty after its rejection in the 2008 Irish referendum regrettably 
queered the pitch for this heightened policy commitment. This standstill was only prolonged by the 
inter-institutional wrangling regarding the practical implications of its often nebulous external 
relations provisions which followed its eventual ratification. The pledge to take the security-
development nexus forward in EU external action is confirmed in subsequent policy statements, but 
not taken any further. The 2008 Report on the implementation of the ESS for instance dedicates a 
separate section to the issue, but stays clear of ground-breaking changes.440 Similarly the 2012 Agenda 
for Change, setting out a vision for the future of EU development policy, simply repeats the 
commitment to improve the interface with security policy.441 Also the 2010 revision of the Cotonou 
Agreement brought the text in line with this growing consensus, without adding any new ideas or more 
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concrete measures. Article 11(2) of the Agreement now states that “[t]he interdependence between 
security and development shall inform the activities in the field of peace building, conflict prevention 
and resolution which shall combine short and long-term approaches, which encompass and go beyond 
crisis management”.442 
Telling for this lost impetus is that the commitment in both sets of 2007 Council Conclusions, to 
concretise this new agenda by preparing an Action Plan, lost traction.443 Based on the experiences of 
a number of pilot countries a draft Action Plan on Fragility was prepared in 2010. Yet, as a confirmation 
of their unnecessary separation the Council first decided to merge the latter into a single Action Plan 
on Security, Fragility and Development, only to postpone the debate until a decision on the scope and 
mandate of the EEAS would be reached. 444  Despite repeated reminders and reiterations of the 
commitment by the OECD, and even the Commission and the Council,445  this forbearance led to 
acquittance and the Action Plan was shelved in the absence of any political sponsorship. Today, this 
stands as an inglorious reminder of the EU’s struggle to turn words into deeds. In a similar vein, the 
announced review of the Göteborg Programme did not produce any new guidelines but resulted in a 
simple reaffirmation that the old commitment “remains a valid policy basis for further European Union 
action in the field of conflict prevention”.446 Given that the dust of the Lisbon Treaty was still settling 
in 2011, it was presumably considered too early for any undertakings that risked to add fuel to the fire 
of disentangling fuzzy competence boundaries.  
In the absence of internal momentum, the EU appeared to invest all the more externally in the New 
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. This was adopted at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in Busan in December 2011. Although the Union had contributed little to the drafting 
stage, its common position for this Forum shows a level of commitment that stands in sharp contrast 
to the prudent declarations of the four preceding years.447 The key innovation of this New Deal is that 
it gives effect to the longstanding rhetoric of local ownership by according a central role to the G7+, a 
voluntary association of fragile and conflict-affected states. It introduces country-led fragility 
assessments, ensuring a shared understanding of conflict drivers and enabling contextualised 
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responses. This essentially aims to turn international partners into “facilitators and enablers” rather 
than imposers of best practices, but ironically faces severe funding shortages.448  
Two decades of rising commitments to enhance the policy nexus between security and development 
have thus witnessed a coming and going of new concepts trying to catch this complex reality. From 
structural stability over conflict prevention, root causes of conflict, human security, a security-
development nexus, failed states to fragility, the EU proofed significantly better in conceptualisation 
than operationalisation; better in following international practice than taking the lead. Now that the 
contours of the Lisbon Treaty’s restructuring are starting to take their definitive shape, EU institutions 
appear ready for another endeavour with the ‘comprehensive approach’, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
3.1.2. The (neglected) legal and political complexity 
In 2009 the Commission acknowledged that “[t]he broad agreement on the principles underpinning 
the security/development nexus contrasts with the difficulties encountered in their 
implementation”.449 A few months before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty this could still be 
seen as a sin of the “the pillar structure [which] impedes coherent action between military and 
development components”.450 There is however ample evidence that this disparity between principles 
and implementation did not end with the depillarisation. While it is generally agreed that development 
cooperation and the CFSP progressively converged throughout the past decade, with positive effects 
on policy outcomes, the EU’s full potential is far from realised. A 2012 OECD-DAC peer review of EU 
development policy, a 2011 evaluation of the Commission’s support to conflict prevention and peace-
building, a 2014 Parliament study on external action coherence, and a 2013 CSDP Lessons report all 
call to increase institutional cooperation and procedural fine-tuning of development and security 
policies.451 Also scholarly work points to concerns of intra and inter-institutional compartmentalisation, 
coordination and coherence.452 All these issues will be discussed in more detail in the present and 
following chapters.  
                                                          
448 M. Tran, 'Apathy over aid effectiveness threatens global partnership', theguardian.com Poverty Matters Blog, 15.08.2013. 
449  Commission Staff Working Document (SEC(2009) 1137 final) accompanying the Report on Policy Coherence for 
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450 Ibid., 73. 
451 OECD-DAC (2012) op.cit. note 83, 33-34; ADE (2011) op.cit. note 82, 100; European Parliament (2013/2146(INI)) op.cit. 
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In section 1.1.2., the difficulty of extracting a constructive policy guide from the well-documented 
“doom spiral”453 of poverty and instability was discussed. In effect, the finding of the International 
Peace Academy in 2004, that practice is running ahead of meaningful debates to support this nexus, 
still stands today.454 The EU pledges to inform its strategies and policies by the security-development 
nexus without displaying much knowledge of the causal connections between aid and stabilising 
tensions. The Treaties give the EU’s development and security competences a very broad scope and 
the link between them can refer to various – potentially contradicting – aims, means and activities. Yet, 
few attempts are made to specify, concretise or narrow down the infinite number of possible linkages 
that alluding to such a nexus implies. According to the Commission, “no one questions … the role that 
development plays for preventing conflicts, ensuring durable exits from conflicts and for accompanying 
crisis management through protective, confidence-building and crisis-alleviating measures”.455 The 
how and why of this role is however not made explicit, nor is the potential for counterproductive action. 
Unfortunately, such uninformed assumptions by far outnumber realistic assessments of the actual 
impact of development action on security objectives and vice versa.  
 
Box 4: Counterintuitive aid results in Somalia and Somaliland 
An interesting example of how more aid does not necessarily lead to more stability is provided by 
contrasting the cases of Somalia and Somaliland. While Somalia, the long-standing problem child of 
the international community, has received tons in aid throughout the past decades, its northern 
neighbour – that seceded in 1991 during the country’s civil war – is not globally recognised as a 
sovereign nation and thus not formally eligible for international assistance. It is nonetheless the latter 
that displays impressive socio-economic progress under stable circumstances, with Somalia lagging 
seriously behind on both accounts. Whilst numerous factors evidently need to be taken into account, 
Eubank finds part of the explanation precisely in the limited availability of aid in Somaliland. This forced 
its government to turn to business leaders and citizens for support, whom in return negotiated 
responsive political institutions that proof today better fit to keep the peace.456 
In addition to the lacunae in the understanding of security-development linkages, EU efforts to 
operationalise the intuitive complementarity of development cooperation and security and defence 
policy are complicated by their particularly outspoken constitutional delimitation. This implies that 
while the challenges of insecurity and poverty are ruthlessly cross-cutting, the Union’s means to cut 
                                                          
453 Vennesson and Büger (2009) op.cit. note 34, 14-16. 
454 IPA, The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century (International Peace Academy, 
New York, 2004) 6. 
455 Commission Staff Working Document (SEC(2009) 1137 final) op.cit. note 449, 62. 
456 N. Eubank, 'Taxation, Political Accountability and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland' (2012) The Journal of Development 
Studies 48(4), 465-480. 
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across the legal divide between the policy areas that address them are limited. EU institutions cannot 
simply respond to needs and rely on good intentions in their efforts to tackle the interconnected 
challenges of poverty, inequality, development, rebellion, instability and war. They must respect the 
Union’s division of competences and act within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by the 
Treaty. Every initiative on the security-development continuum requires a legal basis, a provision in 
the budget and a financial instrument establishing the basis on which money can be spent for that type 
of action (cf. infra 3.2.).457 It is however “difficult to unite what the Treaty and its authors so clearly 
wished to separate”. 458  Moreover, the Union’s development and security communities are very 
separate entities for whom the idea of a nexus tends to have a different meaning and impact.  
First, the conceptualisation of the nexus is in essence a political undertaking. Hereby the power of 
definition “implies the power to define not only the relevant field of interest, but also the material 
content of practices, the distribution of resources and subsequent policy responses”.459 How this has 
tended to oppose the Council Secretariat and the Commission, which before the creation of the EEAS 
formed the centre of gravity in the daily management of respectively CFSP/CSDP and development 
cooperation (cf. infra Chapter 4), is clear when contrasting statements of Director in the GSC Cloos and 
the former Director General of DG DEVCO Fotiadis. The former articulated strategically that: 
the link between political objectives defined in ESS and the actual use of Community funds should 
be strengthened. The question has also to be asked whether we get good value for money for our 
external assistance and development aid. The EU (EC and Member States) provides 54 % of the 
world’s ODA … But the results achieved in terms of development and in terms of the EU’s influence 
and visibility are not commensurate with that effort.460  
Portraying aid in terms of political influence tends to upset development staff within the Commission. 
Yet, that the latter is no plaster saint either is made clear by Fotiadis, who held that the nexus 
“represents an opportunity to boost Policy Coherence for Development … and to strengthen the role 
and visibility of the Commission’s activities”. 461  The Commission’s introduction of the ‘structural 
stability’ concept (cf. supra 3.1.1.) provides an early illustration of how this can influence policy framing: 
“[t]he security sector has not traditionally been a focus of EC co-operation. However in many countries, 
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achieving structural stability may require fundamental overhaul of the state security sector”.462 An 
example from the other side is the European Security Strategy establishing “[s]ecurity as a precondition 
of development” and adhering to the concept of ‘failed states’ to advance security objectives in the 
programming of development aid.463  
Second, also the impact of the security-development nexus is felt differently by the EU’s development 
and security communities. Development actors that get more involved with security issues risk to 
undermine their traditionally autonomous and neutral status. This brings along an increasing exposure 
to threats, necessitating a difficult trade-off between bunkering the development sector and 
safeguarding the much-needed interaction and confidence-building with local communities. It is 
therefore not surprising that many in the aid community “long for the ‘good old days’ of technical, 
apolitical, simplicity: a clear mandate, a specialized technical assistant to execute it, and a nice photo 
of a new piece of infrastructure”.464 For security actors, the increasing involvement with development 
practitioners and their practices of local engagement erodes the traditionally more secretive and 
shielded nature of their work. Military personnel, in particular, are not always at ease when 
cooperating with actors that do not fit their logic of discipline and hierarchy.465  
The coherence call of the nexus thus challenges deep-seated practices. Consequently, it is a highly 
sensitive and all but straightforward process. For some, both communities “remain frustratingly 
separated”,466 for others – particularly within the aid community – this interaction has already reached 
too far and challenges the autonomous goals of the individual policy areas.467 This has led to diverging 
criticism ranging from a far-reaching securitisation of aid, over an insufficient developmentalisation of 
security, to the nexus as a re-legitimisation of development cooperation – or even an example of “aid-
industry boosterism”.468  The security-development agenda calls for a much-needed fine-tuning of 
activities, but this can evidently not come at the price of undermining the raison d’être of both policy 
fields. In other words, it requires a delicate balance between the rationales of Articles 21 and 40 TEU. 
The different meaning and impact of this agenda in the EU’s divided security and development 
communities resulted in very different views on how to strike this balance between the autonomy and 
insulation of objectives. This might explain why – yet does not make it any more acceptable – EU 
institutions struggle to adopt consensual plans of action in this area. These are of vital importance for 
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living up to this commitment and exploiting the full potential of the EU’s broad range of instruments. 
As put in a 2013 Parliament report: 
[w]ith its long-term and continued presence, the critical mass of financial support, the vast range 
of tools, instruments and political and economic power, the EU could be a critical and important 
actor in fragile states. However, there is no consensus yet on either the means of setting precise 
objectives, or on the design of policies and implementation mechanisms to reach those objectives 
that ensure coherence across the different domains.469  
The biannual reports on PCD and the yearly reporting on the implementation of the Göteborg 
Programme (which was unfortunately halted in 2010) 470 provide key moments of stocktaking and 
lessons-learning, but cannot compensate for the absence of strategic thinking. The next section will 
demonstrate that this strategic void has not prevented the EU from developing an impressive policy 
arsenal. Lacking a shared vision, this occurred however in a rather ad hoc fashion, with obvious risks 
of fragmentation, duplication and inter-institutional tensions.  
3.2. The security-development toolbox: centrifugal forces at play 471 
The insulation of the CFSP implicates that the EU can only approach the security-development 
interface by way of instruments and policy communities that are deliberately kept separate along 
those lines. As primary law does not define the outer limits of EU development cooperation and 
CFSP/CSDP, both sets of toolboxes have gradually converged towards the core of the nexus. A key 
question is therefore whether secondary law provides more clarity on the division and delimitation of 
development and security competences. In order to answer this question, this section will respectively 
set out the Union’s development cooperation instrumentarium on the interface with the CFSP (3.2.1.), 
its security arsenal on the interface with development (3.2.2.) and the challenges of fine-tuning and 
coordinating this whole (3.2.3.).  
3.2.1. Development instruments on the interface with security policy 
After fierce inter-institutional negotiations, the Council adopted, on 2 December 2013, the EU’s new 
multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the years 2014-2020.472 The external financing instruments 
                                                          
469 M. Gavas, et al., 'EU Development Cooperation in Fragile States: Challenges and Opportunities' (European Parliament DG 
for External Policies, Brussels, 2013) 13. 
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largely follow the lines of the previous MFF.473 Five of them hold the legal basis of development 
cooperation (Article 209(1) TFEU).474 Two are thematic instruments (the Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)) and 
three have a geographic focus (the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the Partnership Instrument (PI)). In addition there is the earlier 
mentioned European Development Fund that finances cooperation under the Cotonou Agreement and 
remains outside the EU budget. 
Before setting out the relevant security-related components of these instruments, this section will 
shortly enunciate on their reach and scope. The ENI builds further on the former European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and provides support to the sixteen countries 
covered by the European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP).475  
Box 5: The EU’s instruments related to development cooperation (2014-2020) 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
Partnership Instrument (PI) 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) 
European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR) 
European Development Fund (EDF) 
EUR 15,433 million 
EUR 19,662 million 
EUR 955 million 
EUR 2,339 million 
EUR 1,333 million 
EUR 30,506 million 
The DCI is made up of three components.476 Its geographic programmes cover all developing countries 
that are not included under the Cotonou Agreement, the ENI and the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA). Thematic programmes address development-related global public goods and 
challenges. Their geographic scope is wider and only excludes (developing) countries covered by the 
IPA. The third component is the Pan-African programme (PAP), backing up the Africa-EU strategic 
                                                          
473  The 2007-2013 MFF had undertaken a drastic reform reducing the various legal instrument from 30 to seven with 
significant efficiency gains and more streamlined and simplified procedures (see further: S. Bartelt, 'The Institutional Interplay 
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partnership and covering activities of a trans-regional, continental or global nature.477 In line with the 
Lisbon Treaty, the primary objective of the DCI is to eradicate poverty and additionally to foster 
sustainable economic, social and environmental development, and consolidate and support 
democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international 
law.478 It is moreover brought in line with the Agenda for Change, meaning that it contains stronger 
elements of differentiation to focus on countries most in need. 
The PI is an entirely new financial instrument supporting “cooperation measures with countries with 
which the Union has a strategic interest in promoting links, especially developed and developing 
countries which play an increasingly prominent role in global affairs, including in foreign policy, the 
international economy and trade, multilateral fora and global governance, and in addressing 
challenges of global concern, or in which the Union has other significant interests”.479  It aims to 
intercept countries that have outgrown development aid.480 As the Regulation does not explicitly touch 
upon security, crisis or fragility-related issues, it will not be discussed further in this chapter. 
The IcSP is the successor to the Instrument for Stability (IfS). It aims to provide swift crisis-response in 
countries victim to or at risk of crises or natural disasters and build the capacity of the EU and third 
countries for crisis preparedness, conflict prevention and peace building.481 As it is the EU instrument 
most explicitly tackling the security-development nexus, it will be analysed in detail below.  
The EIDHR supports the promotion of human rights and democracy in countries where these are under 
threat. With its focus on and support to civil society organisations it allows the EU to engage in 
countries with which cooperation is low, officially suspended or non-existent. The new Regulation aims 
to give the Union a stronger capacity to respond promptly to human rights emergencies, focus more 
on vulnerable groups and target countries where human rights are most in danger.482 
The 2012 OECD-DAC peer review of EU development cooperation stipulates that setting up the new 
MFF requires “finishing on-going conceptual work on security, fragility and development”. 483  As 
discussed above this work has still not been finalised at present. In this light, this section aims to 
                                                          
477 It is interesting to note 100% of the actions under the geographic programmes have to fulfil the OECD’s criteria for Official 
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PAP (Article 2(3) DCI Regulation). This is mainly due to the transversal nature of these last two components. 
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uncover to what extent EU institutions have succeeded in making development instruments more 
security-sensitive.  
The ‘traditional’ external financing instruments 
In tackling the interface with security policy the Union has undertaken a gradual adaptation of its 
development cooperation toolbox following a two-tiered approach: security-sensitising its 
development activities and targeting development instruments directly at security challenges.  
First, enhancing the security-sensitivity of traditional development funding consists of directing them 
at the so-called root causes of conflict, such as “[p]overty, economic stagnation, uneven distribution 
of resources, weak social structures, undemocratic governance, systematic discrimination, oppression 
of the rights of minorities, destabilising effects of refugee flows, ethnic antagonisms, religious and 
cultural intolerance,” etc.484 In this manner, over two thirds of funding under the 11th EDF and more 
than half of the 2014-2020 DCI will be targeted at people in fragile situations.485 Yet, despite the 
constantly changing needs in such circumstances, the importance of inter-service consultation and 
democratic scrutiny implies that the Commission cannot propose very light procedures. Consequently, 
it has introduced a number of measures to make development cooperation more responsive to 
unpredictable security challenges. These include the mainstreaming of conflict prevention in country 
strategy papers (CSPs), conflict impact assessments, a root causes checklist with a watch list of 
countries most at risk of instability, trainings and efforts to increase the flexibility of development 
programming. 
This last element appears in various forms and shapes. First, there is the inclusion of ad hoc emergency 
procedures to revise country or regional strategy papers. This occurs “[i]n the event of crises or threats 
to democracy, the rule of law or human rights and fundamental freedoms, or of natural or man-made 
disasters”.486  Second, for countries included on the crisis declaration list (annually revised by the 
Commission), grants can be awarded without a call for proposals. Moreover, special procedures can 
be negotiated to speed up the procurement of essential goods and services. A third category consists 
of reserving funds for unexpected events by underprogramming aid envelopes or setting aside a ‘rainy 
day fund’. The MFF Regulation includes a general Emergency Aid Reserve with a fixed annual amount 
of EUR 280 million. This is “intended to allow for a rapid response to specific aid requirements of third 
countries following events which could not be foreseen when the budget was established, first and 
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foremost for humanitarian operations, but also for civil crisis management and protection”.487 This 
amount, which covers rapid responses under all external instruments, is evidently very limited.  
Consequently, several instruments dispose of their own emergency reserves. A new provision in the 
DCI allows to leave funds unallocated “in order to ensure an appropriate response of the Union in the 
event of unforeseen circumstances, in particular in fragile and post-crisis situations”.488 In addition, the 
Commission may now adopt immediately applicable implementing acts under the DCI Regulation “[o]n 
duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, such as crises or immediate threats to democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights or fundamental freedoms”.489 In other cases or under other instruments 
there is also the possibility of reverting to budgetary reserves or surpluses. The EDF, for its part, 
disposes of two separate envelops: a general A-envelop for national indicative programming and a B-
envelop for unforeseen needs, exogenous shocks and humanitarian, emergency and post-emergency 
assistance.490 The proportion of unallocated funds has been stepped up over time and an ever larger 
percentage of the B-envelop is left unassigned to any particular country.491  
A specific EU modality to intervene in fragile states is the state-building contract (SBC), introduced in 
late 2012.492 This is a particular type of budget support493 targeted at intervening rapidly in crisis 
situations to address basic needs, restore essential public functions and cushion social, economic and 
political deterioration. The EU’s general experience with budget support is rather mixed.494 Given that 
crisis situations often go hand in hand with weak state authorities, corruption and human rights 
violations, this new modality attaches stronger safeguards to this hazardous undertaking. The 
combination of aid conditionality and predictability gives the EU stronger leverage and the partner 
country more impact to manage instability. As argued by the Commission, “[l]ack of capacity is seldom 
a good reason for bypassing local authorities, as it eliminates the opportunity for learning by doing”.495 
In this reasoning, the SBCs allow fragile countries to take the lead and gain legitimacy from re-
establishing basic services. However, it cannot “be seen as a cure-all to stabilise an environment” and 
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more efforts need to be undertaken to connect this with longer-term capacity-building and more 
systematically incorporate better risk management.496 A more persistent problem is the difficulty of 
guaranteeing buy-in for the EU’s objectives of human security and development from often 
fragmented state authorities.497 
Finally, the EU regularly reverts to ad hoc shock-absorbing schemes such as the Food Facility (providing 
a rapid response mechanism to soaring food prices), Vulnerability-Flex (V-Flex – helping ACP countries 
cope with the impact of the global financial crisis and economic downturn) or the Supporting Horn of 
Africa Resilience (SHARE – responding to the 2011 food crisis) programme. These mechanisms deliver 
counter-cyclical aid to mitigate sudden socio-economic deterioration.  
The second track of adapting the EU’s aid toolbox consists of targeting development instruments more 
directly at security challenges with the argument that they undermine development activities. The 
Union’s showpieces in this undertaking are the IcSP and the African Peace Facility (APF). Before going 
deeper into their functioning, it is important not to ignore the ability of traditional external instruments 
to finance security-oriented actions. For one thing, all the above instruments are accorded – with 
varying gradations – a role in the elastic field of security sector reform (SSR). This goes from 
strengthening the rule of law, over capacity-building, to fostering democratic accountability and 
oversight of the security and justice sectors.498 In this regard, a key change under the new MFF is that 
the prevention as well as settlement of conflicts is mainstreamed as transversal objective under the 
IcSP, DCI and ENI.499  
Additionally, several instruments touch upon specific elements of the interface with security and 
defence policy. The EIDHR is the key framework for the Union’s election observation missions (EOMs). 
Furthermore, the fact that its activities do not require governmental approval in the targeted country 
enables the EU to engage in sensitive areas such as the fight against torture and harmful traditional 
practices, preventing the use of child soldiers and “promoting the peaceful outcome of electoral 
processes, the reduction of electoral violence and the acceptance of credible results by all segments 
of society”.500  
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Whereas the 2007-2013 DCI embarked still prudently upon post-crisis and fragile situations, this 
instrument is now placed from the outset and firmly within the context of the security-development 
nexus. This is included as a general area of activity under geographic programming and set out in more 
detail under the specific objectives of all the various regions.501 It involves promoting reconciliation, 
strengthening early warning systems, building institutional capacity, post-conflict reconstruction and 
even state and peace-building. While this appears to increase the potential for overlap with the IcSP 
(cf. infra), it is notable that a number of previous duplications, such as demining and demobilisation 
and reintegration of former combatants, have now been left out of the DCI Regulation.  
The specificity of the EDF is that it finds its origin in the Cotonou Agreement, which has Article 217 
TFEU on associations as its legal basis. This implicates that the European Development Fund is not 
determined or confined by the Union’s development cooperation objectives. As mentioned above the 
most striking expression of this broad legal basis is Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement, including 
commitments on peace-building, conflict resolution, combatting terrorism and even countering the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That this accords the EDF a far-reaching role on the verge 
of the CFSP and CSDP is most clearly demonstrated by the African Peace Facility. 
The African Peace Facility 
The creation of the APF is situated in the context of the transformation of the Organisation for African 
Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in the early 2000s. One of the main priority areas of this 
regained commitment for pan-African governance was that of peace and security. It resulted from 
strong political will among African leaders to put more effort in preventing, managing and resolving 
conflicts by the continent as a whole. This is embodied in the creation of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) as a long-term structure that functions in collaboration with and acts through the 
building blocks of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Yet, African leaders abounded in 
ambition what they lacked in resources. The July 2003 AU Summit consequently requested the EU “to 
examine the possibility of setting up a Peace Support Operation Facility to fund peace support and 
peace keeping operations conducted under the authority of the AU”.502  
Whereas the EDF was considered most suited, its design did not allow for such reactive support. 
Consequently a separate facility was to be erected under its auspices. In December 2003, the ACP-EC 
Council of Ministers adopted a decision on the use of resources from the 9th EDF for the creation of a 
                                                          
501 Article 5(3)(c)(iv) and Annex I.A.III.(d) and I.B. DCI Regulation. 
502 AU Assembly (Assembly/AU/Dec.21 II) Decision on the Establishment by the European Union of a Peace Support Operation 
Facility for the African Union, Maputo, 10−12.07.2003, para. 5. 
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Peace Facility for Africa.503 This was soon rebranded as African Peace Facility to reflect the continent’s 
central ownership. That a solution could be found so rapidly was due to an “accidental convergence” 
of bureaucratic interests.504 The AU’s philosophy of ‘African solutions for African problems’, connected 
with the Union’s general goal of an ambitious foreign policy, the Commission’s willingness to become 
more engaged in the field of African security as well as the increasing risk aversion among EU Member 
States. In the spirit of African solidarity, and given that the 9th EDF’s envelop for regional cooperation 
and integration was at the moment of its creation already exhausted, the necessary APF resources 
were obtained by shaving off 1,5 % from EDF allocations notified to individual ACP countries (the 
‘shaving off’ or ‘slicing mechanism’) and topped up an equal amount of unallocated EDF resources.505 
This unusual entry of development aid into the field of peace-keeping necessitated – in the words of 
former Commissioner Nielson – “a veritable slalom between the pillars of the Maastricht Treaty”.506 
The compromise formula is that interventions are requested by the AU, managed by the Commission 
and – in an innovative bridge between the Commission and CFSP decision-makers507 – subject to 
approval by the PSC. The relevant Council bodies should moreover be informed or consulted in due 
time “in order to ensure that, in addition to the military and security dimension, the development and 
finance related aspects of the envisaged measures are being taken into account”.508 The funding from 
the EDF was established as a temporary solution to overcome the complexity of filling an entirely new 
bag of money. Yet, while the slicing mechanism has meanwhile been abandoned, EDF funding for the 
APF has today – in spite of regular controversies509 – become a well-established practice. Because the 
APF is not an instrument in itself, but a facility under the EDF, there is no dedicated regulation 
stipulating its aims. Article 15 of the 11th EDF Regulation only covers the financing arrangements and 
leaves the objectives, scope and nature of possible interventions to be defined in three-year action 
programmes. Given this clear entrance in the traditional CFSP territory of peace-keeping a more solid 
and accountable legal basis would not be redundant.  
The APF’s focus of funding was initially limited to peace support operations (PSOs) and their relevant 
capacity. Under the 10th EDF the Facility was integrated in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy as a constituent 
                                                          
503  Decision of the APC-EC Council of Ministers (3/2003/EC) on the use of resources from the long-term development 
envelope of the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa, OJ L345/108, 21.12.2003. 
504 Carbone (2013) op.cit. note 452, 103. 
505 Article 1(1) Decision of the APC-EC Council of Ministers (3/2003/EC) op.cit. note 503. 
506 P. Nielson, 'EU Aid: What Works and Why', UNU-WIDER Working Paper No. 2012/76 (United Nations University - World 
Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, 2012) 13. 
507 G. Grevi, 'Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives', Chaillot Paper n° 106 (EU Institute for Security 
Studies, Paris, 2007) 101. 
508 Article 15(d) EDF Regulation. 
509 The Council and Commission legal services for instance disagreed on APF funding in 2006. The former noted that the 
Commission did not have the power to use development budget appropriations to fund peace-support objectives. The 
Commission, on the other hand, argued that this was justified because conflicts are destroying the possibility of delivering 
development aid (D. Cronin, 'Legal spat over Africa aid funds', European Voice, 01.02.2006).  
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part of the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security.510 This turned the EU from a payer into a 
player and expanded the scope of the APF significantly to all phases of the conflict cycle. It includes 
funding for the Africa-EU dialogue on peace and security, post-conflict stabilisation, conflict 
management and prevention, with crucial support for critical APSA structures such as the African 
Standby Force and a Continental Early Warning System. A crucial comparative advantage to other EU 
instruments is that – as the APF/EDF is not part of the EU budget – it is not subject to the primary law 
exclusion of expenditure having military or defence implications (cf. infra 6.1.2.).511 This is not without 
limits as the EDF Regulation requires programming to “be designed so as to fulfil to the greatest extent 
possible the criteria for official development assistance”.512 The 2014-2016 Action Plan in this regards 
excludes the financing of "ammunitions, arms and specific military equipment, spare parts, salaries for 
soldiers and training for soldiers".513 Particularly innovative is the APF’s Early Response Mechanism 
(ERM), which backs up fact-finding and mediation missions. The funding is transferred in advance to 
the AU, meaning that it can be released rapidly once specific initiatives – with a maximum timespan of 
12 months – are approved. At relatively low cost, i.e. a budget of EUR 15 million for 2014-2020, a great 
number of fairly successful mediation missions have been carried out. “[I]t is reasonable to surmise 
that several millions of Euros and the lives of hundreds might have been saved”; however these remain 
“one-off missions … [which do] not necessarily increase AU or REC institutional capacity for 
mediation”.514  
The 2006 independent mid-term review of the first APF called it “a bold move because it confronts 
head on the fraught security and development nexus”.515 Two more recent independent evaluations 
continue the laudation of the Facility as a “game changer” with “a direct and positive impact on the 
lives of millions of Africans”.516 It enhanced the EU’s credibility and gave the AU political clout with a 
physical and political presence in peacekeeping that was unimaginable ten years earlier.517 In a similar 
vein, stakeholders across the AU, international and regional organisations and civil society acclaim the 
APF for its achievements and the concerns it addresses.518 Particularly, its demand-driven design which 
                                                          
510 Council (16344/07) op.cit. note 92, paras 18 and 20. 
511 Article 41(2) TEU.  
512 Article 1(3) EDF Regulation. 
513 Council Note (8269/14) Three-year Action Programme for the APF: 2014-2016, 28.03.2014, 13. 
514 IBF, Part 1 of the African Peace Facility Evaluation: Reviewing the Procedures of the APF and Possibilities of Alternative 
Future Sources of Funding (IBF International Consulting, Brussels, 2011) 13-15.  
515 J. Mackie, et al., Mid term evaluation of the African Peace Facility framework contract (European Centre for Development 
Policy Management, Maastricht, 2006)11. 
516 ADE, African Peace Facility Evaluation - Part 2: Reviewing the Overall Implementation of the APF as an Instrument for 
African Efforts to Manage Conflicts on the Continent (Aide à la Décision Économique, Brussels, 2013) 9. 
517 IBF (2011) op.cit. note 514, 9; ADE (2013) op.cit. note 516, 9. 
518 See: IBF (2011) op.cit. note 514, 1 
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supports rather than dictates,519 and the manner in which it gives effect to the often empty vessels of 
empowerment, ownership and partnership are regularly praised.  
However, paradoxically, the APF can also be seen as undermining these exact principles of ownership 
and partnership. The Facility in a way symbolises EU disengagement by contracting out security policy 
to African actors.520 Moreover, the one who pays the piper tends to call the tune, meaning that the 
APF risks to undermine rather than boost African ownership. Indeed, “there is the real danger that it 
is the EU that decides when, where and how ‘African solutions to African problems’ are applied”.521 
This is further exacerbated by the significant under-delivery of parallel contributions by African states, 
making it difficult for them to be meaningful partners. The AU’s institutional capacity has gradually 
been scaled up, but its track record in peace-keeping missions is at best mixed, while the role and 
commitment of RECs remains generally substandard. This implies that the APF’s impact and results 
rest on precarious foundations.   
The most widely shared critique of the APF is that it diverts money away from development objectives. 
As significant as the praise for where its resources go to, is the discontent regarding where they come 
from. Quoting the 20th century Austrian economist-philosopher Ludwig von Mises: “it may sometimes 
be expedient for a man to heat the stove with his furniture. But he should not delude himself by 
believing he has discovered a wonderful new method of heating his premises”. This is evidenced by 
the fact that, despite a number of flexibility clauses, EDF procedures often remain too cumbersome to 
tackle the unpredictable challenges at issue. Under ideal circumstances it still takes two months for 
requests to go through the Brussels decision-making machinery. IBF’s evaluation of the APF even 
makes note of two requests for peace support which were still waiting for a decision after one year 
and three months.522 This is mainly due to political sensitivities and the fact that the APF is often poorly 
understood by parts of the Commission machinery that are not used to manage peace support.  
A final significant problem is that the continuous widening of the APF’s strategic agenda, spreads its 
resources very thin in terms of financing and human resources, both at the level of the EU and the 
AU.523 Consequently, the APF’s utility often remains limited to that of a fire extinguisher treating the 
symptoms of African conflicts without providing sustainable solutions. Boosting African capacity 
through the Facility is essential because other financing instruments can either not engage in peace 
and security matters or do not have a continental coverage. The African environment is unfortunately 
                                                          
519 Chatham House (2013) op.cit. note 60, 4. 
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not very welcoming to this objective. The unremitting need for short-term responses to emerging 
conflict continues to steer funding in the direction of rapid peace-keeping deployments. Further 
damaging sustainability are the insufficient links to the EU’s other tools and activities: “[w]hile there 
have been examples of joint planning between the APF and different EU instruments, this has not 
occurred in a systematic manner or been informed by an overall strategic or ‘comprehensive’ plan for 
EU engagement in support of peace and security organisations in Africa”.524 
The 2014-2016 APF Action Plan acknowledges many of these challenges and weaknesses. It aims to 
enhance African ownership and deliver “a better balance between salary support and support to key 
processes within partner institutions that underpin lasting capacity building”. 525  Furthermore, 
authorisation procedures are simplified and the EU will propose the creation of special fund to finance 
African-led peace operations in cooperation with the AU and the UN. Yet, the Action Plan does not 
incorporate many of the useful suggestions put forward in two independent evaluations that were 
commissioned for this exact purpose. These approach the APF as “the best available instrument, but 
also as a tool that can be further improved”.526 Their suggestions consist of the inclusion of a wider 
range of military costs, procedural modifications inspired by the IcSP (cf. infra) and a stronger 
decentralisation of implementation responsibilities to EU Delegations.527 The latter would not only 
improve outreach, visibility and communication, but also enable a more “hands-on”, politically-
sensitive and responsive use of resources (cf. infra 4.4.).528 Finally, the support for and effectiveness of 
APF funding would benefit from better targeting funding at early warning, mediation and conflict 
management, for instance by using specific earmarks. It is in this sense rather discouraging that former 
EEAS Executive Secretary-General Vimont, expects APF resources under the first action plan to be 
depleted by 2015 already, due to the costly support of peace missions in Somalia and the Central 
African Republic.529 
The Instrument covering Stability and Peace  
The IcSP is the EU’s ‘flagship instrument’ to address the security-development nexus.530  It is the 
successor to the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which in its turn built further on the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism (RRM). These successive name changes provide a first indication of the ever more 
                                                          
524 Ibid., 87-88. 
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determined entrance into the field of peace and security. This is not the result of a smooth process, 
but involved considerable inter-institutional wrangling on the scope and radius of EU development 
cooperation, which will be analysed in more detail below.  
In the early 2000s, the need for an instrument enabling a more flexible response to situations of 
(emerging) crisis was widely felt. Significantly less agreement existed on the legal basis for such 
measures. Given that the CFSP did not abound in resources, the Council eventually agreed with the 
Commission’s proposal to erect the mechanism as part of the ex Community. Yet, to counterbalance 
this hitherto clearest embarkation of an EC instrument upon security issues, it significantly toned down 
the scope of the proposed instrument. Particularly, the aim “to provide immediate financing for non-
combat activities related to urgent operations of crisis management and conflict prevention, with a 
view to fostering international peace and security”,531 proofed a step too far for many Member States. 
Rather than on any new fields of activity, the emphasis in the Council Regulation was therefore put on 
rendering traditional Community responses more rapid, efficient and flexible in the context of crises 
or urgencies.532 Yet, even for this tempered RRM, the ex EC in essence lacked a Treaty basis. Sanctuary 
was sought in the flexibility clause of ex Article 308 TEC (current Article 352 TFEU), which is de jure 
reserved for actions that are necessary “in the course of the operation of the common market”. The 
justification for this choice was not particularly sound. The second indent of the preamble merely 
explained that “[t]he aims of aid and cooperation programmes and/or the conditions for their proper 
execution may be jeopardised or directly affected by, inter alia, the emergence of situations of crisis 
or conflict”.  
Between 2001 and 2006 the RRM demonstrated its added value by supporting around 50 projects in 
25 countries.533 With an annual budget of EUR 30 million and a time limitation of six months per funded 
activity, the mechanism was however not sufficiently equipped to re-establish sustainable stability on 
a broad scale. The Commission therefore proposed in 2004 to take it to a new level by creating the 
Instrument for Stability. Even though there had been no changes to the Treaty-defined scope of 
development cooperation since the creation of the RRM, the Commission now considered that the 
civilian aspects of crisis response came within the scope of ex Article 179 (current Article 209 TFEU) as 
well as the new Nice Treaty Article 181a (current Article 212 TFEU) on economic, financial and technical 
cooperation with third countries. The argument again built on the destructive impact of instability on 
the implementation of development aid. Such juggling with the principle of conferral unavoidably 
                                                          
531 Article 1 Commission Communication (COM(2000) 119 final) Proposal for a Council Regulation creating the Rapid Reaction 
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opens the door for increased overlap between TEU and ex TEC competences.534 The Commission put 
the arguably arbitrary limitation of this causality on the notable extension of the IfS towards peace-
keeping and support. Such activities, “while clearly contributing to the objectives of Articles 179 and 
181a, justify a legal basis in [ex] Article 308 of the Treaty”.535  
What followed were tense inter-institutional negotiations to solve the delicate question “as to whether 
or not the IfS would be in a position to effectively walk the ‘thin line’ between security and 
development, neither infringing on the prerogatives of the one or the other by eventually ‘securitising 
development’ or ‘developmentalising security policy’”.536 The discussions focused more on legalistic 
arguments of competence delineation than on the content and effectiveness of the tool at issue.537 
This stood in sharp contrast to the spirit of solidarity that was widely portrayed in the run-up to the 
adoption of the 2006 European Consensus on Development. The Council eventually vetoed the 
inclusion of peace-keeping and peace-support,538 but agreed on the expansive nature of development 
and cooperation, implying that the Regulation could be adopted on the bases of ex Articles 179 and 
181a TEC.539 In the light of the ongoing proceedings in the Small Arms and Light Weapons case, the 
Council moreover objected the inclusion of support measures tackling the proliferations of such arms 
(cf. infra 5.2.2.). Its veto did not extend to harmful remnants of war, through mine detection and 
clearance as well as stockpile destruction,540 laying bare the artificiality of the emerging competence 
boundaries in secondary law. The eventual IfS Regulation presented a sea change to the experimental 
RRM. It accorded the instrument a substantial budget of EUR 2,062 million (2007-2013), speeded up 
decision-making and introduced a capacity-building dimension to ensure better crises preparedness.  
The relevance of such a stability instrument was consequently not questioned in the negotiations on 
the most recent MFF. Rather, discussions focussed on how its shortcomings could be tackled and 
whether or not it should be further expanded to cover new fields of activity. The IcSP to a large extent 
follows the structure of the IfS with a short and long-term component. The non-programmable short-
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term component (Article 3 IcSP Regulation) aims to preserve or (re-)establish the essential conditions 
for cooperation. It is directed at providing a quick response to the following unforeseen events: (1) a 
situation of urgency, crisis or emerging crisis; (2) threats to democracy, law and order, the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, or the security of individuals; (3) a situation risking to 
escalate into armed conflict or to severely destabilise the country or region concerned; (4) urgent 
needs in countries where the Union has invoked essential elements clauses to suspend cooperation. 
The long-term component (Article 4 IcSP Regulation) funds capacity-building and crisis preparedness 
in areas such as law and order, early warning, reconciliation and recovery. The new Regulation 
introduces a stronger focus on conflict prevention and peace-building, and no longer limits capacity-
building to ‘the context of stable conditions for the implementation of cooperation policies’.541 This 
components supports efforts of (1) promoting early warning and conflict-sensitive risk analysis in 
policy-making and implementation; and (2) facilitating the building of capacity in confidence-building, 
mediation, dialogue and reconciliation, with specific attention for inter-community tensions; (3) 
strengthening capacities for participation and deployment in civilian stabilisation missions; (4) 
improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery; and (5) curbing the use of natural resources to 
finance conflicts. The IcSP adds a new third dimension (Article 5 IcSP Regulation), which is detached 
from the former long-term component, namely to address specific global and trans-regional threats to 
peace, international security and stability. The support under this component covers (1) threats to law 
and order, the security of individuals, critical infrastructure and public health; as well as (2) the 
mitigation of and preparedness against risks, whether of an intentional, accidental or natural origin, 
related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents. 
The slightly increased budget of 2,339 million (2014-2020) is spread as follows over the three 
components: 70% for Article 3, 9% for Article 4 and 21% for Article 5 IcSP Regulation.542 As the name 
of the refurbished instrument suggests, the Council’s veto on undertaking peace-building efforts 
through development assistance vanished. Another important novelty is that the IcSP attaches 
considerably more weight to consistency, complementarity, continuity, synergies and arriving at the 
most efficient use of all the EU’s available resources. Whereas the IfS concentrated predominantly on 
alignment with other development cooperation instruments, this is now resolutely extended to all the 
Union’s CFSP and TFEU external activities.543 The IcSP’s main added value does not lie in the type of 
support it provides. Comparable to the aforementioned instruments this consists mainly of financial 
and technical assistance, topped up with elements of transferring know-how, information and best 
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practices, risk assessment, research and analysis, early warning and training.544 The uniqueness and 
significance of the IcSP lay in the rapidity of response and the conditions of crisis wherein it operates.  
First, to put the IcSP into effect the Commission can decide on Exceptional Assistance Measures (EAMs) 
and Interim Response Programmes (IRPs). The former do not require heavy comitology545 procedures 
if their cost remains below EUR 20 million.546 It implies that the Commission does not need to obtain 
the approval of the PSC, but can simply inform it of the measures it plans to take.547 The maximum 
duration of EAMs has been increased from 24 under the IfS to 30 months at present.548 IRPs, on the 
other hand, are not subject to time constraints but always trigger comitology. In practice the focus has 
clearly been on the speediness of response, with sole use of EAMs that only seldom exceeded the EUR 
20 million bar.549 
A second key feature of the IcSP is its gap-filling function. It only operates “to the extent that an 
adequate and effective response cannot be provided under [the other external assistance] 
instruments”.550 This can be due to a sense of urgency, the trans-regional nature of the problem, the 
exclusion of the supported area from other ODA-bound instruments or the non-country specific nature 
of assistance. By addressing these blind spots the IcSP prepares the ground for development 
cooperation and closes the gap with CFSP activities. Much more than is the case for the APF, the IcSP’s 
management is sub-delegated to EU Delegations that are closely involved in the identification of 
programmes and projects. This enables a better coordination of EU activities and reduces the risk of 
overlap. The availability of IcSP resources often provides the catalyst for EU Delegations to tackle 
conflict prevention and peace-building more profoundly.551 It moreover stimulates an exchange of 
information between headquarters and Delegations, among different Commission bodies and with the 
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PSC and the geographic working groups of the EEAS, making it a politically responsive tool. 552 
Nonetheless, significant difficulties continue to arise “in linking project-driven demands from the field 
with policy driven demands deriving from various EU commitments”.553 
This IcSP’s raison d’être thus lies in the link with other EU instruments. It is therefore unfortunate that 
it is precisely on this point that three significant difficulties emerge. First, the gap-filling conditions to 
activate the IcSP are not clearly defined. This is particularly problematic in fragile states, which 
constantly hinge between crises and stability. Given that the types of support and many of the areas 
covered are similar to those addressed by the DCI, ENI and EDF, the risk for overlap is obvious. One 
solution would be to put in place indicators allowing to identify crisis situations and establish 
mechanisms to ensure better in-country coordination of the available instruments.554 Second, the IcSP 
is meant to cushion the blow of instability but often proves too slow. A 2011 independent evaluation 
of the Commission’s support to conflict prevention and peace-building concludes that despite being 
the most rapid of EU external assistance instruments, this was still insufficient in all five conducted 
country case studies.555 If the minimum time span for the launch of an intervention of two to six 
months can already appear very long for victims of crisis, in practice it is rather nine to eleven months 
with reported excesses of one and a half year.556 A particularly good practice of accelerating this 
process are the pre-approved Standing Facilities, which are activated through IcSP financing decisions 
and allow the immediate launch of small-scale and targeted activities.557 Third, the limited duration of 
IcSP initiatives stems from the desire to make best use of its limited funding and confine long-term 
support to the EU’s traditional external instruments. Yet, often stabilisation fails because no adequate 
follow-up is provided when IcSP initiatives come to an end.558 The easiest solution is then to exhaust 
the IcSP’s possibilities for extension, leading to an unnecessary depletion of its resources.  
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ensure continuity of cooperation from crisis to stable conditions for development” (Article 5(2) Regulation (1905/2006/EC) 
establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, OJ L378/41, 27.12.2006). This not only implied that both 
instruments gave precedence to the other, the only exception to this principle under the DCI regulation constituted precisely 
the assigned role of the IfS. 
555 Namely Bolivia, CAR, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Sierra Leone (ADE (2011) op.cit. note 82, 39). 
556 Ibid., annex 3, 16-17. 
557 Examples hereof are the Facility for urgent Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation and Reconciliation, the Conflict 
Resources Facility (CRF) and the Transitional (post-conflict) Justice Facility (TJF) (see for instance: Commission Staff Working 
Document (SWD(2013) 292 final) Accompanying the 2012 Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability, 26.7.2013, 28-33). 
558 Gavas et al. (2013) op.cit. note 469, 27. 
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Making optimal use of this impressive policy machinery 
 
Box 6: The case of South Sudan: facilitating the birth of a country trough EU development aid 
The case of South Sudan, the world’s newest country, provides a good illustration of how these various 
instruments often operate in parallel. During its independence referendum, which took place between 
9 and 15 January 2011, the EU deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) funded by the EIDHR. 
An IfS intervention of EUR 15 million simultaneously aimed at delivering “peace dividends” during the 
referendum and post-referendum process, through the provision of basic services to the population.559 
Later that same year, this was followed by a second IfS tranche (EUR 18 million) providing support to 
conflict prevention, peace building and stabilisation efforts, with a particular focus on the border areas 
with Sudan. In the light of the rising tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, the EU further 
mobilised EUR 1.1 million from the APF enabling the Intergovernmental Authority for Development 
(IGAD) to establish a platform for peace talks and a monitoring mechanism. Even though the 
developmental needs in this country – which has since 2014 overtaken Somalia as the most fragile 
country on earth560 – are huge, it is not eligible for EDF funding because is it still no signatory to the 
Cotonou Agreement.561 The EU decided to partly fill this funding gap with an ad hoc allocation of EUR 
200 million from decommitted resources of previous EDFs.562 These funds support projects in the areas 
of food security, health, education, stabilisation, security, human rights and the rule of law. In addition, 
South Sudan benefits from DCI thematic programmes on food security and support to non-state actors.  
The above illustration of EU aid to South Sudan (cf. Box 6) shows clearly how the EU has, over the 
years, unfolded an impressive range of development instruments tackling the interface with security. 
It has been calculated that the support of these instruments to conflict prevention and peace-building 
constituted EUR 7.7 billion for the period 2001-2010, or 10% of the total Commission-managed 
development budget. 563  This repertory covers a wide variety of activities. Yet, its impromptu 
development, combined with the Union’s tendency to accumulate rather than to rationalise, has given 
rise to a labyrinth of funds which is difficult and costly to manage.564 A key question is therefore 
                                                          
559 Commission (MEMO/11/908) EU development cooperation with South Sudan, 14.12.2011. 
560 FFP, Fragile State Index 2014 (The Fund For Peace, Washington, 2014) 39p. 
561 Even though South Sudan’s request to accede was approved already by the June 2012 ACP-EU Joint Council of Ministers, 
its government appears to be backtracking on this commitment due to concerns over the obligation to accede to the Rome 
Statute recognising the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (A. Mehler, H. Melber and K. van Walraven, Africa 
Yearbook Volume 9: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2012 (Brill, Leiden, 2012) 37. 
562 Council Decision (2011/315/EU) concerning the allocation of funds decommitted from projects under the ninth and 
previous European Development Funds for development cooperation in Southern Sudan, OJ L142/61, 28.05.2011.  
563 ADE (2011) op.cit. note 82, 7. It is interesting to note that more than half of these funds benefited only four countries, 
unsurprisingly of geostrategic importance: the Palestinian territories, Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan). 
564 D. Lecompte and T. Vircoulon, 'L'Aide de L'Union Européenne: du Dévelopmment à la Sécurité, l'Exemple du Fonds 
Européen de Développement', Note de l'Ifri Juin 2014 (Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris, 2014) 1. 
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whether this gets the most out of the Union’s potential. A number of reports indicate that although 
the EU has come a long way in security-sensitising its aid instruments, the challenges and obstacles are 
still manifold. These can be grouped in two categories (in Chapters 4 and 6 we will analyse to what 
extent the more recent involvement of the EEAS and HR offers room for improvement).  
First, the most recurring sore point is the difficult balance between the adaptability and predictability 
of development funding. 565  A valuable purpose of multiannual programming is to improve the 
reliability of aid streams. The lengthy procedures moreover have a protective function guaranteeing 
checks and balances, transparency and accountability. The downside hereof is a reduced adaptability 
to changing and unforeseen circumstances, which are the order of the day in fragile and crisis 
situations. Ceasefires, reconciliations or settlements offer frail windows of opportunity which can 
easily burst.566 Consequently, donors face short timeframes (often lasting no longer than a couple of 
months) to promote mediation, restore critical infrastructure, put economic development back on 
track and re-ignite the provision of basic social, economic and security services. 567  Multiannual 
programming makes it difficult to draw on new funds or divert resources away from established focal 
areas and priorities. Despite introducing ever more acceleration mechanisms, the 2011 evaluation of 
the Commission’s management of security-related aid found that the time-lapse between the 
identification and approval of development initiatives can still take up to one year.568 In 2014 the Court 
of Auditors put the spotlight on the complex eligibility rules which lead to poor targeting of funds.569 
Moreover, the fixation with spending puts too much emphasis on compliance with the conditions for 
getting and using the resources, rather than on the objectives and results achieved. An associated 
tension is that efforts to stabilise crises situations or prevent the escalation of conflict do not always 
easily correspond to ‘the primary aim of eradicating poverty’ and targeting aid at the neediest.570  
A second key problem is much less inherent to the nature of development cooperation and might 
therefore be more easily overcome. As pinpointed in a 2013 Parliament report, “[i]nvesting in expertise 
in fragility and conflict-prevention has not, to date, been a priority, particularly at the operational 
level”.571  As a result, conflict impact assessments are often not carried out, conflict analysis and 
                                                          
565 See for instance: OECD-DAC (2012) op.cit. note 83, 21. 
566 UN Secretary-General, Report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, General Assembly Sixty-Third 
session, A/63/881–S/2009/304, New York, 11.06.2009. 
567 L. Chauvet and P. Collier, 'Helping Hand? Aid to Failing States ', DIAL Document de Travail DT/2006-14 (Développement, 
Institutions et Analyses de Longe terme, Paris, 2006) 14. 
568 ADE (2011) op.cit. note 82, 85. 
569 European Court of Auditors, Making the best use of EU money: a landscape review of the risks to the financial management 
of the EU budget (ECA, Brussels, 2014) 102 p. 
570 For instance, combatants that are the focus of reintegration policies, are often not those most in need of assistance 
(Overhaus (2013) op.cit. note 452, 516). 
571 Gavas et al. (2013) op.cit. note 469, 7. 
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prevention is insufficiently mainstreamed and early warning does not seep through in policy-making.572 
This implies that despite all the rhetoric, the EU’s development machinery is still too often working ‘in’ 
rather than genuinely ‘on’ conflicts. Consequently, too much efforts go to mitigating the consequences 
of conflict, instead of addressing its root causes. This is a costly weakness “as it means that 
interventions are more likely to take place in a context where time-horizons are shorter and resource 
requirements are more significant”, placing an undue burden on rapid response mechanisms. 573 
Moreover, investment in preventive action has a considerably higher cost effectiveness than 
intervening after the outbreak of conflict. 574  Despite making up a considerable portion of EU 
development aid, resources tackling the interface with security policy remain a very specific niche, of 
which few development staff are fully aware. This hampers coherence between the various policy tools 
and can result in a poor transition from crisis responses to long-term cooperation. Moreover, there 
remains considerable room to scale up coordination, which could simultaneously improve cross-
learning between instruments.575 The EDF’s B-envelope, the IcSP’s flexibility and the APF’s focus on 
African ownership, could all provide meaningful sources of inspiration for the whole development 
arsenal.  
3.2.2. CFSP instruments on the interface with development policy 
The bulk of CFSP activity has no explicit basis in the Treaty and takes the form of statements and 
declarations expressing the Union’s views and positions on diverse global events. These range from 
vague non-committal expressions of support over condemnations, denunciations to forthright 
announcements of future EU action. There is no formal category of CFSP statements576 and their scope 
is often broader than this single policy area.577 For their operationalisation such statements rely on 
legal acts, which are used on a rather lower scale. These are laid down in Article 25 TEU and include 
decisions defining (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union; (ii) positions to be taken by the Union; 
and (iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii).578 Given 
the broad primary law scope of the CFSP it is not surprising that these instruments have from the 
outset embarked on policy fields that are also targeted by EU development policies. A clear example 
                                                          
572 ADE (2011) op.cit. note 82, 93-95. 
573 Gavas et al. (2013) op.cit. note 469, 24. 
574 See for instance: M. Chalmers, 'Spending to Save? The Cost-Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention' (2007) Defence and Peace 
Economics 18(1), 1-23. 
575 OECD-DAC (2012) op.cit. note 83, 71. 
576  The only form of categorisation is their inclusion in a separate tab ‘CFSP Statements’ on the Council website. See: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/latest-press-
releases/newsroomloadbook?lang=en&bid=73&lang=1&cmsid=257> (last accessed 02.12.2014). 
577 A February 2014 Declaration on Zimbabwe, for instance, discusses relations in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement 
and the possibility of resuming support under the EDF (High Representative (6673/14) Declaration on behalf of the EU on the 
review of EU-Zimbabwe relations, 19.02.2014. 
578 As mentioned above, the first two subcategories respectively replace the old CFSP joint actions and common positions. 
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is the control of SALW which was subject of a 1999 CFSP Joint Action.579 Its successor formed the 
subject of the well-known Commission challenge before the Court in the SALW case (cf. infra 5.2.2.).  
In the early days of the CFSP, a source of considerable contention with regard to development policy 
was the repeated recourse to Community means for giving effect to CFSP decisions. This was often a 
manner to deal with the limited availability of own CFSP resources. Yet, the fact that the EC would be 
reduced to an executive branch of the CFSP was irreconcilable with ex Article 47 TEU. The classic 
example is the 1994 Common Position on Rwanda which included commitments on the progressive 
resumption of development cooperation.580 The Commission objected to this unlawful intrusion into 
the Community’s autonomy, while the Council Legal Service argued that this was justified as the EC 
would remain fully competent to choose the respective operational measures.581 The hatchet was 
finally buried in a joint Council-Commission Mode d’emploi on Common Positions.582 In essence, this 
established that such positions could cover the whole spectrum of EU and EC policies, as long as they 
did not impose binding obligations that would infringe on the autonomy of EC institutions. Arguably, 
this resulted more in a linguistic than a substantive change of course. The typical new formulation 
consisted of the Council noting that “the Commission intends to direct its action towards achieving the 
objectives of this Common position, where appropriate, by pertinent Community measures”.583 Kuijper 
calls this formula of pushing the Community into action while carefully avoiding to impede upon the 
acquis communautaire a practice of “gentle subordination”.584 It appears that the further maturing of 
the Union as well as the constitutional and institutional changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty 
have made an end to this legal tinkering (cf. infra Chapter 6).  
The most persistent sources of overlap with or rapprochement to development cooperation results 
from the gradual operationalisation of the CFSP. This started with the Treaty of Amsterdam that 
created the function of High Representative for the CFSP as well as the Special Representatives (EUSRs) 
operating under his/her authority. Even though EUSRs are part of the CFSP chapter of the TEU, and are 
therefore sensu stricto CFSP actors, some of their mandates clearly touch upon development 
competences. In the next chapter on the institutional track, the EUSRs will be studied more in-depth. 
The single most visible factor in moving this policy area closer to the interface with development policy 
is the CSDP. Its initial purpose, expressed at the 1999 Cologne European Council, to develop “an EU 
                                                          
579 Joint Action (1999/34/CFSP) on the EU’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small 
arms and light weapons, OJ L93/27, 08.04.1999. 
580 Common Position (94/697/CFSP) on the objectives and priorities of the EU vis-a-vis Rwanda, OJ L283/1, 29.10.1994.  
581 Timmermans (1996) op.cit. note 458, 67-68. 
582 Doc. 5194/95 of 06.03.1995, unpublished (content described in Koutrakos (2001) op.cit. note 166, 45-46). 
583 See for instance: Article 5 Common Position (1999/722/CFSP) concerning EU support for the implementation of the Lusaka 
ceasefire agreement and peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, OJ L286/1, 09.11.1999. 
584 Kuijper (2007) op.cit. note 122, 1577. 
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military crisis management capacity”585 was one year later extended with a civilian component as well 
as conflict prevention.586 This was only formally codified by Article 43(1) Lisbon TEU extending the lists 
of Petersberg tasks. Given that it proofed considerably more onerous to unfold the CSDP’s military 
than civilian dimension, the latter soon took the upper hand. Of the 17 ongoing (at the time of writing) 
CSDP missions and operations 11 are of civilian nature and only 6 have a military mandate (cf. Box 7). 
Even though they are all designed as short-term interventions, 8 have been operational for more than 
6 years, with EUFOR ALTHEA Bosnia-Herzegovina nearing its 11th birthday.  
Both civilian missions and military operations are generally small-scale in nature and have a rather 
narrowly targeted mandate. 587  CSDP military operations have been conducted to enforce peace-
agreements, provide deterrence, stabilise security conditions, protect civilians and critical 
infrastructure, support and prepare the ground for international peacekeeping missions, combat 
piracy at sea and provide military training. Civilian missions have been delivering contributions to 
security sector reform (including the restructuring of armies, rule of law missions and police reform), 
border management and monitoring. All of these missions and operations operate in environments 
where the EU also deploys development cooperation activities. Points of contact are consequently 
unavoidable. Evidently, the more the balance tilts towards civilian missions and the longer the planning 
horizon, the more the security-development distinction blurs. As these interactions are highly context-
specific section 6.2. will further elaborate on this issue by means of the particular case of the EU’s 
CFSP/CSDP and development activities in the Horn of Africa. 
 
                                                          
585 Cologne Presidency Report (1999) op.cit. note 283, Annex II. 
586 Santa Maria de Feira Presidency Conclusions (2000) op.cit. note 285, 11-12. The CSDP’s focus on conflict prevention is 
clear from the annual reports on the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, which always referred extensively 
to CSDP activities (see for instance the 2008 annual report of the Council (10601/08), 17.06.2008). 
587 EULEX Kosovo, as the only civilian mission with an executive mandate, exceptionally employs over 2000 international and 
local staff. On the military side EUNAVFOR Atalanta is an unusually large operation comprising around 1200 personnel. Staff 
numbers in other missions and operations range from less than ten to a couple of hundreds. 
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Box 7: Ongoing CSDP missions and operations (chronologically) 
Mission/Operation Nature Main tasks Launch Current Legal Basis 
EUFOR ALTHEA 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Military Building capacity of the BiH armed forces; supporting BiH in its efforts to 
maintain a safe and secure environment; supporting the overall EU 
comprehensive strategy for BiH. 
December 
2004 
Joint Action 2007/720/CFSP 
amending Joint Action 
2004/570/CFSP  
EUSEC RD Congo Civilian Supporting DRC authorities in rebuilding an army that will guarantee 
security throughout the country; creating conditions for making social 
and economic development possible again. 






Civilian Providing a third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point in order to 
contribute to its opening and to build confidence between the Israeli 
Government and the Palestinian Authority. 
November 
2005 
Council Decision 2014/430/CFSP 





Civilian Supporting the reform and development of police and judicial 




Council Decision 2015/599/CFSP 
amending Decision 
2013/354/CFSP 
EUPOL Afghanistan Civilian Supporting the reform process towards a trusted police service; helping 
to establish civilian policing arrangements that ensure appropriate 
interaction with the justice system; 
June 2007 Council Decision 2014/922/CFSP 
amending Decision 
2010/279/CFSP 
EULEX Kosovo Civilian Assisting and supporting the Kosovo authorities in developing and 




Council Decision 2014/685/CFSP 
amending Joint Action 
2008/124/CFSP 
EUMM Georgia Civilian Providing civilian monitoring in order to contribute to stabilisation, 
normalisation and confidence building in support of a durable political 
solution for Georgia. 
September 
2008 
Council Decision 2014/915/CFSP 
amending Decision 
2010/452/CFSP  
EU NAVFOR Atalanta Military Protecting WFP vessels and AMISOM shipping; deterring, preventing and 
repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast; 
monitoring fishing activities. 
December 
2008 
Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP 




EUTM Somalia Military Mentoring, advising and supporting the Somali authorities to build up 
and train the Somali National Armed Forces and to implement the Somali 
National Security and Stabilisation Plan. 
April 2010 Council Decision 2015/441/CFSP 
amending Decision 
2010/96/CFSP 
EUCAP Nestor  Civilian Supporting the development of maritime security; strengthening the 
maritime criminal justice system, from investigation, over arrest, 
detention to prosecution. 
July 2012 Council Decision 2014/485/CFSP 
amending Decision 
2012/389/CFSP 
EUCAP SAHEL Niger Civilian Promoting the interoperability of Nigerien security forces; supporting 
the development of regional and international coordination in fighting 
terrorism and organised crime. 
August 
2012 
Council Decision 2014/482/CFSP 
amending Decision 
2012/392/CFSP 
EUTM Mali Military Providing military training and advice to the Malian Armed Forces in 




Council Decision 2014/220/CFSP 
amending Decision 
2013/87/CFSP  
EUBAM Libya Civilian Advising, training and mentoring the Libyan authorities in developing 
border management and security at the country’s land, sea and air 
borders. 
May 2013 Council Decision 2015/800/CFSP 
amending Decision 
2013/233/CFSP 
EUAM Ukraine Civilian Mentoring and advising Ukrainian authorities in establishing sustainable 
and accountable security services for delivering the rule of law. 
December 
2014 
Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP 
EUCAP Sahel Mali Civilian Assisting and advising the Malian security forces in improving their 
operational efficacy; re-establishing hierarchical chains; reinforcing the 
role of judicial and administrative authorities. 
January 
2015 
Council Decision 2015/76/CFSP 
amending Decision 
2014/219/CFSP  
EUMAM RCA Military Advising CAR authorities in preparing the upcoming security sector 
reform and assisting armed forces in building capacity, quality, 
accountability and effectiveness. 
March 
2015 
Council Decision 2015/78/CFSP 
EU NAVFOR 
Mediterranean 
Military Supporting the detection and monitoring of migration networks (first 
phase), conducting boarding, search, seizure and diversion of suspected 
vessels (second phase), taking all necessary measures to render those 
vessels inoperable (third phase). 
June 2015 Council Decision 2015/778/CFSP 
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To manage this considerable range of responsibilities the CFSP has a relatively small budget of EUR 2.3 
billion for 2014-2020.588  Most of these funds are absorbed by civilian CSDP missions (which are 
concomitantly financed by voluntary Member States contributions) and the EUSRs. In 2012 these 
accounted respectively for 86% and 8% of the annual CFSP budget.589 It is part of the general Union 
budget, implying that the Commission is responsible to administer funds.590 Given that the latter is not 
politically responsible for or formally involved in their adoption, it has degradingly been called the 
“cashier” of the CFSP.591 This situation causes a number of complications necessitating procedural 
detours. A first obstacle arises with regard to the financial framework for CSDP missions. The financial 
reference amount is laid down in the respective Council Decision, whereas the impact statement 
specifying the expected costs can only be prepared by the Commission. The latter drafts this statement 
based on the input it receives from the mission Head and staff. It then forwards it to the Council, 
incorporates any possible amendments the latter submits, after which it is again send to the Council 
for formal adoption. Only through this intricate procedure can the Commission’s budgetary powers be 
reconciled with the Council’s final say on how the money should be spent.592 A similar issue arises with 
regard to the CSDP Heads of Missions, which are assigned to implement the mission’s budget,593 but 
have no authority under the Treaty to do so. For this purpose they sign a Special Advisor contract with 
the Commission entrusting them with the technical implementation of the mission’s finances.594 This 
also implies that besides the formal chain of command, the Head of Mission “shall report fully to, and 
be supervised by, the Commission regarding the activities undertaken in the framework of his/her 
contract”.595 
CSDP military operations cannot be charged to the EU budget and Member States are not obliged to 
contribute to their financing.596 For about 10% these are funded by a separate Athena mechanism to 
                                                          
588 Compare this for instance with the EUR 7.7 billion allocated by the external financing instruments to contribute to conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding over the period 2001-2010, op.cit. note 563. 
589 High Representative (14924/13) Annual Report - Main aspects and basis choices of the CFSP, 16.10.2013, Annex I. 
590 Since 2010 this task is taken on by the Foreign Policy Instruments Service (FPI) which forms full part of the Commission 
but is co-located in the EEAS’ premises (cf. infra section 4.3.). 
591 J. Monar, 'The Finances of the Union's Intergovernmental Pillars: Toruous Experiments with the Community Budget' (1997) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 35(1), 77-78. 
592 G. Sautter, 'The Financing of Common Foreign and Security Policy – on Continuity and Change' in H.-J. Blanke and S. 
Mangiameli (eds), The European Union after Lisbon: Constitutional Basis, Economic Order and External Action (Springer, 
Berlin, 2012) 580. 
593 See for instance: Article 6(4) Council Decision (2012/389/CFSP) on the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building 
in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR), OJ L187/40, 17.07.2012 (hereafter: EUCAP Nestor Decision). 
594 Commission Communication (COM(2009) 9502 final) on Specific Rules for Special Advisers of the Commission entrusted 
with the implementation of operational CFSP actions and contracted international staff, 30.11.2009. 
595 See for instance: Article 13(5) EUCAP Nestor Decision. That this may be source of confusion is clearly illustrated by the 
Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo case. The fact that the applicant wrongly identified Eulex Kosovo, and not the Commission, as 
the party responsible for dismissing its tender was “not excusable” according to the Court and led to the dismissal of its action 
(Case T-213/12, Elitaliana v Eulex Kosovo, ECLI:EU:T:2013:292, paras 42-46). 
596 Article 41(2) TEU.  
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which Member States provide resources based on their GNP.597 It covers a range of common costs – 
from the preparation to the termination phase – for activities such as fact-finding, recruitment of local 
staff, medical evacuations and treatment, travel and accommodation, communications, etc.598 The 
remaining 90% of the operations’ costs is covered by the participating Member States on the basis of 
a 'costs lie where they fall' principle. This is one of the sorest points and – in the words of High 
Representative Ashton – “securing Member States’ commitment to supporting missions and 
operations, especially when it comes to accepting risk and costs, can be challenging, resulting in force 
generation difficulties”.599 A partial but limited remedy is Athena’s Early Financing Scheme, endowed 
with provisional appropriations worth EUR 19 million from 19 Member States (which can later detract 
it from their contribution). It becomes operational as soon as a Crisis Management Concept is 
adopted.600  
In the light of these limited resources and capabilities there is currently no drive to move CSDP missions 
and operations beyond the targeted contributions they deliver at present. The advantage of this 
approach is that it allows the CSDP to build up significant niche expertise and establish a comparative 
advantage, particularly with regard to monitoring as well as mentoring, advising and training police, 
judicial and military services. On the other hand, CSDP missions and operations have been criticised as 
lacking critical mass and delivering “small contributions to very big problems”.601  The Parliament 
laments the lack of a clear doctrine to operationalise the Petersberg tasks and “regrets the modest 
nature of CSDP interventions, especially the military ones, consisting mainly of small-scale military 
training missions instead of substantial European contributions to peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement”.602 With regard to the CSDP’s growing focus on SSR, General Coelmont, the former 
Belgian representative to the EU Military Committee (EUMC), finds that generally a “homeopathic 
dose” is delivered while “the real stuff was needed”.603 Arnaud Danjean, the former chair of the 
European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence, goes as far as calling civilian missions 
pretexts which simply serve the EU’s good conscience.604   
                                                          
597 Article 24(4) Council Decision (2015/528/CFSP) establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs 
of EU operations having military or defence implications (Athena) and repealing Decision 2011/871/CFSP, OJ L84/39, 
28.03.2015 (hereafter: Athena Decision). 
598 A complete list is set out in Annex I-IV Athena Decision. 
599 High Representative/Head of the EDA, Final Report on the CSDP, 15.10.2013, 3. While a Mission Support Platform to fine-
tune Member States contributions is currently under consideration, the more ambitious idea of a setting up of a Shared 
Services Centre, together with an Integrated Resource Management System, faces more difficulties. 
600 Article 26 Athena Decision. For instance, this scheme provided EUR 7.3 million to EUTM Somalia and EUR 7 million to 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta in 2014. 
601 Koutrakos (2013) op.cit. note 91, 129. 
602 European Parliament Report (2014/2258(INI)) on financing CSDP, 22.04.2015, paras 1 and 3. 
603  J. Coelmont, 'A comprehensive approach without a security strategy is a hallucination', europeangeostrategy.org, 
08.05.2014. 
604 L. Merelle, 'Quand le mot « politique » manque à l’Europe. Le bilan de Arnaud Danjean', Bruxelles2.eu Le Club, 03.04.2014 
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The mandate of civilian CSDP missions is often not so different from that of the security-related 
projects funded under the external financing instruments (cf. infra 6.2.). Yet, the approach is inherently 
different as the CSDP constitutes – even more than the CFSP – a quarantined compartment shielded 
from interaction with other areas of EU external action. It is “a deeply introverted policy”, preoccupied 
with the often military-style management of its own – very specific – challenges and characteristics.605 
The sovereignty-sensitive nature of the CSDP has resulted in the emergence of an autonomous legal, 
political, and administrative structure characterised by deep and secluded institutionalisation and 
proceduralisation of planning, decision-making and implementation (cf. infra 4.1.). This separate 
compartment is in its turn further compartmentalised along civil and military lines. “[S]eparated at 
birth”, these have since remained parallel strands of a single casing. Under the guise of civil-military 
cooperation (CIMIC) and coordination (CMCO) (cf. supra 3.1.1.) a difficult process was set in motion to 
strengthen the ties. Yet, this tended to overlook the politico-strategic level, leaving measures at the 
operational-tactical level without any guidance.606 Under the impetus of the civilian-military cell within 
the EU Military Staff (EUMS)607 and the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), the CSDP is gradually becoming 
more successful in converging both strands.608 Yet, it seems that this demanding undertaking has, 
throughout the past decade, consumed most of the energy for an equally important debate on the 
security-development nexus within CSDP circles.  
3.2.3. Challenges of fine-tuning and coordination: the choice of legal basis in 
practice  
Over the years the EU has established an impressive amalgam of instruments spanning the whole 
spectrum of interrelated security and development challenges. From the prevention, over the 
emergence and the termination of conflict to reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction, the Union 
has various instruments in place which allow it to play a role of significance. The main challenge 
remains to turn this embracive policy reach into comprehensively coordinated action. A key problem 
in this undertaking is that the improvised manner in which this evolution took place has come to blur 
the logics of what exactly distinguishes development cooperation from the CFSP/CSDP.  
Many of the external financing instruments, and the CFSP as a whole, share the policy fields of conflict 
prevention, peace-building and keeping, reconciliation and crisis management. This occurs without 
much encompassing policy guidance and limited or no pronounced division of labour. This can be 
                                                          
605 Koutrakos (2013) op.cit. note 91, 181. 
606  M. Drent and D. Zandee, Breaking the Pillars: Towards a Civil-Military Security Approach for the European Union 
(Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague, 2010) 23. 
607 Called into being by the Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Brussels, 12-13.12.2003, para. 90. 
608 See further: P.M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force: Governance and Strategy (Cambridge 
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problematic as the legal, procedural and institutional divide between CFSP and development 
cooperation, combined with functional specialisation and essentially distinct policy horizons, obstruct 
the exchange of relevant development and security-related expertise across departmental boundaries. 
Moreover, development and security funding follow an inherently different logic. Whereas for 
development cooperation a budget is dedicated before it is decided how it will be spent, in the CSDP 
it is first decided that something needs to be done and only then attempted to assemble the necessary 
resources. As a consequence, the EU’s development and security communities often talk at cross-
purposes. Security-related departments are said to be not really interested in or well informed on 
development issues, while development actors remain sceptical of the security and defence 
community.609 A key example is the PCD agenda which Krätke compares to a “dialogue of the deaf”, 
because PCD administrators as “bearers of bad news and other reminders” often become isolated from 
the administrations they aim to cohere.610 As a result, the practical consequences of different policy 
choices on the respective security or development perimeters remain unclear and thus unsatisfactorily 
anticipated. This is further exacerbated by the EU’s deficient human resources policy, which provides 
insufficient attention and resources to the tail ends of the development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP, 
where the nexus is enacted. While the EU has all the major building blocks in place, this prevents EU 
institutions from adding these up for a measured response to crises and fragility.611 In Chapters 4 and 
6, it will respectively be discussed to what extent the institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the new tendencies of comprehensive and strategic policy design are meeting these shortcomings.  
Whereas the EU has gradually become more effective in targeting its policies at the interconnected 
challenges of poverty, instability and violence, the complexity of its machinery and the fragmentation 
of its approach put a strain on the effectiveness and impact of these efforts. First, it leads to 
considerable overlap. This is evidenced by the area of SSR which is not only a prevalent field of activity 
under the EU’s development instruments, but has become the pet project of the CSDP. In 2006 the EU 
attempted to bring the uncomfortably separated Commission and Council SSR policies612 together in a 
single Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform. However, in trying to sort out a division of labour 
this two-pager got no further than concluding that “[a] case-by-case analysis based on a situation-
specific approach is always needed to assess whether any proposed activities are most appropriately 
carried out through ESDP or Community action or a combination of both with the objective of ensuring 
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effective and coherent EU external action in this area”.613  Second, it provokes the duplication of 
institutional structures and mechanisms. In 2010 the EU disposed, for instance, of around 15 different 
rapid alert systems spread over the EU institutions. 614  Finally, the complexity and fragmentation 
occasionally incite inter-institutional disagreements on competence delimitation, mostly under the 
radar but sometimes overtly fought out before the Court (cf. infra Chapter 5). Such ‘turf-wars’, as they 
are somewhat exaggeratedly called, are particularly problematic in situations of crisis where timely 
responses are of the essence.  
The variety and comprehensiveness of the EU’s policy reach is one of its main comparative advantages, 
but simultaneously its Achilles heel. It implies that fine-tuning these numerous initiatives is all but a 
self-evident undertaking. The fragmented diversity complicates efforts to come to an optimal mix of 
its available resources and makes the Union vulnerable to counterproductive action. As acknowledged 
by former High Representative Ashton, this complexity is exacerbated by the cyclical nature of conflict, 
rendering it extremely difficult to neatly sequence long-term development action with short-term 
security interventions.615 The Commission puts it as follows:  
In stable contexts, a lack of coherence across policies and related interventions can lead to limited 
results. In a fragile or conflict-affected situation, lack of coherence can easily lead to no results at 
all — or even do harm. And a lack of progress in one area — be it political, security, economic or 
social — risks reversing the whole transition process.616 
Particularly the IcSP and the CSDP often poach into each other’s preserves. The IcSP is regularly 
catalytic in preparing the ground for CSDP missions, complementing their objectives or cushioning their 
termination.617 This tends to bring along an administrative and institutional density that not only 
confuses third parties but also EU staff struggling to grasp the vast diversity of projects and budget 
cycles (cf. infra 6.2.).618 This is further muddled by the compartmentalisation of the CSDP that does not 
lend to fine-tuning, particularly regarding the highly sensitive and secretive military arm. According to 
General Coelmont all military CSDP operations have reached their military objectives, but only a very 
limited number was conducted comprehensively. This implies that “lasting results have seldom or 
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never been achieved”.619 Significant complications arise from the discordant time horizons of CSDP 
activities. Contrary to the seven-year EU budgetary framework, CSDP missions and operations follow 
a one or two-year programming cycle. On the positive side, this allows considerably more 
responsiveness and flexibility. Yet, given their increasingly long-term presence this does evidently not 
match operational realities and makes CSDP activity difficult to align with other EU external action 
instruments. It obstructs efforts to guarantee a workable exit strategy or follow-up by longer-term 
programmes. In this regard it is notable that a longer-term planning cycling, with the possibility of 
annual revisions, is under discussion.620  
Development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP initiatives thus regularly touch upon each other's 
competences. Yet, inter-institutional relations are characterised more by acquiescence than tension 
and disputes only seldom end up before the Court. This begs the question of how in most cases a 
modus vivendi is found. A glance at the practice of choosing an appropriate legal basis on the cross-
section of security and development competences resonates more of improvisation than 
systematisation. Hoffmeister’s noticeable effort to disentangle the EU’s division of competences in 
civilian crisis management uncovers a policy-making chaos, with similar efforts in various countries 
undertaken by different instruments (e.g. a Commission managed border assistance mission EUBAM 
Moldova/Ukraine and CFSP border assistance in Rafah), entire policy areas moving from the CFSP to 
the ex EC (election observation – which is now conducted under the EIDHR) and vice versa (monitoring 
missions) and an ESDP mission taken over by a Commission-funded project without further notice 
(EUJUST THEMIS).621  
In this mishmash of programmes and initiatives approaching the nexus, some criteria that guide the 
choice of legal basis can nonetheless be identified. When the focus is on funding local or international 
initiatives, or when project follow-up requires a significant amount of technical/managerial expertise, 
measures will rather be taken on the legal basis of development cooperation. If action relates to the 
conclusion of international conventions, involves a large-scale secondment of Member States’ experts, 
relies heavily on national capabilities, requires political judgment and follow-up or when security 
conditions are unstable, it will instead be adopted under the CFSP. Indeed, many of the focal areas 
included in the IcSP Regulation, such as mediation, promoting and defending the respect for human 
rights or strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and judicial authorities, are also undertaken 
in the CFSP and CSDP realm. Yet, the difference is that in the framework of the IcSP these activities are 
predominantly assumed through financial and technical assistance, while under the CFSP/CSDP 
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framework more direct action is taken, based on EU and Member States capabilities. In practice, the 
emphasis thus seems to lie on the content rather than the aim of the measure. This is not illogical given 
that policies covering the security-development nexus will by definition contribute to both 
development cooperation and CFSP objectives. However, these criteria are not necessarily conducive 
to expertise maximisation and lesson learning. To give just one example of missed opportunity for 
cross-learning: counter-piracy training to coastguards in the Gulf of Guinea is financed under an IcSP 
project (CRIMGO),622 while similar activities in the Horn of Africa are undertaken by a CSDP mission 
(EUCAP Nestor).  
In essence, the EU remains instrument rather than strategy-driven. Its discourse may be holistic, the 
policies that straddle the security-development nexus embody a piecemeal practice of rather small 
and loosely connected initiatives. In designing the Union’s instruments and approach, the division of 
competences and the question of who does what regularly tend to overshadow the issue of what is 
being done. In this light a 2013 Parliament report urges the EU to “[c]ommunicate clearly in one 
document what financing options exist for addressing fragility, which EU organisations are responsible 
for them, which recipients are eligible and the terms and conditions of each instrument”.623 Not only 
is such a broad political consensus to be preferred over judicial solutions, it is essential to finally focus 
all attention on the substance rather than the power balance of this policy nexus.  
3.3. Conclusion 
Contrary to the inherent notion of the security-development nexus, professing that the aims of 
development cooperation and the CFSP are inseparable and should thus be closely tied together, the 
separation between them is firmly enshrined in the Union’s DNA. The EU may portray a single policy 
commitment, its competences, policy regimes and instruments are essentially divided. The EU’s 
respective development and security toolboxes were driven into the grey area between them on 
tiptoes. Both gradually converged towards the core of the security-development interface and today 
confidently address its various challenges. Yet, rather than clarifying competence boundaries through 
secondary law, this has come to blur the logic of what distinguishes development cooperation from 
the CFSP and particularly the CSDP. Objectives of conflict prevention, crisis management, reconciliation 
and post-conflict reconstruction cannot be assigned to one or the other EU competence, forging an 
indissoluble link between development cooperation and the CFSP.  
This interaction occurs in a rather improvised manner, barring the EU from systematically coming to 
an optimal mix of its diverse instrumentarium. Problematically, this gives rise to considerable hurdles 
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of fragmentation, duplication and inter-institutional disagreements on competence delimitation. An 
Action Plan on Security, Fragility and Development never saw the light of day and EU institutions only 
seem to find consensus in a rather generic call for more coherence. Such an approach, which assumes 
that it is known what is to be done in the name of the nexus, is difficult to reconcile with the uncertain 
and contested understanding of its practical implications. It is telling that Keukeleire and Raube found 
that most EU officials, in spite of good intentions, struggle to make practical sense of this nexus.624 In 
this light, the standard refrain, that ‘there cannot be sustainable development without peace and 
security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’, risks 
to read as a simplistic ‘all good things go together’ mantra where security and development initiatives 
automatically reinforce each other.625 Without task certainty the EU’s rhetorical call for coherence 
expresses nothing more than a wish and risks to result in a diffusion, or even evasion, of policy 
responsibility.626 This creates the impression that it was the mere existence of the EU’s extensive 
armoury that prompted this commitment (as this would signify that the EU was meant to act 
comprehensively), rather than the commitment serving to improve the functionality of its instruments. 
In this view, this agenda is more of a teleological inevitability or meant-to-be ideal, than a genuine 
policy programme allowing to attune individual actions to an overall strategy.627 
These simplistic impressions which the EU’s approach evokes are regrettable in the light of the 
considerable strides it has made in enhancing the security-development connection. In order to do 
justice to its achievements and capitalise on the full potential of its impressive and diverse policy-
making machinery, EU institutions must urgently come to terms in laying down guidelines and 
instructions on how to match its words with concrete action on the ground. This will require a 
comprehensive policy framework that manages to strike the delicate balance between Articles 21 and 
40 TEU, between CFSP-TFEU integration and delimitation. Only in this manner can they maximise 
positive connections across security and development toolboxes and avoid counterproductive action. 
In Chapter 6 it will be studied whether the comprehensive approach, built on the streamlined 
institutional and constitutional foundations of the Lisbon Treaty, is more fit for purpose. 
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4. The security-development 
nexus on the institutional track 
 It must be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful 
of success, nor more dangerous to manage than a new system. For the initiator 
has the enmity of all who would profit by the preservation of the old institution 
and merely lukewarm defenders in those who gain by the new ones. 
 
Niccolò Machiavelli, 1532 
 
From its founding fathers to its current leaders, the European Union has been governed by a great 
believe in the role of institutions and institutional change. To many of the obstacles the European 
integration project has come across throughout its nearly 60 years of existence, a substantial part of 
the answer has been delivered in terms of institutional and administrative restructuring. The creation 
of ECSC institutions to indurate peace on the European continent, the establishment of the High 
Representative for the CFSP in reaction to the Balkan crisis of the late 1990s and the formation of new 
supervisory bodies in response to the current economic and financial crisis in the Eurozone, are just a 
number of examples illustrating the Union’s deep-seated trust in the problem-solving potential of 
institutions. As acknowledged by former European Council President Herman Van Rompuy: “[w]e have 
in the Union a tendency of solving problems by creating new institutions, new jobs”.628 The approach 
is generally one of accumulation rather than rationalisation. Institutions are only rarely abolished and 
institutional changes leave deep marks on the EU’s governance system. As “the present and the future 
are connected to the past by the continuity of today’s institutions”, they can learn us a lot about the 
nature of the EU beast.629  
With regard to the CFSP such institutional fiddling has often attempted to better connect it to other 
(ex EC) external policies. Nonetheless, the Union’s institutional framework has always remained 
“[s]ingle by name, dual by regime, multiple by nature”.630 On the positive side, the fact that the nexus 
is managed in a single institutional framework implies that “it should be politically possible to resolve 
any issues of coherence resulting from bipolarity”.631  On the negative side, the EU’s institutional 
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arrangements have been called “a divorce between development and security”, 632  with the 
differentiated roles and institutional balance contributing more to fragmentation than coherence.633 
The most recent and thorough institutional reorganisation was undertaken by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which reformed the function of High Representative, created a single foreign service in the form of the 
EEAS and transformed the old Commission Delegations into genuine Union Delegations. EU leaders 
confidently announced that these innovations would finally “give the Union a single voice in external 
relations”, 634  overcome the fragmentation of the past and make it “work more efficiently and 
effectively”.635 This signals a strong conviction that the absence of these mechanisms “was responsible 
for the underwhelming effect of the Union’s foreign policy and, accordingly, that their introduction 
would place the Union in its well-deserved place at the very centre of the world stage”.636  
The above statements provide ample reason to analyse the impact of these institutional innovations 
on the conduct of EU external action, by focusing on their advances to enhance the link between 
development cooperation and the CFSP. For this purpose we will first scrutinise the traditional love-
hate relationship between the Commission and the Council in managing the security-development 
nexus, which preceded the Lisbon Treaty (4.1.). The subsequent titles will respectively analyse the 
changes brought by the High Representative (4.2.), the EEAS (4.3.) and the Union Delegations (4.4.). 
4.1. The traditional love-hate relationship between the Commission and 
the Council 
The EU’s institutional framework is sometimes presented as if the Commission has the sole 
responsibility for the daily management of TFEU external competences such as development 
cooperation, and the Council for all that concerns the CFSP. This is evidently misconceived as the 
Council is pivotal under every EU competence, and also the Commission’s involvement in the CFSP 
cannot be ignored (cf. supra 2.3.1. and 3.2.2.). The disjointed nature of EU external action, and the 
management of the security-development nexus in particular, condemn the Commission and Council 
to close cooperation.637 Former High Representative Ashton described the complications before the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty as follows: 
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EU work around the world has been guided by two masters: the External Affairs Commissioner and 
the Council's High Representative. There has been one chain of command for our development 
efforts, and a completely separate chain of command for our security activities. Too often good 
people have been hampered by poor systems.638  
The following sections will succinctly describe the pre-Lisbon Council and Commission apparatus for 
development cooperation (4.1.1.) and for CFSP/CSDP (4.1.2.), which gave rise to a fragmented 
management of the security-development nexus (4.1.3.).  
4.1.1. The pre-Lisbon Council and Commission apparatus for development 
cooperation 
Both the Council’s and the Commission’s apparatus for development cooperation underwent a key 
reform in the early 2000s. The main modalities of the Commission’s refurbishment concerned the 
creation of AIDCO as implementing agency (cf. supra 2.2.2.), a deconcentration exercise towards the 
Delegations and the introduction of Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) setting out multiannual strategic 
frameworks for cooperation with a strong focus on poverty alleviation. These reforms had an 
administrative and a political rationale, which were not always in line. On the one hand, they aimed to 
meet the managerial concern, expressed by the OECD-DAC in 1998, that the EU’s “organisational 
framework has appeared to influence policy, rather than the opposite”.639 On the other hand, the 
Commission wanted to deliver a stronger counterweight to the rising Council role under the gradually 
maturing second pillar. For this purpose, particularly the role and responsibilities of DG External 
Relations (DG RELEX) had to be boosted. 
In an effort to professionalise aid policies, as well as to substantiate the EU’s claim of becoming a global 
development actor, the separate ACP portfolio was abolished in the 1999 Prodi Commission and 
Nielson was made responsible for EU development and humanitarian aid as a whole.640 His mandate 
included the entirety of relations with the ACP, but with regard to Asia, Latin America and the Middle 
East, the Commissioner for External Relations was entrusted with all non-development aspects. 
Commercial relations with developing countries – which have always been a key component of the 
Union’s aid programme – were the full responsibility of the Commissioner and DG for Trade. Further 
exacerbating this fragmentation, the reach of DG Development remained restricted to the ACPs, with 
development programming for all other regions done by DG RELEX. The latter’s more political mandate, 
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compared to the aid sheltering role of DG Development, regularly caused tensions over the 
management of the security-development nexus,641 reminiscent of the current strains between DG 
DEVCO and the EEAS (cf. infra 4.3.). AIDCO was given a global focus for aid implementation and 
consequently its board was co-headed by the Commissioners for Development and External Relations. 
Under the 2004-2009 Barroso I Commission, AIDCO (as well as Trade) was even entirely entrusted to 
the Commissioner for External Relations. Also the Commission Delegations were to report to DG RELEX, 
further strengthening its coordinating role. This led to criticisms that the Commission’s reshuffle, 
rather than cohering development, turned the Development Commissioner into “an emperor without 
clothes”, 642 and DG Development into “an empty shell”.643 In any case it significantly complicated the 
latter’s responsibility for promoting PCD. The reforms aimed to strengthen the focus of development 
policies on poverty eradication and alignment with the local context, but simultaneously dispersed aid 
management over three DGs644 and one implementing agency. These all had their separate geographic 
desks, resulting in significant fragmentation and duplication of expertise. The diffusion was only to a 
limited extent overcome by loosely connecting these separate entities under the heading of a ‘RELEX 
family’, with coordination responsibilities that also embodied DG Enlargement (ELARG) and ECHO.645  
The Council’s rationalisation of the early 2000s, in essence, consisted of a reduction in the number of 
Council configurations from 16 to 9. This was decided at the 2002 Seville European Council in order to 
streamline decision-making in preparation of the 2004 enlargement.646 In the field of foreign policy the 
General Affairs Council was merged with the externally-oriented Councils to form the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council (GAERC). This covered foreign and security policy, trade, development 
and humanitarian assistance. The abolishment of a separate Development Council did not imply that 
European development ministers would no longer meet, as the GAERC could be convened in a 
development constellation. This move did not escape the constant in the history of affiliating 
development with broader EU policy-making and led to rising fears of its instrumentalisation. 647 
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COREPER, which carries out preliminary scrutiny of the Council’s dossiers,648 is in principle designed to 
rectify such imbalances, but appeared not particularly proactive in promoting PCD.649 At the senior 
preparatory level, the Council’s Development Committee (DevCom) undertook considerably more 
efforts. For this purpose, it could rely on support from a number of Council working groups such as the 
ACP Working Party, the ACP Finance Working Party, the EDF Committee, the Committee for Asia and 
Latin-America (ALA), etc. Yet, communication and cooperation between these various entities was not 
always optimal,650 and DevCom was often fighting a losing battle against vested interest groups and a 
crowded GAERC agenda. 
Logistic and planning support for the Council’s role in development policy was delivered by its General 
Secretariat. More specifically this occurred through a number of regionally and thematically-organised 
directorates of DG E ‘External economic relations and Politico-Military Affairs’. Contrary to the 
diffusion of responsibilities within the Commission, DG E thus covered the various aspects of this role, 
ranging from development programming to emergency aid, trade-aspects and human rights. Then 
again, compared to the Commission, the Council faces considerably more difficulties in ensuring policy 
coherence at its highest echelons. Decision-making in the Council must navigate various configurations 
where decisions are generally taken by majority voting, while the Commission brings the various 
sectors together in the college of Commissioners deciding collegially.  
4.1.2. The pre-Lisbon Council and Commission apparatus for CFSP and CSDP 
For what concerns the CFSP, the Council always held most cards. At the politico-strategic – and thus 
most visible – level the well-known key roles were (and are) played by the GAERC, COREPER and PSC. 
Their decisions require hands-on operational support, particularly with regard to the CSDP, in which 
the earlier-mentioned Policy Unit, placed under the authority of the HR, has been key. Its main tasks 
were set out in an annexed Declaration to the Amsterdam Treaty and included monitoring and 
analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP, as well as early warning of crisis situations.651 
After some wrangling regarding its composition – which reminds of the recent establishment of the 
EEAS by focussing more on who would get in than on what it actually might do (cf. infra 4.3.) – it was 
decided to include a seconded diplomat from each Member State, four members of the GSC and one 
Commission representative.652 “[F]requently underestimated if not completely ignored (by lawyers in 
                                                          
648 See: Article 240 TFEU. 
649 CEPS, Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council: Strategies for the Way Forward (Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, 2006) 20-22. 
650 Participants in the ACP Finance Working Party for instance came from finance ministries, while those in the ACP Working 
Party were send by the respective development ministries. The policy horizon of such officials was often very different and 
coordination minimal (Woolcock (2012) op.cit. note 647, 160). 
651 Declaration No. 6 attached to the Final Act of the Amsterdam Treaty, op.cit. note 264. 
652 Bretherton and Vogler (2006) op.cit. note 262, 170. 
125 
 
any event)”, in the framework of the CFSP, was the role of the GSC, with the CFSP High Representative 
as Secretary-General.653 Along with the EU’s growing activities in this domain, its DG E staff soon 
outgrew their role of minute-takers and meeting organisers. In particular, the directorates on ‘Defence 
aspects’ and ‘Civilian crisis management’ were key in providing operational and policy support in the 
planning and implementation of CSDP missions and operations. This filled the void left by the 
Commission’s lower involvement in the CFSP, and so laid the groundwork for two, opposing, externally-
oriented EU bureaucracies in Brussels.  
The rapid unfolding of CSDP activity in the 2000s was mirrored by the speed in which new actors and 
bodies saw the light of day. This was not based on an overarching plan, but rather resulted from 
mission-oriented pragmatism, ad hoc solutions to rising problems and the lobbying of neutral EU 
Member States to compensate military evolutions with a civilian counterpart.654 These bodies, until 
today, provide critical support to the politico-strategic CFSP formations through planning, assessment, 
resource generation and policy execution. The aim here is not to give a complete overview but rather 
to succinctly set out the most important actors and the fields they cover. First, the PSC is assisted by 
the Politico-Military Group (PMG) which carries out preparatory work, including the political aspects, 
concepts and capabilities of EU military and civil-military issues, operations and missions. Advice on all 
military matters, including strategic military options with regard to crisis situations and CSDP 
operations, is provided by the EU Military Committee (EUMC). As highest military body in the EU, it is 
composed of Member States Chiefs of Defence. The EUMC is assisted by the EU Military Staff (EUMS), 
consisting of seconded national military experts. It contributes to early warning, situation assessment 
and planning, and supervising military aspects in EU crisis management operations. For civilian 
matters, these tasks are taken on by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
(CIVCOM), composed of national diplomats. It oversees the functioning of civilian CSDP missions and 
advises the PSC.  
For planning, managing and monitoring military operations the EU does not dispose of permanent 
headquarters.655 Rather there are seven available locations decided upon on ad hoc basis. When an 
operation relies on NATO capabilities (under the Berlin Plus arrangements) 656  the latter’s Allied 
Command Operations in Mons, Belgium, will serve as basis. In other cases a choice will be made 
                                                          
653 Curtin and Dekker (2011) op.cit. note 97, 181. 
654 S. Duke, 'Peculiarities in the Institutionalisation of CFSP and ESDP' in S. Blockmans (ed), The European Union and Crisis 
Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (TMC Asser, The Hague, 2008) 104. A particularly strong impetus in strengthening the 
Union’s crisis management structures and procedures was given by the 2005 informal European Council at Hampton Court 
(Presidency Conclusions, European Council meeting, Hampton Court, 15-16.12.2005). 
655 This is mainly due to UK objection (B. Waterfield, '"Big five" tell Baroness Ashton to bypass Britain over EU military HQ', 
The Daily Telegraph, 08.09.2011). 
656 Council Decision (2003/211/CFSP) concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the EU and NATO on the Security 
of Information, OJ L80/35, 27.03.2003. 
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between five Framework States which can avail operational headquarters.657 A last possibility consists 
of launching an Operations Centre (OPCEN – the term ‘Headquarters’ was considered too sensitive and 
state-like for a number of Member States). This is no standing centre, but a facility in Brussels, staffed 
by a core team of four officers and disposing of the necessary security and communications equipment. 
It enables the Council to launch a full-fledged Operations Centre on very short notice. It did so for the 
first (and so far only) time in March 2012 to improve coordination and strengthen civil-military 
synergies between the three CSDP operations in the Horn of Africa (cf. infra 6.2.3.). Again these 
evolutions in the military realm were matched at the civilian side by the creation, in August 2007, of 
the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). This is a permanent structure under the political 
control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the High Representative. Its staff 
is more or less equally divided between Council officials and seconded national experts (SNEs) 
consisting of police officers as well as rule of law, procurement, finance and logistic experts. The 
Director of the CPCC is simultaneously EU Civilian Operations Commander exercising strategic 
command and control for the planning and conduct of all civilian crisis management missions. The 
CPCC has contributed significantly to the professionalisation and standardisation of civilian crisis 
management. Yet, the ‘civilianisation’ of the CSDP is stretching the workload beyond its capacity and 
staff limits.658 
Box 8: EU command and control structures 
 
Source: J. Rehrl and H.-B. Weisserth, Handbook CSDP (Austria Armed Forces/European Security and Defence 
College, Vienna/Brussels, 2010) 62. 
                                                          
657 These five countries are Germany (Ulm), France (Paris), UK (Northwood), Italy (Rome) and Greece (Larissa).  
658 Interview EEAS official, February 2014.  
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In order to improve civil-military cooperation and coordination it was, on the eve of the Lisbon Treaty’s 
entry into force, decided to merge the GSC DGs for civilian and defence aspects. Together with part of 
the civilian-military cell of the EUMS, this now forms the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate 
(CMPD). The mixed civil-military staff of the CMPD works closely with the respective operational 
headquarters to improve strategic planning, but it does not take over their managerial tasks.659 While 
the CMPD will thus not unite the separated worlds, it certainly strengthens the bridge connecting 
them.660 In the same spirit the Joint SitCen serves, since its creation in 2002, both the Union’s civilian 
and military communities with round-the-clock intelligence, assessments and early warning.  
Although the CFSP’s hand-shaking and grand declarations were, before the Lisbon Treaty, generally 
done by the Presidency and the High Representative for the CFSP, the Commission has from the outset 
provided much of the organisational backbone. As noted by former Commissioner Patten, “even with 
the emergence of the CFSP High Representative, Member States look to the Commission to manage 
the nuts and bolts of that engagement, and to do much of the donkey work”.661 The Treaty framework 
was rather misleading in this regard. The Commission’s most concrete responsibility under the CFSP 
Title, namely the right of initiative which it shared with Member States, never really materialised.662 
This was mainly due to a reservation not to further provoke Member States that were generally 
sensitive for what concerned their foreign policy prerogatives.663  The Commission’s much vaguer 
mandates of being fully associated and ensuring the consistency of EU external activities, in 
cooperation with the Council, have resulted in considerably more concrete policy-making. The 
Council’s rules of procedure state, without any exception, that the Commission shall be invited to take 
part in its meetings.664 The Commission has made full use of this right and is represented in the 
Council’s various CFSP-related gatherings, at all levels. Even though its full association and consistency 
mandate also apply to the CSDP, the Commission appeared considerably more careful here to avoid 
stepping on Member States toes. Its seat at the EUMC, for instance, remained long unoccupied.665 The 
main exception to this rule has always been the PSC, given that its broad coverage made it difficult to 
separate military from non-military aspects.  
The ever more intensive interfaces with the Commission’s traditional responsibilities for external 
(economic) policy instigated quite some organisational changes. In the aftermath of the Amsterdam 
                                                          
659The fact that it is composed of about 4/5 military staff while the majority of CSDP missions are civilian constitutes a source 
of tension (M.E. Smith, Building the European External Action Service: Institutional Learning versus Intergovernmental and 
Bureaucratic Politics, Paper presented at the UACES Conference on ‘The EU Diplomatic System after Lisbon’ (London, 31 
January-1 February 2011) 20-21). 
660 Drent and Zandee (2010) op.cit. note 606, 36. 
661 Quoted in Spence (2006) op.cit. note 249, 411. 
662 Ex Article 22(1) TEU.  
663 Spence (2006) op.cit. note 249, 360. 
664 Article 5(2) Council Decision (2009/937/EU) adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure, OJ L325/35, 11.12.2009. 
665 This absence ended mid-2005 under the Barroso Commission (Spence (2006) op.cit. note 249, 375). 
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Treaty, the Commission created a specific CFSP Directorate benefiting from state-of-the-art security 
procedures and equipment. This was rebranded in 2005 as the ‘Crisis platform – Policy coordination in 
the CFSP’ to ensure crisis coordination between second pillar operators and the Commission’s 
geographic desks. It included a European Correspondent’s Unit (responsible for the Commission’s 
policy input in the CFSP as well as secure communications with Member States), a Crisis Management 
and Conflict Prevention (CMCP) Unit, a CFSP Counsellor Unit (with mainly managerial and budgetary 
responsibilities relating to EUSRs and civilian crisis management missions) and a Security Unit (taking 
care of the input for the Council’s CFSP working groups).  
Box 9: Commission staff working on conflict prevention and peace-building 
 
ADE, 'Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building' (Aide à la Décision 
Economique, Brussels, 2011) 73. 
Box 9 lists the Commissions extensive conflict prevention and peace-building machinery before the 
EEAS entered the picture. While general inter-DG cooperation mechanisms were in place – not the 
least through the college of Commissioners – there existed no dedicated cooperation platform for CFSP 
or issues of conflict, crisis and fragility. For instance, the Commission’s participation in the PSC occurred 
only through the CMCP Unit of DG RELEX. This implied that DG Development’s design of policy and 
programming towards the ACP countries (where coordination with CFSP/CSDP crisis management has 
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been most pressing) was only indirectly linked to the GSC and the CFSP High Representative. The same 
goes for the implementation responsibilities of AIDCO and the Delegations. This again illustrates how 
not only inter-institutional fragmentation, but also the diffusion of responsibility within the 
Commission put a strain on coherence across the security-development nexus.666 These problems 
were further compounded by significant staff constraints. The CMCP Unit disposed for instance of only 
one focal point to coordinate the policy aspects of conflict prevention and peace-building. Independent 
assessors of the Commission’s activities consequently concluded that its institutional set-up and 
human resources policy “were not commensurate with its policy commitment and the level of its 
funding for [conflict prevention and peace-building]”.667 
4.1.3. Fragmented management of the security-development nexus 
The overlapping entities within the two internally heterogeneous bureaucracies of the Council and the 
Commission, combined with the unclear division of labour in the field of the security-development 
nexus (cf. supra Chapter 3), resulted in considerable uncertainties regarding the precise roles of both 
institutions.668 Over the years a number of working arrangements emerged to deal with this inter-
institutional gap. These include joint Commission-Council fact-finding/technical assessment missions 
(FFM/TAM), joint option papers and Crisis Response Coordination Teams (CRCTs). This last practice 
was introduced in 2001 to address coordination shortfalls among the different instruments from the 
earliest phase of planning CSDP crisis management operations. The CRCT is no standing facility but a 
practical vehicle aiming to prepare inclusive Crisis Management Concepts (CMCs). It took the Council 
and the Commission considerable but instructive efforts to learn how to cooperate in these settings.669 
These are all very useful initiatives, but as High Representative Ashton herself pointed out: “too much 
depends on ad-hoc arrangements and the creativity of individuals. We achieve comprehensive 
strategies despite our structures, not because of them”.670  Or, as put by the Commission: “[t]he 
different services of the Commission and the Council keep each other mutually informed, but there is 
room for further improving the inter-institutional co-ordination, planning and decision-making”.671  
The Lisbon Treaty includes an important instrument to reconcile such varying institutional concerns in 
Article 295 TFEU. This regulates inter-institutional agreements between the Parliament, Council and 
                                                          
666 This was also the opinion of 47% of survey respondents (consisting of Commission officials, staff in Delegations, partner 
country officials, civil society, Member States, donors, international organisations and implementing partners of the 
Commission) to the Commission’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation (ADE (2011) op.cit. note 82, 70). 
667 Ibid., v and 51. 
668 Ibid., 66-67 (40 % of the interviewees found that the task division between the Council and the Commission was not well 
adapted to the challenges at stake). 
669 GSC/Commission (14400/2/02) Follow-up to the CMC Action Plan – Outline Paper on the CRCT, Brussels, 02.12.2002, 2-3. 
670 Ashton (2010) op.cit. note 638. 
671 Commission Staff Working Document (SEC(2009) 1137) see note 449, 62. 
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Commission to make arrangements for their cooperation “which may be of a binding nature”. Such 
agreements have a long history in inter-institutional relations as pragmatic ways to regulate legal voids 
and prevent or overcome tensions.672 Their inclusion in the Lisbon Treaty accords them a firmer status, 
which might paradoxically diminish their use, as this makes them more prone to monitoring by turf-
sensitive institutions.673 This immediately effectuated with the November 2010 Framework Agreement 
between Parliament and Commission. Amongst others, the Commission committed to inform and 
involve the Parliament at every stage of negotiations on international agreements and take its views 
into account as far as possible in the CFSP.674 The Council found that this agreement modified the EU’s 
institutional balance and refused to be bound. It declared that it would “submit to the Court of Justice 
any act or action of the European Parliament or of the Commission performed in application of the 
provisions of the Framework Agreement that would have an effect contrary to the interests of the 
Council and the prerogatives conferred upon it by the Treaties”.675 So far this has not materialised. In 
the subsequent sections it will be examined whether the Lisbon Treaty’s institutional fiddling offers 
better prospects for putting in place concerted approaches to the security-development nexus. 
4.2. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
As set out in Chapter 2 the function of High Representative was initially created by the Amsterdam 
Treaty to deal with the absence of continuity in the CFSP’s leadership as well as its poor visibility. 
Although it is today perceived as one the key innovations empowering this policy area, its insertion 
into the Treaty was not without controversies. Then Commission President Prodi called this function 
“a provisional response to a lasting need … [confusing] the roles of the Council and the Commission in 
a way that could ultimately jeopardise both struts of the institutional system”.676 He therefore believed 
that the High Representative “should be integrated into the Commission, with a special status tailored 
to the needs of security and defence”.677 Nonetheless, the Commission and the High Representative 
soon came to cooperate rather well, largely due to the complementary personalities of Javier Solana, 
the first CFSP High Representative, and Chris Patten the then External Relations (RELEX) Commissioner. 
Patten explained the division of labour between them as follows:  
Javier's role is to help the Council rally the Member States to our common policies and to represent 
those policies to the world. My role is to ensure that the EU can deliver on those policies, to come 
                                                          
672 See for instance the 1997 inter-institutional agreement on the financing of the CFSP (op.cit. note 266). 
673 See further: S. Becker-Alon, The Communitarian Dimension of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011) 136-146 and 275-276. 
674 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, OJ L304/47, 20.11.2010. 
675 Council Statement (15172/10) on the relations between the European Parliament and Commission, 3039th Employment, 
Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 21.10.2010, 17. 




up with the necessary ideas and proposals, to implement them and to make sure that Europe’s 
external action is consistent with its internal policies.678 
Occasional frictions were however unavoidable. Patten for instance had a problem with Solana who, 
in his view, “as soon as something is designated a 'crisis' … proposes it should at once become the 
object of a comprehensive Joint Action covering both Community and second pillar issues”.679 He 
moreover disapproved that the creation of his role had “increased the tendency for CFSP to usurp 
functions which should be the responsibility of the Commission”.680 Such tensions never culminated 
and were commonly tempered by pragmatics, not the least because both functions strongly depended 
on each other. Solana had significant political capital, but was “a chief with very few Indians” and relied 
for resources and administration on the Commission. The RELEX Commissioner, for his part, held a 
more back office position with significantly less politico-strategic leverage. Purely focussing on their 
functional complementarity, there was thus definitely logic in uniting these portfolios.    
In what follows we will first entangle the Treaty provisions on the High Representative in order to 
unveil her681 expansive tasks and responsibilities (4.2.1.). In a second part it will be argued that it is 
precisely the confidence put in this single new bridge to provide leadership across competence and 
institutional boundaries, while the latter remain firmly in place, that render this position the 
personification of the integration-delimitation paradox (4.2.2.). This results in significant challenges 
with regard to the loyalty and accountability of this function, complicating efforts to strengthen ties 
across the security-development nexus. A final section will then discuss the specific case of EU Special 
Representatives (4.2.3.).  
4.2.1. The Treaty framework: crossing competence and institutional 
boundaries 
The European Convention’s External Action Working Group felt “that more needed to be done to 
ensure coherence between foreign policy decisions on the one hand and the deployment of 
instruments and policy making in the field of external relations on the other hand”.682 In this light they 
discussed four options to smoothen the tandem of the CFSP High Representative and RELEX 
                                                          
678 C. Patten, ‘A voice for Europe? The future of the CFSP’, Brian Lenihan Memorial Lecture delivered in Dublin, 07.03.2001, 
4. 
679 Letter by Commissioner Patten to EU foreign ministers of November 2000 quoted in F. Cameron, An Introduction to 
European Foreign Policy (Routledge, New York, 2007) 56. 
680 He gave the example of the EC Monitoring Mission to the Balkans, “which was dreamt up by CFSP and then left as an 
expensive baby on the Commission's doorstep” (C. Patten, 'External Relations: Demands, Constraints and Priorities', Agence 
Europe, 06.10.2000). 
681 Given that its first two incumbents are women, we will use the feminine pronoun to refer to the High Representative post-
Lisbon.  
682 European Convention (CONV 459/02) op.cit. note 371, para. 28. 
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Commissioner. A first option consisted of strengthening the role of High Representative and enhancing 
synergies with the Commission, while keeping both functions separate. Secondly, the advocates of 
introducing the Community method to the widest possible extent in EU external action proposed to 
fully merge the High Representative into the Commission, forming a single centre for external policy 
guidance.683 The third option consisted of uniting both offices in the person of an “External Action 
Representative”, preferably with the rank of Vice-President in the Commission. Finally, there was the 
proposal of creating an “EU Minister of Foreign Affairs”, who would operate under the immediate 
authority of the European Council President. The Minister would combine the functions of High 
Representative and External Relations Commissioner and chair the external action Council.  
Following significant contention, the consensus in the 2004 Constitutional Treaty was to combine 
elements of the last two models. The ‘Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ united the High 
Representative’s responsibilities for the CFSP, those of Commissioner for external relations as well as 
Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, and was simultaneously made Vice-President of the 
Commission.684 Both the title and the high-ranking roles are indicative of the Treaty drafters’ ambition 
to enhance the visibility, stability, coherence and effectiveness of EU external action. The Lisbon Treaty, 
which undid the “constitutional character” of the Constitutional Treaty,685 abolished the name but 
maintained the ambitious triple-hatted portfolio686 of the renamed ‘High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’.687  
As this title suggests, the Treaty mandate is no longer limited to assisting the Council and the 
Presidency in CFSP matters alone, but includes wide-ranging tasks encompassing the whole EU 
external action field. This is clear from the impressive increase from three references to the function 
of High Representative in the ex TEU, to nearly 70 in the current TEU and TFEU. If the limited 
responsibilities of the High Representative under the Amsterdam Treaty were compensated by the 
choice for the high-profile figure of Solana, these much extended powers were now counter-balanced 
by opting for someone with a lower international profile.688 This was the case with Catherine Ashton 
in 2009 and again with Federica Mogherini in 2014. The various provisions on this function are so 
                                                          
683 Under this model CSDP issues were to remain subject to a separate arrangement. 
684 Article I-28 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C310/1, 16.12.2004. The GAERC is again split into a 
General and a Foreign Affairs Council.  
685 Presidency Conclusions, IGC Mandate, European Council, Brussels, 21-22.06.2007, para. 3. 
686 Some only distinguish the two hats of High Representative and Commission Vice-President. Others add the hats of chairing 
the EDA and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and simply speak of multi-hatting (for instance: A. Missiroli, 
'Commentary: Security Governance Matters' (2013) Journal of Contemporary European Research 9(3), 479). Because the 
three above roles are so key to her mandate, we will speak throughout this dissertation of the triple-hatted HR. 
687 Article 18 TEU. 
688 E. Denza, 'The Role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' in H.-J. Blanke and S. 
Mangiameli (eds), The European Union after Lisbon: Constitutional Basis, Economic Order and External Action (Springer, 
Berlin, 2012) 486. 
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dispersed throughout the Treaty that it is not easy to get a clear picture of the new High 
Representative’s (HR) role. Most indications are given with regard to her competence to ‘conduct’ the 
CFSP. These can be subdivided in five categories.  
First, it includes the power of initiative. Both Articles 18(2) and 27(1) TEU note that the HR shall 
contribute by her proposals to the development of the CFSP. Article 30(1) TEU specifies that this is a 
shared right. The Member States and the HR, solely or with the Commission support, “may refer any 
question relating to the [CFSP] to the Council and may submit to it, respectively, initiatives or 
proposals”. This implies that the Commission no longer has a CFSP right of initiative independent from 
the HR.689 A number of other specific cases are provided where the HR has the power of initiative. 
These include proposals for appointing Special Representatives (cf. infra 4.2.3.), the implementation 
of European Council decisions on EU strategic interests and objectives (cf. infra 6.3.), procedures for 
setting up, administering and auditing the CFSP start-up fund, restrictive measures, the 
implementation of the solidarity clause and CSDP decisions.690 This last element is key as the previous 
Treaty framework did not assign the HR specific CSDP responsibilities. She may moreover “propose the 
use of both national resources and Union means” for the CSDP and “shall ensure the coordination of 
the civilian and military aspects” of the Petersberg tasks.691 Finally, she shall recommend the opening 
of negotiations to the Council for agreements that relate “exclusively or principally” to the CFSP (cf. 
infra 5.3.2.).692 
A second component of her mandate is executive. The Treaty language is rather confusing in this regard. 
Article 18(2) TEU states that the HR “shall carry out” the CFSP “as mandated by the Council”. This 
subservient position disappears in Article 24(1) TEU, which suddenly shares her responsibility to “put 
into effect” the CFSP with the Member States. Rather puzzling, the definition and implementation of 
the CFSP is here restricted to the European Council and the Council. Article 27(1) TEU then specifies 
that the HR – with no mention of Member States – “shall ensure implementation of the decisions by 
the European Council and the Council”. Not only is it unclear whether carrying out, putting into effect 
and implementing the CFSP signal different activities, these Articles also assign various executive 
agents without specifying a division of labour or clear chain of command. Given that the HR is not 
                                                          
689 Her power to initiate does not have the same legal value as the Commission’s “quasi-exclusive right of legislative initiative” 
in other policy areas (P. Ponzano, C. Hermanin and D. Corona, 'The Power of Initiative of the European Commission: A 
Progressive Erosion?', Study & Research 89 (Notre Europe, Paris 2012) 56p.). Article 17(2) TEU prescribes that “Union 
legislatives acts may only be adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where the Treaty provide otherwise”, 
while no such provision is provided for CFSP decisions. There is moreover no equivalent of Article 293(1) TFEU prescribing 
that the Council, when acting on a Commission proposal, may only amend it by acting unanimously. 
690 Respectively: Article 33 TEU, Article 22(2) TEU, Article 41(3) TEU, Article 215(1) TFEU, Article 222(3) TFEU (under the TFEU 
this right is systematically shared with the Commission) and Article 42(4) TEU. 
691 Articles 42(4) and 43(2) TEU. 
692 Article 218(3) TFEU. 
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accorded any formal role in decision-making, it is safe to argue that her autonomy falls within the 
boundaries set by the European Council and the Council.   
Third, the HR is jointly with the Council assigned to ensure compliance with CFSP principles, as set out 
in Article 24 TEU. Besides the (in)famous “specific rules and procedures”, this includes the provision 
that the Union shall conduct, define and implement the CFSP within the framework of the principles 
and objectives of its external action. The High Representative and the Council must moreover make 
sure that Member States “support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly 
in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity [,] comply with the Union’s action in this area [,] work 
together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity [and] refrain from any action which 
is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness”.693 This supervisory role is 
however not accompanied by any legal means of enforcement. One may therefore wonder how the 
HR is to ensure compliance with the principles of a policy that she herself is to ‘carry out as mandated 
by the Council’. An important tool in this regard is her close connection to the PSC, which ensures the 
political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations under her (and the Council’s) 
responsibility.694 Moreover the fact the she is appointed by and participates in the European Council 
gives the HR considerable authority and standing.695  
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Commission (SEC(2011)881) Vademecum on the external action of the EU, n.d., 14-15. 
                                                          
693 Article 24(3) TEU.  
694 Article 38 TEU. Another important provision in this regard is her mediating role in the ‘emergency brake’ procedure of 
Article 31(2) TEU. 
695 Article 18(1) and 15(2) TEU. 
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A fourth key component is to represent the Union in CFSP matters, conduct political dialogue with third 
parties on the Union’s behalf and express its position at international organisations and conferences.696 
Despite the European Convention’s strong conviction that “a single representation would improve the 
Union's capacity to act effectively and convincingly on the global stage”,697 the HR is again not the only 
rooster in the henhouse (cf. Box 10). The President of the European Council “at his level and in that 
capacity” ensures the external representation of the Union for CFSP issues “without prejudice to the 
powers of the High Representative”.698 The Commission takes on this representational tasks outside 
the CFSP. 699  As international matters regularly transcend competence boundaries, ad hoc 
arrangements and interpersonal chemistry are of the essence.  
Fifth and finally, the HR is to “regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the 
basic choices of the [CFSP and CSDP] and inform it of how those policies evolve”.700 She shall ensure 
that its views are duly taken into consideration. The Parliament may address questions or make 
recommendations to the HR as well as the Council, and shall organise, twice a year, a debate on the 
progress made in implementing the CFSP. 
With this five-stranded role the High Representative replaces “the Presidency as the key animating 
force of the CFSP”, 701 in a manner that is similar to the Commission’s traditional role in TFEU policies. 
If it is challenging to complete the puzzle of her CFSP responsibilities, hardly any pieces are provided 
concerning the HR’s role in the broader framework of EU external action. The task of chairing the FAC 
is rather straightforward on a general level and consists of taking over this responsibility from the 
Presidency. This is a key responsibility as the FAC represents the central EU cockpit to “elaborate the 
Union’s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and 
ensure that the Union’s action is consistent”.702 Chairing means having a hand in shaping EU external 
action, which for the first time occurs through a figure representing the Union as a whole, rather than 
an individual Member State. Her participation in the European Council is key here because of its 
anchoring role in providing “the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and [defining] 
the general political directions and priorities thereof”.703 In this manner she forms yet another key 
                                                          
696 Article 27(2) TEU. Article 34 TEU moreover specifies that the HR shall organise the coordination of Member States action 
at international organisations and conferences and shall be invited to present the Union’s position at the UN Security Council. 
697 European Convention (CONV 459/02) op.cit. note 371, para. 65. 
698 Article 16(6) TEU.  
699 Article 17(1) TEU. By not specifying representation arrangements in the sensitive area of shared competences, the Treaty 
gave rise for considerable strife and differing opinions among EU institutions and Member States (see further: Wouters and 
Ramopolous (2014) op.cit. note 408, 232-235). 
700 Article 36 TEU.  
701 UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty: Third Report of Session 
2007-2008, 20.01.2008, 51. 
702 Article 16(6) TEU. 
703 Article 15(1-2) TEU.  
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bridge, this time with the Member States foreign ministers which ceased to sit in this highest of EU 
institutional spheres. Finally, with regard to her hat as Commission Vice-President Article 18(4) TEU 
specifies, in the tersest of terms, that she “shall be responsible within the Commission for 
responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s 
external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these 
responsibilities, the High Representative shall be bound by Commission procedures to the extent that 
this is consistent with paragraphs 2 and 3” (i.e. her responsibilities in the CFSP and as FAC Chair). This 
evidently leaves open many questions regarding her loyalty and accountability, which will be discussed 
in the next section.  
4.2.2. The personification of the integration-delimitation paradox 
With this impressive range of duties the office of HR outgrew its supportive role and has become a 
central figure in moulding and casting EU external action as whole. The integrative potential hereof is 
most clearly exemplified by the emerging practice of the HR and Commission co-authoring 
communications that organically combine CFSP and TFEU aspects of external relations.704 With her 
three hats she stands with one foot among the Member States in the Council and another in the 
Commission, giving her mandate an essentially dual nature. This fusion of portfolios was not 
accompanied by any adaptations to the Treaty powers of the Commission, Council or Member States, 
nor does this change anything to the robust CFSP-TFEU delimitation. Crowe, former Council Director-
General for External Relations, therefore argues that the Treaty does not unite the jobs of CFSP High 
Representative and External Relations Commissioner but simply assigns them to the same person.705 
A dual mandate with a strong coherence rationale to overcome the duality of EU external action 
represents the ultimate personification of the Lisbon Treaty’s integration-delimitation paradox (cf. 
supra 2.3.2.). It provides both opportunities to move this figure beyond the mere sum of its 
institutional components, as well as risks to founder at the rocks of institutional and competence 
boundaries. 706  Associated problems include bureaucratic navel-gazing, counteraction of vested 
interests and ultimately loss of time, efficiency and money. Crowe was not the only well-informed 
insider to be sceptical, also Solana and Patten expressed serious doubts about the viability of this inter-
                                                          
704  See for instance: Commission and High Representative Joint Communication (JOIN(2013) 22 final) Towards a 
Comprehensive Approach to the Syrian Crisis, 24.06.2013; Commission and High Representative Joint Communication 
(JOIN(2011) 886 final) Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action: Towards a more Effective Approach, 
12.12.2011. 
705 B. Crowe, Foreign Minister of Europe (The Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2005) 3. 




institutional straddle as well as the practical feasibility of her sizeable portfolio.707 In this chapter it will 
be evaluated to what extent such concerns were justified. 
Split loyalty and accountability 
This inter-institutional straddle implies diverging and potentially conflicting allegiances. Depending on 
the hat she is wearing, the HR is answerable to different principals and has to abide by their respective 
rules. Article 18(4) TEU defines that she shall be bound by Commission procedures when acting as 
Commission Vice-President, to the extent that this is consistent with her CFSP and FAC responsibilities. 
This wording offers little to nothing in terms of practical guidance, and moreover appears to 
subordinate the HR’s Commission role to her other hats. This could be particularly restrictive in relation 
to her role as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council. The FAC not only deals with CFSP issues but also with 
TFEU policies such as development cooperation.708 The language of Article 18(4) TEU therefore appears 
to release her from collegiality obligations at the tail end of most foreign policy decision-making.709 
This has given rise to some mistrust regarding this “Trojan horse” 710  construction, giving the 
“representative par excellence of the intergovernmentalism of the CFSP … a seat in the last remaining 
bulwark of the méthode communautaire’”.711 However, such an interpretation goes against the spirit 
of the Treaty and also the travaux préparatoires suggest that this was not the drafters’ intention. The 
proceedings of the European Convention indicate a more balanced view: “[w]hen he/she exercised 
his/her right of initiative on CFSP, the Commission should abstain from taking a competing initiative. 
His/her initiatives on CFSP and decisions to put them into effect would not be subject to prior approval 
by the College of Commissioners”. 712  It should moreover not be forgotten that the HR is a 
Commissioner à part entière, while she acts only as a broker within the FAC, without any voting rights.  
The HR’s split personality is inherent in the Commission’s appointment and resignation rules. The 
Commission President is elected by the European Parliament, on a proposal from the European Council 
acting by qualified majority.713 The list of Commissioners is subsequently drawn up by the Council in 
common accord with the President-elect and subject as a body to a vote of consent by the 
                                                          
707 See: European Convention (CONV 356/02) Summary of meeting Working Group VII on External Action, 15.10.2002, para. 
9; European Convention (CONV 342/02) Summary of meeting Working Group VII on External Action, 11.10.2002., para. 15. 
708 Only in the case of the Common Commercial Policy will the Chair “ask to be replaced by the six-monthly Presidency” 
(Article 2(5) Council Decision (2009/937/EU) op.cit. note 664). In addition there are informal Council meetings for defence 
and development which the High Representative does not always attend (cf. infra). 
709 Dashwood (2013) op.cit. note 95, 14-15. 
710 J. Wouters, 'The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs: Europe's Single Voice or Trojan Horse?' in J.W. de Zwaan, J.H. Jans and 
F.A. Nelissen (eds), The European Union: An Ongoing Process of Integration. Liber Amicorum Alfred E. Kellerman (TMC Asser, 
The Hague, 2004) 77-86.  
711 Kuijper (2007) op.cit. note 122, 1598.  
712 European Convention (CONV 459/02) op.cit. note 371, para. 5. 
713 Article 17(7) TEU.  
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Parliament.714  The High Representative/Vice-President is evidently subject to this same vote, but 
follows a different trajectory to arrive on the list. He/she is appointed by QMV in the European Council 
with the agreement of the Commission President.715 This appears to give her a more authoritative rank 
than other Commissioners. By the same token, all Commission members “shall resign if the President 
so request”, except for the HR for whom additionally a qualified majority in the European Council has 
to agree.716 When the Parliament issues a motion of censure, the Commission shall resign as a body, 
yet, the HR only from the duties that she carries out in the Commission.717 The practical consequences 
of this provision are not entirely clear, but it presumably means that either the European Council 
decides that the HR shall resign completely or she simply gets reappointed in a new Commission.   
As prima inter pares the HR is entrusted in the Commission with the “responsibilities incumbent on it 
in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action”.718 The Treaty 
does however not distinguish between what constitute these incumbent responsibilities and which are 
the other aspects. This task is left to the Commission President who decides over the internal 
organisation of the Commission. 719  Barroso, in his second term that started in 2009, used this 
discretion in what could be seen as an erosion of the HR’s Commission-hat. First, by assigning separate 
portfolios for ‘Development’, ‘International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response’, 
‘Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy’ and ‘Trade’, no incumbent responsibilities were 
left for Ashton to fulfil. All these Commissioners evidently have their own plans and ambitions, 
complicating the HR’s efforts to effectively use the Commission’s extensive resources as external 
leadership instrument.720 While this task division could still be justified in the light of her already dense 
agenda, this is much less the case for Barroso’s second move. In announcing the 2010-2014 
Commission, he left out ‘Trade’ from the above portfolios that were to be conducted “in close 
cooperation with the High Representative/Vice-President”.721 He subsequently erected an External 
Relations Commissioners group (RELEX), including besides the three above Commissioners those 
responsible for ‘Trade’ as well as ‘Economic and Monetary Affairs’. The HR was entrusted with 
presiding this group, however, with the remarkable caveat that “the President can decide to attend 
                                                          
714 On the basis of this consent the Commission shall then be appointed by QMV in the European Council. 
715 Article 18(1) TEU.  
716 Articles 17(6) and 18(1) TEU. Notably, in cases of serious misconduct or when she no longer fulfils the conditions required 
to perform her duties, this extra condition does not appear to apply. Article 247 TFEU then empowers the CJEU, on application 
by the Council acting by a simple majority or the Commission, to retire her, just like any other member of the Commission. 
717 Article 17(8) TEU. 
718 Article 18(4) TEU. 
719 Article 17(6)(b) TEU.  
720 C. Berger and N. von Ondarza, 'The Next High Representative and the EEAS: Reforming the EU Foreign Policy Structures', 
SWP Comments 40 (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 2013) 3. 
721 Commission Press Release (IP/09/1837) ‘President Barroso unveils his new team’, Brussels, 27.11.2009. This is repeated 
in the Mission Letters of these respective Commissioners, see: <ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/mission_letters/index_en.htm> (last accessed 20.05.2015). 
139 
 
any meeting, which he will then chair”.722 The combination with Ashton’s busy schedule and limited 
proactivity tended to turn her into a technically jobless Vice-President. If her one in three attendance 
rate in Commission meetings was already very low, the European Court of Auditors reported that only 
five RELEX Commissioners meetings were held between 2010-2014, none of which chaired by the 
HR.723 It further lamented the lack of progress in clarifying the scope of her Vice-President role.724 In 
essence, this meant that despite the comprehensiveness of her mandate, the HR still had to share 
leadership over the security-development nexus within the Commission with then Development 
Commissioner Piebalgs. Notably, the latter – and not the HR– often functioned as the Commission’s 
linchpin for external relations.725 Problematically, Ashton described the division of labour between 
them as “potentially unclear and [to] be clarified”.726 
A wind of change occurred with the 2014 appointment of Juncker as Commission President, exhibiting 
a will to rivet the HR firmly within the college of Commissioners. Contrary to the President-centred 
Barroso Commission, Juncker – introducing himself as a “modest chap” – decentralised leadership 
responsibilities to seven Vice-Presidents.727 Mogherini leads the team “A Stronger Global Actor” which 
includes the Commissioners for Development, Neighbourhood and Enlargement Policy, Humanitarian 
Aid and Trade. Juncker announced that he “will not put any new initiative in the Commission Work 
Programme or on the agenda of the College that has not received the backing of the relevant Vice-
President”. This accords the HR the strategic role of filtering and coordinating the external policy 
aspects of all external portfolios.728 Her stronger mandate aims to “overcome silo mentalities” and 
includes arrangements to establish close ties between her cabinet and that of the President 
(particularly in the light of their concomitant representational duties) and convene at least monthly 
RELEX meetings presided by her.729 Johannes Hahn, the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood 
and Enlargement Negotiations (as well as other Commissioners if the need arises) is explicitly assigned 
                                                          
722 Commission President Information Note (SEC(2010) 475 final) on the Commissioners groups, 22.04.2010. 
723 ECA, ‘The Establishment of the European External Action Service’, Special Report No.11 (ECA, Brussels, 2014) para. 53. 
Consequently, the HR’s participation in the RELEX group was not very different from the pre-Lisbon situation where HR Solana 
occasionally attended those meetings (UK House of Lords EU Committee, 48th Report of Session 2005–06: Europe in the 
World, 22.11.2006, para. 45). 
724  Also the Parliament regularly called to activate the High Representative’s Commission hat (for instance: European 
Parliament (2013/2146(INI)) op.cit. note 84, para. 15). 
725 For instance, Barroso did not consider the Commission to be represented through HR Ashton in the FAC and appointed 
Commissioner Piebalgs as full-fledged Commission representative in those meetings. (J.-M. Barroso, Mission Letter 
Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, 27.11.2009). 
726 High Representative Ashton, EEAS Review, Brussels, 2013, 8. 
727 V. Pop, 'New Commission sees greater role for Juncker deputies', euobserver.com, 10.09.2014. 
728 Commission (MEMO/14/523) Questions and Answers: The Juncker Commission, 10.09.2014. 
729  J.-C. Juncker, Mission Letter Federica Mogherini: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security 
Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Brussels, 10.09.2014, 2-4. The 2013 EEAS Review had announced that the 
Commission President and HR agreed to scale up RELEX cooperation, with meetings chaired by the latter and jointly prepared 
by the Commission Secretariat-General and the EEAS (EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 8). 
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as Mogherini’s deputy to allow her “to focus her efforts on tackling the real geopolitical challenges”.730 
Symbolically, an end was made to the HR’s double offices in the Commission’s Berlaymont and the 
EEAS’ Triangle building. In order to demonstrate internally and externally that she is full part of the 
Commission, her one and only seat is now set in the Berlaymont. A logical consequence of the 
upgraded position of the HR in the current Commission, is that the Development Commissioner, Neven 
Mimica, is partly taken of his pedestal and shall “contribute to the work of the High Representative”.731 
This clears the path for more unified leadership over the security-development nexus within the 
Commission, but simultaneously holds risks for tilting the balance away from development objectives. 
A cooperative relationship with the Member States is equally key to the effectiveness of her function. 
This is particularly so with the Presidency, which continues to chair nine of the ten Council formations, 
regularly deciding on the external dimension of their internal subject areas. This explains why the 
Council’s rules of procedure do not accord the HR full independence in setting the FAC agenda, but 
require her to cooperate with the Presidency trios.732 Moreover, not all the Council preparatory bodies 
are chaired by delegates of the HR. This is only so for certain horizontal and all geographic and CSDP-
related committees and working parties, while bodies in the area of development cooperation and 
trade continue to be chaired by the rotating Presidency.733 Given that the great majority of decisions 
are shaped and taken at these lower levels, this evidently requires intensive cooperation, coordination 
and follow-up (cf. infra 4.3.1.). 
A herculean task description 
Besides the challenges of reconciling her various allegiances, the triple-hatted and multitasking High 
Representative faces practical difficulties in executing her sizeable – and according to some 
“impossible” – task description. 734  These challenges were already predicted at the time of the 
European Convention, but eventually no coping mechanisms made their way into the Treaty. 735 
Unsurprisingly, the herculean nature of her tasks soon manifested itself. Unrelenting choices had to 
be made as it proofed near impossible to simultaneously undertake time-consuming consensus-
                                                          
730 Juncker (2014) op.cit. note 729, 2-3. The mission letter moreover states that half of her cabinet staff should consist of 
Commission officials. 
731 J.-C. Juncker, Mission Letter Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development Neven Mimica, 10.09.2014, 3. 
732 Article 2(6) Council Decision (2009/937/EU) op.cit. note 664. The Presidency trios are pre-determined groups of three 
successive presidencies cooperating to ensure a coherent approach to the Council’s work.  
733 Council Decision (2009/908/EU) laying down measures for the implementation of the European Council Decision on the 
exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory bodies of the Council, OJ L322/28, 
09.12.2009, Annex II. The growing practice of letters from like-minded Member States’ with concrete agenda items, further 
decreases the agenda-setting powers of the Chair (N. Helwig, 'The High Representative 3.0: Taking EU Foreign Policy to the 
Next Level', FIIA Briefing Paper 155 (The Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki, 2014) 3-4). 
734 H. Mahony, 'EU foreign minister has "impossible" task ahead', euobserver.com, 16.11.2009. 
735 European Convention (CONV 459/02) op.cit. note 371, para. 37. Article 33 TEU on the EUSRs provides a basis for delegating 
authority, yet only in relation to “particular policy issues”.  
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building within the FAC and the Commission, conduct forward-looking strategic thinking regarding the 
CFSP, react to international crises and conduct political dialogue. For Ashton this was further 
complicated by the fact that she concurrently had to set up her own office as well as the EEAS. She 
liked to explain it as follows: “[o]n appointment I was given the Treaty … but that was it, so everything 
we have done we have had to create … it is like flying a plane while you are still building the wings and 
somebody might be trying to take the tail off at the same time”.736  
A number of arrangements emerged to deal with her relentless workload. First, administratively, the 
EEAS’ senior leadership took over much of the management of the service (cf. infra 4.3.) and 
occasionally stands in for internal EU coordination and lower-level representation. Second, in relation 
to her formal representational functions she chose to rely on both the Presidency737 and her fellow 
Commissioners. The Vademecum on EU external action elucidates the arrangement: 
 When the HR/VP is prevented from taking up himself/herself the task of chairing a meeting at 
ministerial level, he/she can be replaced by a representative of the Member State holding the 
Presidency of the Council or, where he/she decides so, by a Commissioner (in agreement with the 
President of the Commission). However, in such a case, the Member State holding the Presidency 
of the Council should limit itself to the role of presiding over the meeting and (as replacement for 
the HR) expressing the EU position on CFSP matters (as well as, as the case may be, expressing the 
views of the Member States on issues within their competence). The presentation of the EU position 
on all non-CFSP issues should be ensured by another Commissioner(s).738 
Third, looser arrangements apply for a number of the HR’s operational tasks. This involves Presidency 
minsters, senior Commission and EEAS staff as well as Special Representatives regularly traveling on 
the HR’s behalf. On all three levels the delegation arrangements remain very ad hoc and practically 
reinstate the institutional duality which the creation of this office was meant to transcend. In the light 
of this obscurity, the 2013 EEAS Review calls to clarify this system of political deputies and conclude 
formal inter-institutional arrangements for the existing practices.739 Remarkably, the Council Legal 
Service responds to this suggestion that “[t]he creation of deputies would require a Treaty amendment 
affecting the institutional balance”, thereby suggesting that the current practices may be 
unconstitutional.740 In case it would ever come to a Treaty revision, Bergen and Ondarza distinguish 
                                                          
736 UK House of Lords EU Committee, Evidence Session with Baroness Ashton of Upholland, High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs And Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission, 14.06.2011, 3-4. 
737 When the Presidency is unable to replace the HR, this task can be assumed by a ministerial representative from another 
Member State. 
738 Commission (SEC(2011) 881 final) Vademecum on the external action of the EU, n.d., 22. 
739 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, medium-term recommendation 3. 
740 Council Legal Service (14458/13) EEAS Review: indications relating to the legal and institutional issues raised by the 
recommendations, 04.10.2013, 8. 
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two possible models.741 The first is based on the German system of ‘Staatssekretär’ and would establish 
a high-level and visible political deputy taking over from the HR in all instances where she cannot be 
present. The French ‘Secrétaire Générale’ provides the inspiration for the second option. He/she would 
be more akin to a high-level official substituting for the HR’s internal responsibilities of EU coordination 
and information-exchange, while the latter remains the single face for the EU externally. Both models 
of triple-hatted deputies would have a stronger political and symbolic impact than the current 
delegation arrangements, but are more complex to set up institutionally and legally. Moreover, they 
risk to simply add a second layer of loyalty complications.  
This casts doubts on the feasibility of this innovative piece of Treaty design. As colourfully put by late 
Professor Peter F. Drucker: “[n]o institution can possibly survive if it needs geniuses or supermen to 
manage it. It must be organized in such a way as to be able to get along under a leadership composed 
of average human beings”.742 On the one hand, the HR is uniquely placed to broker whole-of-EU 
responses to global challenges combining the wide variety of CFSP and TFEU competences. Yet, to 
achieve this she must sail the murky waters of diverging EU interests and command the trust of often 
mistrustful Member States, Commissioners and members of Parliament. In line with the general thread 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the design of the HR reflects a midway between integration and delimitation. The 
result is a certain feel of incompleteness in relation to the design of this position. Whereas the High 
Representative was created to provide the Union with a single voice and phone number, she eventually 
shares this with the European Council, Council and Commission. She is the anchor for everything 
external within the Commission, but not to the extent that she absorbs or dictates other external 
portfolios. She is the one and only chair of the FAC, but does not control all of its preparatory bodies. 
If there is one figure that should and could provide the much-needed leadership over the nexus 
between development and security, the HR would definitely be it. However, “[w]ith her wings as [Vice-
President] clipped, and a mandate, which is largely defined by the Treaty in terms of CSFP, the lop-
sided persona of the High Representative has and will have a hard time in effectively joining up the 
CFSP and non-CFSP strands of EU external action”.743  
It is, at the time of writing, too early to confidently assess the track record of HR Mogherini in this 
regard. For what concerns HR Ashton it is clear that she accorded considerably more time to diplomacy 
than to development cooperation, more to crisis management than to conflict prevention, more to 
                                                          
741 Berger and Ondarza (2013) op.cit. note 720, 2-3. 
742 P.F. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation (John Day Company, New York, 1946) 927p. 
743 S. Blockmans and M. Spernbauer, 'Legal Obstacles to Comprehensive EU External Security Action' (2013) European Foreign 
Affairs Review 18(4), 13. 
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CFSP than to CSDP. Particularly her passivity on defence issues is remarkable744 given the explicit 
mandate in the Treaty, her role as chair of the FAC and the close links to the PSC. Ashton’s limited 
attention for and guidance on conflict prevention and development cooperation were – at least partly 
– related to the internal organisation of the Commission and the Council. Even if the presently scaled-
up Vice-President hat makes policy linkages more evident in the Commission, a significant stumbling 
block remains the division of policy preparation in the Council between the HR for the CFSP and the 
Presidency for development cooperation.  
The integration-delimitation paradox implies that while the HR’s effectiveness is dependent on her 
capacity to transcend diverging institutional interests, she can only be as effective as the other 
institutions allow her to be.745 At present, this has not led to realising the renewed potential for 
pragmatic policy guidance across development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP, free from sclerotic 
obsession with competence boundaries. In order to facilitate her leadership, the Parliament suggests 
to establish a Political Council, including representatives of all relevant institutions, to guide and advise 
the HR’s work. 746  Another possibility would be the creation of a personal representative on the 
security-development nexus (or the comprehensive approach cf. infra 6.1.) to pioneer and mainstream 
this issue throughout the EU’s structures and act as a “seismograph” detecting trends, rising tensions 
and opportunities.747 
4.2.3. Special Representatives of the Union, or of the CFSP? 
At first, the practice of posting EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) did not have a specific legal basis in 
the Treaty and even preceded the creation of the office of HR for the CFSP.748 As these proofed valuable 
assets in expanding the CFSP’s diplomatic presence, the function was soon codified in the Amsterdam 
Treaty. In order to maintain maximal flexibility this was done in a particularly open-ended fashion. Ex 
Article 18(5) TEU tersely stated that “[t]he Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a 
special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues”.749 On the basis of this 
                                                          
744 Gros-Verheyde observed that Ashton attended only two informal Defence Councils during her five-year mandate (N. Gros-
Verheyde, 'Dernières absences de Catherine Ashton', Bruxelles2.eu Le Club, 04.09.2014) . Mogherini show more commitment 
in this regard and attended both the September 2014 Milan and February 2015 Riga informal Defence Councils. 
745 P. Koutrakos, 'Primary Law and Policy in EU External Relations: Moving Away from the Big Picture' (2008) European Law 
Review 33(5), 673.  
746 European Parliament Recommendation (2012/2253(INI)) on the 2013 review of the organisation and functioning of the 
EEAS, 26.04.2013, para. 3. 
747 Helwig (2014) op.cit. note 733, 8.  
748 Then still named EU Special Envoys, Aldo Ajello and Miguel Ángel Moratinos were appointed through two 1996 Joint 
Actions, respectively in reaction to the crises in the African Great Lakes region and the Middle East (Joint Action (96/250/CFSP) 
in relation to the nomination of a Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region, OJ L87/1, 04.04.1996; Joint Action 
(96/676/CFSP) in relation to the nomination of an EU special envoy for the Middle East peace process, OJ L315/1, 04.12.1996). 
749 The Nice Treaty left this mandate as it was but included the appointment of EUSRs among the exceptions where the 
Council could vote by QMV instead of the general CFSP rule of unanimity (ex Article 23(2), current Article 31(2) TEU)). 
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single Treaty paragraph an extensive practice emerged. In nearly 20 years 49 people have occupied 18 
different EUSR posts. In the absence of much Treaty guidance the EEAS website provides some 
clarification: “[t]he EUSRs promote the EU's policies and interests in troubled regions and countries 
and play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law … They provide the 
EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and ‘face’ for the 
EU and its policies”.750 In the words of Solana “EUSRs are the visible expression of the EU's growing 
engagement in some of the world's most troubled countries and regions. The list of where we have 
EUSRs is, in part, also a list of where our foreign and security policy priorities lie”.751  
The drafters of the Lisbon Treaty chose to keep the primary law mandate vague, and the according 
room of manoeuvre for policy-makers broad. The only change in Article 33 TEU is that EUSRs are 
appointed by the Council “on a proposal from the High Representative”, under whose authority they 
now formally operate. Their mandate is set out in CFSP decisions based on Articles 28 (the former Joint 
Actions), 31 (2) (the exception for the Council to vote by qualified majority instead of unanimity) and 
33 TEU. Member States can propose candidates that will be assessed by the HR, with the support of 
the EEAS.752 On the basis of this assessment Member States formulate their recommendation to the 
PSC, which decides on their political endorsement whereupon they are formally appointed by the 
Council. At present nine EUSRs are operating in various countries and regions and one has a thematic 
focus on human rights.753  
The pragmatic learning-by-doing style of appointing EUSRs, with annual or biannual results-oriented 
revision of mandates, led to a continuous widening of their responsibilities.754 To date, this has come 
to include contributions to the collection and circulation of first-hand information and intelligence, 
coordination of local, EU, Member States and international actions and positions, policy 
implementation and making (with a blurred distinction between both as the latter needs permanent 
nourishment by the experience on the ground),755 negotiation with and mediation between respective 
                                                          
750  EEAS, EU Special Representatives <http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm> (last 
accessed 21.05.2015). 
751 CFSP High Representative Speech (S 239/05) Opening remarks by EU High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana, 
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Foreign Service: How to Build a More Effective Common Policy, EPC Working Paper N°28 (European Policy Centre, Brussels, 
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755 Grevi (2007) op.cit. note 506, 142. 
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authorities or vying parties, acting as CFSP spokesperson and networking from the grass-roots to the 
highest echelons of power. This naturally makes EUSRs key actors in the Union’s efforts of conflict 
prevention, crisis management, peace and state-building and post-conflict stabilisation. It is not 
surprising that nearly all the current geographic EUSRs operate in environments with ongoing CSDP 
missions.756 The EUSRs are tasked to provide local political guidance to the respective Heads of Mission 
of Force Commanders.757 Besides informing and advising on political developments this involves high-
level negotiations to unlock stalemates in sensitive areas such as security sector reform, coordination, 
joint demarches with Heads of Mission, etc.758  
The gradual expansion of their scope and geographical reach went along with a step-by-step regulation 
process through successive ‘Guidelines on appointment, mandate and financing of EU Special 
Representatives’, issued by the GCS since 2000. These provide EUSRs with a framework guiding their 
appointment and resignation, systematising their mandates, regulating links with Brussels, introducing 
evaluation and review modalities, setting out financial principles and governing their security plan.759 
These remain however rather loose and non-binding documents, adopted without the involvement of 
the Commission and Parliament. It is therefore not surprising that this stirred up the perennial debate 
regarding the alleged encroachment by the CFSP on ex Community prerogatives.760 The EUSRs, initially 
conceived as ad-hoc crisis response instruments, eventually turn to stay for an average period of eight 
years,761 with an ever expanding mandate, showing signs of déjà vu with development operations. For 
instance, the recently ended mandate of the EUSR for the AU was based on the objective of supporting 
institutional development “including through development assistance”.762 
EUSRs are part of the CFSP Chapter and thus de jure CFSP actors/instruments. They should “contribute 
to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union's external action and representation [, and] 
help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States’ actions are engaged consistently to attain 
the Union’s policy objectives”.763 In the light of this cohering mandate it would have been more legally 
robust if the EUSRs were – like their patron the High Representative – accorded an explicit bridging 
                                                          
756 The only exception being the EUSR to Central Asia. 
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762 Article 2(c)Joint Action (2008/898/CFSP) extending the mandate of the EUSR to the African Union, O.J. L322/50, 
02.12.2008. 
763 Council (7510/14) op.cit. 752, 3. 
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function, at minimum by including them under the TEU’s Title III ‘Provisions on the Institutions’. Not 
only is the current structure disputable in the light of the mutual delimitation clause of Article 40 TEU, 
it is also less effective given the limited influence of EUSRs on shaping and implementing TFEU policies. 
Yet, this practice is arguably less problematic in the light of the Lisbon Treaty’s streamlining of the EU’s 
external action system. The EEAS is sensu strictu also a CFSP institution, but – in line with the coherence 
rationale of Article 21 TEU – this has not prevented the adoption of a Council Decision that gives it a 
hand on the TFEU competence of development cooperation (cf. infra section 4.3.). All-embracive 
mandates, such as the responsibility of the former EUSR for the Sudans for “supporting institution 
building and fostering stability, security and development in South Sudan”, seem therefore less 
problematic at present.764 
Nonetheless, their controvertible legal status causes certain complications from an institutional point 
of view. This is particularly so because the EUSRs “stand at the crossroads between the institutional 
dynamics of Brussels headquarters, the often heterogeneous priorities of Member States, and the 
requirements for action in the field”.765 A particular complication results from the practical necessity 
to entrust EUSRs with the management of expenditures arising from their mandate, even though they 
have no formal legal authority to do this.766 The Treaty restricts the execution of the budget to the 
Commission,767 with whom the EUSRs enter in a contractual engagement, making them “accountable 
to the Commission for all expenditure charged to the CFSP chapter in the EU budget”.768 For this 
purposes they are employed by the Commission under the formal legal status of CFSP Special Advisors 
(cf. supra 3.2.2. regarding CSDP Heads of Mission).769 Together with the Commission’s management of 
sizeable development programmes (and formerly the extensive network of Commission Delegations) 
this implied that the EUSR are often thrown back on the former in the implementation of their mandate. 
In spite of all this, their mutual contacts remain very much extemporary and the task division between 
them is broadly perceived as ill-adapted.770   
EUSRs have always been the odd one out in the EU institutional system. Legally employed by the 
Commission and formally part of the GSC, the temporary nature of their mandate prevents their full 
incorporation in the EU system. As diplomatic envoys many of them are moreover only limitedly 
acquainted with the ins and outs of the EU’s bureaucratic structure. For these reasons, rationalised 
                                                          
764 Article 2 Council Decision (2010/450/CFSP) appointing the EUSR for the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, 
OJ L211/42, 12.08.2010. 
765 Grevi (2007) op.cit. note 506, 155. This crossroads position is reflected in the practice that allows all EU institutions, 
including the EEAS and Member States, to second staff to the EUSRs’ teams (Council (7510/14) op.cit. 752, 8). 
766 Cf. the discussion on the budgetary responsibilities of CSDP Heads of Mission and Force Commanders in section 3.2.2. 
767 Article 17(1) TEU.  
768 Council (7510/14) op.cit. 752, 11. 
769 Commission (COM(2009) 9502 final) op.cit. note 594, 2. 
770 ADE (2011) op.cit. note 82, 68. 
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coordination structures and contact points have over time been set up within the Council 
Secretariat.771 Yet, the fact that an inter-institutional support cell has the last eight years not moved 
beyond the phase of analysis and discussion illustrates that this anchoring remains both complex and 
imperative.772 The creation of the EEAS, which will be discussed in the next section, offered a good 
opportunity to rectify this anomaly, particularly because both operate under the authority of the HR. 
It is therefore surprising that the EUSRs are entirely absent from the EEAS Decision.773  
This silence seems to be related to their uncertain future after the Lisbon Treaty. 774 With the creation 
of the EEAS, and in particular the Union Delegations which are now entrusted to represent the whole 
range of EU competences, the EUSRs appear to lose at least part of their significance. Ashton was 
consequently quick to announce that EUSRs “should be the exception and not the norm since both 
Brussels and delegations will be better equipped to deliver on the ground the integrated approach we 
need”.775 Member States were however less keen on giving up on the EUSRs as this remained one of 
the few EU external instruments over which they had firm control through the PSC. Article 33 TEU is 
rather misleading in this regard. Even though it indicates that the High Representative has the 
monopoly of proposing the appointment of an EUSR, it seems unlikely that the Council would let this 
depend solely on her initiative.776 Furthermore, even though Article 33 TEU states that EUSRs carry out 
their mandate under the HR’s authority, the 2014 Guidelines specify that this only relates to 
operational issues, while the political direction and strategic guidance falls to the PSC.777  
The survival of the EUSRs turned to be a source of considerable strive between the High Representative 
and the Member States. In her successive attempts to end ongoing mandates, Ashton faced a wall of 
Member States’ resistance, causing her to backtrack regularly.778 The tensions ran particularly high 
when she abruptly refused to renew the operating budget of the EUSR to the Middle East peace 
process beyond December 2013, “pulling the rug from under his feet”.779 Also the Parliament would 
                                                          
771 See further: Grevi (2007) op.cit. note 506, 23-24. 
772 Compare on this matter the 2007 and 2014 Guidelines (Council (11328/07) op.cit. 752, 2; and (7510/14) op.cit. 752, 2). 
773 Council Decision(2010/427/EU) establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, OJ 
L201/30, 03.08.2010 (hereafter: EEAS Decision). 
774 Blockmans and Hillion provide another argument, namely that the incorporation of the EUSRs into the EEAS would require 
a Treaty change for Articles 27 and 33 TEU (S. Blockmans and C. Hillion, 'Recommendations for the Amendment of Council 
Decision 2010/427/EU Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service', CEPS Special 
Report No. 78 (Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 2013) 10). The Council Legal Service, on the other hand, finds a 
revision of the EEAS Decision sufficient (Council Legal Service (14458/13) op.cit. note 739, 3). 
775 X, 'Action Woman: exclusive interview with EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton', Parliament Magazine, 14.06.2010.  
776 The 2014 EUSR Guidelines state that “[w]here it considers that the political context so requires, the Council may invite the 
HR to present a proposal for the appointment of an EUSR with a mandate in relation to a particular policy issue”. Even though 
this is prudently formulated as invitation, it does not seem to be one that the HR can easily turn down. 
777 Council (7510/14) op.cit. 752, 5. 
778 See for instance: A. Gardner, 'Ashton in power struggle over Middle East policy', European Voice, 20.06.2013; A. Rettman, 
'Four EU special envoys facing the chop', euobserver.com, 06.07.2010. 
779 E. Fouéré, 'The EU Special Representative: A Dying Breed?', CEPS Commentary (Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, 2013) 2. 
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rather see the back of the EUSRs given that it is not involved in their appointment and has only very 
limited scrutiny over their activities. In its 2014 discharge report the Parliament criticised the EUSR’s 
vague responsibilities, their obscure budget and the significant rise in funding. It called to “end to the 
parallel foreign policy pursued through the EUSRs” and integrate them fully into the EEAS.780 In her 
2013 Review of the EEAS, Ashton acknowledged the “anomaly” of the EUSRs’ status and agreed with 
the need for their incorporation in the EEAS, “while retaining a close link to Member States via the 
PSC”.781 While no specific time-frame is foreseen, this is listed as a short-term recommendation and 
the Brussels-based EUSRs have already been co-located with the EEAS.782 Not everyone agrees with 
the benefits of this undertaking. Former EUSR Erwan Fouéré calls this “a bureaucratic solution” and 
warns for the “danger that EUSRs will become buried under multiple layers of EEAS hierarchy”,783 
putting their much valued flexibility at risk.  
In sum, Special Representatives are a key tool of EU crisis diplomacy and form valuable EU tentacles 
across the globe. Yet, because they are strongly encapsulated in the CFSP and poorly in the Union’s 
institutional system, they face important shortcoming to give effect to a comprehensive approach to 
security and development challenges. While their mandates not seldom touch upon development 
competences, this is not an area they are generally comfortable with, nor do they have much impact 
on its planning and implementation. Their key value lies in providing the HR eyes, ears, and a voice on 
the frontline of EU external action. This is invaluable in building up the latter’s leadership over the EU’s 
commitment to the security-development nexus. Section 4.4. will elaborate on the field-level 
interaction and potential for overlap between EUSRs and EU Delegations, while section 6.2.3. will focus 
on the specific case of the EUSR for the Horn of Africa. 
4.3. The European External Action Service784 
The EEAS, formally launched on 1 December 2010, presents one of the most visible and sweeping 
changes of the Lisbon Treaty. For the first time in its history, the Union is accorded with a genuine 
foreign service. Also the amalgamation in a single institutional setting of staff from the Commission, 
                                                          
780 European Parliament Report (A7-0199/2014) on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the 
European Union for the financial year 2012, Section X – European External Action Service, 20.03.2014, para.22. The EEAS’ 
administrative budget is included in the general EU budget, according the EP significantly more oversight (D. Tolksdorf, 'EU 
Special Representatives: An Intergovernmental Tool in the Post-Lisbon Foreign Policy System' (2013) European Foreign Affairs 
Review 18(4) 479-481). 
781 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 4-5. Yet, in what could be seen as a latent remainder of her opposition, it is added 
that these are not the only actors that can undertake specific missions. The EEAS should “have flexibility to recruit short-term 
senior figures (special representatives, co-ordinators or EU envoys)” as the need arises. 
782 EUSRs with a country-focus are field-based (cf. infra 4.4.3.). 
783 Fouéré (2013) op.cit. note 779, 3. 
784 This section is partly based on the following article of the author: H. Merket, 'The European External Action Service and 
the Nexus between CFSP/CSDP and Development Cooperation' (2012) European Foreign Affairs Review 17(4) 625-652. 
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the Council and the Member States, with security, defence and development-oriented portfolios, is 
unprecedented. Even before it was clear how this service would be organised, it was bestowed with 
the highest of expectations. In a number of speeches Ashton lauded its creation as “a once-in-a-
generation opportunity” to finally promote joined-up action and bring together “all the instruments of 
our engagement – economic and political instruments, development and crisis management tools – in 
support of a single political strategy”.785  
Discussions on optimising the security-development nexus in EU external action did not shape the 
debate on the creation of the EEAS. Yet, its aims of enhanced effectiveness and consistency indirectly 
raise hopes for this particular interface. In this section we aim to understand if and how the EEAS (can) 
enable(s) the EU to overcome the hurdles that stop it from optimising the security-development 
linkage. For this purpose, the underlying legal framework that determines its place in the EU 
institutional framework, its composition, competences and impact on EU decision-making will first be 
scrutinised (4.3.1.). In a second part it will be argued that the demons of the integration-delimitation 
paradox again led to a halfway construction that must navigate tricky waters between various 
institutional interests and across competence rifts in realising the quest for coherence (4.3.2.).  
4.3.1. The design and role of the EEAS 
In spite of creating an unparalleled foreign service with the potential to significantly overhaul the ins 
and outs of EU external action, the Lisbon Treaty is remarkably sparing of details regarding its actual 
role and outlook. Only one succinct paragraph is accorded to this so-called “historic step”:786 
In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action 
Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States 
and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council 
and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member 
States. The organisation and functioning of the [EEAS] shall be established by a decision of the 
Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the 
European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.787 
Besides assisting the HR and cooperating with national diplomatic services, nothing is provided in 
terms of competences. Its inclusion in the CFSP Chapter of the Treaty, even though the EEAS was from 
                                                          
785 High Representative Ashton (SPEECH/10/120) Speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Brussels, 23.03.2010, 2. 
786 High Representative Ashton (A/127/10) ‘The Creation of the European External Action Service’, address to the European 
Parliament, Strasbourg, 07.06.2010, 5. It is in this light puzzling that the HR’s spokesperson, reacting to later criticism on the 
EEAS’ opaque organogram, argued that its role “is set out in black and white in the Lisbon Treaty” (M. Mann, 'Unsubstantiated 
tittle-tattle from anonymous "sources"', euobserver.com, 03.10.2011). 
787 Article 27(3) TEU. 
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the outset meant to support the HR in the various aspects of her mandate,788 only stirred up more dust. 
This primary law obscurity laid the basis for the tense negotiations on the nitty-gritty of the EEAS’ 
institutional location, composition, staff and competences that followed the Treaty’s ratification. 
Throughout these so-called quadrilogue talks, the HR, Council, Commission and Parliament789 fiercely 
sought to ensure a certain degree of control over this EU diplomatic corps.790 Eight months after the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty this resulted in the adoption of a Council Decision that was not 
written for the sake of legal clarity but rather to overcome political differences. The complete ‘EEAS 
package’ further includes two Declarations by the HR791 as well as amendments to the Financial and 
Staff Regulations and the general budget for 2010.792 Notably, even though Article 27(3) TEU is the sole 
legal basis of the EEAS Decision, its numbering in the EU Official Journal is 2010/427/EU, and not 
2010/427/CFSP.793 This broader legal nature corresponds to its role and functioning as bridging organ, 
set out in the body of the Decision.794 Yet, in order to avoid any chance of collision with Article 40 TEU, 
it would have been more solid to add Article 18 TEU, setting out the HR’s three hats which the EEAS is 
designed to support, and/or the consistency lead of Article 21 TEU, as legal foundation. 
As will be discussed below, this “masterpiece of ambiguity”795 left many important issues unaddressed, 
some of which were subsequently tackled in service level arrangements (SLAs) with the GSC and the 
Commission.796 The risk of complications in implementing the “rushed and inadequately prepared” 
establishment of the EEAS – dixit the European Court of Auditors797 – was arguably foreseen in the 
EEAS Decision. Article 13(3) entrusts the HR with a review of its organisation and functioning, covering 
                                                          
788 See for instance: European Convention (CONV 342/02) op.cit. note 707, para. 25. 
789 Even though the Treaty only prescribes its consultation, the Parliament flexed its muscles over its involvement in the 
necessary amendments to the EU’s financial and staffing regulations to obtain considerable concessions. 
790 See further: L. Erkelens and S. Blockmans, 'Setting up the European External Action Service: An Institutional Act of Balance', 
CLEER Working Papers 2012/1 (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, The Hague, 2012) 32p. 
791 High Representative (12401/10 ADD 1) Declaration on Political Accountability, OJ C210/1, 03.08.2010; High Representative 
(12401/10 ADD 4) Statement given to the Plenary of the European Parliament on the Basic Organisation of the EEAS Central 
Organisation, OJ C210/1, 03.08.2010. 
792 Regulation (1081/2010/EU/Euratom) amending Council Regulation 1605/2002/EC/Euratom on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, a regards the European External Action Service, OJ L311/9, 
26.11.2010; Regulation (1080/2010/EU/Euratom) amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities 
and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities OJ L311/1, 26.11.2010. 
793 The fact that the General Court confirmed its jurisdiction over this Decision is another confirmation of this broader legal 
basis (Case T-395/11, Elti d.o.o. v EU Delegation Montenegro, ECLI:EU:T:2012:274, paras 31-35 (cf. infra 4.4.2.)). 
794 Notably, the transfer of responsibility in the area of development cooperation was contested by the law firm White & Case 
(on assignment of the development NGOs CAFOD and CIDSE) in view of the positioning of the EEAS provision in the CFSP 
Chapter of the Treaty (White & Case LLP, Memorandum on Legal Objections to the EEAS’ Involvement in EU Development 
Cooperation Activities (White & Case, Brussels, 2010) para. 3.7. For a reasoning to the contrary: S. Duke and S. Blockmans, 
'The Lisbon Treaty Stipulations on Development Cooperation and the Council Decision of 25 March 2010 (Draft) Establishing 
the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service', EIPA Working Paper 2010/W/01 (European 
Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 2010) 13p. 
795 C. Hillion, 'Editorial Comments - The 2013 Review of the European External Action Service: A missed Opportunity?' (2013) 
Common Market Law Review 50(5), 1212. 
796 Article 3(3) EEAS Decision. Gatti lists an important number of these SLAs with various Commission departments: M. Gatti, 
'Diplomats at the Bar: The European External Action Service before EU Courts' (2014) European Law Review 2014(5), 678, 
footnote 88.  
797 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, para. 70. 
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inter alia the implementation of Article 6(6), (8) and (11) (staffing provisions) and, if necessary, 
“accompanied by appropriate proposals for the revision of this Decision”. This review, published in July 
2013, left few stones of its contentious early years unturned, yet “without addressing what these 
would require in terms of internal organisational changes [or] modifications in legal texts”.798 In the 
light of the above, Hillion argues that “one should not overrate the Decision’s actual contribution to 
the organisation and functioning of the Service”.799 In what follows, the analysis of these various 
documents will consequently be complemented with practical policy and institutional evolutions, in 
order to shed light on the EEAS’ composition, tasks and policy discretion.  
An inter-institutional support hub for EU external action 
The composition of the External Action Service mirrors the three-hatted portfolio of its principal, the 
High Representative. The EEAS Decision stipulates that staff transferred from the Commission, GSC 
and Member States’ diplomatic services should each account for an equal share at AD(Administrator)-
level.800 They “shall all have the same rights and obligations and be treated equally”.801 A significant 
part of the inter-institutional negotiations concerned the departments of the GSC and Commission to 
be shifted to the EEAS. The final consensus is included in the Annex to the EEAS Decision. From the 
Commission it integrates entire DG RELEX,802 including all EU Delegations, as well as the ACP-related 
geographic directorates of DG DEV. The GSC transfers DG E in its totality, the CFSP/CSDP implementing 
bodies (Policy Unit, CMPD, CPCC, EUMS and SitCen) and officials on secondment to EUSRs and CSDP 
missions. The strained negotiations raise the impression that this transfer was not based on any 
preordained set of objectives for the EEAS, but rather that the latter resulted from the institutional 
compartments that the negotiating parties were willing to give up.  
This is confirmed by the subsidiary, diffused and complex manner in which the EEAS Decision sets out 
its role and responsibilities. Article 1(2) EEAS Decision stipulates that the EEAS is “a functionally 
autonomous body of the European Union, separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and 
from the Commission with the legal capacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives”.803 
                                                          
798 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 15. Notably, the Council Legal Service published its own view on the necessary 
constitutional and legal amendments (Council Legal Service (14458/13) op.cit. note 739). 
799 Hillion (2013) op.cit. note 795, 1219. 
800 Art. 6(9) EEAS Decision states that, when the EEAS reaches full capacity, Member States staff “should represent at least 
one third of all EEAS staff at AD level” and Commission and Council officials should together account for “at least 60%”. The 
initial bias towards staff coming from the Commission, due to the en bloc transfer of a number of its large departments, has 
largely been rectified. This is however only on an overall scale. When breaking down these numbers for temporary agents 
from national diplomatic services we see that these are underrepresented in headquarters (23.8%) and overrepresented in 
Delegations (46.2%) (figures from the EEAS Review op.cit. note 729). 
801 Art. 6(7) EEAS Decision.  
802 In another seemingly protectionist move, former Commission President Barroso anticipated this transfer to the EEAS by 
removing several sections from DG Relex to DG Climate Action, DG Energy and DG Enlargement (Blockmans and Spernbauer 
(2013) op.cit. note 743, 12). 
803 Art. 1(2) EEAS Decision. 
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The precise nature of these tasks and objectives is however nowhere clearly addressed. This is not 
entirely surprising as – in line with the Treaty mandate – the title of the EEAS Decision only announces 
to tackle its ‘organisation and functioning’. Article 2 entitled ‘Tasks’ presents itself as point of 
reference, but does not include a ready-made description. Rather, it clarifies that the raison d’être of 
the EEAS lies – as it name suggests – in being of service. This consists of a duty to “support” the High 
Representative in fulfilling her threefold mandate and “assist the President of the European Council, 
the President of the Commission, and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in 
the area of external relations”.804 In principle, the scope of the EEAS’ role thus depends on the content 
given to the concepts of ‘support’ and ‘assistance’ as well as the broad Treaty-defined mandates of the 
above institutions. This serves both as a reminder that the latter maintain their key role in EU external 
action, and a preclusion of overlapping support services that could otherwise give rise to antagonistic 
external action baronies across the EU system.805 While the EEAS stands at the service of many, its only 
true principal remains the HR under whose authority it operates.806 
This role of inter-institutional support hub is central to its mandate. This is further evidenced by Article 
3 requiring the EEAS to support, and work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of Member 
States, GSC and Commission services. This aims “to ensure consistency between the different areas of 
the Union’s external action and between those areas and its other policies”. 807  It is therefore 
remarkable that Article 3(2) limits the duty to “consult each other on all matters relating to the external 
action of the Union” to the Commission and the EEAS, and excludes the CSDP. Whilst this last exception 
is in line with the strong preservation of its intergovernmental character in the Treaty, it is regrettable 
in the light of the EEAS’ potential to bridge the security-development gap. A final paragraph extends 
this support and cooperation by the EEAS to “the other institutions and bodies of the Union, in 
particular to the European Parliament”. In its turn the EEAS may rely on these institutions for support 
and cooperation, yet only “as appropriate” and “where necessary”.808 This limited reciprocity, which is 
central to all the cooperation provisions of Article 3, is not the result of sloppy legal drafting. The 
travaux préparatoires indicate that attempts to introduce more balanced language were blocked in 
the negotiations. 809  Whereas it can indeed be argued that the constitutional – and inherently 
                                                          
804 Article 3(1) EEAS Decision. This is reflected in the briefing requests handled by the EEAS: 243 of the 937 handled between 
January and September 2011 came from the HR, 67 from the European Council President, 125 from the Commission President 
and 235 from the Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP (Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission, The European External Action Service, 22.12.2011, 6). Also in 2012 the EEAS prepared more 
than twice the number of briefings for the Commission than for the HR (EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 8). 
805 B. Crowe, 'The European External Action Service: a Roadmap for Success', Chatham House Report (Chatham House, 
London, 2008) p. 19.  
806 Article 1(3) EEAS Decision. 
807 Article 3(1) EEAS Decision. 
808 Art. 3(4) and 4(5) EEAS Decision. 
809 See further: B. Van Vooren, 'A Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service' (2011) Common 
Market Law Review 48(2), 496-499. 
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reciprocal – duty of sincere cooperation of Article 4(3) TEU, allows “to fill the gaps of Article 3 EEAS”,810 
this purposeful drafting, at least symbolically, serves as a reminder of the EEAS’ subservient position.   
Further insights on the EEAS’ range of duties are scattered over various articles of the Decision. In 
essence, they accord the EEAS a role in both development programming and the planning and conduct 
of CFSP/CSDP initiatives. This turns the Service into the EU’s chief arena for optimising the security-
development linkage. Yet, the respective provisions are covered with a shroud of uncertainty and it 
seems as if the negotiating parties could only find unity within obscurity. 
The EEAS’ role in the reshuffled development programming cycle 
Development cooperation is the only area where the Decision assigns the EEAS concrete policy-making 
responsibilities. The programming and management cycle of EU external assistance instruments 
consists of five phases: (1) strategic assessments and identification of general objectives in five to 
seven-year country or regional strategy papers (CSPs/RSPs); (2) multiannual allocation of aid resources 
based on the country’s/region’s needs, absorption capacity and reform commitment; (3) 
determination of priority sectors and the associated financial envelops in national and regional 
indicative programmes (NIPs/RIPs); (4) development of annual action programmes (AAPs); and finally 
(5) implementation of the external assistance programmes. Before the creation of the EEAS, the 
Commission managed this whole process for all development instruments. The first three strategic 
stages were conducted by the DGs where the respective geographic desks were located,811 while 
AIDCO managed the two implementation phases.812  
During the inter-institutional negotiations on the set-up of the EEAS considerable controversy arose 
regarding the allocation of responsibilities over these five phases.813 Reconciling the various positions 
resulted in the complex arrangement of Article 9 EEAS Decision. Under the overall responsibility of the 
Commission, the EEAS is entrusted with the management of the strategic, multiannual steps – namely 
drawing up CSPs/RSPs, the aid allocations and the NIPs/RIPs – of the European Development Fund, 
European Neighbourhood Instrument, Partnership Instrument, European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights, the Instrument covering Stability and Peace, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety 
Cooperation (NSCI) and the geographic programmes of the DCI (cf. infra 3.2.1. for an overview of the 
                                                          
810 S. Blockmans and C. Hillion, 'EEAS 2.0: A Legal Commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation 
and functioning of the European External Action Service', SIEPS 2013:1 (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 
Stockholm, 2013) 42-43. 
811 DG DEV for the EDF, DG ELARG for the Western Balkans and the IPA and DG RELEX for the other developing countries that 
fall under the DCI and ENPI. 
812 Except for the IPA, which was managed by DG ELARG (see further: Woolcock (2012) op.cit. 647, 161-163). 
813 Blockmans and Hillion (2013) op.cit. note 810, 92-94. 
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scope and design of these instruments).814  The thematic programmes of the latter are strangely 
decoupled to keep full competence with the responsible Commission services. The development of 
annual action programmes for the above instruments and their execution remains the responsibility 
of the Commission. Throughout the whole cycle “the High Representative and the EEAS shall work with 
the relevant members and services of the Commission” and “[all] proposals for decisions will be 
prepared by following the Commission’s procedures and will be submitted to the Commission for 
adoption”.815 Also the changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents are to “be 
prepared jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the responsibility 
of the Commissioner responsible for [Development Policy/Neighbourhood Policy] and shall be 
submitted jointly with the High Representative for adoption by the Commission”.816  
These arrangements evidently meant a strong dismantlement of DG DEV, which saw a significant part 
of its work and all geographic desks move to the EEAS. What remained was the portfolio of an upgraded 
think-tank, delivering input to decision-makers that set the direction of development policy. It is in this 
light that the decision was taken to merge the latter with DG AIDCO, thereby creating DG EuropeAid 
Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO). This was put into effect on 1 January 2011 when a great 
amount of its staff moved to the EEAS. Ten years after its split (cf. supra 2.2.2.) this again unifies policy-
making and implementation in one institutional setting. Not only does this provide the Commission 
with a stronger institutional counterpart to the EEAS, it also ensures that the crux of its development 
expertise maintains geographic desks and thus their direct feel with the situation on the ground.  
Another institutional reorganisation stemming from these changes is the creation of the Service for 
Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI). This is a body under the responsibility of the HR as Vice-President of 
the Commission, formally part of that institution but co-located with the EEAS.817 It aims “to support 
the attainment of the objectives of the EU foreign and security policy as defined in Article 21 [TEU], in 
particular as regards peace and conflict prevention, and to project the EU’s interests and image in the 
world”.818 This occurs through its involvement – in varying constellations – in the programming and 
management of operational expenditure resulting from the IcSP, the CFSP budget, the PI, anti-torture 
measures, communication and public diplomacy and election observation. The FPI moreover acts as 
Commission representative in CFSP/CSDP Council working parties to ensure that the relevant 
budgetary aspects are in line with the Treaty and the Financial Regulation. Its particular set-up serves 
to guarantee both the Commission’s responsibility for budget execution and operational coherence 
                                                          
814 Art. 9(1-3) EEAS Decision. The IPA, the Instrument for Humanitarian Aid and the financial assistance to Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCTs) remain the responsibility of respectively DG ELARG, ECHO and DG DEVCO.  
815 Art. 9(3) EEAS Decision, second paragraph. 
816 Article 9(4-5) EEAS Decision.  
817 Art. 9(6) EEAS Decision. 
818 Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, Management Plan (European Commission, Brussels, 2014) 3. 
155 
 
with the EEAS as the Union’s institutional core for the more traditional foreign policies (cf. infra). The 
fact that yet a new EU body – of around 120 staff – was to be erected to interlink the Commission with 
a service that was just created as inter-institutional intermediary, highlights the limitations of the EU 
institutional system. It had moreover significant consequences for the EEAS’ capacity, as most conflict 
and security experts from former DG RELEX moved to the FPI rather than to the new Service.819  
The complexity of these arrangements is vividly illustrated by the programming of the Instrument 
covering Stability and Peace, with varying arrangements governing its three components. The EEAS 
provides the political guidance of the non-programmable short-term component of Article 3 
(assistance in situations of crisis). The FPI takes charge of the identification and appraisal of measures, 
in close consultation with the EEAS, as well as the implementation and evaluation. Programming for 
the strategic phases under Article 4 (long-term assistance for conflict prevention, peace-building and 
crisis preparedness) is conducted by the EEAS, with the definition and execution of AAPs done by the 
FPI. Article 5 (global and transregional threats) follows the general pattern of EEAS-DEVCO division of 
labour set out above. That this EU flagship instrument for approaching the security-development nexus 
necessitates such a complex construction agonisingly illustrates the poor adaptation of the EU’s rigid 
institutional and constitutional system to the challenges at stake. It is moreover counterproductive for 
the IcSP key aim of better interlinking short and long-term approaches to preventing conflicts. The 
EEAS Review indirectly acknowledges these suboptimal arrangements. Yet, given “the Treaty 
responsibilities for the execution of the budget”, it can only propose to transfer more financial 
programmes (such as the long-term IcSP components) from DEVCO to the FPI and explore "more 
efficient and closer working relations with the EEAS”.820 
All the above instruments are put forward in Article 9(2) of the Decision as the High Representative’s 
central means to ensure “the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s external action”. It is 
rather ironic that this can only be achieved through particularly fragmented procedures. The shadowy 
provisions of Article 9 leave many questions open: how to establish reporting lines between the 
Commission, the EEAS and EU Delegations (which provide the crucial connection with the partner 
countries at each stage of the programming process, cf. infra 4.4.), who will set the agenda and how 
to deal with cases of disagreement? For instance, what will happen when the EEAS does not follow the 
Commission’s general policy choices with regard to aid modalities? Consequently, HR Ashton and 
                                                          
819 Only three staff members responsible for the IcSP eventually moved to the EEAS, leading the parliamentary rapporteurs 
to accuse the Commission of acting contrary to the quadrilogue agreement (see: N. Helwig, P. Ivan and H. Kostanyan, The 
New EU Foreign Policy Architecture: Reviewing the First Two Years of the EEAS (Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
2013) 49).  
820 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 8-9. Herewith, she refuted the call from 14 Member States for “the full integration 
of the [FPI] into the work of the EEAS” (Foreign Affairs Ministries of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Non-paper: Strengthening the European External 
Action Service, 01.02.2013). 
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Commissioner Piebalgs immediately announced to conclude a service-level arrangement to sort out 
remaining procedural gaps. The fact that it took until January 2012 before these so-called “Working 
Arrangements” could be adopted, highlights the delicacy of this process. In the end, it was the 
approaching renewal of the MFF that provided the strongest stimulus to conclude discussions.821  
On a general level, the Working Arrangements specify that Commission services and EEAS “will 
perform their respective tasks throughout the programming and implementation cycle in full 
transparency, informing and consulting each other, sufficiently in advance, on initiatives or 
announcements that could have an impact on each other’s areas of responsibility”. 822 Further details 
are accurately summarised by Tannous in Box 11 below. Yet, even that simplified scheme cannot hide 
the complexity of these procedures, which the Court of Auditors evaluates as “less flexible and more 
demanding than the ones that existed when DG RELEX was in charge”.823  The language remains 
moreover open to diverging interpretations. By simply stating, for instance, that the strategic phases 
of the ENPI, EDF and DCI shall be undertaken by the “EEAS, in agreement with DEVCO”,824 considerable 
faith is put in the cooperative capacity of the responsible services. The potential breaking points along 
these various steps are not new, but could in the past at least be managed within a single institution. 







                                                          
821 In fact, if the implementation of aid programmes was to start in 2014, the first three planning phases had to be concluded 
by early 2013 already (I. Tannous, 'The Programming of EU's External Assistance and Development Aid and the Fragile Balance 
of Power between EEAS and DG DEVCO' (2013) European Foreign Affairs Review 18(3), 345 and 348). Given that the respective 
Regulations establishing the 2014-2020 financial instruments were only adopted in March 2014, this scenario was soon 
beyond reach. Consequently, temporary mitigation measures had to be activated (see further: A. Herrero, G. Galeazzi and F. 
Krätke, 'Early Experiences in Programming EU Aid 2014-2020', ECDPM Briefing Note No. 54 (European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, Maastricht, 2013) 6-7). To speed up the process, the Commission and EEAS formed joint 
negotiating teams. These functioned rather well but dissension emerged over organisational and leadership issues, and the 
EEAS was reproved for shirking responsibility on PCD to the Commission (UK House of Lords EU Committee, The EU’s External 
Action Service, 11th Report of Session 2012-2013, 19.03.2013, paras 131-134). 
822  Commission (SEC(2012) 48 final) Working Arrangements between Commission Services and the EEAS in Relation to 
External Relations Issues, 13.01.2012. 
823 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, para. 56. 
824 Commission (SEC(2012) 48 final) op.cit. note 822, 18-19. 
825 Tannous (2013) op.cit. note 821, 351. 
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Box 11: Programming Arrangements between Commission Services and the EEAS on EU financial 
assistance and cooperation for the multiannual financial framework 
 
Source: I. Tannous, 'The Programming of EU's External Assistance and Development Aid and the Fragile Balance 
of Power between EEAS and DG DEVCO' (2013) European Foreign Affairs Review 18(3), 349. 
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Although not an institution in the sense of Article 13 TEU, and thus not involved in formal decision-
making, these arrangements accord the EEAS “quasi-institutional prerogatives” in development 
programming.826 This aims to better integrate development policies into EU external action as a whole. 
In order to reconcile this drive for coherence with the principle of conferred powers, final authority 
and policy responsibility rests with the Commission.827 This has given rise to arrangements that render 
constant inter-institutional cooperation not only necessary but also increasingly complicated, 
particularly regarding the fragmentation of the IcSP, the split between geographic and thematic DCI 
programming and the birth of yet a new EU institutional layer in the form of the FPI. A 2013 UK House 
of Lords report concludes that the EEAS, thus far, “appears to have brought no significant benefit to 
the EU’s handling of … development issues”.828 
The key challenge for the future is thus to minimise the fragmentation of aid programming and 
maximise the potential for improved PCD. Two different approaches can be distinguished in proposals 
to remedy the current situation. On the one hand, the Parliament pleads – as welcomed by the HR829 
– for further strengthening the role of the EEAS in crafting the strategic orientation and contributing 
to the implementation of the external financing instruments.830 On the other hand, many officials from 
the Commission, Council and European Council argue that current problems will not be solved by 
simply extending the powers of the EEAS. Given the Commission’s long-standing experience and 
expertise, as well as its management of spending in related areas such as trade, they plead rather to 
improve coordination with the Commission.831  
Doubts have indeed arisen on whether the EEAS is up to a (stronger) role in development policy. Cited 
problems include capacity constraints as well as a lack of interest in and knowledge of development 
issues and procedures, leading to a role that is below the one set out in the Working Arrangements. 
The EEAS itself gives the clearest proof hereof in its organogram, where development cooperation is 
conspicuous by its absence (cf. Annex). No dedicated leadership is provided and staff with 
development-related portfolios is scattered over various entities. One important hub is provided in the 
Development Cooperation Coordination division. It is tasked to support the HR in preparing 
development issues on the FAC agenda, coordinating EEAS input to DEVCO’s proceedings and guiding 
                                                          
826 Van Vooren (2011) op.cit. note 809, 494. 
827 M. Gatti, 'Coherence vs. Conferred Powers? The Case of the European External Action Service' in L.S. Rossi and F. Casolari 
(eds), The EU after Lisbon: Amending or Coping with the Existing Treaties? (Springer, Cham, 2014) 255-257. 
828 UK House of Lords (2013) op.cit. note 821, 5. 
829  High Representative Ashton (SPEECH/13/530) ‘Statement on EEAS Review’, address to the European Parliament, 
Strasbourg, 12.06.2013, 4. 
830 European Parliament (2012/2253(INI)) op.cit. note 746, para. L. While the Parliament does not extend much further on 
the issue, this appears a notable shift of faith in the EEAS, as it was initially no proponent of an autonomous service taking 
powers from the Commission (See for instance: E. Brok and G. Verhofstadt, Non-paper on the EEAS, 23.03.2010).  
831  See: J. Wouters, et al., The Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service: Achievements, 
Challenges and Opportunities (European Parliament DG for External Policies, Brussels, 2013) 48-49. 
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other EEAS divisions in upholding the EU’s values and principles of development cooperation.832 It 
moreover facilitates a monthly cross-departmental Development Cooperation Task Force, comprising 
staff from various geographic and thematic departments. It is in this regard opportune that the EEAS 
Review calls to strengthen the capacity of this lone development ranger.833  
The EEAS’ CFSP/CSDP footprint 
The External Action Service is assigned to support the High Representative “in fulfilling his/her 
mandate to conduct the [CFSP] including the [CSDP], to contribute by his/her proposals to the 
development of that policy, which he/she shall carry out as mandated by the Council”.834 The nature 
and content of this seemingly vast task is not further defined in the EEAS Decision. Only a close reading 
reveals two indications on how the foreign service is to put flesh to the bones of this assignment. These 
are not placed in the rather empty vessel of Article 2, but counterintuitively in Article 4 on the ‘Central 
administration of the EEAS’.  
Firstly, Article 4(4) prescribes that the HR “shall designate the chairpersons of Council preparatory 
bodies that are chaired by a representative of the High Representative, including the chair of the 
[PSC]”. Additionally, these include a number of thematic and all geographic and CSDP-related 
committees.835 Of particular importance are the EEAS-designated chairs of the EUMC and PSC, as these 
are central organs where Member States ensure the day-to-day management of the CFSP/CSDP. In 
relation to these preparatory bodies the EEAS fulfils the traditional role of the GSC, consisting of 
administratively, procedurally and politically supporting and advising the chairs. This provides the 
Service considerable opportunity to leave a mark on policy-making. It is important that the chairs are 
no isolated figures, but directly linked to the respective geographic and thematic directorates, as 
provided in the EEAS organogram (cf. Annex). Even though the EEAS does not house the chairs of 
development bodies, the chairmanship over geographic working parties delivers key opportunities to 
enhance coherence between CFSP and development competences on a regional level. “[I]n the interest 
of policy coherence” the EEAS Review nonetheless appeals to extend its chairmanship to all FAC 
preparatory bodies.836 Yet, even though Member States generally evaluate EEAS chairs positively, 
significant problems arise with regard to agenda-setting and planning. 837  The sometimes late 
submission and ill-preparation of documents deteriorates the quality of discussions.838  
                                                          
832 J. van Seters and H. Klavert, 'EU Development Cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty: People, Institutions and Global Trends', 
ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 123 (European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, 2011) 2. 
833 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 9. 
834 Art. 2(1) EEAS Decision. 
835 Council Decision (2009/908/EU) op.cit. note 733. 
836 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 6. 
837 Wouters et al. (2013) op.cit. note 831, 37-40. 
838 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, paras 65-67. 
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Box 12: CSDP crisis management structures 
 
Source: J. Rehrl and H.-B. Weisserth, Handbook CSDP (Austria Armed Forces/European Security and Defence 
College, Vienna/Brussels, 2010) 39. 
A second informative provision is that the CMPD, CPCC, EUMS and SitCen839 swell the EEAS’ ranks to 
assist the HR in conducting the CFSP. Unsurprisingly, this occurs “while respecting, in accordance with 
Article 40 TEU, the other competences of the Union”.840 Even though these operational entities have 
no decision-making role as such, their niche expertise and technical know-how directly feed into the 
proceedings of the European Council, the FAC, COREPER, and the PSC (cf. Box 12). This accords them 
considerable policy discretion, which could turn the EU’s diplomatic corps into the keystone of EU 
civilian and military crisis management. There is however an important caveat. Whereas these bodies 
are nominally part of the EEAS, they are cocooned internally. Their distinctiveness is legally rooted in 
the EEAS Decision, with Article 4(3)(a) professing that the “specificities of these structures, as well as 
the particularities of their functions, recruitment and the status of the staff shall be respected”. This is 
translated in physical terms by keeping crisis management staff in their secured premises of the 
Kortenberg building and the Royal Military School.  
Rather than adapting these organically grown CFSP/CSDP crisis management bodies to their inclusion 
in the EEAS, new bodies have been set up to fulfil the needs and goals of the foreign service. From its 
earliest days this included the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination department (CROC) under 
the leadership of Managing Director Miozzo. As much as the absence of development cooperation in 
the EEAS organogram could be read as sign of limited engagement, the immediate inclusion of CROC 
paraded the crisis-oriented focus of the new foreign service. The same goes for the Security Policy and 
                                                          
839 SitCen was subsequently refurbished and rebranded as EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen). 
840 Art. 4(3)(a) EEAS Decision. 
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Conflict Prevention directorate, which consists today of divisions on ‘WMDs, conventional weapons 
and space’, ‘Conflict prevention, peace building and mediation’, ‘Security policy’ and ‘Sanctions policy’. 
Another key step was taken in July 2011 with the creation of the EU Situation Room (SITROOM), 
drawing together previously scattered resources. The SITROOM is placed in the CROC directorate and 
co-locates civilian Duty Officers and military Watchkeepers in a cost-saving and efficiency-gaining 
effort.841 It aims to “provide worldwide monitoring, current situation awareness, and front line service 
for EU Delegations and CSDP Missions/operations, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, the year around”.842  
Despite the obvious common ground with the CFSP/CSDP crisis management bodies, their division was 
– in addition to the legal and physical separation mentioned above – institutionalised in the first EEAS 
organogram. This foresaw no linkages, other than through the HR, between the CFSP bodies and the 
rest of the Service. This contributed to the perception that the two groups of security-oriented entities 
were direct competitors. In line with the call of Article 4(3) EEAS Decision to ensure “[f]ull coordination 
between all the structures of the EEAS”, this separation was partly undone in continuously published 
amendments to the organogram. These directly attached the Security Policy and Conflict Prevention 
directorate to the EEAS Deputy Secretary-General (SG) for inter-institutional affairs and placed it under 
the common umbrella of ‘Security Policy and CSDP Structures’. Importantly, the latter is no longer a 
separate island, but is brought under the political authority of the CROC Managing Director (MD). 
While these are highly relevant adaptations, the division of labour between the EEAS’ various crisis 
and conflict-related entities is still to be illuminated. The confusion hampers coordination and leads to 
costly (both in resources and time) overlaps in areas such as crisis prevention, crisis response planning 
and SSR.843 In this light the EEAS Review proposes to explore ways to make the expertise of EUMS 
military staff more widely and directly available to other departments, “without prejudice to [their] 
specific profile and administrative status”.844 It moreover calls to clarify reporting lines and better 
integrate the CSDP structures into the general operation of the EEAS.845  
In sum, the EEAS mandate in the area of CFSP/CSDP is formally limited to ‘supporting’, ‘assisting’ and 
‘cooperating’. Nevertheless, by incorporating the crisis management bodies, housing the chairs of 
important FAC preparatory organs and taking over supporting tasks of the GSC, the foreign service is 
involved in all phases of foreign, security and defence policy-making. This ranges from the preparation 
                                                          
841 P. Vimont, 'The European External Action Service and Complex Crises' in P. Pawlak and A. Ricci (eds), Crisis Rooms: Towards 
a Global Network? (EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2014) 36. 
842 High Representative Press Release (A286/11) ‘Catherine Ashton visits the new EU Situation Room’, 17.07.2011.  
843 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, para. 32. 
844 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 6. 
845  Ibid., short-term recommendation 1, medium-term recommendation 3 (further on the possible timing and legal 




over decision-making to implementation.846 To make the most of this involvement, the capacity and 
flexibility of the CFSP crisis management entities could serve as a source of inspiration in preparing and 
supporting the work of the relevant FAC working parties. The way in which the HR-designated chairs 
are integrated into the service, on the other hand, forms a model for better connecting the crisis 
management bodies to other relevant EEAS entities. 
4.3.2. Making use of the security-development network: mind the gap! 
The EEAS is designed as a functionally autonomous body that has a hand in managing the whole EU 
security-development toolbox. Its multifarious composition of security and development-related 
entities, with staff originating from various diplomatic and institutional backgrounds, establishes the 
EU diplomatic corps as a security-development network. The model of a network, as opposed to the 
pre-EEAS approach of central coordination, provides a point of contact and channel of cooperation, 
enabling a constant and decentralised exchange of experience-based knowledge between all relevant 
actors. This stimulates problem-oriented cooperation and enables responsive coordination, adapted 
to the specificities of each policy field (cf. infra 6.1.). In the optimal scenario such a laboratory of 
integrated policy-making allows the EU to reduce duplication, eliminate areas of overlapping 
competences and diminish the risk of inter-institutional rivalry on the continuum of security and 
development policies.  
Such a scenario will however not actualise without striking a blow. The EEAS interlinks competences 
but does in no way end the delimitation between them, nor has its creation diminished the Treaty 
powers of the traditional EU external actors. The remaining procedural and institutional gap lurks 
around every corner. For one thing, this submits the EEAS’ effectiveness to the mercy of cooperation 
by EU institutions and Member States, which have attached strong safeguards to the coherence 
mandate of the EEAS. For another, fragmentation remains the other of the day, both in the Service’s 
relations with other institutions as internally. While many of the above challenges lay beyond its own 
area of control, scaled-up EEAS leadership and policy guidance can come a significant way in reaping 
the potential of this security-development network. 
A conditional coherence mandate 
The Lisbon Treaty’s integration-delimitation paradox resulted in a service on which all main policy 
actors agree that it should enhance coherence, yet not at the price of their own foreign policy 
                                                          
846 As stressed in the EEAS Review “the Lisbon Treaty left CFSP intergovernmental and therefore subject to unanimity: in the 
absence of collective political will and agreement between Member States, this is a limiting factor on decision-making. The 
longer term perspective of the EEAS allows it to play an important role in policy formulation, brokering and implementation” 
(EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 7). 
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prerogatives. For this purpose Member States and institutions put in place a number of safeguards to 
ensure that the EEAS does not become an “independent kingdom” outside their control.847 This puts 
considerable strain on the EEAS’ potential to pull together the various strands of EU foreign policy. The 
most important safeguard is that the EEAS is established as a “body” – not an institution – which is 
“functionally” – not organisationally or substantively – “autonomous” from the GSC and 
Commission.848  Even though the term, which was floated in the quadrilogue negotiations, is not 
retained in the final Decision, this de facto designs the EEAS as a sui generis body.  
The Treaty refers at various occasions to term ‘body’ but does not define what it means, nor can this 
be detracted from the way in which it is used. This unclear status has been a source of inherent 
contradictions and considerable confusion. 849  Whilst the only certainty seems that it is not an 
institution, it should nonetheless be treated as such in the context of the Staff Regulations.850 The fact 
that it disposes of its own premises, a separate website and email addresses, signal a degree of 
independence. Yet, simultaneously its distinct terminology (e.g. MDs rather than DGs, a Chief 
Operating Officer and a Corporate Board) serves to emphasise precisely that it is not a full-fledged EU 
institution. The EEAS is accorded its own budget, governed by the standard discharge procedures.851 
However, more than scaling up its institutional posture, this was the result of intensive Parliamentary 
lobbying to ensure scrutiny over the EEAS. Further, operational expenditure remains within the 
Commission section of the budget, according it final control over all instruments and operations. 
Another challenge is that, in meeting all the different demands for support and cooperation, the EEAS 
must be “guided by the principle of cost-efficiency aiming towards budget neutrality”.852 This principle 
is applied very strictly, 853  meaning that the Commission and the GSC transferred foreign policy 
structures but not the respective support services. This obliges the EEAS to fall back on these 
institutions for many particularly costly aspects of setting up and managing an entirely new body of 
over 3,400 staff. This is arranged through pragmatic SLAs that provide short-term solutions, but do not 
fully address the EEAS’ needs nor take into account the considerable savings that result from its 
establishment. The Commission for instance, without a plausible justification, continued to take charge 
of the security inspections in Delegations and the Council ended its support for maintaining secure 
information systems before an alternative was agreed.854 This led the High Representative to raise the 
                                                          
847 European Parliament (PV 21/10/2009 – 8) Debates on the institutional aspects of the creation of a European External 
Action Service, Strasbourg, 21.10.2009, intervention by Elmar Brok. 
848 Article 1(2) EEAS Decision. One might even wonder whether an autonomous service is no contradiction in terminis. 
849 Crowe therefore argued that a more straightforward solution would have been to establish the EEAS as an agency (Crowe 
(2008) op.cit. note 805, 21). 
850 Preamble, eighth indent EEAS Decision. 
851 Article 8(1) EEAS Decision.  
852 Preamble, 15th indent EEAS Decision. 
853 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, para. 21. 
854 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 10. 
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alarm in 2011 as to the “structural deficit” resulting from the Service’s limited financial and 
administrative means.855 
A final intrinsic contradiction is that the EEAS is entrusted with “the legal capacity necessary to perform 
its tasks and attain its objectives”, but not with formal legal personality.856 As a consequence, the 
extent to which the EEAS can defend and enforce its prerogatives before the EU Court of Justice is 
uncertain.857 On the one hand, the language of Article 263 TFEU appears to indicate that the EEAS may 
be brought before the Court for the annulment of its actions. This provision indeed empowers the 
Court to “review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce 
legal effects vis-à-vis third parties”. The question is then whether the EEAS produces acts with these 
legal effects and has the capacity to act as a defendant. Given that the Service has functional autonomy, 
it should at least have standing before the CJEU in disputes concerning administrative measures. This 
is confirmed by a series of staff cases before the Civil Service Tribunal858 as well as a case on the 
implementation of its budget.859 As the EEAS does not have any decision-making autonomy, acts 
pertaining to the management of policies can arguably not be attributed to it, but rather to the 
institution maintaining the final say (for instance the Commission in the case of development 
programming). It is even more questionable whether the EEAS has locus standi to challenge (in)action 
of EU institutions or Member States damaging its administrative or policy prerogatives. Its sui generis 
status means that it would need to act as non-privileged applicant and it is not certain whether it would 
fulfil the particularly restraining conditions this entails.860 Whereas the restriction to “any natural or 
legal person” can already be problematic given the EEAS’ lack of formal legal personality, it might even 
be harder for the Service to proof direct and individual concern.861 Also scenarios where either the 
Commission or the Council would step in for the EEAS in proceedings as privileged applicant are 
difficult to envisage. This could mean that one of these institutions would litigate against the other in 
defence of the EEAS. Not only does this risk to undermine the functional autonomy of the Service, it 
might also be divisive in political terms and put the accountability of the High Representative, as 
institutional bridge and patron of the EEAS, severely to the test. 
                                                          
855 High Representative (2011) see note 805, para. 32. 
856 Article 1(2) EEAS Decision. Gatti convincingly argues that the EEAS has de facto legal personality and that the absence of 
an explicit mention hereof should be seen as a political rather than a legal choice (Gatti (2014) op.cit. note 796, 668-671). 
857 For an elaborate analysis: Ibid., 664-681. 
858 Indeed Article 270 TFEU entrusts jurisdiction to the Court for all disputes “between the Union and its servants”. See for 
instance: Case F-53-13, Diamantopoulos v EEAS, ECLI:EU:F:2014:22; Case F-154/12, Locchi v EEAS, ECLI:EU:F:2013:29; Case F-
15/11, Mariën v EEAS, ECLI:EU:F:2011:144; Case F-64/12, Martinez Erades v EEAS, ECLI:EU:F:2012:154. 
859 Case C-501/13, Page Protective Services v EEAS, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2259. 
860 Article 263 TFEU, fourth indent.  
861 Gatti lists some limited examples of Commission measures affecting the EEAS’ role in the legislative process, against which 
it might have chances to object before the Court. These include decisions authorising the compensation of certain 
administrative expenses incurred by the EEAS, acts implementing the Financial Regulation, Commission instructions to its 
officers in EU Delegations (cf. infra 4.4.2.) and changes to the Staff Regulation (Gatti (2014) op.cit. note 796, 672-674). 
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Two further textual safeguards symbolise the preoccupation of institutions and Member States with 
ensuring control over the future development of the foreign service. The first results from Article 2(1) 
EEAS Decision, stating that the EEAS’ support to the HR in fulfilling her mandate as President of the 
FAC and Vice-President of the Commission shall be “without prejudice to the normal tasks” of 
respectively the GSC and the services of the Commission. What these normal tasks consist of “may be 
subject to variable interpretation especially since the very idea of normalcy has shifted dramatically in 
EU external relations with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and, in particular, the EEAS”.862 The 
GSC loses most of its external responsibilities to the EEAS and also the Commission DG DEVCO looks 
nothing like the former DG DEV. In the context of development programming it is for instance unclear 
what the practical implications are of a foreign service that has to work throughout the whole 
programming cycle with the relevant services of the Commission, while remaining at the same time 
without prejudice to their normal tasks. Given that it would be hard for anyone to argue that the post-
Lisbon situation is business as usual, it appears that this lofty language rather serves the legal 
departments of the Commission and the GSC a basis to argue against the intrusion of the EEAS in what 
they consider their territory. Declarations 13 and 14 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty contain a remarkably 
similar, yet considerably more defensive statement on the part of Member States. These underline 
that the TEU provisions on CFSP, including “the establishment of an External Action Service do not 
affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist” and “will not affect the existing 
legal basis, responsibilities and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and 
conduct of its foreign policy”.863 
The effectiveness of the EEAS in interconnecting the various dots of EU external action thus largely 
rests on the constant cooperation of the traditional EU external actors. A lot will depend on its capacity 
to find common ground with its numerous interlocutors and clear a path that steers between the 
‘normal tasks’ of the Commission and the GSC as well as the Member States’ foreign policy 
responsibilities ‘as they currently exist’. There is moreover internal disagreement on whether the EEAS 
should take a pro-active policy-shaping approach or rather stick to its role of inter-institutional support 
hub. The former tends to be the preference of staff with a Commission background, whereas personnel 
transferred from the GSC and Member States have a more reserved attitude.864 
                                                          
862 S. Duke, 'The European External Action Service', DSEU Policy Paper 2 (The Diplomatic System of the European Union, 2010) 
2. 
863 Declarations No. 13 and 14 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, op.cit. note 355. 
864 Wouters et al. (2013) op.cit. note 831, 26-27. 
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Addressing fragmentation: EEAS leadership and policy guidance 
The centralisation of development and CFSP actors and instruments in the EEAS render the EU’s 
commitment to the security-development nexus considerably more visible and thus prone to public 
scrutiny. However, the above discussed institutional protectionism, combined with the insulation of 
CFSP and CSDP competences, implicates that diffusion of policy responsibility remains the order of the 
day. Three main sources of fragmentation, complicating efforts to enhance external action synergies, 
can be distinguished. Failing to address these will not only render the EEAS’ contribution to coherence 
delusional, it might also backfire on the credibility of the Union’s entire external action system. 
First, the creation of the Service has incited the conception and maintenance of parallel structures in 
the Commission and to a lesser extent the GSC. DG DEVCO in particular reacted with institutional 
counterparts for the EEAS, most outspoken in the creation of a unit for Fragility and Crisis Management 
(the first ever organisational entity in this area to be included in the Commission’s development 
services).865 Such bureaucratic parallelism lays at basis of considerable duplication, which is especially 
striking with regard to the crisis monitoring services across the institutions. The Court of Auditors 
denounced the existence of three separate situation monitoring entities within the EEAS, the 
Commission and the GSC,866 whereas Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard count 84 different – and often 
incompatible – systems to collect, analyse, check and communicate information on unfolding crises.867 
Besides evident losses of efficiency and resources, this parallelism implies that coordination between 
structures with similar titles and task descriptions, “while increasingly necessary, became ever more 
tedious, shot through with contention and hampered by a mismatch between barely augmented staff 
resources and rhetorical political ambitions”.868  
In reaction to such complexities, a number of coordination mechanisms have been put in place within 
the EEAS, doing justice to its status of inter-institutional policy hub. A major innovation is the EEAS 
Crisis Response System (CRS), which contains the above mentioned SITROOM, the Crisis Management 
                                                          
865 A. Sherriff, 'Is there a new impetus on the EU to deal with conflict and fragility in third countries? Part 2: recent policy 
developments', ecdpm.org/talking-points, 25.11.2011 
866 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, para. 56; in May 2013 the Commission created an Emergency Response Centre (ERC) and the 
GSC supports the implementation of Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements (IPCR). The EEAS Review calls to co-
locate the EEAS SITROOM with the ERC in order to generate savings and avoid duplication (EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 
726, 5).  
867 A. Boin, M. Ekengren and M. Rhinard, 'Sensemaking in Crises: What Role for the EU?' in P. Pawlak and A. Ricci (eds), Crisis 
Rooms: Towards a Global Network (EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2014) Annex 1. Strikingly, the EEAS itself has three 
different early warning systems, located in the Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments Division, EU 
INTCEN and the SITROOM, with incongruent reporting channels (H. Manchin, 'Overview of Crisis Rooms' in P. Pawlak and A. 
Ricci (eds), Crisis Rooms: Towards a Global Network? (EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2014) 167-168). The Parliament 
therefore calls to carry out a systematic and in-depth audit aimed at identifying duplication and further developing the 
practice of joint technical and logistical services (European Parliament (2012/2253(INI)) op.cit. note 746, paras 10-11) 
868 D. Spence, 'The Early Days of the European External Action Service: A Practitioner's View' (2012) The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy 7(1) 119. 
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Board and the Crisis Platform mechanism. The Board functions under the chairmanship of the HR or 
the EEAS’ Executive SG. Responsible for ensuring consistent EU responses to natural or man-made 
crises around the globe, it can launch Crisis Platforms bringing together all the Union’s competent 
services.869 These Platforms serve to facilitate first-hand information exchange, formulate operational 
conclusions and promptly translate these into concrete action. This model soon proofed successful and 
was replicated in structures such as a Conflict Prevention Group, the SSR Informal Inter-Service 
Working Group, country team meetings and the Intelligence Steering Board.870 While coordination 
clearly improved, these platforms do however nothing to address functional overlap. The Court of 
Auditors therefore found that this was still insufficient to realise the EEAS’ full potential.871 Moreover, 
protectionism occasionally gains the upper hand and has led these platforms to meet less often and 
be less inclusionary than initially envisaged. Another key problem is that the specialised units of 
DEVCO, EEAS and FPI on the security-development interface are insufficiently linked to geographic 
departments and especially higher-level decision-making.  
Second, the EEAS’ dual functions in the TFEU and CFSP realms entail a split accountability that may 
proof particularly demanding in practise. As a general rule the EEAS operates under the authority of 
the High Representative. In the words of EEAS MD for Africa Westcott, “Baroness Ashton is our boss 
and we are answerable to her, with her HR hat on, for the conduct of the EU’s foreign policy, and, with 
her Vice-President’s hat on, for the overall coherence of the EU’s external action”.872 In the EEAS 
leadership this is indeed presented as an important asset:  
Very much like our new EEAS building (sitting, Solomon-like, halfway between the two opposite 
sides of rue de la Loi), the Service is not the exclusive expression of the community method 
safeguarded (and cherished) by the Commission; nor of the intergovernmental method 
characterising the working of the Council. The EEAS encapsulates (and perhaps transcends) them 
both.873 
The extent to which this is workable depends on the EEAS’ “chameleon”-capacity874 to transform 
smoothly between its functioning as a GSC department when assisting the HR in conducting the CFSP 
and preparing the FAC, and as a Commission DG under TFEU responsibilities. With regard to 
development programming the EEAS Decision is clear and states that “all proposals for decisions will 
                                                          
869 High Representative (2011) see note 805, 4. 
870  Moreover, in case of a major emergency the Commission and the EEAS will jointly draft an Integrated Situational 
Awareness and Analysis (ISAA). 
871 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, paras 51-54. 
872 N. Westcott (EEAS MD for Africa), ‘A New Framework for European Relations with Africa’, speech to the EUISS Conference 
on EU-Africa Foreign Policy after Lisbon, Brussels, 18.10.2011. 
873 D. O'Sullivan (former EEAS Chief Operating Officer), ‘The EEAS, national foreign services and the future of European 
diplomacy’, speech at the EPC Policy Dialogue, Brussels, 06.09.2012, 5. 
874 Blockmans and Hillion (2013) op.cit. note 793, 21. 
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be prepared by following the Commission’s procedures”.875 Yet, also for other assignments such as the 
preparation of proposals for adoption by the college, Article 18(4) TEU – stating that the HR shall in 
this capacity “be bound by Commission procedures” – can be applied by extension to the EEAS. The 
latter is accorded the same rights and competences as any other Commission department and 
participates fully in the institution’s inter-service consultations. When assisting the HR in her CFSP and 
FAC responsibilities, the EEAS is incorporated in the vertical chain of command running through the 
preparatory bodies and HR to the 28 Member States represented in the Council, and finally the 
European Council. This implicates that depending on whether EEAS staff is dealing with security or 
development-related issues they are answerable to different principals. This offers opportunities for 
better exploiting synergies, but simultaneously holds the risk of internalising old complexities of 
determining the often fuzzy boundary between development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP. If the 
associated difficulties are not overcome they could drag the Service to the core of future SALW-like 
legal disputes on competence delimitation (cf. infra 5.2.2.). 
A final fragmentation challenge consists of reconciling the diverging working environments of 
development and CFSP/CSDP actors to build a common EEAS esprit de corps. Given that the Service is 
composed of transferred and seconded staff, it is no straightforward undertaking to ensure staff loyalty 
to the EEAS rather than their institutions of origin. The transfer en bloc of a great number of 
Commission and GSC entities has helped the foreign service to become operational quickly, but 
considerably obfuscates this process. The EEAS is faced with a constant challenge to ensure that the 
allogamy of Union and national, communitaurised and more intergovernmental, development and 
security-oriented staff, bodies and policies, forms a hybrid foreign service rather than a mere 
juxtaposition of distinct elements. Particularly in the early years, the internal quest for compromise 
among this wide variety of players, tended to divert valuable energy and time away from the EEAS’ 
core tasks.876  
The two main elements that lay at the basis of this fragmentation – i.e. institutional protectionism and 
the insulation of the CFSP/CSDP – are part of the reality that the EEAS has to deal with. There are 
nonetheless two key issues which the HR and EEAS management can address point-blank to address 
fragmentation and better exploit the potential of its security-development laboratory: internal 
leadership and policy guidance. These could help to soften the CFSP-TFEU delimitation and improve 
the EEAS’ policy in- and output, which, in turn, can command more confidence of institutions and 
Members States in the role and potential of the EEAS.  
                                                          
875 Art. 9(3) EEAS Decision, second paragraph. 




The first element is rather paradoxical. Despite having a particularly top-heavy structure, the EEAS falls 
short on leadership. Its pyramidal design largely results from the rule that one third of staff needs to 
come from Member States. The en bloc transfer of Commission and GSC departments occupied most 
management posts, meaning that additional high-ranking functions had to be generated to match the 
seniority of national diplomats. This led to duplicated layers of management (with Managing Directors 
and Directors sometimes in a one-to-one relationship),877 diffused chains of command and opaque 
relationships between the EEAS’ geographic and thematic entities.878 Two structures were called into 
being to clarify the hierarchy and set the direction for the EEAS: the Corporate Board and the Political 
Affairs Department. The former oversees the daily work of the EEAS and consists of the HR, the Chief 
Operating Officer, the Executive Secretary General and two Deputy SGs – one for inter-institutional 
and another for political affairs. The latter holds responsibility over the Political Affairs department 
consisting of divisions for Policy Coordination, Strategic Planning and one with responsibility for 
preparing and chairing PSC, CIVCOM and PMG meetings. The Policy Coordination division is assigned 
to assist the High Representative “in her task of ensuring consistency of the Union’s external action”.879 
While this division is valued for its hands-on support and guidance, its exact role remains unclear to 
many of the EEAS top and lower-level staff.880 The same holds true for the Corporate Board which has 
no formally enunciated task description. By guaranteeing the daily management of the Service, the 
Board aims to exempt the overburdened HR from its technical ins and outs. All the MDs report to the 
Corporate Board, which facilitates better coordination but runs the risk of sacrificing decision-making 
agility to quality assurance.881 Furthermore, the fact that the HR still has 23 direct reporting lines882 
illustrates that the full potential for reducing her workload has not been realised. The EEAS Review 
therefore calls to streamline its top management structure, for one thing by merging the posts of 
Executive SG and Chief Operating Officer into a single Secretary General.883 This has been picked up by 
HR Mogherini and a major reform of the EEAS’ senior management and organisational structure is 
currently in the pipeline. The likely result will be a significantly simplified organogram, with a more 
lucid hierarchical structure running down from a reinforced Secretary-General.884 
                                                          
877 There is for instance both a Managing Director and a Director for the Americas, as well as for North Africa, Middle East, 
Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq (cf. Annex – EEAS organogram).  
878 In spite of ongoing efforts to gradually cut down on these posts, in 2014 still over 50% of all EEAS administrators were 
AD12 (Head of Unit-level) or above (European Parliament Resolution (A7-0199/2014) with observations forming an integral 
part of its Decision on discharge for implementation of the general EU budget for the financial year 2012, Section X – European 
External Action Service, 03.04.2014, para. 19).  
879 High Representative (12401/10 ADD 4) see note 791, p. 2. 
880 Interviews with EEAS officials in Addis Ababa and Brussels in June 2013 and May 2014. 
881 Wouters et al. (2013) op.cit. note 831, 22. 
882 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, para. 33. 
883 Medium-term recommendation 5 of the EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726. 




A second – related – issue that can be addressed is the level of policy guidance. The Corporate Board 
and Political Affairs department are there to ensure that the totality of EEAS activities contributes to 
the political objectives set by the HR. However, these remain generally vague and often boil down to 
blank calls for coherence and comprehensiveness. Even though the EEAS is said to be “uniquely well 
placed in the EU institutional framework to promote the strategic direction of the EU’s external 
action”,885 the Court of Auditors finds that it favours ad hoc approaches.886 This increases the chances 
of fragmented or counterproductive action. Departments and divisions plan their activities rather 
independently, which complicates internal fine-tuning as well as alignment with the Commission 
annual work programme or the 18-month agenda of the Presidency trios. Also this issue is likely to be 
addressed in the announced reorganisation of the EEAS, which could already be effectuated by 
September 2015. 
In sum, as a central policy interlocutor with a heterogeneous composition the EEAS could finally put 
the rhetoric of coordination across the security-development nexus in practise. Its setting enables a 
decentralised and cross-fertilising exchange of experience-based knowledge in a network of security 
and development-oriented actors. Yet, as with the High Representative, the EEAS’ design gives the 
impression of a halfway solution that is still in an experimental phase. In spite of all the faith put in this 
new body, its “hands are tied to the competences attributed to the political masters it is supposed to 
serve”.887 Consequently, the old challenges of delimitating CFSP and development cooperation seeped 
through in the EEAS’ constellation. This causes considerable hurdles of duplication, coordination, 
accountability and institutional solidarity, which at present prevent the EEAS from collecting the full 
gains in terms of efficiency and coherence. Besides the challenges of delimitation there are also risks 
attached to increased integration of both policy fields. The development-related responsibilities of the 
EEAS have intensified the long-standing concern about the potential instrumentalisation of aid.888 
However, the fears that this would lead to an increased exposure to short-term political and economic 
pressures appear unfounded at this stage.889 Ironically, this is less due to a commonality of objectives 
than to the limited interest of the EEAS to make its imprint on development cooperation.  
                                                          
885 Ibid., 7. 
886 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, para. 25. 
887 S. Blockmans and M.-L. Laatsit, 'The European External Action Service: Enhancing Coherence in EU External Action' in P.J. 
Cardwell (ed), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (TMC Asser, The Hage, 2012) 157. 
888 For example: CONCORD, 'EEAS One Year On: "Work in progress" for poverty eradication' (European NGO Federation for 
Relief and Development, Brussels, 2012) 15p. 
889 Herrero, Galeazzi and Krätke (2013) op.cit. note 821, 13. 
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4.4. The Union Delegations890 
The passing reference in the Lisbon Treaty, stating that “Union delegations in third countries and at 
international organisations shall represent the Union”, does not do credit to the major break with past 
practice this causes.891 Previously, external representation only occurred through Delegations of a 
single EU institution, the European Commission. 892  For the first time in the history of European 
integration, the EU now disposes of quasi-embassies that represent, implement and defend the entire 
range of EU competences abroad. These Delegations, which constitute the EU’s eyes, ears and face on 
the ground, hold great potential. The Union’s global role indeed depends on the acceptance of and 
relations with third countries and international organisations, two elements that are to a great extent 
developed in-country. In the most ambitious of terms, High Representative Ashton professed – in one 
of her first public statements after she took up the post – that these Delegations should form “a 
network that is the pride of Europe and the envy of the rest of the world … It should offer our citizens 
added value to what their countries already do, and give our partners around the world a trusted and 
reliable ally on European issues”.893 Despite setting the bar this high, the creation of EU Delegations 
passed rather unnoticed in scholarly and public debate. All efforts and eyes first turned to erecting the 
EEAS, of which the EU Delegations form an integral part. Only recently has attention started to shift to 
the field, as reflected in the greater focus on Delegations in the 2013 EEAS Review. Remarkably, this 
did not lay bare similar haggling and criticism. Rather to the contrary, while it is generally agreed that 
a lot of work remains to be done, EU Delegations are hailed as the “perhaps unintended”894 but “most 
conspicuous”895 success story of the new external action constellation.  
A concise historical overview of the emergence and evolution of Commission Delegations will first 
contrast their legal framework to the practice on the ground. This aims to understand what kind of 
offices were exactly in place on the eve of the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification (4.4.1.). A second section will 
analyse the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and put flesh to the bones of the current 
Delegation’s rather void primary law status (4.4.2.). A final part will then study whether these quasi-
                                                          
890  This article draws from the author’s following paper: H. Merket, From Commission to Union Delegations: A Legal-
Institutionalist Analysis, Paper presented at the conference ‘European Union in International Affairs IV’ (Brussels, 22-
24.05.2014) 24p. Important insights on the functioning of these new diplomatic entities were obtained during a three-month 
period of participatory observation at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia, where the author worked as part of the Governance and 
Civil Society section. 
891 Article 221 TFEU.  
892 The two ‘EU liaison offices’ of the Council Secretariat in Geneva and New York were, even though physically separate, 
legally part of the Commission (Crowe (2008) op.cit. note 805, 22). 
893 C. Ashton, 'Quiet diplomacy will get our voice heard', The Times, 17.12.2009. 
894 R. Balfour, 'Revolution from the periphery', European Voice, 25.07.2013. 
895 J. Wouters and B. Van Vooren, 'More clarity and cohesion required', ibid., 04.07.2013. 
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embassies are up to the tasks at issue and shed light on their potential with regard to the security-
development nexus (4.4.3.).  
4.4.1.  The emergence of Commission Delegations: diplomacy by default 
EU diplomacy is no recent phenomenon, but is in fact as old as the European integration project itself. 
Already in 1954 the European Coal and Steel Community opened a first Commission information office 
in Washington,896 soon followed by an ECSC liaison office for Latin America and a first diplomatic 
mission in 1956 to London. The most important stimuli for expanding this network geographically were 
the Commission’s role in trade negotiations and particularly aid programming. The highly technical 
nature of large EDF-funded projects, mainly targeted at infrastructure works, required on-the-spot 
presence of very specific expertise. This triggered the unfolding of an expansive web of EDF offices 
under the umbrella of a European Agency for Cooperation. These roots of European diplomacy were 
not based on any legal framework or blueprint, resulting in an internally heterogeneous design. The 
various offices did initially not even represent a single EU institution but three separate Commission 
DGs: press and information offices of the former DG Press, a number of diplomatic missions of DG 
External Relations and EDF offices of DG Development.  
The Commission’s network continued to evolve rapidly. Particularly DG RELEX Delegations tended to 
operate on the same footing with national diplomatic missions, requiring similar protection and 
privileges. Consequently, these Delegations sought and obtained, throughout the 1970s, full 
diplomatic recognition from their host country authorities, based on the privileges and immunities 
defined in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Although the latter limits 
membership to states,897 its regime was extended in the widest possible manner through bilateral 
establishment agreements.898 EU Member States were presented with a fait accompli and saw this as 
an act of piracy by the Commission.899 The recognition of the more technical development offices went 
less smoothly and, initially, these had to satisfy themselves with a formal mention of their existence in 
the 1975 Lomé Convention.900 
                                                          
896 Shortly after the inglorious demise of the European Defence Community (cf. supra 2.1.2.) Jean Monnet decided to open 
this ECSC information office to convince the US government that Europe’s post-war project had not lost traction (European 
Commission, Taking Europe to the World: 50 Years of the European Commission's External Service (Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2004) 11-12). 
897 Articles 48 and 50 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), Vienna, UNTS vol. 500, p. 95, 18.04.1962. 
898 See further: R. Ambast and V. Tyagi, 'Ambassadors of Europe: An Insight into the Evolution of the European Union and 
International Diplomatic Law' (2008) Studia Diplomatica LXI(4), 173-189. 
899 V. Dimier and M. McGeever, 'Diplomats Without a Flag: The Institutionalization of the Delegations of the Commission in 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries' (2006) Journal of Common Market Studies 44(3), 496. It should also be noted that 
host countries were, for the sake of clarity, often demanding party for granting such status, the more so since they had already 
diplomatically recognised the Community by accrediting their own ambassadors in Brussels. 
900 Articles 26 and 31 ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé (1975) op.cit. note 151. 
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A next key moment for European diplomacy was the Commission’s full association to the EPC in the 
1981 London Report.901 Whereas in Brussels this chiefly implied a silent seat at the EPC table, the 
involvement of its foreign network was considerably more intensive. Member States – particularly 
those with limited diplomatic resources – happily relied on the Delegations’ expertise in EC policy, 
assisting presidencies as well as their institutional memory. This implied that all Commission offices 
became intimately involved with sensitive information in places where confidentiality and discretion 
were of the essence. One direct consequence was that the 1989 revision of the Lomé Convention 
provided that “the ACP States shall grant Commission Delegations privileges and immunities similar to 
those granted to diplomatic missions”.902 By the end of the 1980s the Commission, which was then 
essentially the executive arm of an economically-oriented international organisation, disposed of 89 
Delegations around the globe, composed of 440 officials and 1440 local staff, which have from the 
outset played a critical role.903  
This rising status was consolidated in the Treaty of Maastricht, according Commission Delegations 
primary law recognition. Given the Commission’s determined exclusion from CFSP decision-making, it 
is puzzling that the only Treaty article mentioning these Delegations was part of the CFSP Chapter and 
accorded these bodies significant responsibilities. Ex Article 20 TEU stated that: 
The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission delegations in 
third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international 
organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by 
the Council are complied with and implemented. 
They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and 
contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 20 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community.904 
As the CFSP is – per definition – largely put in practice abroad, the assignment to ensure, in cooperation 
with Member States, that its decisions are complied with and implemented, is potentially large and 
demanding. Not only is it therefore strange that the modalities of this role were in no way defined, this 
also entirely neglected their wide-ranging EC responsibilities.  
Under the Prodi Commission, which took office in 1999, a radical reform of EU aid delivery was 
undertaken (cf. supra 4.1.). This included a large-scale deconcentration exercise, transferring 
                                                          
901 London Report (1981) op.cit. note 160. 
902 Fourth ACP-EEC Convention (1989) op.cit. note 199, Annex LXXIII: Joint declaration relating to Protocol 3 on Commission 
Delegations. 
903 Commission (2004) op.cit. note 896, 34.  
904 Ex Article 20 TEC provided that every EU citizen in the territory of a third country shall be entitled to protection by the 
diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State. 
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numerable posts from Brussels towards Delegations to shorten the lines of communication and 
improve the alignment of aid management with the local context. 905  As a sort of internal EU 
subsidiarity the Commission explained that: “[a]nything that can be better managed and decided on 
the spot, close to what is happening on the ground, should not be managed or decided in Brussels”.906 
This gradual professionalisation and formalisation of Delegations in the 1990s and 2000s filled the 
regulatory void in which these bodies had been operating for so long, but simultaneously put a break 
on their autonomy, which had previously facilitated the mushrooming of their responsibilities. 
Arguably, the Commission did not intend to become a diplomatic actor. Rather, being the only 
permanent EU presence in situ, its Delegations evolved by default and on demand to fulfil specific 
needs. Gradually charged with ever more responsibilities, they turned from centres of technical 
expertise into a “quasi-diplomatic service”.907  Consequently, its inclusion in the global diplomatic 
community – based on the rules and rights of the VCDR – became a necessary condition for their 
effective functioning.908 Yet, “[a]cting without a clear foreign policy, without a head of state, with 
limited resources and without professional diplomats, the external delegations of the Commission 
[were] deprived of most of what traditionally unifies and consolidates foreign services”.909 Moreover, 
their legally unorthodox status gave rise to considerable confusion. In essence, these Delegations only 
represented the Commission, not the Community let alone the EU. Nonetheless, they were often 
perceived abroad as representatives of the whole Union,910 and even presented as such by its leaders. 
Prodi and Patten – i.e. the patrons of the External Service – conveyed that “[t]hese diplomatic 
representations are essential to the promotion of [EU] interests and values around the world, and are 
in the front line in delivering EU external relations policy and action, from the [CFSP] through trade 
and development cooperation to scientific and technical relations”.911  
Member States, however, kept a close eye on this evolution. They activated a kind of ‘diplomatic fire-
alarm’ to notify the Commission when Heads of Delegation (HoDs) trespassed their competences and 
                                                          
905 Commission (COM(2000) 456 final) op.cit. note 301. Between 2001 and 2005 the Commission assigned around 1 500 
additional staff to delegations (European Court of Auditors, ‘Has the Devolution of the Commission’s Management of External 
Assistance from its Headquarters to its Delegations Led to Improved Aid Delivery?’, Special Report No. 1 (ECA, Brussels, 2011) 
para. 40).  
906 Commission Communication (COM(2000) 814 final) op.cit. note 301, 20. 
907 Spence (2006) op.cit. note 249, 396. 
908 J. Wouters and S. duquet, 'Unus inter plures? The EEAS, the Vienna Convention and International Diplomatic Presence' in 
J. Bátora and D. Spence (eds), European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia (Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, forthcoming). 
909 M. Bruter, 'Diplomacy without a State: the External Delegations of the European Commission' (1999) Journal of European 
Public Policy 6(2), 192-193. 
910 Through a survey of Mexican media Bruter for instance found that in 73% of the cases the Commission Delegation was 
perceived as representing the EU or even Europe in general (M. Bruter, Les Délégations Extérieures de la Commission 
Européenne: Un Outil Moderne de Diplomatie Communautaire? (Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Bordeaux, 1996); reproduced in 
Bruter (1999) op.cit. note 909, 186-187). 
911 Commission (2004) op.cit. note 896, 3-4. 
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remind them of the boundaries to their radius of action.912 The Commission was susceptible for such 
sensitivities, as illustrated by this note from May 1991 to its Delegates:  
May I remind you – and ask you to remind your staff – of the need to exercise the greatest tact and 
discretion … above all in relation to diplomatic titles and diplomatic precedence. [You should not] 
seek to impose the title Ambassador. If an interlocutor fails to use this courtesy title, the Head of 
Delegation should not pursue the matter. He should discourage his own staff from referring to him 
as the Ambassador … In particular, the appellation ‘Ambassador of the European Community’ 
should be avoided. For the time being, Commission delegations remain Commission delegations – 
not Community delegations – even though they may in practice represent the Community on 
questions falling within areas of exclusive competence. One cannot expect the average diplomat 
in the street [sic] to understand such subtleties.913 
This could not prevent the Commission network from being criticised, particularly in UK Eurosceptic 
press, as illegal or created by stealth.914 Even the former UK Foreign Secretary Straw disparaged these 
Delegations as “all sorts of odd-bods from the [EU] running all sorts of odd offices around the world”.915  
The manner in which these Delegations became diplomatic actors by matter-of-fact default also meant 
that they were not always suited or sufficiently equipped for the tasks at hand. Staffing levels were 
low and while training was gradually scaled-up it was still rudimentary compared to that of traditional 
career foreign services. Given the very limited number of staff with political profiles, the lack of secure 
communications lines and the restrained access to intelligence networks, the Commission Delegations 
were poorly equipped for the diplomatic culture of confidentiality. In essence, the approach of 
Delegations always stayed one of project management rather than diplomacy. This was particularly 
problematic with regard to their vaguely defined responsibilities under the CFSP. These involved 
providing regular political analysis, conducting joint evaluations with Member State embassies and 
contributing to policy-making. Further, Commission Delegations assisted in preparing visits of the CFSP 
High Representative and cooperated with EUSRs. As a herald of the creation of a double-hatted 
HR/Commission Vice-President, the functions of EUSR and Head of Commission Delegation were even 
combined in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and to the African Union. Not seldom 
Commission Delegations were therefore seen in their host states as representing the policies of these 
CFSP actors and held accountable for their consequences. The emergence of CSDP missions provided 
                                                          
912 P. Duchâteau, 'La Chine et l'Europe' (2004) Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union Européenne 474, 11. 
913 H. G. Krenzler, Note for the Attention of Heads of Delegation DG I, Use of the Title Ambassador, Brussels, 27.05.1991; 
quoted in Bruter (1999) op.cit. note 909, 190. 
914 For instance: D. Hannan, 'EU's "illegal" diplomatic corps is edging out our national embassies', Daily Telegraph, 20.03.2003; 
and X, ‘Scandal of EU missions in paradise’, Sunday Express, 14.01.1996. 
915 UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence from Examination of Witnesses, 25.05.2004, Q59. 
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an even more remarkable extension to the Delegations’ portfolio. In countries where a mission or 
operation was deployed, it was evident that it could not act in isolation from the Commission 
Delegation. Consequently, joint actions setting up the latter required “close coordination” between 
the Commission Delegation and the Head of Mission/Force Commander “without prejudice to the 
chain of command”. 916  The implementation of this vague duty was left to the discretion of the 
personalities holding these posts and often remained rudimentary.  
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the EU did thus not lack diplomatic presence abroad. EUSRs acted as 
antennae for the CFSP (cf. supra 4.2.3.), the CSDP launched an increasing amount of missions and 
operations and the Commission Delegations continuously expanded their coverage and competences 
– albeit on shaky legal foundations. The relation and coordination between them was however 
diffused. In essence this implied that while EU institutions were increasingly striving for synergies 
across their various external policies – not the least those spanning its security and development 
competences – they lacked strong decentralised actors to translate these complex processes to the 
field.  
4.4.2. Entangling the nature, composition and competences of EU 
Delegations 
In the light of the shortcomings of the Commission’s diplomatic structure, the idea of creating a 
genuine Union diplomatic system gradually matured in EU circles, with the Parliament as most active 
proponent. 917  At the European Convention a “large consensus” emerged to establish EU 
delegations/embassies, as well as an EU diplomatic academy (which did eventually not see the light of 
day).918  The conviction, expressed in the travaux préparatoires, that these should arise from the 
Commission Delegations, was eventually not that straightforwardly expressed in the Lisbon Treaty, 
with Article 221 TFEU merely stating that: 
1. Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall represent the Union. 
2. Union delegations shall be placed under the authority of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They shall act in close cooperation with Member States’ 
diplomatic and consular missions. 
Given that the Commission itself found that its network was “ideally placed to ensure the success of 
this ambitious and far-reaching proposal”, the logical decision to build further on what already existed, 
                                                          
916 For instance: Article 10(3) Joint Action (2005/355/CFSP) on the EU mission to provide advice and assistance for security 
sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), OJ L 112/20, 03.05.2005. 
917 See for instance: European Parliament Resolution (2000/2006(INI)) on a common Community diplomacy, 24.07.2000. 
918 European Convention (CONV 459/02) op.cit. note 371, para. 7. 
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was quickly taken. 919  With the insertion of this one Article, the Lisbon Treaty finally gives EU 
Delegations the legal recognition they had been missing for half a century. No longer can these offices 
be “expected to be models of secretion and self-effacement”.920 As a logical extension of the EU’s 
single legal personality, the Delegations now represent the Union as a whole, across its entire range of 
competences. This is an important step forward, but in the absence of further Treaty guidance, it raises 
more questions than it answers. Besides the responsibility to represent the Union and act in close 
cooperation with Member States, Article 221 TFEU clarifies nothing in terms of the Delegations’ 
general nature, role and composition. If the EEAS provisions of Article 27(3) TEU are considered meagre 
(cf. infra 4.3.), these at least call for a Council decision to establish its organisation and functioning. 
Despite the importance of creating Union Delegations, that more than ever insert the EU in the global 
diplomatic community and thus constitute one of the most visible Lisbon innovations for outside 
actors, their functioning is entirely left in the open.  
As in the previous Treaty framework, it is again the CFSP Chapter that provides more information on 
the role of Delegations. In addition to the old tasks of cooperating with Member States’ missions to 
ensure that CFSP positions and actions, as well as the provisions on consular protection, are complied 
with and implemented, two new specifications are introduced.921 The first is mainly semantic but 
signals a stronger recognition of their role. The obligation of Member States’ missions and Union 
Delegations to “step up cooperation by exchanging information and carrying out joint assessments” is 
no longer attached to the provisions on consular protection, but inserted as a separate provision, 
signalling a broader scope.922 Second, Article 32 TEU expands the duty of Member States to “inform 
and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general 
interest” with an obligation to “determine a common approach”. Member States’ diplomatic missions 
and Union Delegations are subsequently tasked to cooperate and contribute to formulating and 
implementing this common approach. While this is a potentially heavy assignment, one should not 
forget that the Treaty leaves responsibility for compliance and enforcement under the CFSP entirely 
to Member States.  
When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, on 1 December 2009, it overnight transformed the 
Commission Delegations into Delegations of the Union. One month later a great number of them was 
                                                          
919 Commission (2004) op.cit. note 896, 10. 
920 M. McGeever, From Foreign Legion to Foreign Service – Evolution of the Status and Role of European Commission External 
Delegations 1976–1988, Paper presented at the conference ‘The EU as an External Actor: The Role of the Delegations of the 
European Commission, 1954–2004’ (European University Institute, Florence, 13–14.11.2004), 26. 
921 Article 35 TEU. 
922 Following three and half years of thorough inter-institutional negotiations, a Council Directive operationalising these 
provisions on consular protection was finally adopted in 2015. It regulates the support EU citizens can receive from other 
Member States abroad as well as the conditions upon which EU Delegations can intervene (Council Directive (2015/637/EU) 
on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in 
third countries and repealing Decision 95/553/EC, OJ L106/1, 24.04.2015). 
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already accorded the “responsibility of representation and coordination on behalf of the EU”, with 
transitory arrangements applicable in other places.923 It took however another seven months before a 
first attempt was made to lift some of the shroud on their nature, role and composition. In the absence 
of any Treaty guidance, this was done through a separate Article 5 on Union Delegations in the EEAS 
Decision. A key issue that this elucidated, is their undefined nature in the Union’s institutional 
architecture, by establishing them as an integral part of the EEAS.924 This seemingly logical verdict was 
not self-evident and is even not fully in line with the letter of the Treaty. The EEAS is in strict legal terms 
established as a CFSP body in primary law (cf. supra 4.3.1.) while Delegations represent the Union as a 
whole. Other forms of institutional design were therefore conceivable. A possible set-up, suggested by 
Spence, was to divide the Union Delegations into a political/CFSP section headed by an ambassador 
representing the EU, and a technical project management service under a deputy ambassador 
responsible for other (TFEU) external policies.925 In comparison to such fragmented design, the current 
unitary construction is certainly organisationally logical and in line with the Treaty’s coherence 
rationale. Yet, it may “have resolved one set of institutional 'boundary' issues at the expense of 
creating another”.926 The fact that Union Delegations have a broader range of competences than their 
mother institution, the EEAS, leads to complex and potentially conflicting situations with regard to the 
composition of staff, chains of command and financial circuits.  
First, EEAS staff occupies all posts of Head and Deputy HoD, support staff directly attached to them, as 
well as staff in political, information, public diplomacy and administration sections.927 Additionally, 
Delegations comprise of Commission officials “where appropriate for the implementation of the Union 
budget and Union policies other than those under the remit of the EEAS".928 This staff continues to 
figure on the establishment plan of their home DGs. As the Commission holds the (purse) strings of 
development programming, trade and enlargement policy, its officials largely outnumber those from 
the EEAS in most Delegations. In July 2013 there were about 5,460 staff working in Delegations, of 
which 3,500 were Commission officials and 1,960 EEAS personnel.929 Of the latter group only 365 were 
AD-level officials, with the remainder being mainly local agents, but also contractual agents, assistants 
and SNE’s.930 Notably, the EEAS itself also consists of staff transferred from the Commission. This 
implies that there are two categories of staff with a Commission background working side by side: 
                                                          
923 Council Note (17770/1/09) EU diplomatic representation in third countries: First half of 2010, 19.01.2010, para. 3. 
924 Article 1(4) EEAS Decision. 
925 Spence (2006) op.cit. note 249, 422. 
926 E. Hayes, 'EU Delegations: Europe’s Link to the World' in K.E. Jørgensen and K.V. Laatikainen (eds), Routledge Handbook 
on the European Union and International Institutions (Routledge, New York, 2013) 30. 
927 Annex to EEAS Decision.  
928 Article 5(2) EEAS Decision.  
929 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 14. 
930 For a detailed break-down of EEAS staff in Delegations, see: High Representative answer to parliamentary question (E-
004218/2011) by Franziska Brantner (Verts/ALE) on VP/HR — Staffing of Union Delegations, 02.05.2011. 
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those temporarily transferred to the EEAS and those directly working on behalf of the Commission in 
the Delegations.   
Second, authority over all staff “whatever their status, and for all its activities” is entrusted to the 
HoD.931 The latter receives instructions from the HR – to whom she/he is accountable – and the EEAS, 
and is responsible for their execution. Also the Commission may, in areas where it exercises the powers 
conferred on it by the Treaties, issue instructions to Delegations “which shall be executed under the 
overall responsibility of the Head of Delegation”.932 These provisions left open a number of delicate 
questions that were further addressed in separate documents. The Commission-EEAS Working 
Arrangements specify that these instructions must be issued through the HoDs, copying the EEAS, who 
shall then call on the relevant staff to carry them out.933 Yet, in practice HoDs and EEAS desk officers 
are not always informed. Particularly in relation to development cooperation problems have been 
reported with instructions that disregard local political considerations or priorities set by the EEAS,934 
putting “at risk the consistency of EU actions”.935 A Commission-EEAS SLA further prescribes that 
Commission staff in Delegations shall receive the necessary services from the EEAS – subject to at least 
the same standards of quality it accords to its own staff – in order to allow them to carry out their 
responsibilities.936 In a provision that leans more towards mistrust than mutual agreement, “[t]he 
Commission can, on its own initiative, and after due notice, undertake on the spot visits to Delegations 
in order to satisfy itself that the present agreement is correctly implemented”.937  
Third, as only figure within an EU Delegation, its Head wears a dual Commission-EEAS hat. Arguably, 
this resulted more from practical necessity than purposeful design. Being EEAS officials, HoDs could 
otherwise not sign off the EU’s aid instruments, which continue to be implemented by the Commission. 
Consequently, the latter had no other choice than sub-delegating its responsibility for budget 
appropriations and implementation to the HoDs.938 When acting as sub-delegated authorising officers 
for such operational expenditure, the Heads “must apply the Commission rules and be subject to the 
same duties, obligations and accountability as any other sub-delegated authorising officer of the 
                                                          
931 Article 2(2) EEAS Decision.  
932 Article 5(3) EEAS Decision.  
933 Commission (SEC(2012) 48 final) op.cit. note 822, 3.  
934 Wouters et al. (2013) op.cit. note 967, 66. 
935 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 846, para. 59. 
936 Article 2 Service Level Agreement between Commission services with staff in EU Delegations and the EEAS, Brussels, 
20.12.2010 (hereafter: Commission-EEAS SLA). Annex I sets out which of these services shall be provided free of charge by 
the EEAS and which shall be charged to the Commission. 
937 Ibid., Article 9.  
938 Article 51 Regulation (1081/2010/EU/Euratom) op.cit. note 792. An initial design error prevented HoDs from processing 
the EDF, which is not part of the EU budget and thus not covered by the above Regulation. This was rather slovenly solved by 
passing this responsibility to the most senior Commission official in Delegation (T. Vogel, 'Heads of delegation to get authority 
for EDF money', European Voice, 10.03.2011).   
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Commission”.939  Adding to the complexity, the Delegations’ administrative budget constitutes an 
entirely separate financial circuit for which the HoDs are accountable to the EEAS. In addition, the 
Commission continues to fund administrative costs relating to its own staff “through eight different 
directorates-general and three instruments”. 940  The Working Arrangements acknowledge the 
potential for a “conflict of priorities”, but provide no solution for such a scenario other than a vague 
prescription that the HoD will inform the Commission and EEAS, who “will take appropriate steps to 
remedy the situation”. 941  This intricacy, of both line management and budget handling, risks to 
complicate the daily functioning of EU Delegations. Arguably, this was the price to pay for their 
comprehensive design that transcends the competence limitations existing at headquarters level.  
Whereas the Delegations finally form part of a common EU external service, their central 
administration thus remains split. In the Elti v EU Delegation to Montenegro case the General Court 
reasoned that “the legal status of the Union Delegations is characterised by a two-fold organic and 
functional dependence with respect to the EEAS and the Commission”. 942  This case concerned a 
decision taken by the Head of Delegation to reject a tender submitted by the applicant. The Court 
reasoned that the HoD acted as sub-delegated authorising officer of the Commission, meaning that 
the measure was attributable to the latter.943 This illustrates how the current arrangements, influenced 
by Lisbon Treaty’s integration-delimitation paradox, put the Head of Delegations in a particularly 
schizophrenic position. This is not only internally confusing, but also – and particularly – for third 
parties, whose faulty identification of the attributable party may imply the inadmissibility of their 
action.944 While the HoD may have authority over all staff, the ultimate supervisors of Commission 
personnel in Delegations are located in their respective home DGs. This situation is not so dissimilar 
from many national embassies, which include personnel from various line ministries, but the 
proportion of this staff category is exceptionally large in EU Delegations. HoDs – as acknowledged by 
former EEAS Executive Secretary-General Vimont – “struggled to control [this] group of people”.945 
Strangely, the idea of parallel universes within EU Delegations was strengthened by former HR Ashton, 
who explained their inadequate response to the Arab Spring as follows: “[r]emember that in most 
delegations the staff who are [EEAS] may be only one. The rest are Commission development people 
doing fantastic work, but they are not mine”.946 Not only is this statement remarkable because the HR 
                                                          
939 Commission (SEC(2012) 48 final) note 822, 5. 
940 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, para. 57. 
941 Commission (SEC(2012) 48 final) note 822, 7. 
942 Case T-395/11 op.cit. note 793, para. 46. In a similar case on the former Commission Delegations, the Court came to the 
same conclusion (Case T-264/09, Technoprocess v Commission and EU Delegation to Morocco, ECLI:EU:T:2011:319, para. 70). 
943 Case T-395/11 op.cit. note 793, paras 62-64. 
944 Ibid., paras 73-75. 
945 UK House of Lords (2013) note 821, para 51. 
946 UK House of Lords (2011) op.cit. note 736, 6. 
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stands directly above the HoD who has authority over all staff, it moreover neglects her second hat as 
Commission Vice-President. The SLA acknowledges the not unlikely possibility of disputes in managing 
these complex staff relations, which are to be addressed at the Director-Generals level “with a view to 
finding an amicable solution”.947  
Union Delegations do not only stand at the service of the EEAS and the Commission, they “shall have 
the capacity to respond to the needs of other institutions of the Union, in particular the European 
Parliament”. 948  This involves the responsibility for receiving, supporting and assisting a sizeable 
number of travelling officials and parliamentary missions.949 In addition, Delegations “shall work in 
close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States”.950 Given 
that this sharing is formulated as a unilateral duty upon the Delegations, it is not entirely surprising 
that Member States’ missions often stay passive receptors.951 Yet, gradually, the tide is turning and 
Member States are jumping on the bandwagon of EU information exchange. On the one hand, this 
new tendency has a very practical cause, namely the unfolding of a secured transmission system, called 
ACID. The absence hereof severely complicated the interchange of intelligence.952 On the other hand, 
reciprocity in such sensitive matters requires trust, something that is gradually growing, as the quality 
of the Delegations’ reporting improves. The wide access to EU-made information and intelligence is 
one of the clearest added values the Delegations can provide, particularly to smaller Member States 
with a limited global presence.953 It is therefore a significant deficiency that no unified reporting model 
has yet been put in place and great disparity exists in the way reports are being drafted and shared.954  
The single most important extension of the Delegations’ range of duties results from the Treaty-
defined task to represent the Union. This has been interpreted as encompassing not only the 
demanding task of in-country coordination, but also the representative functions taken over from the 
rotating Presidency.955 As a consequence, the whole range of EU coordination meetings, including the 
                                                          
947 Article 9 Commission-EEAS SLA, op.cit. note 936. If a dispute persists it shall be addressed according to the mediation and 
arbitration proceedings set out in Article 6 of the Commission-EEAS Framework SLA.  
948 Article 5(7) EEAS Decision.  
949 This leads some Delegation staff to complain that they are being turned into “travel agents” (interview Commission official 
in the EU Delegation to the African Union, July 2013). 
950 Article 5(9) EEAS Decision.  
951 Some among the EEAS staff in Delegations therefore proposed to make reporting conditional upon Member States’ 
participation in information exchange. Vimont was however quick to point out that the EEAS was established as a ‘service’ 
and should not try to act differently (Interview with EEAS official at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia, June 2013). 
952 This is evidenced by the fact that most Delegation staff finds that the oral exchange of information occurs with much 
greater regularity (EEAS, Report of survey of EU Delegations Implementation of the Guidelines on Local Co-operation in third 
countries, Brussels, 13.05.2013, para. 2.22. (document on file with the author)). 
953 There are for instance about 53 countries where an EU Delegation is present and only one in four Member States have a 
diplomatic representation (K. Raik, 'Serving the Citizens? Consular Role of the EEAS Grows in Small Steps', EPC Policy Brief 
(European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2013) 45). 
954 F. Bicchi, 'The European External Action Service: A Pivotal Actor in EU Foreign Policy Communications' (2012) The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy 7(1), 90. Bicchi’s conclusion dates back to autumn 2011, yet the author’s observations and conversations 
with Member States’ diplomats in Addis Ababa and Brussels indicate that this problem partly persists.  
955 Articles 5(8) EEAS Decision.  
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typically monthly gatherings of Heads of Mission (HoMs), Deputy HoMs, Economic Counsellors, 
Development Counsellors, etc., are now chaired by EU Delegations and generally held at their premises 
(cf. supra Box 10, illustrating that this is the most unified level of EU representation). This holds the 
risk of losing the dynamism inserted by the alternating presidencies, but is undoubtedly beneficial for 
the continuity of the EU’s approach. Disregarding some teething problems,956 the HR assesses this 
transfer of responsibilities as “remarkably smoothly in bilateral delegations”. 957  Third countries 
appreciate the clarity and simplification this brings, yielding considerable cost and time-savings. This 
gradually leads to a greater reliance upon the EU Delegations as preferred interlocutor, feeding back 
to their role and status. However, there are considerable variations between locations, partly 
dependent on interpersonal relations, the (geo)strategic importance of the respective country or topic 
(with the ease of coordination inversely proportional to the strategic importance due to increasing 
Member States’ sensitivities), 958  as well as the background, experience and level of initiative of 
HoDs.959  Beyond information and coordination, a number of practical cooperation modalities are 
emerging between Member States and EU Delegations. These include mechanisms for co-location (the 
so-called ‘laptop diplomats’), sharing premises and joint contracting.960 While often purely pragmatic, 
these provide important steps towards genuine diplomatic integration. 
4.4.3. EU Delegations as quasi-embassies: are they up to the task?  
EU Heads of Delegation as quasi-ambassadors 
With their broad design and scope, EU Delegations constitute quasi-embassies that compared to their 
national counterparts only lack military, consular and cultural sections.961 Considered as embassies for 
all practical diplomatic purposes,962 the only voids in the almost complete applicability of the VCDR are 
                                                          
956 The UK Minister of State Lidington, for instance, send out a public warning for competence creep by the new Union 
Delegations that “should not try to speak for member states despite their new powers” (A. Rettman, 'UK attacks Ashton over 
"ludicrous" budget proposal', euobserver.com, 25.05.2011). In Washington certain Member States did reportedly not show 
up for months in EU coordination meetings. In other places “EU Teams” were established, with the Head of Delegation 
working alongside the Presidency (P.M. Kaczynski, 'Swimming in Murky Waters: Challenges in Developing the EU’s External 
Representation', FIIA Briefing Paper 88 (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 2011) 9-10).  
957 High Representative (2011) see note 805, para. 16. In multilateral Delegations the situation is more challenging “given the 
greater complexity of legal and competence issues” (Ibid., para 17). Precisely due to this specificity, the study of this last 
group of Delegations falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
958 These sensitivities also appear to incite Member States to increasingly outsource human rights issues to EU Delegations, 
in order to avoid souring their bilateral relations (R. Balfour, The Role of EU Delegations in EU Human Rights Policy (European 
Parliament DG for External Policies, Brussels, 2013) 14). 
959 R. Balfour and K. Raik, 'Equipping the European Union for the 21st century', FIIA Report 36 (The Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, Helsinki, 2013) 44. 
960 Merket (2014) op.cit. note 890, 17-18. 
961 M. Comelli and R. Matarazzo, 'Rehashed Commission Delegations or Real Embassies? EU Delegations Post-Lisbon', IAI 
Working Papers 11/23 (Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 2011) 4. 
962 Article 5(6) EEAS Decision prescribes that the HR “shall take the necessary measures to ensure that host States grant the 
Union delegations, their staff and their property, privileges and immunities equivalent to those referred to in the [VCDR]”. 
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the lack of EU diplomatic passports and the complications with granting diplomatic asylum to persons 
in need.963 This also implies that Heads of Delegation are required to act – and increasingly perceived 
– as quasi-ambassadors. Similar to standard diplomatic practice, third states are requested in an 
accreditation letter, signed by the Presidents of the European Council and Commission, to “give entire 
credence to all that he will communicate … in accordance with the instructions of the European 
Union”.964 Even the taboo on using the term ‘ambassador’ in reference to HoDs is gradually fading and 
the title is ever more frequently used in diplomatic correspondence. This reflects a growing 
appreciation for the role of EU Delegations within the global diplomatic community. Yet, the fact that 
in 2014, 70 out of 140 HoDs still had no security clearance to access classified information, 965 
embarrassingly illustrates how the EU is not yet completely ready for and adapted to this new situation.  
The ability of HoDs to deal with these increased responsibilities and expectations depends as much on 
their personality as on their background. Those transferred from national diplomatic services generally 
have more affiliation with diplomatic sensitivities, but may struggle with the Delegations’ traditionally 
more administrative and technical tasks. This last element is claiming a disproportionately large share 
of their already dense schedules.966 Since the transformation from Commission to EU Delegations, 
their Heads can no longer delegate the daily management of assistance programmes to their deputies 
or senior Commission staff, meaning that they can only themselves sign off on even the smallest 
transactions. This problem is acknowledged as one of “paramount importance” to be solved “in the 
shortest possible timescale”.967  
Given that Heads of Delegation now provide in-country leadership across the whole range of EU 
competences, including the CFSP, the question rises whether there is still value in and need for 
assigning EU Special Representatives. Indeed, the latter’s tasks of information gathering and 
circulation, representation and coordination (cf. supra 4.2.3.) can now be assumed by HoDs. 
Nonetheless, a case can still be made for the EUSRs. In particular, HoDs can hardly match the clout and 
status emanating from such high-profile and inherently political postings. EUSRs can be appointed on 
an ad hoc basis, allowing the EU to materialise its concern for and commitment to certain crises. 
Moreover, seen that the mechanisms for cooperation and information-sharing between Delegations 
                                                          
For a template of an Establishment Agreement, see: P.J. Kuijper, et al., The Law of EU External Relations: Cases, Materials, 
and Commentary on the EU as an International Actor (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) 51-52. 
963  J. Wouters and S. Duquet, 'The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New Horizons?' (2012) The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy 7(1) 38-48. The former is being solved through EU Laissez-Passer documents that are upgraded to meet modern 
diplomatic standards (interview EEAS official, September 2013), the latter is perhaps legally shaky but Wouters and Duquet 
argue that the difficulties are not unsurmountable.   
964 For a template of such a letter, see: Kuijper et al. (2013) op.cit. note 962, 56. 
965 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, reply by the EEAS para. 34(b). 
966 46 % of the HoDs report to spend 50 % or more of their time on management/administrative tasks (Ibid., footnote 45). 
967 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 12. This could for instance be done by amending the Financial Regulation in order to 
allow for such tasks to be delegated to the Deputy HoD.  
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in the same region are fairly limited, EUSRs can fill an important void. The importance hereof is only 
rising in the light of the EU’s increasingly regional approach to external challenges (cf. infra 6.2.). All 
this points to a clear need to clarify the relation and division of labour between HoDs and EUSRs, which 
is however nowhere addressed. EUSRs decide for themselves how to cooperate and coordinate with 
the relevant EEAS services, leading “to parallel lines of reporting and confusion about who [is] in 
charge”. 968  Half of the HoDs surveyed by the Court of Auditors in 2014 indicate that they are 
insufficiently informed about the activities of EUSRs operating in their region.969  
The EEAS Review acknowledges that EUSRs, “being housed in a separate building with a relationship 
primarily to the Member States through the PSC”, have only limited contacts with Delegations.970 It 
purports to solve this legal anomaly by integrating them more closely in the EEAS structures (cf. supra 
4.2.3.). In this same light the 2014 Guidelines on appointment, mandate and financing of EUSRs call on 
them to “maintain close liaison with and provide regular briefings to Member States' diplomatic 
representations and Union delegations”.971 The latter, for their part, should make every effort to assist 
EUSRs in implementing their mandate. A more concrete suggestion has been to extend the practice of 
double-hatting HoDs and EUSRs, as it is currently done for Kosovo, Afghanistan and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Similar to the HR’s hats, this represents “a ‘personal union’ of two functions that remain 
distinct, just as the competences falling, respectively, in the CFSP and in the [TFEU] basket remain 
separate”.972 Their staff is co-located in the Delegation, but remain divided in two distinct categories 
with their own chain of command. The benefits of this formula are widely acknowledged and include 
cost savings, efficiency gains and more financial leverage to raise the negotiating position of the EUSRs 
(and Union as a whole). Fouéré, the former double-hatted EUSR/HoD to Macedonia adds that:  
our interlocutors, before I came, were not quite sure who they should speak to if they wanted to 
convey a message or they could perhaps misuse the fact that there were different actors. 
Now…they know exactly who to call, who to talk to and they know that person has a direct link 
with both the Council and the Commission and vice versa.973  
The European Parliament therefore pleads to double-hat EUSRs whenever possible.974 Nonetheless, 
the extent to which this success formula can be replicated is limited. For one thing, there are a number 
of downsides, such as encumbering EUSRs with the huge administrative burden of managing a 
Delegation as well as the close supervision by the EEAS and Commission which might diminish their 
                                                          
968 UK House of Lords (2013) op.cit. note 821, para. 75. 
969 ECA (2014) op.cit. note 723, para. 38. 
970 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 5. 
971 Council (7510/14) op.cit. note 752, 6. 
972 Grevi (2007) op.cit. note 506, 48. 
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flexibility. Moreover, their sizeable task description entails the risk that one role takes primacy over 
the other. Yet, most importantly, this formula does not work for the majority of EUSRs with a focus 
transcending a single country or international organisation.  
The permeation of politics in the Delegations’ daily work 
As put by an EEAS official in Delegation, since the Lisbon Treaty “politics is no longer a hobby that can 
be performed with relatively limited oversight from Brussels. It has become part and parcel of every 
aspect of our daily business, couched in a formal straightjacket under strict supervision from both 
headquarters and Member States”.975  The fact that Delegations are increasingly perceived as EU 
embassies strongly permeates their everyday functioning. Even though politics had evidently never 
been far away in policy and technical dialogues with partner authorities, the new situation requires all 
staff to execute their responsibilities in a more politically sensitive manner. Moreover, events such as 
the Arab Spring and the more recent turmoil in Ukraine, continue to confront the EU with the sobering 
fact that even purely economic policies cannot be implemented in isolation from the political context.  
A key question is therefore to what extent Union Delegations are up to these new tasks and altered 
working environment. Rather problematically, the increased expectations on what they should deliver, 
particularly with regard to EU representation abroad and the CFSP, were not accompanied by a 
commensurate capacity expansion. Most Delegations have managed the transition without any 
additional resources, and 13 of them have no political section, with the HoD being the only AD-level 
official from the EEAS.976 As long as the target of budget neutrality – which applies just as much to 
Delegations as to the EEAS – is not replaced with a more realistic focus on budgetary efficiency,977 the 
EEAS’ hands are tied. A small but significant contribution is the HR’s commitment to continue the 
transfer of posts from headquarters to Delegations to cope with their heavy workload.978 Other than 
that, Delegations must make do with what they have. Regrettably, this often consists of understaffed 
and resourced political sections, which partly consist of Commission staff that were re-hatted to the 
latter without appropriate training.979 Notably, 49% of HoDs find the skills of their operational, finance, 
monitoring and auditing staff insufficient to carry out the tasks at issue.980 
In a dubious sign of both team spirit and protectionism a joint Commission-HR Decision strives to 
cushion staff shortfalls by exceptionally allowing Commission personnel to contribute to the political 
work of Delegations. This is tolerated on three conditions: the staff member at issue should have the 
                                                          
975 Interview EEAS official at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia, 06.07.2013. 
976 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 10. 
977 Wouters and Van Vooren (2013) op.cit. note 895. 
978 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 4. 
979 UK House of Lords (2013) op.cit. note 821, para.67. 
980 European Parliament (A7-0199/2014) op.cit. note 780, para. 31. 
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relevant expertise, the arrangement may not jeopardise the performance of his/her core tasks and it 
shall not exceed a “reasonable proportion of working time (indicatively no more than 20%)”.981 Fouéré 
calls this last requirement an “archaic” rule adding to a disjointed service.982 On the other hand, some 
of these conditions may already be problematic as also the capacities of Commission staff members 
are regularly overstretched, preventing them from properly absorbing the relevant guidance and 
training.983 Nonetheless, this practice is increasingly widespread, with considerable variations, as their 
use is at the discretion of HoDs. Moreover, in the light of the often fuzzy division of labour between 
political sections and the operational governance or civil society sections, interpersonal relations tend 
to matter more than any formal arrangement.984  
A number of practical initiatives and practices aid to scale up diplomatic skills within Delegations. A 
first major contribution is delivered through staff transferred and seconded by Member States. This 
creates a win-win for exchanging knowledge, information and contacts. It may be further reinforced 
through the plans to re-launch a Diplomatic Exchange and Secondment Programme (DESP). This was 
initially created in 2007 to support the secondment of EU officials to national foreign ministries. 
Furthermore, Article 6(10) EEAS Decision makes staff rotation between Brussels and the field “in 
principle” an obligation for all EEAS staff, providing the basis for a genuine career foreign service. 
Finally, two specific staff categories contribute with targeted security expertise to the work of 
Delegations in fragile contexts. One the one hand, Regional Security Officers (RSOs) monitor the 
security situation, yet not primarily to deliver policy input but to guarantee the safety of EU staff.985 
On the other hand, personnel responsible for the implementation of the IcSP is closely involved in crisis 
response and prevention. They tend to have large grassroots networks and fulfil an important 
exploratory role in testing the ground for new security approaches. Yet, the convoluted EEAS-DEVCO-
FPI division of labour over its short and long-term components (cf. supra 4.3.1.) creates fractured 
chains of command hampering their work. 
                                                          
981  Article 6(1) Joint Commission and High Representative Decision (JOIN(2012) 8 final) on Cooperation Mechanisms 
concerning the Management of Delegations of the EU, 28.03.2012. Even though only “indicative” the Commission in 2012 
launched an audit to verify whether its staff in Delegations did not exceed this 20% limit. 
982 E. Fouéré, 'EU Delegations, EU Special Representatives and Common Security and Defence Policy Missions: Building a True 
Cooperative Relationship' in L.N. González Alonso (ed), Between Autonomy and Cooperation: Shaping the Institutional Profile 
of the European External Action Service, CLEER Working Papers 2014/6 (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, The 
Hague, 2014) 47. 
983 A. Herrero and N. Keijzer, 'EU Support to Governance at a Critical Juncture: Will the New EU External Action Architecture 
Deliver Smarter Support to Governance in Partner Countries', ECDPM Briefing Note No. 26 (European Centre for Development 
Policy Management, Maastricht, 2011) footnote 10.  
984 Given the staff limitations of the political section at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia, it was for instance easily agreed that 
the operational governance section would take the lead in the informal monitoring of the 2013 nation-wide local elections. 
Where staff relations are less fruitful such issues can be a source of considerable tension. 
985 These positions were initially piloted in Yemen, Libya, Libanon and Somalia and are currently expanded to cover mainly 
Middle-East and Maghreb countries. 
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The above efforts are however rather impromptu, and political expertise remains an area of concern 
for Delegations. This is most worrisome with regard to security issues, particularly relating to CSDP 
activity. While coordination with CSDP missions and operations has always been a requirement, the 
HoD is now expected to take the lead, often in cooperation with EUSRs (cf. infra 6.2.3.). The mandate 
of EUCAP Nestor, for instance, states that “[t]he Head of Mission shall, without prejudice to the chain 
of command, receive local political guidance from the Head of Union Delegation”.986 At least on the 
level of politics, this suggests some form of hierarchical relationship. Such guidance can however not 
be effective without sufficient understanding of CSDP specificities, as well as the security climate in 
which they operate; two elements that are often problematic or incomplete in Delegations.987 As single 
most sensitive area of EU cooperation, the CSDP is moreover kept under strict surveillance of Member 
States. This is evidenced by the fact that Defence Attaché meetings are one of the very few in-country 
gatherings continuing to be chaired by the Presidency, with the Delegations’ political officers only 
occasionally invited. CSDP Heads of Mission or Force Commanders, on the other hand, typically attend 
HoM meetings at the EU Delegation. The EEAS Review consequently pleads to improve the availability 
of security and military personnel.988  For this purpose it commits to improve synergies between 
geographical experts in the EEAS Intelligence Centre and the relevant Delegations, as well as expand 
an initialled pilot programme of detaching security and military experts to Delegations.989 Yet, HR 
Ashton added that, as resources are a key concern, changes will not occur overnight. 990  Recent 
promising practices are the appointment of liaison officers for CSDP missions and the co-location of 
CSDP staff in EU Delegations. These are demonstrating their value in mapping out potential for 
synergies.991 Gros-Verheyde observes that this last staff category holds the potential of a valuable 
‘third way’ between the scattering of Commission-managed contracts and the heavy requirements of 
putting CSDP missions/operations in place.992 Pools of CSDP experts in EU Delegations could – building 
upon the latter’s network – deliver important contributions in preparing or following up on 
missions/operations or carry out SSR advice and assistance tasks where a full-fledged mission is not 
necessary, desirable or conceivable. 
The extremely diverse personnel in Delegations is guided by different chains of command, career paths 
and training opportunities. This holds the risk of magnifying the widely reported hurdles of creating a 
                                                          
986 Article 6(7) Council Decision (2014/485/CFSP) op.cit. note 593.  
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988 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 6. 
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common esprit de corps in the EEAS. Nevertheless, after a transitory phase, relations are now overall 
reported to be constructive and staff generally values the “biodiversity” of their new working 
environment.993 An important explanatory factor might be that these changes largely occurred out of 
spotlight, not the least due to the geographical distance from Brussels. This allowed them to gradually 
mature without every mishap or quarrel being magnified under the public microscope. Moreover, 
there is a strong feeling among staff in Delegations that they have to make this work in order to 
improve their standing vis-à-vis and influence on decision-making in Brussels. However, not everything 
in the garden is rosy and as noted in the EEAS Review there remains considerable room for 
improvement in resource management.994 Substantial tensions arise over the fact that the Commission 
has duplicated the steering committee “EUDEL”, managing contacts between EEAS and Commission 
on staff in Delegations,995 with its own “COMDEL” to coordinate between various Commission services 
with staff abroad. In the words of the Court of Auditors “the existence of two separate bodies to deal 
with delegation-related matters complicates the working arrangements”. 996  This remaining 
fragmentation is further illustrated by the fact that the Commission is pushing to have its own officials, 
rather than those of the EEAS, on the posts of deputy HoDs.997 
If such growing pains can be further overcome, and with adequate staff and resource levels, 
Delegations offer unique opportunities to translate the widely-portrayed coherence rationale of the 
security-development nexus into needs-oriented and inclusionary action on the ground. Their wide 
networks, gathered mainly through implementing various aid programmes, allow them to act as 
antennae and monitor the local context “beyond the usual government-to-government diplomacy”.998 
In fragile states these Delegations stand at “the crossroads between early warning, early action and 
long-term vision”.999 Contrary to the diffused political direction over the security-development nexus 
in Brussels between the HR, Commission and EEAS, Heads of Delegation are in an optimal position to 
provide unified leadership. Yet, these Delegations represent very specific microcosms of EU 
cooperation and coordination. As a consequence, the extent to which seconded Member State 
diplomats contribute to their political expertise, the interaction between the political and operations 
sections, the fine-tuning with EUSRs, CSDP and Member States activity as well as their impact on the 
ground, depends very much on interpersonal relations. Nonetheless, headquarters can steer these in 
                                                          
993 D. Helly, et al., 'A closer look into EU’s external action frontline: Framing the challenges ahead for EU Delegations', ECDPM 
Briefing Note No. 62 (European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, 2014) 6-7; Wouters et al. (2013) 
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994 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 11. 
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the right direction by providing better training and guidance on issues such as early warning, conflict 
prevention and crisis response.1000  
Furthermore, in order to fully engage these comprehensive Delegations in comprehensive action, they 
need to be able to better feed into both EU decision-making and implementation.1001 Rather to the 
contrary, staff in Delegations complain about top-down decisions that fail to take into account their 
input and advice.1002 Not only does this undermine relations with and trust of their host authorities, 
businesses and civil society, it is also fails to fully exploit the potential for optimising the reality check 
of EU initiatives. A 2013 Parliament report in this light proposes to further devolve decision-making to 
Delegations and enable a more flexible use of resources.1003 The EDF B-envelope for unforeseen needs 
(cf. supra 3.2.1.) proofs for instance still too cumbersome to activate. It can only be allocated after the 
government or any other relevant organisation of the country concerned submits a request, which will 
be assessed by the Delegation, subsequently forwarded to the EEAS for further examination, 
transmitted to DG DEVCO to check the availability of funds and the eligibility of the intervention, who 
then finally prepares an Implementing Decision in consultation with the EEAS. 1004  More 
deconcentration and flexibility will “require a change in the culture of the Commission from instructing 
and controlling Delegations to providing timely resources and support to do their work”.1005  
4.5. Conclusion 
The commitment of the Union to fine-tune and cohere its policies spanning the nexus between 
development cooperation and CFSP, condemns EU institutions to close cooperation and coordination. 
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this applied particularly to the Council and Commission, 
ensuring the day-to-day functioning of these two policy areas in a love-hate affair. On the one hand, 
the Council’s more politico-strategic role could not function effectively without the Commission’s 
managerial responsibilities and vice versa. On the other hand, the diverging institutional balance under 
the EU’s development and security competences led both institutions to closely watch that the other 
did not trespass on its conferred powers. A continuous stream of coordination efforts emerged, which 
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was however generally judged as insufficient to maximise positive connections along the security-
development interface.  
Besides a constitutionally upgraded – but practically vague – duty of consistency, the Lisbon Treaty 
drafters put considerable confidence in an institutional servicing of the EU. This includes the creation 
of a triple-hatted High Representative, the establishment of an unprecedented European External 
Action Service and the refurbishing of Commission Delegation into genuine diplomatic Delegations of 
the Union. Whilst not drafted with the commitment to the security-development nexus in mind, the 
way in which these institutional novelties allow to guide, unite and integrate the EU’s scattered 
security and development resources and policy actors, put them manifestly at the centre of this 
debate. Their potential for taking this nexus a considerable step forward is unmistakable, but not a 
given. The integration-delimitation paradox of the Lisbon Treaty meant that these innovations were 
bestowed with the highest of expectations for improving coherence, but not with the unconditional 
trust and competences to put this into effect.  
Their new tasks and responsibilities did not diminish the formal powers of the traditional EU external 
actors, and arguably even augmented their sensitivity about them. Particularly regarding the HR and 
EEAS, this resulted in a certain feel of incompleteness as to their design. While the inherent aim of the 
HR’s triple-hatted portfolio is to transcend institutional boundaries, she can only be as effective as the 
other institutions allow her to be. The EEAS is assigned to assist the HR in her extensive mandate, yet 
without a formal involvement in decision-making. The effectiveness of the Service to unite security 
and development approaches depends on its capacity to steer the tricky waters between various 
institutional interests and across competence rifts. The Union Delegations are much less affected by 
such half-hearted design and represent, without exceptions, the whole range of EU competences. In a 
rather short timeframe they have brought significant improvements to the implementation and 
coordination of EU external action, but lack the necessary resources to fully develop their new political 
and security dimension. Moreover, the fact that they have a broader scope than their mother 
institution, the EEAS, implies that they serve many masters, leading to complex lines of authority.  
These three institutional innovations can undoubtedly offer many improvements for aligning 
development cooperation and CFSP initiatives. Whether their full potential is exploited will depend 
less on their legal design, which even though imperfect proffers sufficient opportunities, than on the 
political will to proceed. It requires a leap of faith to give up on institutional prerogatives and offer 
these bodies the necessary trust to develop joined-up action, which might eventually benefit them all. 
The fact that tensions arose from the earliest discussions on setting up the EEAS to the more recent 
division of labour on development programming is not illogical and could arise in any political system. 
“However, their impact is bound to be felt more acutely in a context within which institutional reform 
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is viewed as the main answer to increasing political influence on the international scene”.1006 A key 
mark of the success of these new institutions is therefore the extent to which inter-institutional turf 
wars on competence delimitation will “come to be regarded as an aberration of the Union's teenage 
years”.1007 This will be the subject of analysis in the following chapter.   
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5. The security-development 
nexus on the judicial track 
  [C]’est une expérience éternelle, que tout home qui a du pouvoir est porté à en 
abuser; il va jusqu’à ce qu’il trouve des limites. … Pour qu’on ne puisse abuser du 
pouvoir, il faut que, par la disposition des choses, le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir. 
 
Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, 1748 
 
The two previous chapters focussed on the different approaches to issues of security and development 
on the level of policies and institutions. This was directed at understanding how these differences 
affect policy outcomes and inter-institutional relations, what obstacles and challenges result from 
them, which efforts are undertaken to transcend the latter, and how effective these are. These same 
questions will now be analysed along the track of the judiciary’s approach to the security-development 
interface. As set out at length in the preceding chapters development cooperation and the CFSP(/CSDP) 
are governed by distinct legal regimes. The choice for one or the other legal basis determines which 
EU institutions are involved, to what degree, and whether the Court has full competence to review the 
act. The CJEU’s standard refrain that the choice of the appropriate legal basis is not about mere 
practicalities but “has constitutional significance”,1008 is therefore all the more relevant along the CFSP-
TFEU interface. 
Through its surveillance of competence boundaries the Court aims to guarantee the observance of two 
intertwined principles. A first is the institutional balance within the EU legal order. Its observance 
means that each institution “must exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of the other 
institutions [and] requires that it should be possible to penalize any breach of that rule which may 
occur”.1009 A second parameter is the principle of attributed powers. According to Article 13(2) TEU 
this implies that “[e]ach institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the 
Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them”. This can 
be seen as horizontal principle of conferral, while Article 5(2) TEU sets this out with regard to the 
vertical relation between the EU and Member States.1010  
                                                          
1008 Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, ECLI:EU:C:2001:664, para. 5. 
1009 Case C-70/88, European Parliament v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1990:217, para. 22. 
1010 It provides that “the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in 
the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein”. 
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In the field of external action, Treaty objectives are defined in the broadest of terms. Combined with 
the naturally comprehensive nature of foreign policy, this means that the identification of the limits to 
competences is a particularly challenging and partly artificial endeavour.1011 Nonetheless, the Court 
assigned itself – commendably – to ensure that “the choice of the legal basis for a measure may not 
depend simply on an institution's conviction as to the objective pursued but must be based on 
objective factors which are amenable to judicial review”.1012 This unavoidably made this already partly 
artificial endeavour, essentially legalistic. EU debates on external action, more than focussing on the 
most efficient and effective organisation of policies, accord a significant amount of time and energy to 
identifying the outer-limits of competence areas. The above chapters demonstrated how such debates 
are all the more sensitive in the field of the security-development nexus, where divergences in 
institutional balance are particularly outspoken and delimitation is diffused. The fact that the CJEU has 
always been excluded from the CFSP, but nonetheless had to supervise its delimitation from the ex EC 
Treaty in line with old Article 47 TEU, did evidently not help to soften controversies. It was thus written 
in the stars that the identification of the security-development demarcation would be hard-fought, 
occasionally before the Court, with all that entails for the Union’s credibility and its capacity to respond 
flexibly to global needs and crises.  
The mainstreaming of the constitutional framework for EU external action by the Treaty of Lisbon (cf. 
supra Chapter 2.3.) can be read as an attempt to put an end to the destructive consequences of inter-
institutional competence competition. The Court’s traditional exclusion from the CFSP was moreover 
softened in three main ways. First, the Janus-face of Article 40 TEU entrusts the Court not only with 
guaranteeing the integrity of the TFEU but also of the CFSP, conclusively extending its interpretative 
command of the latter. Second, it is accorded jurisdiction to verify the legality of restrictive measures 
against natural or legal persons, irreversibly abolishing “the policy’s conventional immunity from 
judicial supervision”.1013 Third, where the CJEU previously had only jurisdiction under the explicit and 
limited exceptions listed in ex Article 46 TEU, it is now generally competent except where derogations 
are overtly formulated. In line herewith, the Court’s capacity to enforce the constitutional principles 
underlying the Union’s legal order, such as transparency, sincere cooperation and consistency, have 
now been generalised.1014 
Yet, as on the policy and institutional tracks, the integration-delimitation paradox causes the Lisbon 
Treaty reforms to hinge somewhere between these two extremes. Its strongest ever integration 
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rhetoric risks to complicate the conduct of EU external action, as it was accompanied by a strong – yet 
more concealed – delimitation along the CFSP-TFEU boundary. Much of the confusion surrounding this 
new constitutional framework boils down to the essential question of how to reconcile the clustered 
competence catalogue of Article 21 TEU with the mutual non-affectation clause of Article 40 TEU. In 
other words, how to tally the seclusion of the CFSP with the fact that its old objectives of preserving 
peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security have now become part of a unified 
external action framework that has to be effectuated by all the Union’s external policies. Paradoxically, 
despite its continued exclusion from the CFSP, all eyes are now set on the CJEU to clarify the position 
of this competence in the Union’s reformed constitutional constellation.  
A first part of this chapter will elaborate on the Court’s traditional approach to verify the choice of 
legal basis (5.1.). Browsing through the continuously evolving case law, the aim is to concisely re-
construct its multi-pronged methodology and detect new or recurring trends. A second part will 
elaborate on how this methodology applied to former cross-pillar situations by focussing on the border 
area between CFSP and development cooperation (5.2.). The final part then undertakes to retrieve the 
relevance of this case law in the rehashed Lisbon architecture (5.3.).  
5.1. The choice of legal basis methodology: producing order out of chaos  
The Treaty does not set out a dedicated procedure for settling jurisdictional conflicts between 
institutions, nor does it define criteria for selecting appropriate legal bases. Such questions are left to 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU,1015 which is restricted to solving the legal questions brought before it, 
typically in the form of actions for annulment or failure to act.1016 Although ideally comprehensive, this 
implies that such procedures and criteria can only be developed on a case-by-case basis. Over the years, 
this evolved into a multi-pronged analysis governed by four main rules.1017  
A multi-pronged analysis governed by four main rules 
The first and predominant rule is that the choice of legal basis must rest on objective factors which are 
amenable to judicial review and “include in particular the aim and content of the measure”.1018 It may 
                                                          
1015 Cremona accurately supports this constitutional choice to let the Treaty stay clear of such methodology, which is “rightly 
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not depend simply on an institution's conviction as to the objective pursued,1019 nor can previous 
practice “derogate from the rules laid down in the Treaty [or] create a precedent binding on the 
Community institutions”.1020 A second rule is the lex specialis derogat legi generali. This dictates that 
“if the Treaty contains a more specific provision that is capable of constituting the legal basis for the 
measure in question, that measure must be founded on such provision”.1021 A third rule of thumb is 
what one could call the principle of singularity or absorption theory. Laying the groundwork of its 
centre of gravity reasoning the Court has held that: “[i]f examination of a Community measure reveals 
that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component and if one of these is identifiable 
as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, the act 
must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or 
component”.1022 Only if a measure simultaneously pursues a number of objectives, or has several 
components, which are inseparably linked without one being incidental to the other, the measure must, 
by way of exception, be founded on the corresponding legal bases.1023 This principle of singularity was 
carried over to external relations cases1024 where it is arguably even more challenging to narrow 
measures down to one legal basis, due to the prevailing tendency of comprehensiveness. As an 
exception to the exception, the fourth rule finally prescribes that the combination of two or more legal 
bases is not possible where the procedures laid down for each of them are incompatible with each 
other (cf. infra).1025 
While these rules are clear, their application is much less so. A lot can be attributed to the near 
impossible strive for complete objectivity. Even if, at face value, the Court adjudicates on the choice 
for one or the other legal basis, it is clear that this has important procedural consequences in terms of 
voting in the Council and the involvement of other institutions. Besides determining the power balance, 
this may in that manner also impact on the content of the eventual measure, turning this into a 
politically-charged affair.1026  Given that the Court’s rulings often create legal precedents reaching 
beyond the specific circumstances of the case at issue, such conflicts not seldom have a broader 
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undercoat of inter-institutional strive over the intensity and direction of EU integration as a whole.1027 
In this sense it is not surprising, but all the more challenging, that the Court wants to clear all suspicion 
of choosing sides. Its preference for a single legal basis does not make this any easier. As put by 
Advocate-General Tesauro:  
this difficulty — or impossibility — of identifying the predominant component means that any 
analysis is certainly influenced, in a decisive manner, by considerations of a subjective nature and 
of an undoubtedly political nature, linked as they are with the differing voting procedures and rules 
associated with the legal bases in question. This leads to a situation of uncertainty which is 
irreconcilable with the principle repeatedly upheld by the Court whereby the choice of the legal 
basis for a measure must be amenable to judicial review.1028 
While it can clearly not depend on institutional preferences, case law indicates that this choice may 
not result from easily identifiable criteria either.1029 In practice the Court often tends to confirm the 
legislature’s choice, not least by (overly) relying on statements made in the preamble of the contested 
act, to determine its predominant aim and content.1030 As formulated by Cremona: “[t]he author’s 
conviction alone may not be enough, but when the author expresses that conviction in Preambular 
statement – especially one that adopts the Court’s own phraseology – that will be accepted”.1031 In 
such a situation, Emiliou argues that everything will depend on the Court: 
It will decide whether the measure falls within an area in which the Community has competence; 
it will formulate the objectives of the measure, and it will decide whether the legal basis of the 
latter corresponds to its objectives. All these questions involve so many imponderables that it will 
almost always be possible for the Court, if it wishes, to find grounds for upholding the measure.1032 
This does not mean that competence questions cannot be adequately addressed by the CJEU. It simply 
illustrates that the latter has considerable room of manoeuvre in this undertaking. This is most clearly 
demonstrated by cases where the Advocate-General and the CJEU conclude to a different legal 
                                                          
1027 H. Cullen and A. Charlesworth, 'Diplomacy by Other Means: the Use of Legal Basis Litigation as a Political Strategy by the 
European Parliament and the Member States' (1999) Common Market Law Review 36(6), 1243-1245. 
1028 Case C-300/89, Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide), Opinion AG Tesauro, ECLI:EU:C:1991:115, para. 8.  
1029 P. Koutrakos, 'Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competence in EU External Relations' in M. Cremona and B. De Witte (eds), 
EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals - Essays in European Law (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2008) 183-184. 
1030 M. Klamert, 'Conflicts of Legal Basis: No Legality and No Basis but a Bright Future under the Lisbon Treaty?' (2010) 
European Law Review 35(4), 505. With regard to Article 114 TFEU, on the approximation of laws, Weatherill goes as far as 
arguing that the Court’s case law has become a preambular “drafting guide” (S. Weatherill, 'The Limits of Legislative 
Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide”' (2011) German 
Law Journal 12(3), 827-864). 
1031 M. Cremona, 'A Reticent Court? Policy Objectives and the Court of Justice' in M. Cremona and A. Thies (eds), The European 
Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014) 21-22. 
1032 N. Emiliou, 'Opening Pandora's Box: the Legal Basis of Community Measures before the Court of Justice' (1994) European 
Law Review 19(5), 499. 
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basis.1033 Interpretation is inherent to adjudication. Therefore, the Court’s case law would benefit from 
the acknowledgment that this can never result from a simple set of legal syllogisms.1034  
Moreover, by regularly staying in the dark regarding the precise nature and implications of its approach, 
the Court puts spokes in its own wheels. For one thing, the centre of gravity methodology to determine 
the measure’s predominant aim and content is often so unfathomable that the outcome has become 
difficult to predict.1035  Even more confusing is that the Court typically states that the purported 
objective factors in particular include the aim and content of the measure, but issues vague and 
sometimes contradictory statements about the existence of other determining elements. Among 
others, this concerns the role of context,1036 the interests of third parties,1037 previous practice,1038 
formal defects1039 and the nature of EU competences.1040 These various elements of confusion do 
evidently not serve the Court’s ultimate goal of objectivity.  
‘It’s the procedure, stupid’ 
Another source of continuing confusion is the practical translation of the rule of procedural 
compatibility. This states that no combination of legal bases is possible “where the procedures laid 
down for each legal basis are incompatible with each other”.1041 Entangling what the Court means with 
this seemingly simple statement is no easy undertaking and represents in fact one of the most obscure 
lines of case law. The foundations hereof were laid in the meanwhile famous titanium dioxide 
                                                          
1033 Compare for instance: Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85 and Opinion AG Mengozzi, ECLI:EU:C:2007:528 ; or Case C-155/07, 
op.cit. note 295 and Opinion AG Kokott, ECLI:EU:C:2008:368. 
1034 Van Vooren (2012) op.cit. note 179, 144. 
1035  B. Van Vooren and R. Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014) 158-186. 
1036 In Opinion 2/00, concerning the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Court added the context in which a measure is 
adopted to the analysis. This was the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) (op.cit. note 1008, 
paras 24-28). Yet, this same Conference lay at the basis of the Rotterdam Convention, at issue in Case C-94/03, where this 
‘context’ did not steer judicial review (Case C-94/03, op.cit. note 1024, para. 41). 
1037 After having determined in Opinion 1/78 that the division of powers within the EU “is a domestic question in which third 
parties have no need to intervene” (Opinion 1/78, op.cit. note 111, para. 35; see also Opinion 2/00, op.cit. note 1008, para. 
17), the Court referred in Rotterdam Convention to the interests of third parties to decide on annulling the contested decision 
(Case C-94/03, op.cit. note 1024, para. 55).  
1038 Despite having consistently held that mere institutional practice cannot create binding legal precedents, the Court relied 
at several occasions on previous legislation and even mere policy statements to corroborate its judgments (See for instance: 
Case C-403/05, Parliament v Commission (Philippines border management), ECLI:EU:C:2007:624, paras 57-58; Case C-91/05, 
op.cit. note 85, para. 66). 
1039 Whereas a purely formal procedural defect in adopting an act does not normally require the adoption of new a measure 
(for instance: Case C-491/01, The Queen and the Secretary of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) 
Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd (BAT), ECLI:EU:C:2002:741, para. 98), this nonetheless led to annulment in the Rotterdam 
Convention case (Case C-94/03, op.cit. note 1024, paras 52-54). 
1040 Whereas the Court repeatedly holds that the choice of legal basis relates to the attribution/existence of competence, and 
not to its exclusive or shared nature (see for instance: Case C-495/03, Commission v Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, para.93), in 
Opinion 1/08 it took into account the balance between ex EC and Member States powers to conclude that the centre of 
gravity did not apply there (Opinion 1/08, GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), ECLI:EU:C:2009:739, paras 135-
141; see further: M. Cremona, 'Balancing Union and Member State interests: Opinion 1/2008, Choice of Legal Base and the 
Common Commercial Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon' (2010) European Law Review 35(5), 689-690).  
1041 Joined Cases C‑164/97 and C‑165/97, Parliament v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1999:99, para. 14. 
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judgment. Despite it often being referred to as a landmark precedent or even doctrine,1042 it proofs 
difficult to pin down its precise implications for the jurisprudence on procedural compatibility. Too 
often has it been picked up by parties to support arguments that were never made, while an attentive 
reading clarifies what was really at issue.  
The Court, after finding that the contested Directive, by means of its twofold aim and content, required 
recourse to both ex Article 100a (on establishing the internal market) and 130s (on environmental 
policy) EEC, considered that this specific combination was impossible here. This followed from the 
particular set up of the cooperation procedure (then Article 149 (2) EEC), required by Article 100a. That 
Article prescribed that the Council could act by QMV when accepting the Parliaments amendments to 
its position, whereas it had to secure unanimity when intending to reject them. Given that Article 130s 
required the Council in any event to act unanimously, their cumulative application “would divest the 
cooperation procedure of its very substance”, which is to increase the involvement of the Parliament 
in the legislative process. 1043  The Court subsequently reiterated its statement that the latter’s 
participation “reflects a fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in the 
exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly”.1044 However, it was not this 
finding that guided its conclusion. Rather, the Court decided that – given the procedural incompatibility 
– additional elements needed to be taken into account and therefore reopened the centre of gravity 
test. Based on a remarkably wide interpretation of internal market measures and the mainstreaming 
obligation of environmental protection, preference was eventually given to the former.1045 
In spite of the absence of generalising statements in these very specific circumstances, as well as the 
near complete replacement of this cooperation procedure by the co-decision procedure two years 
later in the Maastricht Treaty,1046 this ruling started to live a life of its own. It was often raked up as a 
proof of the Court’s preference for procedures that increase the involvement of the Parliament.1047 
The Court, for its part, only referred occasionally and rather abstractly to this judgment, so that the 
‘doctrine’ was initially not further developed. 1048  Some more details were unveiled in a 2004 
                                                          
1042 R. Lauwaars and R. van Ooik, 'De Problematiek van de Dubbele Rechtsgrondslagen in het Europese Recht' (2010) Sociaal-
economische Wetgeving : Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht 58(7/8), 299-300. 
1043 Case C-300/89, op.cit. note 1018, paras 18-20.  
1044 Ibid. para. 20. This had already been clearly expressed in Case C-183/79, Roquette Frères v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1980:249, 
para. 33; and Case C-139/79, Maizena v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1980:250, para. 34. 
1045 Case C-300/89, op.cit. note 1018, paras 21-24; R. Barents, 'The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the 
Legal Basis of Community Legislation' (1993) Common Market Law Review 30(1), 95-96. 
1046 Respectively ex Articles 252 and 251 TEC (the first has been completely abandoned by the Lisbon Treaty, the latter is now 
called the ordinary legislative procedure and set out in Article 294 TFEU). The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was the 
only area where the cooperation procedure still applied after Maastricht. 
1047 See for instance: H. Somsen, 'Annotation Case C-300/69, Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide)' (1992) Common 
Market Law Review 29(1), 149-151 (sic.). Recently it was used by the Parliament as an argument to select the legal basis which 
“involves the Parliament more closely in the adoption of the act concerned” (Case C-490/10, Parliament v Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:525, para.27). 
1048 For instance: Joined Cases C‑164/97 and C‑165/97, op.cit. note 1041, para. 14. 
199 
 
Commission v Council ruling. There the Court considered that, in line with titanium dioxide, legal bases 
cumulating QMV and unanimity in the Council are incompatible.1049 It took a decade and half after 
titanium dioxide before the role of the Parliament in choosing legal bases received renewed judicial 
attention. This was in the form of an addendum attached to the Court’s former phraseology, stating 
that combining legal bases is impossible, not solely when the procedures laid down for each legal basis 
are incompatible but also “where the use of two legal bases is liable to undermine the rights of the 
Parliament”.1050 This was not the case here, as a legal basis (ex Article 133 TEC) providing no role for 
the Parliament had to be added to a measure adopted according to a provision (ex Article 175(1) TEC) 
that gave the latter a consultative role.1051  
In the 2008 EIB case the Court specified that a legal basis (ex Article 181a TEC) providing for the 
consultation of the Parliament could be combined with one (ex Article 179 TEC) prescribing co-decision, 
simply by applying the procedure that maximises the involvement of the Parliament.1052 If any obstacle 
as to the varying involvement of the Parliament can be overcome by applying the most demanding 
procedure, one might wonder when cumulative legal bases can still ‘be liable to undermine its rights’. 
Interestingly, Advocate General Kokott took a different perspective in the EIB case. She concluded to 
procedural incompatibility because applying the co-decision procedure of ex Article 179 TEC would 
impinge on the Council’s right to be sole legislator under ex Article 181a TEC.1053 Indeed, the respect 
for Member States’ powers and their national majorities can equally be seen as ‘reflecting a 
fundamental democratic principle’. The Court does however not seem to accord a similar importance 
to the role played by the Council, to the point of being even contradictory. Whilst having firmly 
determined in Case C-338/01 that a combined voting in the Council by qualified majority and unanimity 
was incompatible,1054 this same combination was not considered problematic in the Erasmus case, 
where issues of procedural incompatibility were not even addressed.1055 In the Kadi and Al Barakaat 
case the Court moreover saw no problem in cumulating ex Articles 60 and 301 EC, providing for QMV 
in the Council and no involvement of the Parliament, with ex Article 308 EC, assigning the Council to 
vote unanimously and consult the Parliament.1056 
                                                          
1049 Case C-338/01, op.cit. note 1021, paras 56-58.  
1050  Case C-178/03, Commission v Parliament and Council (Regulation implementing the Rotterdam Convention), 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, para. 57.  
1051 Respectively current Articles 207 and 192 TFEU. The Advocate-General considered that this combination of legal bases 
was not possible (Ibid., Opinion AG Kokott, ECLI:EU:C:2005:312, para. 63). 
1052 Case C-155/07, op.cit. note 295, para. 79; respectively current Articles 212 and 209 TFEU. 
1053 Case C-155/07, Opinion AG Kokott, op.cit. note 1033, paras 89-90. She made a similar point in Case C-178/03 (Opinion 
AG Kokott, op.cit. note 1050, para. 61). 
1054 A reasoning which appears to be confirmed in C-94/03, op.cit. note 1024, para. 59. 
1055 Case C-242/87, Commission v Council (Erasmus), ECLI:EU:C:1989:217, para. 37. This concerned a combination of then 
Article 128 EEC (cf. ex Article 150 TEC and current 166 TFEU) and 235 EEC (ex Article 308 TEC and currently 352 TFEU). 
1056 Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, op.cit. note 349, paras 211-214. This increasingly tolerant judicial approach to 
procedural accumulation was confirmed in Opinion 1/08. There, the Court concluded to a combination of ex Articles 133(1), 
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The above enumeration of cases reveals that the accumulation of varying degrees of involvement of 
the Parliament does not pose unsurmountable obstacles and also the prohibition of combining 
different voting procedures in the Council shows cracks. This begs the question as to which procedural 
combinations could still lead to a conclusion of incompatibility. The 2009 International Fund for Ireland 
(IFI) case offered the CJEU the opportunity to finally settle the dust. This case involved a combination 
of the co-decision procedure (required by ex Article 159(3) TEC) with unanimity in the Council and 
consultation of the Parliament (under the flexibility clause of ex Article 308 TEC, current Article 352 
TFEU). In the light of the above account, the Court’s finding in this case that these procedures can be 
combined is not surprising. As if stating the obvious, it relies on the Erasmus and Kadi cases, to 
conclude that the “Community ought to have had recourse to both [legal bases] … while complying 
with the legislative procedures laid down therein, that is to say, both the ‘co-decision’ procedure 
referred to in Article 251 EC and the requirement that the Council should act unanimously”.1057  
With this statement the CJEU appears to complete an unpronounced “levelling-up rule”, which it 
initiated one year earlier in the EIB case.1058 This would imply that different procedures can be joined 
up by conceiving an ad hoc decision-making formula that maximises the involvement of all actors, i.e. 
the Member States in the Council by applying the most restrictive voting procedure and the Parliament. 
The Court did not clarify or justify this approach, which is regrettable given that it does not have an 
obvious ground in primary law.1059 In the view of Advocate General Maduro it might even contradict it. 
A couple of months earlier, he reasoned that all cumulative legal basis should be prohibited because 
they alter “the institutional and democratic balance laid down by the Treaty”.1060 Even more puzzling 
is that this judgment of the Fourth Chamber appears to announce the death of titanium dioxide 
without even once referring to this otherwise omnipresent ruling. Although in no way hinted at by the 
Court, Vice-President Lenaerts explains that IFI does not mar the titanium dioxide line of case law, but 
                                                          
(5) and (6), 71 and 80(2) EC, in conjunction with Article 300(2) and (3) EC – cumulating QMV and unanimity in the Council as 
well as consultation and information of the Parliament (Opinion 1/08, op.cit. note 1040, final conclusion). A potential 
justification lies in the exceptional nature of ex Article 133(6)(2) and (3) TEC (see further: S. Adam and N. Lavranos, 'Annotation 
Opinion 1/08' (2010) Common Market Law Review 47(5), 1535-1536). 
1057 Case C-166/07, Parliament v Council (International Fund for Ireland – IFI), ECLI:EU:C:2009:499, para. 69. 
1058 G. De Baere, 'From ‘Don’t Mention the Titanium Dioxide Judgment’ to ‘I Mentioned it Once, But I Think I Got Away with 
it All Right’: Reflections on the Choice of Legal Basis in EU External Relations after the Legal Basis for Restrictive Measures 
Judgment' (2013) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 15, 542. 
1059 This gives rise to uncertainty. For one thing, there is disagreement as to which procedure maximises the democratic role 
of the Parliament. Whereas Lauwaars and van Ooik argue that the new consent procedure of 352 TFEU gives the Parliament 
most power (Lauwaars and van Ooik (2010) op.cit. note 1042, 298-299), Corthaut disagrees and finds that the co-decision 
procedure better allows for every MEP to steer legislation (T. Corthaut, 'Case C-166/07, Parliament v. Council - Institutional 
Pragmatism or Constitutional Mayhem' (2011) Common Market Law Review 48(4), 1293-1294). It is moreover unclear how 
to approach the varying involvement of other actors, such as the EU’s consultative bodies, under this rule (ibid., 1286-1287). 
1060 Case C-411/06, Commission v Council (Basel Convention), Opinion AG Maduro, ECLI:EU:C:2009:189, para. 6 and footnote 
5. In certain cases the combination of legal bases could moreover go against the ratio legis of certain articles. In Kadi, for 
instance, the addition of ex Article 308 EC meant both the involvement of the Parliament and the need for unanimity in the 
Council, going against the need for speed of the traditional sanctions regime (De Baere (2013) op.cit. note 1058, 548-549). 
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forms a specific exception to it. It was the only conceivable solution to simultaneously preserve the 
principle of conferral and the political safeguards of federalism.1061 This interpretation of the IFI case 
as a peculiar side-way, rather than the burial of titanium dioxide, is confirmed in the 2012 targeted 
sanctions case (cf. infra 5.3.2.).1062  
In addition to these various obscurities, there is one thorny contradiction in the Court’s general 
methodology. After first determining that two or more legal bases are on account of the aim and 
content of the measure necessary for its adoption, the conclusion of procedural incompatibility implies 
that one of them must nonetheless be chosen. Several parties have referred to titanium dioxide to 
then opt for the most democratic legal basis.1063 Only recently did the Court decidedly rule out this 
misapprehension, confirming that “it is not procedures that define the legal basis of a measure but the 
legal basis of a measure that determines the procedures to be followed in adopting that measure”.1064 
The argument of democracy thus only plays in levelling-up the procedure for cumulative legal bases, 
not in choosing between them. Consequently, in spite of all the strive for objectivity, the finding of 
incompatibility exposes the Court to criticisms of subjectivity by necessitating a choice between legal 
bases for which it had just determined that none is of itself sufficient to fully cover the measure at 
issue. Schaffrin therefore argues that “basing an act of a hybrid nature on a single legal basis only, 
infringes even more on the institutional balance and the letter of the Treaties than using both pertinent 
legal bases and then applying only the provision with the stricter procedure”.1065 
5.2. Drawing the legal boundary between development cooperation and 
the CFSP: development without borders? 
The Court’s general methodology for choosing appropriate legal bases is thus the product of 
longstanding but still incomplete jurisprudence. This sows the seeds of legal uncertainty and does not 
help to reduce the appetite for inter-institutional conflict. The pillarised CFSP required 
additional/different rules when choosing between a CFSP and non-CFSP legal basis. This section will 
                                                          
1061 “Had the ECJ interpreted ex Article 159 EC broadly, the competences of the EU would have been expanded without the 
Member States having a right of veto, circumventing the political safeguards laid down in ex Article 308 EC. In the same way, 
had it relied on ex Article 308 EC alone, the EU would have expanded its competences whilst weakening the powers of the 
European Parliament” (K. Lenaerts, 'EU Federalism in 3-D' in E. Cloots and G. De Baere (eds), Federalism in the European 
Union (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 30-31. 
1062 S. Adam, et al., 'Chronique de Jurisprudence de l’Union: Les relations extérieures (1er janvier 2009 — 31 décembre 2012)' 
(2013) Cahier de Droit Européen 49(3), 840-842. 
1063 The Court had generated confusion in this regard in the Kadi and Al-Barakaat cases by taking account of the strengthened 
role for the Parliament in selecting the appropriate legal basis (Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, op.cit. note 349, paras 
235-236); Advocate General Jääskinnen continues this reasoning in Case C‑270/12 (United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, paras 58-59) which was however here not confirmed by the CJEU. 
1064 Case C-130/10, op.cit. note 1017, para. 80; see also: Case C-155/07, op.cit. note 295, para. 82. 
1065 D. Schaffrin, 'Dual Legal Bases in EC Environmental Law Revisited: Note on the Judgments of the European Court of Justice 
in the Cases C-94/03 and C-178/03' (2006) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 15(3), 342. 
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disentangle this system and analyse what the above confusion meant for this particular interface. In a 
first instance it will be set out how the Court has gradually sketched a broad policy horizon for EU 
development cooperation, how it approached security aspects of EU legislation, and how ex Article 47 
TEU entered the picture in cross-pillar situations (5.2.1.). This was put to the ultimate test in the 2008 
SALW case, wherein the CJEU delivered a long-awaited blueprint for understanding the position of the 
CFSP in the EU legal order (5.2.2.). Even though this did not come with an expiration date, its relevance 
was soon questioned as the Lisbon Treaty significantly shakes up its legal foundations. This will be the 
subject of section 5.3. 
5.2.1. Setting the scene: development and security objectives in EU litigation  
Exploring the outer limits of development cooperation 
The early litigation on development policy did not predict a bright and broad future. The focus was 
more on what development cooperation was not, rather than on what it actually constituted.1066 Trade 
measures, such as tariff reductions or the establishment of international commodity funds, designed 
to contribute to the socio-economic advancement of developing countries, could be covered in their 
entirety by the CCP.1067 The same was true for a banana import regime, which fell entirely under the 
common agricultural policy, despite its specific focus on the development of disadvantaged 
countries.1068 This is not surprising given that these cases were decided at a time when development 
policy had no primary law status. On the eve of its formal recognition in the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Court clarified that development policy and humanitarian aid – the distinction between them then still 
unclear – are complementary competences. This implies that Member States can freely choose to 
enter “either collectively or individually, or even jointly with the Community” into international 
commitments.1069 Notably, even the recruitment of EU institutions to carry out financial obligations 
resulting from such commitments, does in no way detract from the choice for either option.1070 
The Maastricht codification then finally made it possible for the Court to revert to the Treaty when 
ruling on issues of development. It did so in all but restrictive terms. The first agreement adopted under 
this new title, namely the Cooperation Agreement between the EC and India on Partnership and 
Development, was immediately put to the test in the 1996 landmark Portugal v Council case. Portugal 
                                                          
1066 S. Peers, 'Annotation on Case C-268/94, Portugal v Council' (1998) Common Market Law Review 35(2), 541. Notably, this 
could also be seen as strengthening European development policy vis-à-vis that of the Member States as it brought this area 
within the confines of exclusive Union competence (Broberg and Holdgaard (2014) op.cit. note 291, 10-20). 
1067 Case C-45/86 and Opinion 1/78 op.cit. note 111. 
1068 Case C-280/93, Germany v Council (Banana Market), ECLI:EU:C:1994:367. 
1069 Case C-316/91, op.cit. note 210, para. 26; Joined Cases C-181/91 and C-248/91, op.cit. note 210, para. 16. 
1070 A. Ward, 'Community Development Aid and the Evolution of the Interinstitutional Law of the European Union' in A. 
Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of E.C. External Relations (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000) 47. 
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brought an action to annul the Decision concluding this agreement, among others targeting the so-
called ‘essential elements clause’. This read that “[r]espect for human rights and democratic principles 
is the basis for the cooperation between the Contracting Parties … and it constitutes an essential 
element of the Agreement” cf. supra 2.2.).1071 The non-observance of such a clause forms a basis for 
suspending the agreement in line with Article 60 VCDR.1072 Portugal argued that such an extensive 
purpose, with potentially wide-ranging consequences, could not simply be covered by the trade and 
development legal bases and required additional recourse to the flexibility clause of current Article 
352 TFEU. The latter was, in its view, also necessary for the Agreement’s provisions on intellectual 
property, drug control, energy, culture and tourism. 
The CJEU built further on its Opinion 1/78, where it held that the characterisation of an agreement 
must be assessed “having regard to its essential objective rather than in terms of individual clauses of 
an altogether subsidiary or ancillary nature”.1073 It developed a two-phased methodology to determine 
whether or not certain provisions can fall within the scope of a Treaty characterised as development 
agreement.1074 First, it has to be determined whether the subject-matter of specific clauses contributes 
to the general objectives of development cooperation as set out in the Treaty. If this condition is 
fulfilled, than a second step consists of assessing whether these clauses contain such extensive or 
concrete obligations that they in fact constitute distinct objectives. With regard to the agreement at 
issue, the Court held that the disputed provisions set out mere frameworks for cooperation, which do 
not “predetermine the allocation of spheres of competences between the Community and the 
Member States”.1075  
With this approach the Court sought to strike a balance between the constantly expanding notion of 
development (cf. supra Chapter 2) and the constitutional principle of conferred powers. According to 
the CJEU the wording of the Treaty’s development objectives made clear that these are broad, in the 
sense that measures required for their pursuit can relate to a variety of specific matters. To require an 
additional legal basis whenever a development agreement “touches on a specific matter would in 
practice amount to rendering devoid of substance the competence and procedure prescribed in Article 
130y” (current Article 209 TFEU). 1076  It hereby indicated that an effective development policy is 
                                                          
1071 Article 1(1) Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on partnership and 
development, OJ L223/24, 27.08.1994. 
1072 Op.cit. note 897. 
1073 Opinion 1/78, op.cit. note 111, para. 56. 
1074 Case C-268/94, op.cit. note 374, paras 37-48; S. Peers, 'Fragmentation or Evasion in the Community’s Development 
Policy? The Impact of Portugal v. Council' in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of E.C. External Relations 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000) 102-103. 
1075 Case C-268/94, op.cit. note 374, para. 47. 
1076 Ibid., paras 37-38. In this light, Portugal also argued that the reversion to a CCP legal basis for this agreement was 
redundant. However, the Court dismissed this question given that the illicit addition of this legal basis could in any case only 
constitute a formal defect (paras 78-80).  
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inclusive and must attempt to remove as many obstacles to development as possible. Its evolutionary 
interpretation of developmental aims is counterbalanced by ensuring that ancillary objectives do not 
raise extensive or concrete obligations. Indeed, “[t]he mere inclusion of provisions for cooperation in 
a specific field does not therefore necessarily imply a general power such as to lay down the basis of a 
competence to undertake any kind of cooperation action in that field”.1077 
In 2007 the Court prudently approached the strained territorial dispute between security and 
development in the Philippines border management case. Herein, the Parliament successfully sought 
the annulment of a Commission Decision (not published in the OJ) approving a project to secure the 
Philippines’ borders. This was adopted as part of its implementing powers under the Regulation on 
financial and technical assistance to, and economic cooperation with, the developing countries in Asia 
and Latin America (ALA Regulation). 1078  The project was targeted at the optimisation of border 
management methods, the creation of a system of information technology, the verification of identity 
papers and the training of relevant staff. It was part of the Commission’s answer to a request from the 
Council to take appropriate measures under its external programmes and instruments in the light of 
the 9/11 attacks and the resulting international fight against terrorism.1079 The Parliament argued that 
this exceeded the scope of the ALA Regulation, which contained no express mention of such activities, 
and that the fight against terrorism did in any case not come within the Community’s general powers. 
The Commission, on the other hand, argued that the Decision was not merely about counter-terrorism, 
but also contained measures to control the trafficking of drugs and human beings. It held that these 
contribute to creating conditions more conducive to economic development and investment, which 
are central objectives of the ALA Regulation.  
None of the parties, nor the Advocate General and the Court, sought to deny the potential of this 
project to contribute to the interrelated challenges of poverty and instability. Building upon the 
Portugal v Council reasoning, Advocate General Kokott contended that measures relating to internal 
security and stability may be based on development powers in so far as “the essential object of those 
measures is the economic and social development of developing countries and the campaign against 
poverty”.1080 As in that landmark case, she adhered to an evolutionary concept of development, which 
might – as suggested by the reference to the broader objectives of the UN and other international 
organisations in ex Article 177(3) TEC (current Article 208(2) TFEU) – change over time under influence 
                                                          
1077 Ibid., para. 47. 
1078 Council Regulation (443/92/EEC) on financial and technical assistance to, and economic cooperation with, the developing 
countries in Asia and Latin America, OJ L52/1, 25.02.1992. 
1079 This is clear from the third recital of the contested Decision, stating that “the overall objective of the proposed project is 
to assist in the implementation of the UNSCR 1373 (2001) in the fight against terrorism and international crime” (Case C-
403/05, op.cit. note 1038, para. 18). 




of the international context. Also the Court acknowledged the existence of this link, albeit in more 
cautious terms. Basing itself on the European Consensus on Development, it affirmed that “there can 
be no sustainable development and eradication of poverty without peace and security and that the 
pursuit of the objectives of the Community’s new development policy necessarily proceed via the 
promotion of democracy and respect for human rights”.1081  
Yet, both Kokott and the Court were careful to distinguish the undisputed existence of this security-
development nexus, from the question at issue: whether the implementing powers of the Commission 
fell within the scope of the ALA Regulation. The latter had been adopted in 1992, right before the 
Maastricht Treaty introduced a development assistance title, and was therefore still based on the 
flexibility clause (cf. supra 2.1.). It is important to note that the Commission’s 2002 proposal to adapt 
this Regulation to the new Treaty framework and the expanding notion of development – amongst 
others by introducing a focus on counter-terrorism – was never accepted.1082 In the end, the ALA 
Regulation was in December 2006, rather shortly before this judgment was issued, replaced by the DCI 
Regulation.1083 The policy framework at issue was thus already outdated by the time of the ruling. This 
significantly limits its contribution to understanding the judicial approach to the meanwhile 
overhauled approach to the security-development link. Rather, this link formed the background as a 
changed contextual circumstance, and the Court’s main focus was on ensuring the responsiveness 
hereto by an established policy framework. 
On this point a considerably more restrictive approach was taken. This should however not be seen as 
an obstinate blindness for the hampering consequences of an overly stringent interpretation of 
conferred powers on keeping up with the interrelated challenges of foreign policy.1084 The openness 
to an evolutionary interpretation of the EU’s “collective power” may not automatically extend to the 
“distribution of institutional powers”.1085 The Court has consistently held that the Commission can take 
all necessary measures for the implementation of given legislation, yet only to the extent that this is 
foreseen in the basic act and limited to its essential general aims.1086 Indeed, just as Treaty provisions 
should not be precise policy prescriptions that leave no room for legislators, neither should the latter 
“try to turn legislative acts into quasi-constitutional mandates”.1087  
                                                          
1081 Case C-403/05, op.cit. note 1038, para. 57. In this regard, the Court also referred to the then freshly adopted IfS and DCI. 
1082 Commission Communication (COM(2002) 340 final) on a Proposal for a Regulation concerning Community cooperation 
with Asian and Latin American countries and amending Council Regulation 2258/96/EC, 02.07.2002. 
1083 It is telling that this new Regulation in no way refers to the objective of counterterrorism, but does provide for assistance 
in the area of border management (Regulation (1905/2006/EC) op.cit. note 554). 
1084 M. Cremona, 'Annotation on Case C-403/05 Parliament v Commission' (2008) Common Market Law Review 45(6), 1738. 
1085 Case C-403/05, Opinion AG Kokott, op.cit. note 1080, para. 86.  
1086 See to that effect: Case C-478/93, Netherlands v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1995:324, paras 30-31; Case C‑159/96, Portugal 
v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1998:550, paras 40-41. This reference to essential elements is now codified in Article 290(1) TFEU. 
1087 Cremona (2008) op.cit. note 1084, 1740. 
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The Court was thus essentially restrained to interpreting the objectives of the (outdated) ALA 
Regulation, which made no mention of internal stability and security. As to the Commission’s argument 
that its Decision constituted an act of capacity-building, which was explicitly mentioned in the 
Regulation, the Court replied that this did not constitute an end in itself. Such measures require the 
existence of a direct link, not “a mere hypothetical side-effect”,1088 to the Regulation’s objectives of 
strengthening investment and development. This was considered all the more necessary “[s]ince all 
cooperation, by the very fact of the funding to be applied, is, as a rule, likely to have an impact on the 
economic situation of the country concerned”.1089 Without demonstrating a direct connection to the 
Regulation’s socio-economic objectives, the Commission Decision could not rashly set its aims on 
improving internal security and stability.  
While the security-development connection thus formed the background to this ruling, there were 
only limited hints as to the judicial approach towards it. The ruling did not mean that the Commission’s 
implementing powers in the field of development cooperation could per definition not engage in areas 
as border management. Rather, the CJEU emphasised that such powers require an appropriate legal 
basis, and may never form a carte blanche to eliminate any obstacles to the achievement of that 
policy’s objectives. A more enlightening elucidation of the division of competences along the security-
development nexus would have to await the outcome of the SALW case. This first ruling on the CFSP 
at once concerned its relation to development cooperation (cf. infra 5.2.2.). It was preceded by a 
number of rulings that shed light on the permissibility of non-CFSP legislation to touch upon political 
and security aspects of foreign policy, as well as on the first and third pillar interface. These two lines 
of case line will be concisely introduced in the next two subsections. 
The place of security objectives in EU legislation 
As was the case for aims of a developmental nature, it was again Opinion 1/78 providing a first 
indication of the Court’s approach. It firmly established that a measure’s security objectives are 
insufficient to bring its subject outside the scope of the then all-mighty CCP.1090 This was confirmed 
and further extended in a number of dual goods cases, establishing that both the military applications 
of such products and their security-related aims can legitimately be covered by the EU’s trade 
competences.1091 This holds a notable parallel to Portugal v Council, in the sense that commercial 
policy can tackle foreign policy objectives as long as its essential aims are of a commercial nature. The 
                                                          
1088 Case C-403/05, Opinion AG Kokott, op.cit. note 1080, para. 94. 
1089 Case C-403/05, op.cit. note 1038, para. 66. 
1090 Opinion 1/78 op.cit. note 111, para. 49. 
1091 Respectively Case C-83/94, Leifer and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:329 , para. 11; and Case C-70/94, Werner v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:1995:328, para. 10. For an extensive annotation: I. Govaere, 'Annotation Case C-70/94, Werner v. 
Germany and Case C-83/94, Leifer and Others' (1997) Common Market Law Review 34(4) 1019-1037. 
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Centro-Com case subsequently determined that even the Member States’ retained foreign and security 
competences (under the then EPC) did not mean a blank check for tackling security-related 
objectives. 1092  These “must be exercised in a manner consistent with Community law”. 1093  This 
moreover provided a first indication that the Court would not be stopped by its exclusion from the 
CFSP to protect the integrity of the EC legal order.  
A decade later, in its 2006 PNR judgment, the Court indicated – although not in so many words – that 
the protection of the acquis is not without limits either. This case concerned the conclusion of an 
Agreement between the EC and the United States on the transfer of Passenger Name Records. It 
followed the passing of US legislation, in the aftermath of the 9/11 events, obliging all airlines 
operating to, from or through its territory to provide electronic access to such data. The Parliament 
put forth a series of arguments pleading for the annulment of two decisions: a Commission Decision 
which – in line with its implementing powers under Article 25(6) of the Data Protection Directive – 
found that the US provided an adequate level of protection and a Council Decision allowing for the 
conclusion of the EC-US agreement.1094 In a remarkably terse and formalistic judgment, the Court 
simply ruled that the transfer of PNR data constituted “processing operations concerning public 
security and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law”.1095 This trespassed the limits of Article 
3(2) of the Data Protection Directive, which specifically excludes the processing of data relating to 
activities provided for under the second and third pillars. 
Reminiscent of the Philippines border management ruling, this (appropriately) formalistic approach – 
closely centred on the wording of the Data Protection Directive – does not allow for much 
generalisation. Nonetheless some prudent conclusions can be drawn, along two rather contradictory 
lines. On the one hand, in line with the ‘direct connection’ required in the above case, PNR might be 
indicative of a raised threshold as to when security-related objectives could be fulfilled through 
(former) first pillar means. On the other hand, it also means that the integrity of the then second and 
third pillars were unevenly protected. Rather than through direct scrutiny in the light of ex Titles V and 
VI of the TEU, the latter were only shielded by default, i.e. if and when it could be established that ex 
                                                          
1092 I. Govaere, 'External Competence: What's in a Name? The Difficult Conciliation between Dynamism of the ECJ and 
Dynamics of European Integration' in P. Demaret, I. Govaere and D. Hanf (eds), 30 Years of European Legal Studies at the 
College of Europe (P.I.E.-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2005) 474. 
1093 Case C-124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com v HM Treasury and Bank of England, ECLI:EU:C:1997:8, para. 25. Without 
explicitly referring to it, this case reflects the rationale inherent to the duty of loyal cooperation (for more details on this duty 
see: Van Elsuwege and Merket (2012) op.cit. note 354, 38-40). 
1094 Commission Decision (2004/535/EC) on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name 
Record of air passengers transferred to the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, OJ L235/11, 06.07.2004; Council 
Decision (2004/496/EC) on the conclusion of an Agreement between the EC and the US on the processing and transfer of PNR 
data by Air Carriers to the US Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, OJ L 183/93, 
20.05.2004. 
1095  Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, Parliament v Council (PNR), ECLI:EU:C:2006:346, paras 54-70; M. Mendez, 
'Passenger Name Record Agreement: European Court of Justice' (2007) European Constitutional Law Review 3(1), 140-143. 
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EC action trespassed against the principle of conferral.1096 The CJEU did indeed not act upon the 
Advocate General’s implicit invitation to rule in terms of the choice of legal basis and no aim and 
content test was undertaken. 1097  Only indirectly and implicitly did the Court’s annulment of the 
Decisions at issue clear the path for adopting a new agreement1098 based on the CFSP and ex PJCC 
Treaty provisions.1099 
Choosing legal bases across the old pillars: ex Article 47 TEU enters the picture 
If cases on the choice of legal basis are generally contentious, this was even more so in the former 
cross-pillar situations given the complexity of delimitating ‘separate but integrated legal orders’. The 
stakes are evidently much higher when the Court’s test not only serves to determine the appropriate 
Treaty provision(s) on which an action is based, but also – and essentially – the applicable legal order. 
A number of cases concerning the interface between the first and third pillar clarified that ex Article 
47 TEU had to be added to the traditional analysis, but left several essential questions regarding the 
practical effect hereof unanswered.  
Ex Article 47 TEU first appeared in a 1998 case on airport transit visas. Whilst not raised by any of the 
parties, it was Advocate General Fennelly who raked it up and introduced the by now well-known 
language of encroachment. He stated that this Article was introduced into the Treaty “with the very 
purpose of ensuring that, in exercising their powers under Titles V and VI of that Treaty, the Council 
and the Member States do not encroach on the powers attributed to the Community”.1100 This implied 
that the Court could adjudicate on acts purporting to be adopted under the third pillar, “in order to 
determine whether or not they deal with matters which more properly fall within the Community 
sphere of competence”. 1101  The Court concurred on both its jurisdiction and the notion of 
encroachment, but failed to specify under which conditions the latter occurred.1102 It appeared to 
indicate that the Community was protected from encroachment even when acting under concurrent 
or shared powers.1103 This would mean that the requirement, under ex Article 47, that nothing in the 
                                                          
1096 Hillion (2014a) op.cit. note 1013, 59. 
1097 G. Gilmore and J. Rijpma, 'Annotation Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, Parliament v. Council and Commission' (2007) 
Common Market Law Review 44(4), 1081. 
1098 Council Decision (2006/729/CFSP/JHA) on the signing, on behalf of the EU, of an Agreement between the EU and the USA 
on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the US Department of Homeland Security, OJ L298/27, 
27.10.2006. 
1099 Two other cases dealing with the place of security objectives in EC legislation, namely Kadi and Al Barakaat and Data 
Retention, were decided after the SALW ruling, and will accordingly be dealt with at the end of the next section. 
1100 Case C-170/96, Commission v Council (airport transit visas), Opinion AG Fennelly, ECLI:EU:C:1998:43, para. 8 (emphasis 
added). 
1101 Ibid., para. 11. 
1102 Case C-170/96, Commission v Council (airport transit visas), ECLI:EU:C:1998:219, para. 16. 
1103 M.-G. Garbagnati Ketvel, 'The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Respect of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy' (2006) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55(1), 91. 
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TEU shall affect the EC Treaties, imposed a “substitution effect”1104 implicating that “if something can 
be done via the EC, it must be done via the EC”.1105 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer seemed to confirm this view in the environmental penalties 
case. “[B]y virtue of the primacy of Community law, established in Article 47 EU”, he expressed that 
the existence of any legal basis for the Community to intervene in a matter, had the effect of 
“cancelling out the powers of the Union”.1106 The Court, however, in this judgment as well as in the 
subsequent ship-source pollution case, applied its powers of scrutiny concisely, precluding generalising 
conclusions on the exact modalities wherein encroachment occurs. Briskly emphasising their 
predominantly environmental – rather than criminal law – character, the Court decided to annul the 
PJCC acts before it.1107 This approach avoided the tricky issue of how to reconcile the centre of gravity 
reasoning with the strict delimitation imposed by ex Article 47 TEU. In essence, what if the examination 
of a PJCC measure revealed that it pursued a twofold purpose or had a twofold component? If the EC-
component was merely incidental, would the strict seclusion of the PJCC nonetheless require the entire 
act to be annulled? And when none of these components was incidental, how to answer the question 
of procedural compatibility?  
The debate on the effect of ex Article 47 TEU thus remained open. The above cross-pillar cases already 
indicated that this Article installed more than a ‘conflict avoidance rule’ to ensure Member States’ 
compliance with EC Treaty obligations in exercising their powers under the TEU.1108 This was in fact the 
approach taken in the Centro-Com litigation, exhuming the spirit of the duty of loyal cooperation. Three 
other possibilities remained. The first is the above mentioned ‘substitution effect’, stating that what 
could that should be done via the EC. In this view, the nature of competences is irrelevant, thereby 
imposing a fixed boundary between EC and CFSP competences. A second possibility is to interpret ex 
Article 47 as a ‘moving boundary’ that extends the ERTA-effect from EC-Member States to EC-EU 
relations.1109 This establishes a rule of primacy or hierarchy, yet only in the case of conflicting activity. 
This is presupposed under exclusive competences. However, in areas covered by shared or 
complementary powers, the CFSP could simultaneously strive for the fulfilment of security-related 
                                                          
1104 Dashwood (2008) op.cit. note 217, 82. 
1105 S. Weatherill, 'Safeguarding the Acquis Communautaire' in T. Heukels, N. Blokker and M. Brus (eds), The European Union 
after Amsterdam (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998) 159-160. 
1106 Case C-176/03, Commission v Council (environmental penalties), Opinion AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, ECLI:EU:C:2005:311, 
paras 26-27. 
1107  Case C-176/03, Commission v Council (environmental penalties), ECLI:EU:C:2005:542, paras 46-51; Case C-440/05, 
Commission v Council (ship-source pollution), ECLI:EU:C:2007:625, paras 66-74. 
1108 Cremona (2008) op.cit. note 1015, 43. 
1109 This effect refers to the statement of the Court that “each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common 
policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever form these may take, the Member 
States no longer have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which 




objectives as along as the Community had not enacted specific rules. A third and final interpretation 
of Article 47 consists of “abandoning the a priori hierarchical inferiority of the CFSP” in favour of a 
context and competence-specific delimitation rule.1110 In this reasoning, the Court, in delimitating EC 
and CFSP competences, should take maximum effectiveness as a guiding principle, and counterbalance 
the protection of the acquis with the principle of conferral and the CFSP’s Treaty objectives.1111  
5.2.2. The SALW case: security and development geared up for the perfect 
storm  
The SALW case was a welcome occasion to finally clarify the position of the CFSP in the EU legal order, 
as well as to shed more light on the judicial approach to the security-development nexus. A lot can be 
said about the contentious choices made in this ruling, and particularly its unworldly schism from and 
harmful impact on the reality of EU policies on the interface between security and development. Yet, 
from a purely legal point of view, the Court’s detailed analysis came a significant way in answering 
some of the above questions regarding cross-pillar litigation. The judgment was however delivered on 
the eve of the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force, without specifying whether it was a dying scream of the 
soon to be dissolved Community or would remain relevant after the collapse of the pillar walls.  
Facts and background 
The Commission, with the support of the Parliament, plead for the annulment of Council Decision 
2004/833/CFSP (hereafter: ECOWAS Decision), implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP (hereafter: 
SALW Joint Action) by setting out the details of an EU contribution to ECOWAS in the framework of the 
Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons. In addition, the Commission asked to declare illegal 
and inapplicable the SALW Joint Action on the EU’s contribution to combating the destabilising 
accumulation and spread of SALW.1112 The latter establishes an EU programme to build consensus in 
the relevant regional and international fora on SALW control. It list principles and measures, supported 
through EU financial and technical assistance, to exact commitments, establish and maintain national 
inventories and restrictive weapons legislation, assist in controlling and eliminating surplus small arms, 
and promote confidence-building. The ECOWAS Decision implements this Joint Action by means of a 
financial contribution to and technical assistance in setting up a Light Weapons Unit within the 
                                                          
1110 B. Van Vooren, 'EU-EC External Competences after the Small Arms Judgment' (2009) European Foreign Affairs Review 
14(1) 14-15, 16-17. 
1111 Dashwood (2008) op.cit. note 217, 97-98. 
1112  Council Decision (2004/833/CFSP) implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a view to an EU contribution to 
ECOWAS in the framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OJ L359/65, 04.12.2004; Joint Action 
(2002/589/CFSP) on the EU’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light 
weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, OJ L191/1, 19.07.2002. 
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ECOWAS Technical Secretariat and convert the Moratorium on SALW into a Convention between 
ECOWAS Member States. 
The Commission argued that such project ought rather to have been conducted through the EDF under 
the Cotonou Agreement. Article 11(3) hereof explicitly provides for the fight against the “excessive and 
uncontrolled spread, illegal trafficking and accumulation of small arms and light weapons” (cf. supra 
2.2.2.). The Commission held that this Article integrates the entire campaign against the proliferation 
of SALW into Community development cooperation policy, thereby denying the CFSP any role in this 
field. 1113  In diametrical opposition, the Council, supported by six intervening Member States, 
considered that “the campaign against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons does not fall 
within Community competences in the field of development cooperation policy or within any other 
Community competences”.1114 These forceful statements pass by the fact that both development 
cooperation and the CFSP have a long tradition of engaging in the fight against weapon 
proliferation.1115 They are moreover downright dishonest. All Member States are party to the Cotonou 
Agreement and had therefore explicitly endorsed the financing of SALW control by the EDF. Article 9(1) 
of the ECOWAS Joint Action moreover stated that: 
The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the consistency of the Union’s 
activities in the field of small arms, in particular with regard to its development policies. For this 
purpose, Member States and the Commission shall submit any relevant information to the relevant 
Council bodies. The Council and the Commission shall ensure implementation of their respective 
action, each in accordance with its powers.1116  
Also the Commission is not free from blame. The contested Joint Action had already been in force for 
two and a half years when the Commission lodged its appeal, and in fact repealed a similar Joint Action 
from 1999. Nonetheless, it had never proclaimed any disagreement and had not protested against the 
earlier and similar implementation of the SALW Joint Action in other regions.1117  
So, why then this challenge and why now? While both the complaint and the Court’s reasoning were 
framed entirely around general competence delimitation between the EC and the CFSP, it appears that 
                                                          
1113 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 38. Notably, the Commission modified its position throughout the course of the 
proceedings and later admitted that certain aspects of SALW control may be better covered by the CFSP (Case C-91/05, 
Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1033, para. 140-142). 
1114 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, paras 42 and 45. 
1115 For an elaborate analysis: P. Koutrakos, 'The Non-proliferation Policy of the European Union' in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos 
(eds), Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2011) 249-272. 
1116 Similar provisions were included in Article 4(2) of the ECOWAS Decision as well as in the 2006 EU SALW Strategy (Council 
Note (5319/06) EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, 13.01.2006, para. 
19). 
1117 The Council and the French Government list these as part of their arguments (Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 53). 
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the real issue was of a much more practical nature. The Commission had been supporting ECOWAS’ 
fight against SALW proliferation for a number of years by funding local programmes and initiatives of 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).1118 A regional support strategy and RIP, co-
signed by the Commission and ECOWAS/West-African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) on 19 
February 2003, provided for EDF support to UN priority measures under the action plan to implement 
a moratorium on the import, export and production of small arms. In this context the Commission, on 
the request of ECOWAS, had in 2004 started preparing a financing proposal for conflict prevention and 
peace-building, of which it stated that the bulk would be allocated to the ECOWAS Small Arms Control 
Programme.1119  In the eyes of the Commission, the contested Council Decision thus concerned a 
unilateral choice to intervene with its ongoing activities, thereby undermining the widely portrayed 
Cotonou principles of partnership and local ownership. Not only did this unsolicitedly alter the 
cooperative method, the Commission would moreover be charged with the financial implementation 
thereof.1120 In this light, it would have been more credible – and arguably less harmful with an eye to 
policy coherence – if the Commission had only contested this specific Council Decision and had not 
argued that the entire Joint Action infringed the non-affectation clause of ex Article 47 TEU. This turned 
its comprehensible practical concerns into a conflict that reflected a fundamental difference regarding 
the structure of the Union.1121 Indeed, “[a]n overly strict interpretation of that non-affectation clause 
could render the CFSP an empty shell; while an exceedingly unrestricted interpretation could open up 
an escape route from the legal principles applicable to the Member States in their relationship with 
the Community”.1122 
The SALW ruling: legal advance, …  
The Court’s judgment had four main components. In a first step it clarified its jurisprudence under ex 
Article 47 TEU. Second, it explained the actual effect of this clause, specifically in relation to the nature 
of competences. Third, the CJEU theoretically and rather abstractly combined this clarified effect with 
the traditional centre-of-gravity test. The final and most extensive component then applied this 
methodology to the specific circumstances at issue.  
First, regarding the Court’s competence, the Council (with the support of Spain and the UK) somewhat 
surprisingly argued that it had no jurisdiction to rule on a plea of illegality brought against a CFSP 
                                                          
1118 B. Nivet, 'Security by Proxy? The EU and (Sub-)Regional Organisations: the Case of ECOWAS', ISS Occasional Paper n° 63 
(EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2006) 26. 
1119 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, paras 5-7. 
1120 Article 3 ECOWAS Decision.  
1121 Case C-91/05, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1033, para. 84. 
1122 Van Vooren (2009a) op.cit. note 1110, 7. 
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act.1123 The CJEU countered this by simply extending its reasoning from the earlier cross-pillar cases. 
Namely, it was tasked “to ensure that acts which, according to the Council, fall within the scope of Title 
V of the Treaty on European Union and which, by their nature, are capable of having legal effects, do 
not encroach upon the powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community”.1124  The italicised 
fragment was added to the Court’s previous statements on its jurisdiction, without any explanation 
regarding its meaning or relevance. This evidently provided food for speculation as to the possible 
implications hereof. Yet, all argumentation that this would limit the effect of ex Article 47 TEU fell foul 
of its strict wording that nothing in the TEU shall affect the Community Treaties.1125 
Second, with regard to the effect of ex Article 47 TEU, the Commission and Parliament took the view 
that this established a fixed boundary (or substitution effect). Although Member States in an area of 
shared competence retained the power to act individually or collectively by themselves as long as the 
EC had not exercised its competence, they argued that the same could not be said for the Union in the 
light of ex Article 47. In other words, any CFSP act that could properly have been adopted on the basis 
of the EC Treaty, constituted an encroachment thereof. The Council naturally opposed this view and 
submitted that Article 47 aimed “to protect the balance of powers established by the Treaties and 
cannot be interpreted as aiming to protect the competences conferred upon the Community to the 
detriment of those enjoyed by the Union”.1126 From this it followed that it was necessary to take 
account of the complementary character of the competence conferred on the EC in the field of 
development cooperation. Any other interpretation, it was held, would deprive the CFSP of practical 
effect and undermine “the coexistence of the Union and the Community as integrated but distinct legal 
orders and also the constitutional architecture formed by the three ‘pillars’ as a whole”.1127 
Dashwood, both as academic and intervening agent for the UK, argued that both the substitution and 
moving boundary effects – set out above – could not occur with regard to the delimitation between 
the EC and CFSP. First, substitution was held to be impossible given that the EC-CFSP relationship was 
one of clear and intended demarcation and was not characterised by an identity of objectives. This 
was contrary to the first and third pillar, sharing the ulterior target of establishing an area of freedom, 
security and justice. In his view, the tasks of the Community were of a purely socio-economic nature, 
with not a single Treaty indication that action by the Community in the domain of foreign and security 
                                                          
1123 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 30. Notably, on two occasions, the CFI had already allowed individuals to challenge a 
CFSP Common Position on measures to combat terrorism, insofar as it concerned a possible infringement of ex Article 47 TEU 
(Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v Council (OMPI), ECLI:EU:T:2006:384, para. 56; Case T-
299/04, Selmani v Council and Commission (Selmani), ECLI:EU:T:2005:404, para. 56. 
1124 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 33 (emphasis added). 
1125  See further on this discussion: C. Hillion and R.A. Wessel, 'Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after 
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policy was contemplated. The assignment of development cooperation to contribute to consolidating 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, “is not a free-standing 
competence but rather a consideration that must inform Community policy in pursuing the socio-
economic objectives of the envisaged cooperation”.1128 Second, also the chance that the CFSP would 
enter an area covered by common EC rules was held to be non-existent. The UK argued that both the 
CFSP’s own powers and the Community competences with which it was likely to interact were of a 
non-pre-emptive nature.1129 Consequently, there was “no race to occupy the field” as the exercise of 
one competence could not prevent initiatives under the other.1130 Yet, the specific circumstances of 
this case provide the strongest illustration that this last view does not entirely reflect reality (cf. infra). 
In essence, this dispute thus boiled down to diverging views on the EU’s constitutional structure. The 
Commission adhered to a triangular model in which the Union possesses its own competences which 
are not merely equivalent to the collective exercise of Member States’ retained powers. The Council, 
and particularly the UK government upheld a dualist model equating EU and collective Member States’ 
competences.1131 The Court followed the Commission’s view, noting that Article 47 TEU does in no way 
distinguish according to the distribution of competences that are protected against encroachment by 
the TEU. Given that this protection “relates to the attribution and, thus, the very existence of that 
competence, and not its exclusive or shared nature”, it is “unnecessary to examine whether the 
measure prevents or limits the exercise by the Community of its competences”.1132 This ultimately took 
away all doubt and established ex Article 47 TEU as a fixed boundary imposing a substitution effect. In 
the words of Advocate General Mengozzi: “Article 47 EU aims to keep watertight, so to speak, the 
primacy of Community action under the EC Treaty over actions undertaken on the basis of Title V 
and/or Title VI of the EU Treaty, so that if an action could be undertaken on the basis of the EC Treaty, 
it must be undertaken by virtue of that Treaty”.1133  
The CFSP was hereby established as a residual competence category covering “all areas of foreign and 
security policy” with the exclusion of those external policies falling within EC competence.1134 This 
conclusion is in line with the system of the Treaties, particularly as set out in Articles 1, 2, 3 and 47 TEU 
(cf. supra 2.1.1.). However, making light of the nature of competences is more debatable. Only just 
                                                          
1128 Dashwood (2008) op.cit. note 217, 83-84. 
1129 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 44. 
1130 Dashwood (2008) op.cit. note 217, 94. 
1131 This would equate the SALW situation with the one at issue in the Bangladesh and EDF cases, where Member States 
could, in an area of shared or complementary competence, freely choose to enter into international commitments, either 
collectively or individually, or even jointly with the Community (op.cit. note 210 and 1069; Hillion and Wessel (2009) op.cit. 
note 1125, 572). 
1132 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, paras 60 and 62. 
1133 Case C-91/05, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1033, para. 116; see also Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 60. 
1134 In the Advocate General’s view this was borne by the explicit provision of a constitutional bridge for economic sanctions 
under ex Articles 60 and 301 EC (Case C-91/05, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1033, paras 117-123).  
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had the Court imposed this fixed boundary, to make it waver again by combining this with the 
traditional centre of gravity reasoning in the third step of its analysis. Contrasting with the immobility 
of the pillar boundary, this introduced a sort of de minimis rule in “a delicate operation that runs the 
risk of transplantation rejection’’.1135 Determining the centre of gravity across integrated but separate 
legal orders required clear rules on how and where the threshold would be set, which were however 
only abstractly elaborated. Building on Portugal v Council, Philippines border management and a 
number of policy statements such as the European Consensus on Development (cf. infra), the Court 
started by establishing the Treaty provisions on development in particularly broad terms. It argued 
that these should not be limited to measures directly related to the campaign against poverty. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary for a measure – such as one combating the proliferation of SALW – in order 
to fall within EC development policy that it contributes to the pursuit of that policy’s socio-economic 
objectives. “That is not the case if such a measure, even if it contributes to the economic and social 
development of the developing country, has as its main purpose the implementation of the CFSP”.1136 
Notably, at no point in this case did the Court undertake a similar analysis of CFSP objectives, further 
emphasising the unequal protection offered by ex Article 47 TEU. 
The traditional centre of gravity test was thus transplanted from the Community to cross-pillar 
situations, yet with a different outcome. Whereas the CJEU had previously held that a measure having 
several non-incidental objectives or components could exceptionally be based on various 
corresponding legal bases, such a solution was considered impossible under ex Article 47 TEU.1137 
Whereas the Court did not waste much words on this finding, the fact that it did not rely on the 
titanium dioxide line of case law suggests that it ruled out this possibility as a principle.1138 Advocate 
General Mengozzi was more elaborate, arguing that it seemed “particularly difficult, if not impossible 
as the law of the European Union stands at present, to contemplate recourse to a dual legal basis 
without breaching Article 47 EU”. 1139  He subsequently expounded on the various procedural 
incompatibilities between the legal provisions on development cooperation and CFSP. In a later case 
on Data Retention, Advocate General Bot added that “[a]lthough it is regrettable, the constitutional 
architecture consisting of three pillars nevertheless requires that the areas of action be split up. The 
priority in this context is to guarantee legal certainty by clarifying as far as possible the respective 
                                                          
1135 Hillion and Wessel (2009) op.cit. note 1125, 576 and 574. 
1136 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, paras 72. 
1137 Ibid., paras 75-76. 
1138 This appeared to shut the door to cross-pillar international agreements as well, even if this had in the past not produced 
major problems. Parts falling under different pillars were simply negotiated under different procedures and concluded by 
separate decisions. See further: R.A. Wessel, 'Cross-pillar Mixity: Combining Competences in the Conclusion of EU 
International Agreements' in C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in 
the World (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 30-54. 
1139 Case C-91/05, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1033, para. 176 and footnote 76. 
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boundaries between the spheres of action covered by the different pillars” (cf. infra).1140 Yet, the legal 
certainty that followed from applying first pillar methodology to a cross-pillar situation can be 
questioned. This is most clearly illustrated by the conflicting outcomes reached by the Advocate 
General and the Court in the SALW case.  
This brings us to the fourth and final step of the Court’s analysis, where this methodology was applied 
to the specific circumstances of the case. With regard to the aim of the contested decision, the Court 
first noted that Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, the predecessor to the contested Joint Action, in the first 
recital to its preamble placed the fight against SALW in the dual perspective of preserving peace and 
safeguarding development. 1141  A second argument was that the contested Joint Action does not 
exclude the possibility of being implemented through ex Community actions. Indeed, Article 8 thereof 
“notes that the Commission intends to direct its action towards achieving the objectives and the 
priorities of this Joint Action, where appropriate by pertinent Community measures". Yet, it is probably 
useful to reiterate that this language – typical for CFSP acts – resulted from a compromise between 
the Council and the Commission to reconcile the ideally broad nature of CFSP acts with the respect for 
ex Article 47 TEU (cf. supra 3.2.2.).1142 It is rather ironic, and arguably counterproductive, that it formed 
the subject here of an argument that would lead to the annulment of a CFSP joint action. Turning to 
the contested Decision, the Court again relied on its preamble stating that the spread of SALW reduces 
the prospects for sustainable development. It could therefore not be inferred “that in comparison with 
its objectives of preserving peace and strengthening international security its concern to eliminate or 
reduce obstacles to the development of the countries concerned is purely incidental”.1143  In this 
manner, the Court basically established the presence of an objective of removing an obstacle to 
development as sufficient to bring it within the reach of that competence, thereby laying the undefined 
centre of gravity threshold very low.  
The content of the ECOWAS Decision consisted of financial and technical assistance. The Commission 
argued that these are instruments typically used in the context of development aid, whereas the 
Council held that Article 47 EU does not preclude the CFSP from using the same instruments as those 
employed by the Community.1144 The Court disagreed with the Commission, contending that financial 
and technical assistance is neutral content, in the sense that “it is only in the light of the aims that they 
                                                          
1140 Case C-301/06, Ireland v Parliament and Council (Data Retention), Opinion AG Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2008:558, para. 108. 
1141 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 85. Remarkably, it disregarded the fact that the repealing and contested Joint Action 
no longer makes any such statement. 
1142 Council-Commission (5194/95) op.cit. note 582 
1143 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 96. 
1144 Ibid., paras 40 and 53. 
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pursue that a financial contribution or technical assistance can be regarded as falling within the scope 
of the CFSP or of Community development cooperation policy”.1145  
From this analysis of its aim and content, the CJEU concluded that the contested Decision contained 
two components, neither of which could be considered incidental to the other. It proceeded to cut this 
Gordian knot by applying the “simple, if brutal, solution” of ex Article 47 TEU.1146 This meant that the 
Council had committed an infringement “by adopting the contested decision on the basis of Title V of 
the EU Treaty, since that decision also falls within development cooperation policy”.1147 The ECOWAS 
Decision consequently had to be annulled. In what was arguably the weakest element of its judgment, 
the Court then found it unnecessary to examine the plea as to the alleged illegality of the contested 
Joint Action, given that the Decision had to be annulled on its own defects. The lack of any further 
explanation opened the floor to estimated guesses as to Court’s reasons, if any. It has been interpreted 
– with some goodwill – as a sort of pragmatic blank leaving room for a constructive modus vivendi 
between the pillars.1148 Reminding of its Portugal v Council construction, the Court hereby indicated 
that the SALW Joint Action could be implemented by both CFSP and EC activity.1149 This would allow a 
CFSP measure, which subject matter contributes to this area’s Treaty objectives, to relate to other 
fields of policy as long as this does not impose extensive obligations. While sitting uncomfortably with 
the Court’s otherwise strict interpretation of ex Article 47 TEU, this could explain the enigmatic 
addition that only acts ‘which, by their nature, are capable of having legal effects’ could encroach on 
EC competences (cf. supra). It can indeed be argued that the Joint Action itself was not directly 
intended to have legal effect, only through its implementation, among others by the annulled Decision.  
The SALW ruling was a stark reminder that, before the era of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was made up 
of separate legal orders. These might to a certain extent have been integrated – as the CJEU used the 
overall Union legal order as interpretative framework – yet always placed delimitation above 
arguments of consistency and effectiveness. This judgment has therefore rightly been called “a pause 
if not a setback in the developing unity of the EU legal order”.1150 On the other hand, the Court’s 
prohibition of cross-pillar legal bases and preference for the first pillar had the benefit of clarity and 
concrete support in the Treaty (even though this clarity was partly eroded by the Court’s refusal to 
examine the legality of the SALW Joint Action). The same could not be said for the traditional centre 
                                                          
1145 Ibid., para. 104. 
1146 Dashwood (2011) op.cit. note 534, 47. 
1147 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 109. 
1148 P. Van Elsuwege, 'On the Boundaries between the European Union's First Pillar and Second Pillar: a Comment on the 
ECOWAS Judgment of the European Court of Justice' (2009) Columbia Journal of European Law 15(3), 543. 
1149 B. Van Vooren, 'The Small Arms Judgment in an Age of Constitutional Turmoil' (2009) European Foreign Affairs Review 
14(2) 236-239. 
1150 Hillion and Wessel (2009) op.cit. note 1125, 582. 
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of gravity test, where big question marks remain as to which procedures can be combined and how to 
choose between two non-incidental yet procedurally incompatible legal bases.  
… political setback? 
The gained legal clarity came at a significant cost, paid largely in terms of policy consistency. In this 
author’s view it was not so much the annulment of the ECOWAS Decision that was problematic, but 
the way in which the Court arrived at this conclusion. In itself, the strict delimitation was in line with 
the Court’s obligation to guarantee the integrity of the EC legal order under ex Article 47 TEU. However, 
if such an imposed boundary is unclear or negates the relevance of the CFSP, it provokes legal 
uncertainty, thereby undermining inter-institutional trust and future policy consistency. Arguably, the 
Court failed to convince on both accounts.  
First, the line drawn by the Court was insufficiently clear. In corroborating its finding that “certain 
measures aiming to prevent fragility in developing countries … can contribute to the elimination or 
reduction of obstacles to [their] economic and social development”, the CJEU entered particularly 
shaky territory.1151 It did this by reverting to various policy statements, including a Council resolution 
on small arms, the 2006 EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and the 
European Consensus on Development.1152 The Court had always refused to be influenced by previous 
practice, and if “this is the case with formal legal acts provided for in the Treaties, it should a fortiori 
be the case with informal acts”.1153 Relying on such statements to delineate competences overlooks 
that these are not drawn up for such purpose, but aim to reconcile various institutional interests and 
respond flexibly to evolving global challenges.1154 Although it could be argued that the CJEU in this 
manner seeks to better understand institutional intentions and thus reduce judicial discretion,1155 this 
is a very delicate and unpredictable exercise. An entirely objective selection and analysis of the 
numerous documents constantly issued by EU institutions is simply impossible and accusations of 
partiality are never far away. One might for instance wonder why the Court does not refer to the 
European Security Strategy, which could have supported a more CFSP-friendly view. The ad hoc nature 
of such an approach moreover makes it nearly impossible to predict how and where the threshold will 
be set by the Court for other measures in the grey area between EC (development cooperation) and 
                                                          
1151 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 68. 
1152 Ibid., paras 88-92. 
1153 J. Heliskoski, 'Small Arms and Light Weapons within the Union's Pillar Structure: an Analysis of Article 47 of the EU Treaty' 
(2008) European Law Review 33(6), 910. 
1154 Koutrakos (2011a) op.cit. note 90, 605.  
1155 Cremona (2014) op.cit. note 1031, 15; Eeckhout (2011) op.cit. note 113, 182-183. 
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CFSP. The Court has thus “neither produced principles clear and consistent in their application, nor 
avoided the danger of rendering its role increasingly politicised”.1156  
Another aspect of the judicial approach harming legal certainty, inter-institutional trust and policy 
consistency was the overreliance on preambular statements of intent. As accurately noted by 
Mengozzi, the mere expression in a preamble that the accumulation of SALW reduces development 
prospects “does not mean that the contested decision seeks to support a project that aims directly 
and/or mainly to improve … social and economic conditions”.1157 By attaching considerable weight to 
such statements the Court clears the path for “legislative hazard” by inviting legislators to draft 
preambles as to match their preferred legal basis.1158 Two Council Decisions that were adopted after 
the SALW ruling illustrate that this is not just a theory. No longer explicitly implementing the SALW 
Joint Action, but conducted in the framework of the EU SALW Strategy, these provide comparable 
assistance to combat the spread of SALW in the Western Balkans and South East Europe. The Council 
appears to have learned its lesson and clearly framed these decisions in the context of the European 
Security Strategy and typical CFSP objectives such as effective multilateralism.1159 Instead of referring 
to the risks for sustainable development, the preambles only stress that SALW proliferation “fuelled 
insecurity …, exacerbating conflict in the region and undermining post-conflict peace building, thus 
posing a serious threat to peace and security”. 
Second, by ruling out the relevance of the nature of competences, and thus finding it unnecessary to 
examine whether the measure obstructed the exercise of EC competence, the CJEU negated much of 
the CFSP’s relevance. An important question is therefore whether another judicial approach was 
conceivable that, while conserving the integrity of the acquis, delimitates rather than subordinates 
responsibilities in a constitutional framework of interlocking systems for foreign policy-making. One 
suggestion that has been put forward consisted of attaching greater value to the principle of conferred 
powers as a counterweight to the protection of the acquis. This allows a better balance of competences 
by “drawing the outer limits of … legal bases in a way which would ensure that the conditions for their 
application do not become irrelevant”.1160 Mengozzi, in fact, instigated such an approach and relied 
for that purpose on the Portugal v Council litigation.1161 Contradicting the attempt of the Commission 
                                                          
1156 Koutrakos (2011b) op.cit. note 1115, 271. 
1157 Case C-91/05, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1033, para. 205. 
1158 Klamert (2010) op.cit. note 1030, 505. 
1159 Third recital of the preamble to Council Decision (2010/179/CFSP) in support of SEESAC arms control activities in the 
Western Balkans, in the framework of the EU SALW Strategy, OJ L80/48, 26.03.2010; first and second recital of the preamble 
to Council Decision (2013/730/CFSP) in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South East Europe in 
the framework of the EU SALW Strategy, OJ L332/19, 11.12.2013. 
1160  Koutrakos (2008a) op.cit. note 1029, 183-185; who made this observation with regard to litigation on the trade-
environment delimitation. 
1161 Case C-91/05, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1033, para. 161. 
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and Parliament to exploit the rationale of the security-development nexus in their advantage,1162 
Mengozzi held that: 
such a connection cannot lead to including in the scope of development cooperation measures 
which would lead to disregarding the distribution of competences in the framework of the pillar 
architecture of the European Union. It would be erroneous and excessive to consider that any 
measure which fosters the economic and social development of a developing country falls within 
the competence of the Community pursuant to Title XX of the EC Treaty.1163 
While he came to the same conclusion as the Court with regard to the neutral content of the Decision, 
Mengozzi found that its aim related “mainly, if not exclusively” to security.1164 Any encroachment on 
EC competences was therefore precluded.  
Besides more attention for a balance of competences, there was arguably another – less abstract –
alternative for the Court to avoid much of the political fallout that resulted from its judgment. If the 
CJEU would not have refused to examine whether the measure obstructed the exercise by the 
Community of its competences, it could have found good and solid arguments to rule the way it did. 
As set out above, the ECOWAS Decision unilaterally altered the cooperative method hitherto 
undertaken by the Commission as part of the Community’s development assistance. This conflicted 
with the provision in Article 7(2) of the SALW Joint Action that the assistance provided by the Council 
thereunder should be without prejudice to the operation of the Community. As such, this could 
arguably have provided sufficient ground for the Court to rule that the contested Decision had to be 
annulled. Such an approach relates to the second of the above set out Article 47-effects, namely that 
of a moving boundary establishing priority in case of inconsistency, but otherwise permitting 
overlap.1165  Disregarding the nature of competence, rules out all arguments of effectiveness and 
consistency and “implies that adjudicating the EU-EC boundary is tied exclusively to interpretative 
breadth given to TEU-TEC objectives, and whether or not one has been pursued primarily or rather 
incidentally”.1166 It moreover ignores the fact that the CFSP and development cooperation have since 
long been operating, generally unproblematic although not always in the most effective manner, along 
each other in similar areas of activity on the security-development interface (cf. supra 3.2.). 
Not only did EU institutions in this case ridicule their grotesque commitments to the security-
development nexus, also the approach taken by the Court was counterproductive to this endeavour. 
                                                          
1162 Case C-91/05, op.cit. note 85, para. 37. 
1163 Case C-91/05, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1033, para. 170. 
1164 Ibid., para. 175. 
1165 M. Cremona, 'External Relations and External Competence of the European Union: the Emergence of an Integrated Policy' 
in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 265-266. 
1166 Van Vooren (2009a) op.cit. note 1110, 18. 
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Half a year after the adoption of the ambitious Conclusions on Security and Development, this ruling 
had the effect of discouraging the Council from including cross-references to development issues in 
future legislation. Rather than expressing a commitment to enhance policy consistency, these could 
now easily be seen as infringing ex Article 47 TEU. A counterfactual analysis of how Council decisions 
would have been drafted in case of a different outcome in the SALW ruling is of course pure speculation. 
Nonetheless, a comparison of joint actions setting up CSDP missions and operations right before and 
after this case indicate that such an effect – at least to a certain extent – manifested itself. The Joint 
Actions of 4 and 12 February 2008 setting up, respectively, a CSDP SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau and a 
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, refer explicitly to the need to ensure consistency with “the external 
activities of the Community” 1167  and to SSR as being “essential for the stability and sustainable 
development”.1168 It is remarkable that the two other CSDP missions, drawn up in that same year but 
after the SALW judgment, namely the counter-piracy operation off the Somali coast and the 
Monitoring Mission in Georgia, no longer include references to development or EC competences of 
any kind.1169 
Another interesting passage is the negotiation on a new IfS Regulation throughout 2006, in the midst 
of the SALW proceedings. The IfS was enabled to tackle the impact of the illicit use of firearms on the 
civilian population, but the Council vetoed a Commission proposal to include support for measures 
tackling the proliferation of SALW.1170 That this was out of fear for steering the Court’s judgment in a 
certain direction is clear from the following Council-Commission gentlemen’s agreement:  
nothing in this Regulation shall be construed as prejudging positions taken in Case 91/05. Until 
such time as the Court of Justice rules on that case the Commission will not seek to take measures 
under Article 3(2)(i). The Council and Commission agree that in the context of the review of the 
Regulation establishing an instrument for stability provided for in Article 25 of that Regulation, the 
scope of Article 3(2)(i) will be revised as necessary, on the basis of a Commission proposal, in the 
light of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-91/05.1171 
                                                          
1167  Article 17 Joint Action (2008/124/CFSP) on the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), OJ L042/92, 
16.02.2008. 
1168 Second recital Joint Action (2008/112/CFSP) on the EU mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of 
Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU), OJ L040/11, 14.02.2008. 
1169 Joint Action (2008/736/CFSP) on the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia, OJ L248/26, 17.09.2008; Joint 
Action (2008/851/CFSP) on an EU military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of 
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, OJ L301/33, 12.11.2008. 
1170 Article 3(2)(i) IfS Regulation, op.cit. note 539; Commission (COM(2004) 630 final) op.cit. note 535, 15. It is noteworthy 
that the types of activity the IfS could support under this provision were explicitly limited to “the framework of Community 
cooperation policies” and much more clearly defined than any other issues falling under this Regulation.  
1171 Joint Council and Commission Statement (14010/06) on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing an instrument for stability, 27.11.2006. 
222 
 
In line with this agreement and the outcome of the case, the Commission proposed in 2009 to amend 
the IfS Regulation to explicitly include SALW control.1172 Reflecting the tensions that followed this 
controversial judgment, this was not picked up by the Council and the Regulation remained unaltered. 
This illustrates how the judgment precipitately turned the choice of legal basis into a zero sum game 
of competence delimitation, all the more since OECD Member States (including 19 of the then 25 EU 
Members) had already in 2005 agreed to list SALW control as Official Development Aid.1173 Another 
indication of underlying tensions is that only the first Progress Report of June 2006 on the 
implementation of the EU SALW Strategy referred to relevant activities of development assistance and 
the EDF, whereupon such elements were never again mentioned.1174  
Two rulings adopted in the immediate aftermath of the SALW case confirmed the potential of EC 
measures to contribute to the fulfilment of security objectives, thereby highlighting the struggle for 
ensuring unity across pillar walls. First, in the Kadi and Al Barakaat case the CJEU held that the 
Community could use its powers to enact targeted sanctions, which – while serving Community 
objectives – are directed at the CFSP aim of guaranteeing international peace and security. 1175 
Interestingly, in this appeal case the CJEU overruled the approach taken by the General Court, which – 
relying on the (then still unjudiciable) duty of consistency – had allowed the use of the flexibility clause 
to directly achieve CFSP objectives. The latter had taken this approach to extend the EC-CFSP bridge of 
ex Articles 60 and 301 EC from economic to targeted sanctions, arguing that action taken hereunder 
by the Community is “in actual fact action by the Union”.1176 In more nuanced terms, the appeal 
judgment pointed out that the flexibility clause could be used, but only insofar as it builds upon the 
“implicit underlying objective” of this bridge to implement actions decided under the CFSP through the 
efficient use of a Community instrument.1177 Rejecting any direct connection between the EC flexibility 
clause and the CFSP might be indicative of the fact that the Court’s strong focus on protecting the EC 
legal order was not without limits. The CJEU signposted that it would not accept the CFSP to be entirely 
devoid of substance by an over-expansive interpretation of EC competences.1178  
Second, in the Data Retention case, Ireland aimed to protect third pillar powers against intrusion by 
the Community. For this purpose it issued an action for annulment of a Directive that laid down rules 
                                                          
1172  Commission Communication (COM(2009) 195 final) Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation 1717/2006/EC 
establishing an Instrument for Stability, 21.04.2009. 
1173 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) High Level Meeting, OECD, Paris 02-03.03.2005. 
1174 Council Note (10538/06) First Progress Report on the implementation of the EU SALW Strategy, 14.06.2006, 2-8. 
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1176 Case T-306/01, op.cit. note 243, paras 161-162. 
1177 Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, op.cit. note 349, paras 226-227. 
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on the processing of personal data in order to protect the rights of individuals, while ensuring the free 
movement of those data in the EU.1179 Ireland found that its sole or, at least, the main or predominant 
objective was to facilitate the investigation, detection and prosecution of crime, including terrorism. 
Confirming its role as protector of the acquis, the Court held that such a security objective is insufficient 
to take a directive, harmonising national measures in order to ensure the functioning of the internal 
market, out of the first pillar realm.1180 The threshold determining the centre of gravity was even less 
defined here than in the SALW ruling. In no way did the CJEU clarify whether such a security objective 
could only be ancillary or even predominant.1181 
By no means was the judicial approach towards EU external action – and the security-development 
nexus more specifically – thus entirely enlightened when the Court was confronted with the 
significantly overhauled constitutional framework of the Lisbon Treaty. It was predicted – and probably 
hoped – by critics of the SALW judgment that its significance would be short-lived in view of these 
substantial modifications.1182 The extent to which the Court’s methodology-under-construction can 
gradually be further developed or requires a radical servicing, forms the focus of analysis in the last 
section of this chapter.  
5.3. In search for a new methodology under the Lisbon Treaty system 
The constitutional changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon gave the legal foundations of the 
SALW ruling a significant shaking. This casts doubts on the remaining relevance of two central elements 
of the Court’s approach, namely the centre of gravity test and the hierarchical delimitation of the CFSP. 
A key question is therefore what remains of the Court’s established methodology. A theoretical 
examination (5.3.1.) will be followed by an analysis of several recent rulings that provide a first glimpse 
of the Court’s post-Lisbon approach to inter-institutional conflicts on development cooperation and 
the CFSP (5.3.2.). 
                                                          
1179 Directive (2006/24/EC) on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
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5.3.1. Constitutional changes casting doubt on the SALW approach 
The difficult marriage of Articles 21 and 40 TEU 
First, Article 21 TEU obscures the traditional centre of gravity test. It expresses a duty for EU institutions 
to interlink and integrate various external policies and objectives, but gives no clues on how this is to 
be operationalised. The elephant in the room is of course how this corresponds to the principle of 
conferral. The silence of Article 21 TEU on this issue is all the more striking given that its equivalent in 
the TFEU (which excludes the CFSP as only external EU competence) states that the “Union shall ensure 
consistency between its policies and activities, taking all its objectives into account and in accordance 
with the principle of conferral of powers”.1183 Further adding to the confusion on this pledge for TEU-
TFEU integration is that the CFSP, again as the only external competence, has been deprived of its own 
specific objectives. It only maintains the general and misleading coverage of ‘all areas of foreign policy 
and all question relating to the Union’s security’ (cf. supra 2.3.2.).  
The advancement of consistency in the new Treaty system thus appears to have inflated the shroud of 
ambiguity over the choice of legal basis. Now that the Union is expressly tasked to pursue the entire 
range of external objectives in all the different areas of external action, one may indeed wonder what 
remains of the aim-part of the centre of gravity test. In this regard, Van Vooren argues that Article 21 
TEU “ought to be interpreted as a non-competence-specific and non-power-conferring statement of 
the need to integrate objectives into specific policies with particular legal bases”.1184 The recurring 
provision in the Treaties that specific competences shall be carried out within the framework of the 
principles and objectives of the Union’s external action supports this view.1185 This bears resemblance 
to the cross-sectional mainstreaming clauses tasking the Union to take certain issues into account in 
all its activities.1186 Already in titanium dioxide the Court reasoned that such provisions do not alter the 
division of competences.1187 Relying on the wording of Portugal v Council, it could thus be argued that 
Article 21 TEU expresses the idea that specific components of a given measure do not constitute an 
infringement as long as these (1) contribute to the general objectives of the competence under which 
the act is adopted and (2) do not impose extensive and concrete obligations beyond those objectives.  
Article 40 TEU deprives the Court of the second key component of its SALW methodology, namely the 
‘simple but brutal solution’ to prioritise an equally important TFEU over CFSP legal basis. It has been 
                                                          
1183 Article 7 TFEU (emphasis added). 
1184 Van Vooren (2009b) op.cit. note 1149, 245. 
1185 See: Articles 24(2) TEU, 208(1), 212(1) and 214(1) TFEU. 
1186 The Lisbon Treaty considerably augments the use of such clauses, now including gender equality, employment, social 
protection, health, anti-discrimination, environmental protection, animal welfare and consumer protection (see: Articles 8-
13 TFEU). 
1187 Case C-300/89, op.cit. note 1018, para. 22. 
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argued that its new two-way-street can simply be seen as a fusion of two of the Court’s previous 
functions, namely protecting the integrity of the acquis under ex Article 47 TEU and ensuring that no 
EC measure infringes on the conferral of powers under proceedings for annulment.1188 In this view, the 
PNR and Data Retention cases demonstrated that before the Lisbon Treaty there was no legal obstacle 
for the Council and/or Member States to challenge a Community act on the ground that it ought to 
have been adopted under the second or third pillar.1189 The ambiguity that Article 40 TEU casts on the 
CFSP-TFEU conflict rule would then be its only addition to the pre-Lisbon situation. In Data Retention, 
Advocate General Bot indeed confirmed that the method to be used to verify “whether a measure was 
correctly adopted on the basis of the EC Treaty and not that of the EU Treaty” was identical to that 
applied in the other direction, under ex Article 47 TEU.1190 Yet, paradoxically, in substantiating this 
argument, he indirectly exposed a key difference. In his assessment, the question is whether – having 
regard to the centre of gravity of the Data Retention Directive – “the adoption under the EU Treaty of 
the measures contained in that directive [would] have amounted to an infringement of Article 47 
EU”.1191 Notably, the question was thus not whether the contested EC directive in itself infringed ex 
Article 47 TEU. This is a key difference. For one thing, this meant that second and third pillar measures 
were merely protected by default. Only when it could first be established that the Community was 
incompetent to adopt a given measure, was recourse to a CFSP legal basis implicitly and 
noncommittally enabled. For another, the EC-biased Article 47 TEU did not require, or maybe even 
allow, the CJEU to interpret CFSP provisions, as illustrated by the notable circumvention hereof in the 
SALW ruling (cf. supra 5.2.2.).  
Article 40 TEU makes an end to both shortcomings. Rather than only protecting the EC Treaty from 
being affected by the TEU as such, it is now targeted at ensuring that neither the implementation of 
the CFSP nor of TFEU policies affects “the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers 
of the institutions” laid down by the TFEU/TEU. As a consequence, it can no longer be sufficient for the 
Court to merely ensure that a TFEU act that is alleged to infringe Article 40 TEU respects the principle 
of conferral. This in itself cannot rule out an infringement of the CFSP’s procedures and institutional 
balance as prescribed by the second paragraph of that Article. Hillion convincingly argues that the 
Court should instead “actively examine whether a specific CFSP procedure exists for adopting the act 
in question, and if so determine whether such procedure ought to have been followed either in 
                                                          
1188  Current Article 263 TFEU; A. Hinarejos, Judicial Control in the European Union: Reforming Jurisdiction in the 
Intergovernmental Pillars (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 153. 
1189 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, op.cit. note 1095; Case C-301/06, op.cit. note 1180; V. Kronenberger, 'Coherence 
and Consistency of the EU’s Action in International Crisis Management: the Role of the European Court of Justice' in S. 
Blockmans (ed), The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (TMC Asser, The Hague, 2008) 210-
211. 
1190 Case C-301/06, Opinion AG Bot, op.cit. note 1140, para. 77. 
1191 Ibid., para. 78; compare on this issue: Case C-301/06, op.cit. note 1180, paras 75-79. 
226 
 
combination with, or rather than the TFEU procedure altogether”.1192 This can of course only work if 
the Court has interpretative powers over CFSP provisions, which must arguably be seen as indirectly 
accorded under Article 40 TEU.  
In the light of the above, the daunting task of giving effect simultaneously to the provisions of Articles 
21 and 40 TEU are evident. Nonetheless, the Treaty remains uncomfortably silent and does not provide 
a single hint as to their possible reconciliation. If it was in the Maastricht era already “difficult to live 
up to the requirements of consistency and delimitation at the same time”,1193 this is all the more true 
today in the light of the current constitutional integration-delimitation paradox. It is difficult not to see 
Article 40 TEU as the Treaty drafters’ answer to the Court’s ever more controversial fixation on the 
integrity of the ex EC legal order. Does this then mean that, despite all the talk of greater external 
action coherence, the “water-shed” of ex Article 47 TEU is simply “vested with a second layer of 
protection”?1194 It has in this regard been argued that the only way to make sense of Article 40 TEU is 
that it forecloses the application of the absorption theory, implying that it precludes any inclusion of 
CFSP components in a TFEU act, and vice versa.1195 The problem is then that this entirely negates the 
aim of the Lisbon Treaty to infuse more unity into the EU external action system as a whole. This aim 
is confirmed by Article 218(3) TFEU, which appears to make the centre of gravity test indispensable for 
international agreements relating to both CFSP and TFEU competences (cf. infra 5.3.2.).  
Interpreting Article 40 TEU as providing the watertight delimitation with mutual lines of defence 
moreover ignores that its language is no longer about separating Treaties, but about respecting the 
appropriate procedures and institutional powers. While the strict demarcation of ex Article 47 TEU did 
indeed not fit easily with the centre of gravity reasoning, the new delimitation rule is significantly more 
in line with this general choice of legal basis methodology. In a way, Article 40 TEU can therefore even 
be seen as codifying – albeit with a new Janus-head – the cross-pillar approach taken in the SALW 
ruling. Yet, based on its effet utile, it cannot be a simple reaffirmation of the principle of conferred 
powers either, which is already covered in Article 5 TEU. Taken together, the levelling out of the 
delimitation rule and the new scrutiny powers over the reinforced duty of consistency, clear the path 
for the Court to enforce the ‘balance of competences’, which was vainly proposed by the Advocate 
General in the SALW case. To keep the integration-delimitation paradox of the Lisbon Treaty from 
turning into a stalemate, it must be read as a call to steer a middle course between the remaining 
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1194 Heliskoski (2008) op.cit. note 1153, 912. 
1195 For instance: S. Adam, 'The Legal Basis of International Agreements of the European Union in the Post-Lisbon Era' in I. 




delimitation of the CFSP as separate legal subsystem and the need for effective external action to be 
coherent. Just as the need for consistency cannot provide an argument to abandon the delimitation 
imposed by Article 40 TEU, also the latter cannot neglect the need for consistency. If the SALW case 
were ruled today, the Court thus disposes of good arguments to counterbalance the CFSP’s seclusion 
with the principles of conferral and consistency in a manner that does not negate its relevance.  
Ways out of the blind alley 
What if the Court would in an SALW-like case on CFSP-TFEU delimitation again conclude that both 
components are non-incidental and inseparable? The abandonment of hierarchy in the Treaty strips 
the Court of its knife to cut the Gordian knot. A number of ways out are imaginable, but it is yet unclear 
how they would operate. A first possibility consists of giving concrete effect to the now judiciable duty 
of consistency. It is however unclear whether this duty is fully and practically enforceable or represents 
a sort of working philosophy. One suggestion for operationalising consistency is that it could mean for 
the relationship between policy areas and initiatives, what the duty of loyal cooperation means for the 
relationship between and among EU institutions and Member States.1196 The latter is set out in Article 
4(3) TEU: 
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full 
mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. 
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment 
of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the 
Union. 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives. 
Article 13(2) TEU confirms that these obligations apply equally to EU institutions. Building further on 
the landmark ERTA ruling, the Court has attached ever more concrete legal and procedural obligations 
to this loyalty principle.1197 These are no end in itself, but – as is clear from the wording of Article 4(3) 
TEU – aim to ensure the attainment of the EU’s objectives, and – as the Court repeatedly emphasises 
– “the requirement of unity in the international representation of the [Union]”.1198 In essence, the 
decisive criterion applied by the Court in ruling whether or not individual Member State or institutional 
action is allowed, is not so much the nature of the EU competence at stake, but its impact on the 
                                                          
1196 For a more detailed account of this view: Van Elsuwege and Merket (2012) op.cit. note 354, 43-45. 
1197 For a critical account of this line of case law: A. Delgado Casteleiro and J. Larik, 'The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless 
Loyalty in EU External Relations?' (2011) European Law Review 36(4), 524-541. 
1198 See: Opinion 2/91, ILO, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, para. 36; Opinion 1/94, op.cit. note 1020, para. 106. 
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consistency of EU external action.1199 In other words, such individual action is excluded when it is liable 
to have negative consequences for the Union. If we now translate this rationale from the context of 
the EU’s international representation to the interaction of policy areas and initiatives, we arrive at the 
moving boundary effect proposed above as an alternative approach in the SALW case. The duty of 
consistency could then work as a rule of primacy or hierarchy in case of conflicting activity. This gives 
leverage to the argument that the ECOWAS Decision, by unilaterally altering the cooperative method, 
was inconsistent with ongoing development activity and thus ran counter the unity of EU external 
action (cf. supra 5.2.2.).  
A second way out of the blind alley created by the relinquishment of hierarchy in Article 40 TEU could 
be to re-evaluate the possibility of combining a CFSP legal basis with other Union competences. The 
fundamental ban in this regard was broken, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, by the 
accession of the EU to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. The Council Decision 
regulating this accession was adopted on the joint legal bases of Articles 37 TEU (CFSP), 209 TFEU 
(development cooperation) and 212 TFEU (financial and technical cooperation with third countries). In 
line with the levelling-up scenario (cf. supra 5.1.), an ad hoc procedure was applied combining 
unanimity in the Council with the consent of the Parliament.1200 Notably, the deliberate choice in the 
Treaty to exclude the Parliament from CFSP affairs was thus not less surmountable than the procedural 
choices made for other policy areas. This is in line with the unified procedure of Article 218 TFEU.  
However, crucial reservations arise when extending this new take towards other types of (non-) 
legislative acts. The exclusion of the CJEU from the CFSP – and the doubtful application of several 
constitutional principles resulting from this – arguably requires that it must be possible to determine 
for each provision of a given act whether or not if falls under CFSP competence. In the case of 
international agreements this may be possible because, even if these are adopted under a single 
Council decision, they are generally compartmentalised in character. Indeed, in the Amity Treaty the 
CFSP legal basis clearly relates to a distinct chapter on the ‘pacific settlement of disputes’. One may 
therefore wonder whether such treaties, because of their more easily distinguishable compartments, 
form an exception to the judicial rule of singularity (cf. supra 5.1.). Among others, this stipulates that 
an act’s objectives must be ‘indissociably linked’ for it to be based on all corresponding legal bases. 
Article 218 TFEU indeed pleads against the application of this rule, which would require that 
implementing decisions of international agreements are split along the lines of their legal bases. Yet, 
it is questionable whether this reasoning can be extended to unilateral EU acts. Article 40 TEU 
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1200 Council Decision (2012/308/CFSP) on the accession of the EU to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 
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empowers the Court to distinguish the applicable legal regime as per their CFSP or TFEU components. 
If these can be discerned, the Court customarily requires the measure to be split along those lines. Yet, 
in the light of the interrelated nature of external relations, it is not unlikely that the various 
components of a unilateral EU act transcend a singular objective or competence boundary. This could 
mean that the Court is unable to determine which components of a measure are governed by the CFSP 
legal regime and which fall under the TFEU. Allowing a combined CFSP-TFEU legal basis in such a 
scenario would obscure the constitutional limits to the Court’s jurisdiction, and is therefore unlikely to 
be accepted. 
A third possible way out of the deadlock is to apply the lex specialis derogat legi generali rule. It has 
been argued that the Court, in applying its centre of gravity test, may take the view that the CFSP, as 
lex generalis, can only serve as legal basis if no other external competence is applicable.1201 Yet, in the 
light of the broad drafting of many TFEU external policies, the chance of finding a more specific 
competence is rather likely. This risks therefore to simply re-endorse the SALW methodology, going 
against the explicitly abandoned subordination of the CFSP.1202 Craig nonetheless expects a latent 
subordination to occur given that “the presumption that ‘normal’ EU law should predominate is deeply 
ingrained in the judicial psyche and will not easily be shifted”.1203 The Court’s preference for measures 
it can adjudicate on is not unlikely and finds support in the EU’s commitment to the rule of law and the 
TEU preamble putting forth an ever closer Union as ultimate objective.1204 It is indeed almost a truism 
to refer to the Court of Justice “as the motor of integration within the European Union legal order”.1205 
A final possibility for the Court to overcome this ‘catch-22 situation’ is to accord more weight to the 
content-prong of the centre of gravity test. This can compensate for the decreased chance that CJEU 
concludes that a measure pursues distinct objectives in the light of Article 21 TEU. Already in the SALW 
ruling, the Court reasoned that there “may be some measures, such as the grant of political support 
for a moratorium or even the collection and destruction of weapons” which fall rather under the CFSP 
radar.1206 Also the Commission in its argumentation appeared to draw a line between political actions 
covered by the CFSP, such as the deployment of military or policy missions to disarm local militia or 
the dismantlement of weapon producing factories, and technical and financial support for local 
initiatives falling under EC development cooperation.1207 These rules of thumb remind of the criteria 
                                                          
1201 M. Cremona, 'Coherence Through Law: What difference Will the Treaty of Lisbon Make?' (2008) Hamburg Review of Social 
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1202 C. Hillion, 'Cohérence et Action Extérieure de L'Union' in E. Neframi (ed), Objectifs et Compétences de l'Union Européenne 
(Brussels, Bruylant, 2012) 245-247. 
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1204 Cardwell (2013) op.cit. note 382, 451-452. 
1205 Cremona (2014) op.cit. note 1031, 15. 
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that were deducted from the mishmash of programmes and initiatives approaching the nexus in 
section 3.2.3. Yet, the SALW case also indicated that it is not always easy or possible to determine 
which content typically relates to what competence. The setting up of a technical secretariat, according 
to the CJEU, could for instance be undertaken by both development cooperation and the CFSP. 
Paradoxically then, while this approach is meant to unburden the aim-part of the test, it can only work 
for content that is closely related to certain objectives, bringing us back to square one.1208 
The Lisbon Treaty, by casting doubt on traditional judicial methodologies in the area of external action, 
causes considerable ambiguity that leaves the judiciary a wide spectrum of choice. All eyes are thus on 
the Court to understand how it will settle the constitutional dust regarding the choice of legal basis in 
EU external action, and particularly the position of the CFSP therein. Ironically therefore, “in asking the 
Court to protect the specificity of the CFSP, the authors of the Treaty may paradoxically have eroded 
it, by entrenching the policy and its governance further in the EU constitutional order, characterised 
by the authority of a powerful judicature”.1209 
5.3.2. Preliminary indications from post-Lisbon litigation 
In the absence of a worthy follower to the SALW-case in a post-Lisbon setting, analysts grasp in the 
dark on how the Court will seek to equilibrate the integration-delimitation paradox on the CFSP-TFEU 
crossing point. Three recent rulings nonetheless give some preliminary indications, namely on the 
targeted sanctions, Philippines Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and Mauritius (Pirate 
Transfer Agreement) cases. Without aiming to annotate the full scope and details of these judgments, 
this section seeks to extract elements and general tendencies that are relevant for and shed light on 
the judicial approach to the new EU external action architecture, and the position of CFSP and 
development cooperation therein.  
The targeted sanctions case  
The 2012 targeted sanctions case concerned the appropriate legal basis for restrictive measures 
directed against natural or legal persons, a practice of ever-growing importance in EU external action. 
It forms the CJEU’s post-Lisbon answer to the Kadi-episode, which initiated a process of judicialisation 
in the CFSP domain.1210 The procedurally intricate and legally moot construction endorsed therein, 
requiring recourse to ex Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC for adopting sanctions against persons and entities 
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associated with Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, cried out for a Treaty revision. However, 
in their efforts to provide a more firm and complete legal basis, the Treaty drafters paradoxically 
generated new confusion by including two disconnected but overlapping provisions without specifying 
a task division.  
As part of the Treaty Title on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) Article 75 TFEU enables 
the Council and Parliament, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, to prevent and 
combat terrorism by laying down a framework for administrative measures regarding capital 
movements and payments owned or held by natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities. 
Article 215 TFEU, on the other hand, is the formal successor to ex Article 301 EC. It provides for the 
necessary measures to give effect to a CFSP decision on the interruption or reduction of economic and 
financial relations with one or more third countries, as well as restrictive measures against natural or 
legal persons and groups. The latter shall be adopted by the Council acting by a qualified majority on 
a joint proposal from the High Representative and the Commission. The fact that the Parliament only 
has to be informed hereof led one observer to call this article the “dinosaur of intergovernmentalism 
in the TFEU”.1211 In addition, the flexibility clause of Article 352 TFEU now explicitly specifies that it 
“cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the [CFSP] and any acts adopted pursuant 
to this Article shall respect the limits set out in Article 40, second paragraph [TEU]” (cf. supra 5.2.2.). 
The contours of these provisions were immediately put to the test as the 2008 Kadi and Al Barakaat 
ruling required a revision of Regulation 881/2002/EC as to allow persons targeted by sanctions to have 
“a reasonable opportunity of putting [their] case to the competent authorities”.1212 This led to the 
adoption, under Article 215 TFEU, of a new Regulation 1286/2009/EU that introduced a listing 
procedure. It provides listed persons or entities of the reasons hereof, as instructed by the UN Security 
Council sanctions committee, and guarantees their fundamental rights of defence.1213 Unsurprisingly, 
in the light of its exclusion under Article 215, the Parliament submitted a plea for annulment, arguing 
that the measure should instead have been adopted pursuant to Article 75 TFEU. The Czech Republic, 
France, Sweden as well as the Commission acted in support of the Council. The targeted sanctions 
ruling is key for the light it sheds on the new sanctions regime,1214 but also – and more relevant to this 
research – for the insights it provides on the Treaty’s reorganisation of external action legal bases and 
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the validation of the Court’s scrutiny powers in this regard. Albeit not its key focus, this concerned the 
first ruling relating to the depillarised CFSP.  
The Court starts by observing that “Articles 75 TFEU and 215 TFEU relate to different European Union 
policies that pursue objectives which, although complementary, do not have the same scope”.1215 It 
argues that the delicate combination of ex Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC is now consolidated and 
mirrored in Article 215 TFEU. The context and tenor of Article 75 TFEU is different and “simply refers 
to the definition, for the purpose of preventing terrorism …, of a framework for administrative 
measures with regard to capital movements and payments” when this is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the AFSJ.1216 In subsequently arguing whether or not Article 215 TFEU could fully cover 
the contested Regulation, particularly given its silence on counterterrorism, emphasis was put on the 
explicit bridge it provides towards decisions taken under the CFSP. Yet, the inexact scope of that last 
competence caused trouble for the judiciary. In the absence of specific primary law objectives, 
Advocate-General Bot proposed to detract Article 21(2)(a) to (c) from the common listing as these “are 
in essence the same as those assigned to the CFSP under [ex] Article 11(1) TEU”. 1217  This path 
dependency-approach is useful, and perhaps unavoidable, but is of course not fully in line with the 
letter and spirit of the Treaty. It moreover represents a partly distorted reality. In fact, under the 
previous Treaty framework the CFSP already shared the aim of Article 21(2)(b) to support democracy, 
the rule of law and human rights with EU development cooperation 1218  as well as financial and 
technical cooperation with third countries.  
The Court circumvents this delicate question and simply reiterates that the objectives of preserving 
peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, set out in Article 21(2)(c) TEU, are 
part of the general provisions on EU external action. Whereas this implies that these are to be targeted 
under all external competences, the Court makes clear that the scope of the CFSP in the new legal 
order is a broad one. In line with Article 24(1) TEU it covers “all areas of foreign policy and all questions 
relating to the Union’s security”.1219 Remarkably, for lack of much Treaty guidance on the CFSP, the 
Court then turns to the CSDP which forms an inherent part of the former but is not at all at issue in this 
case. It reverts to Article 43(1) TEU affirming that CSDP activity “may contribute to the fight against 
terrorism”. This might set a potentially contentious precedent as it goes against the indefinite nature 
of CFSP provisions, which arguably results from determined Treaty drafting (cf. supra 2.3.2.). Where 
its avoidance of interpreting CFSP provisions led to subordination in the SALW ruling, the Court feels 
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less restricted by the current constitutional framework and even uses these TEU provisions to expand 
the scope of Article 215 TFEU:  
Given that terrorism constitutes a threat to peace and international security, the object of actions 
undertaken in the sphere of the CFSP, and the measures taken in order to give effect to that policy 
in the Union’s external actions, in particular, restrictive measures for the purpose of Article 215(2) 
TFEU, can be to combat terrorism. 
While acknowledging that combating terrorism and its financing can also be undertaken as part of the 
AFSJ, the CJEU exposes a number of arguments why the contested Regulation was rightly adopted 
under Article 215 TFEU. This includes (again) a preambular reference to the aim of maintaining 
international peace and security, the fact that it is similar to previous Regulation 881/2002/EC and the 
relation of the contested act to a CFSP decision on restrictive measures that moreover establishes a 
system of interaction between the Security Council and the Union.1220 Basing such action on Article 75 
TFEU would render Article 215 TFEU “largely redundant”.1221 Safeguarding the effet utile of Article 215 
in this manner indirectly preserves the integrity of the CFSP, as well as its practical significance given 
that sanctions represent a considerable portion of its current activity.1222  
The fact that this ruling only indirectly relates to the CFSP precludes much generalisation. Nonetheless, 
it contains a number of indications confirming that the Lisbon Treaty struck down its narrow pillar walls. 
The specific powers the CFSP is accorded in the fight against terrorism make it unlikely that the CJEU 
would in future cases approach the CFSP restrictively as lex generalis. A passage on procedural 
compatibility moreover confirms that the judicial approach towards the CFSP has been considerably 
normalised. While it still rules out the possibility of a joint CFSP-TFEU legal basis, this is no longer 
according to the dogmatic SALW ban, but in so far as the respective procedures are incompatible.1223 
Contrary to the ordinary legislative procedure applicable under Article 75 TFEU, Article 215(2) TFEU 
entails the mere information of the Parliament and moreover requires a previous decision in the CFSP. 
This last element is not as such problematic for the CJEU, but the fact that this calls for unanimous 
voting in the Council acting alone, makes that these differences are such as to render those procedures 
incompatible. Strikingly however, the Court discusses these procedural issues in its preliminary 
observations, even before examining the aim and content of the measure that would eventually lead 
                                                          
1220 Ibid., paras 67-78.  
1221 Ibid., para. 84. 
1222 This risks to be to the detriment of the external dimension of the AFSJ. By failing to specify whether the enumerated 
factors justifying recourse to Article 215 TFEU are cumulative or individually sufficient, the Court ambiguously left open what 
remains of the AFSJ’s security component (I. Bosse-Platière, 'La Cour Confirme le Rattachement de la Lutte Contre le 
Terrorisme Internationale et son Financement à la PESC' (2013) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 2013(2), 119). This 
question resurfaces in the Mauritius Pirate Transfer Agreement case discussed below. 
1223 Case C-130/10, op.cit. note 1017, paras 47-49.  
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to the conclusion of the single basis of Article 215 TFEU. This reflection therefore seems to serve the 
sole purpose of reviving the ostracised titanium dioxide legacy. In contrast to the series of cases 
suggesting that no procedural differences are too big to be overcome (cf. supra 5.1.), the CJEU opines 
here that the titanium dioxide approach, for which if finds questionable validation in Case C-178/03 
with regard to the co-decision procedure, “is still valid, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
in the context of the ordinary legislative procedure”.1224  
The Court moreover confirms its singularity rule, implicating that various components of an act must 
be “indissociably linked” for it to be adopted on the multiple corresponding legal bases.1225 Above it 
was argued that such intrinsic inseparability between a CFSP and TFEU aim or content would sit 
uncomfortably with the exclusion of jurisdiction over part of the legal act. On the other hand, a 
fundamental ban on joining up such legal bases could be seen as colliding with Article 218 TFEU as well 
as 21 TEU. Consequently, the Court had to maintain its objection on different grounds. It finds a 
solution in no longer submitting the CFSP to separate rules of delimitation, but applying its general 
methodology regarding the choice of legal basis. However, the CJEU fails to go the whole way in this 
approach. In responding to the Parliament’s argument that, since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the EU can adopt “measures concerning fundamental rights only under the ordinary legislative 
procedure or with the consent of the Parliament”,1226 it submits the CFSP to a special treatment. It first 
reasons that “it is not procedures that define the legal basis of a measure but the legal basis of a 
measure that determines the procedures to be followed in adopting that measure”.1227 While this 
would arguably have been sufficient to counter the Parliament’s position, it goes on to argue that the 
procedural differences between Articles 75 and 215 TFEU “is the result of the choice made by the 
framers of the Treaty of Lisbon conferring a more limited role on the Parliament with regard to the 
Union’s action under the CFSP”.1228 While constitutional choices had not prevented the application of 
the levelling-up scenario for other competences, this can thus not be extended towards the CFSP. 
This could in fact be seen as the message of Article 40 TEU.1229 Yet, the Court turns down the invitation 
of both the Council and the Advocate General to draw in this provision.1230 Apparently, it did not (yet) 
want to put itself in a position of having to clarify its interpretation of this thorny constitutional rule. 
Nonetheless, between the lines of the ruling’s predominant focus on targeted sanctions, the Court’s 
                                                          
1224 Ibid., para. 46. 
1225 Ibid., para. 36. 
1226 Ibid., para. 29. 
1227 Ibid., para. 80. 
1228 Ibid., para. 82. Notably, this so-called constitutional choice had not caused any troubles in allowing the Parliament’s 
consent for signing the Amity Treaty with Southeast Asia (cf. supra 5.3.1.). 
1229 Van Elsuwege (2013) op.cit. note 369, 122. 
1230 Case C-130/10, op.cit. note 1017, para. 41; Case C-130/10, Opinion AG Bot, op.cit. note 1215, para. 67. According to 
Bosse-Platière the Court’s silence confirms the limited relevance of this mutual non-affectation clause (Bosse-Platière (2013) 
op.cit. note 1222, 119). 
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refusal to interpret the CFSP restrictively as well as its interest in and interpretative jurisdiction over 
various CFSP and CSDP provisions (that were not invoked by any of the parties) convey the rationale 
of this provision.1231 Moreover, the fact that the Court can now assuredly look both ways of the CFSP-
TFEU boundary, appeared to mean that it was no longer deterred by its jurisdictional restrictions to 
enforce constitutional principles across the whole Union legal order.1232 It noted that “the duty to 
respect fundamental rights is imposed, in accordance with Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, on all the institutions and bodies of the Union … [and thus] bears also 
on Union measures giving effect to resolutions of the Security Council”.1233 
On the whole, the judiciary displays a balance between protecting the specificity of the CFSP, as 
required by the unrecorded second paragraph of Article 40 TEU, and respecting the limits of its own 
jurisdiction. Key questions that were not posed in this case relate to the balance between the upgraded 
duty of consistency and the incontestable delimitation ensuing from the principle of conferral. In other 
words, how to reconcile the increasingly multi-faceted nature of legal instruments, with the need to 
ensure that no Treaty competences become nugatory. Certain aspects of the judicial approach hereto 
are laid bare in the Philippines PCA and the Mauritius Pirate Transfer Agreement cases, both litigated 
in June 2014. Centred on the choice of legal basis, these cases – again particularly relevant for analysing 
the judicial approach towards the security-development nexus – respectively saw the Commission 
defending the development cooperation foundation of one agreement and the Parliament contesting 
the CFSP basis of another.  
The Philippines PCA case 
The case on the Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the EU and the 
Republic of the Philippines deals with the nature and scope of EU development policy after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The agreement forms part of a new generation of PCAs, negotiated 
throughout the past decade with countries from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Partnership and cooperation are established in the broadest of terms, ranging from trade and 
investment, through justice, migration, transport, tourism, culture and fisheries to combating 
terrorism and crime.1234 The Commission had initially proposed to adopt this agreement pursuant to 
Articles 207 and 209 TFEU, respectively on CCP and development cooperation. It contested the 
addition by the Council of Articles 79(3), 91, 100 and 191(4) TFEU, dealing with readmission, transport 
                                                          
1231 C. Hillion, 'Fighting Terrorism Through the Common Foreign and Security Policy' in I. Govaere and S. Poli (eds), EU 
Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating Threats and Crises (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2014) 86. 
1232 Hillion (2014a) op.cit. note 1013, 66-69. 
1233 Case C-130/10, op.cit. note 1017, paras 83-84. 
1234 Framework Agreement on partnership and cooperation between the EU and its member states, of the one part, and the 
Republic of the Philippines, of the other part, (Council, 15616/10) 21.01.2011 (hereafter EU-Philippines PCA). 
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and environment.1235 For this purpose it submitted a plea for annulling the implementing Decision, 
arguing that even though the agreement covers a wide range of sectors, it pursues the single objective 
of development cooperation. Only the trade part could in its view not be seen as merely incidental.1236 
The Court is hereby presented with a constitutional dilemma.1237 On the one hand, an inflation of legal 
bases could harm the effectiveness of EU development cooperation. It would moreover be contrary to 
the intentions of Article 209 TFEU empowering the Union to conclude “any agreement helping to 
achieve the objectives referred to in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union and in Article 208 of 
this Treaty”. On the other hand, such goals of comprehensiveness may not undermine the Treaties’ 
institutional balance and decision-making arrangements.  
In a rather terse ruling, the Court commences by confirming, and in fact even expanding, the wide 
notion of development under the current Treaty framework. The primary focus on the eradication of 
poverty in Article 208 TFEU is not perceived as limiting its scope to measures directly targeted at this 
purpose. The first paragraph of that Article indeed prescribes that it shall be conducted within the 
framework of the principles and objectives of EU external action. The Court deduces from this that 
development cooperation shall also pursue the objectives referred to in Article 21(2) TEU, such as that 
of fostering the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing 
countries. 1238  This indicates that Article 21 TEU does not serve to detract from the division of 
competences as it stood before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, further 
extrapolating this reasoning could also serve to undermine the principle of conferral. It is indeed 
unclear on what basis the CJEU determines which objectives of that general framework might be 
pursued under which competences and to what extent. This is even more tenuous in the light of the 
support found for this broad view in the blanket European Consensus on Development as well as the 
2006 DCI Regulation.1239 This creates the awkward impression that rather than the significant Treaty 
changes, two pre-Lisbon documents determine the scope of today’s development policy. 
To determine whether certain specific provisions of the PCA fall within this broadly defined scope, the 
Court rakes up its Portugal v Council methodology (cf. supra 5.2.1.).1240 It thereby rejects the Council’s 
argument that this methodology is not transposable on account of the evolution of cooperation 
agreements, which are today more comprehensive in scope and binding in their consequences. For 
                                                          
1235 Council Decision (2012/272/EU) on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the Framework Agreement on Partnership and 
Cooperation between EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of the Philippines, of the other part, OJ 
L134/3, 24.05.2012. 
1236 Case C-377/12, Commission v Council (Philippines PCA), ECLI:EU:C:2014:1903, paras 16-17. 
1237 M. Broberg and R. Holdgaard, 'Demarcating the Union's Development Cooperation Policy after Lisbon: Commission v. 
Council (Philippines PCFA)' (2015) Common Market Law Review 52(2), 561. 
1238 Case C-377/12, op.cit. note 1236, para. 37. 
1239 See particularly ibid., paras 42-55. 
1240 Case C-377/12, op.cit. note 1236, para. 38; Case C-268/94, op.cit. note 374. 
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the Council this implies that it is no longer possible to determine which fields of activity prevail or are 
merely incidental, let alone that these agreements can be reduced to development cooperation 
alone.1241 Therefore, it is not the Court’s approach on a 1994 EC-India Agreement on Partnership and 
Development that should apply, but rather its classic centre-of-gravity case law. The Court, to the 
contrary, finds that far from casting doubt on its findings in Portugal v Council, that evolution 
corresponds to an increase in the objectives of development cooperation, again reflecting the vision 
set out in the European Consensus.1242 The Portugal v Council methodology then merely represents 
the other side of the same coin in determining the appropriate legal basis of a Union measure. As put 
by Advocate General Mengozzi, the characterisation of an agreement  
must be determined having regard to its essential object – principal or predominant to repeat the 
terms used in the case-law cited by the Council – and not in terms of individual clauses, provided 
that those clauses do not impose such extensive obligations concerning the specific matters 
referred to that those obligations in fact constitute objectives distinct from – and thus not of a 
secondary or indirect nature – those of development cooperation.1243 
Arguably, however, there is potential for contradiction between both methodologies.1244 Whereas 
classically, the Court focusses on the scope of a measure’s aim and content, in Portugal v Council it 
based itself on the nature of obligations that stem from an agreement’s objectives. Equating both 
might cause confusion. What if a measure imposes concrete obligations under a component that is 
merely incidental? Does the outcome of the test remain unaltered or will the nature of obligations 
count as an extra criterion nonetheless necessitating an additional legal basis?1245 
After this rather doctrinal enunciation, the CJEU turns to the analysis of the Philippines PCA. That 
agreement does not contain any reference to development in its title and development cooperation, 
rather than being a transversal component, forms the subject of a single Article 29. Nevertheless, the 
Court sees the Commission’s characterisation of the PCA as development agreement confirmed in its 
general focus and preamble. To substantiate this finding it cherry-picks, among the panoply of areas 
mentioned, those preambular references that support its claim.1246 More solid evidence is found in the 
                                                          
1241  Case C-377/12, op.cit. note 1236, paras 24 and 41. This is according to the Council corroborated by the fact that 
“obligations contained in the PCA will continue to apply even after the objectives related to development have been attained” 
(Case 377/12, Commission v Council (Philippines PCA), Opinion AG Mengozzi, ECLI:EU:C:2014:29, para. 23). 
1242 Case C-377/12, op.cit. note 1236, para. 42. 
1243 Case 377/12, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1241, para. 27. 
1244 L. Ankersmit, 'The boundaries of the development cooperation legal basis: what to make of the Court's "centre of gravity" 
test?', europeanlawblog.eu, 13.06.2014. 
1245 As put by the Council, “[a]s the most limited obligation could lead to a wide development of the external relations with 
the third country party to the framework agreement, the criterion proposed by the Commission that an obligation must be 
extensive in order to constitute an objective distinct from those of the development cooperation cannot be accepted” (Case 
C-377/12, op.cit. note 1236, para. 25). 
1246 Case C-377/12, op.cit. note 1236, para. 46. 
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recurring references to regional development throughout the PCA. Moreover, in the agreement’s 
general principles the parties “confirm their commitment to promoting sustainable development, 
cooperating to address the challenges of climate change and to contributing to the internationally 
agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Development Goals”.1247  
Advocate General Mengozzi attaches an accurate call for vigilance, especially because the 
determination of the appropriate legal basis has constitutional significance. He cautions that 
development cooperation is defined so broadly at EU level that it can become difficult to demonstrate 
that, alongside the large number of sectors it encompasses, there are still objectives distinct from and 
inseparably linked to those pursued under its scope.1248 He contends that the EU’s relationship with 
developing countries  
has progressed from being a mere system of financial assistance to the establishment of 
comprehensive and more elaborate agreements in which reference to ‘mutual’ advantages is not 
mere diplomatic language and the relationship put in place is much less lopsided and is, thus, more 
balanced. It is, however, for that reason that, while I can certainly acknowledge the multi-facetted 
nature of development cooperation, I find it, by contrast, more difficult to regard the legal basis 
for development cooperation alone as sufficient when so many and varied areas are covered by 
the same agreement.1249  
Even though Mengozzi is thus not entirely at ease with the continuous expansion of the notion of 
development, this nonetheless drives him to conclude that the PCA’s provisions on transport and 
environment do not trespass against that notion as it currently stands. This conclusion results from the 
Portugal v Council test, which the Court applies rather more tersely.1250 Although clearly broader than 
the EC-India agreement, it finds that these provisions and their aims “are integrated into the 
development policy defined in the European Consensus”, included in the DCI Regulation and linked in 
the PCA itself to developmental objectives. 1251  Moreover, they do not set out concrete policy 
prescriptions. While this conclusion is rather unsurprising in the light of earlier case law, the extension 
of this reasoning to the provisions on readmission is more contentious. In Article 26(3) of the 
Philippines PCA, the parties pledge to readmit any of their nationals upon request, without undue delay 
once nationality has been established and due process carried out. The fourth paragraph expresses a 
commitment “to conclude as soon as possible an agreement for the admission/readmission of their 
                                                          
1247 Article 1 EU-Philippines PCA. 
1248 Case 377/12, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1241, para. 29. 
1249 Ibid., para. 43. 
1250 Case C-377/12, op.cit. note 1236, paras 48-59; Case 377/12, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1241, paras 46-77. 
1251 Case C-377/12, op.cit. note 1236, paras 49-51. 
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nationals”. The Court cannot get round the observation that this establishes a binding commitment.1252 
Also according to Mengozzi, it marks a change in wording from merely listing aims towards signalling 
“a clear and unambiguous obligation and specifically [anticipating] the results to be achieved … and 
the instruments to be used subsequently in order to attain a clearly defined legal objective”.1253 He 
adds that this contributes more to EU interests than to advancing development objectives. It is 
therefore all the more striking that the Advocate General nonetheless arrives at the conclusion that 
this does not require the inclusion of a separate legal basis. In a remarkable contortion performance, 
he finds unconvincing evidence in the simple fact that this binding commitment results from a political 
deal that would not have existed “without the overall cooperation put in place by the PCA”.1254 This 
implies that the objective of readmission “is not autonomous, and is thus of a secondary or indirect 
nature”.1255 
The Court does not follow this strange reasoning, but instead opts to narrow the meaning of what 
constitute concrete obligations in the sense of Portugal v Council. The obligation in the PCA to adopt a 
readmission agreement is in its view not problematic. To the contrary, the fact that such an agreement 
will be much more comprehensive and concrete serves to illustrate the limited commitment imposed 
by the PCA’s provisions.1256 A legally binding commitment must in this reasoning thus only be seen as 
a concrete obligation if no further implementation is required. As no limits are set, this approach could 
have a particularly expansive impact on the scope of future development agreements.  
The narrowing of the concept of a ‘concrete obligation’ in any case meant yet another widening of the 
elastic notion of development policy. This not only relates to the breadth of policy areas it can cover, 
but now also the depth of cooperation. Arguably, this judgment means that agreements adopted 
pursuant to Article 209(2) TFEU can attach significantly more conditions and obligations, “without this 
entailing institutional complications on the EU end”. 1257 The Court hereby solves the constitutional 
dilemma between the need for multi-faceted instruments and the principle of conferral, rather more 
in the benefit of the former. Broberg and Holdgaard argue that this does not provide sufficient 
guarantees against competence creep as the CJEU failed to univocally clarify “why the provisions in the 
PCFA concerning readmission are not sufficiently ‘concrete’ to warrant their own legal basis, and how 
much more concretization can be allowed before an additional legal basis is necessary”.1258 
                                                          
1252 Ibid., para. 57. 
1253 Case 377/12, Opinion AG Mengozzi, op.cit. note 1241, para. 67. 
1254 Ibid., para. 72. 
1255 Ibid. 
1256 Case C-377/12, op.cit. note 1236, para. 58. 
1257 S. Peers, 'The CJEU enhances the EU’s role as an external actor', eulawanalysis.blogspot.com, 11.06.2014. In a similar 
fashion, this ruling implies a narrowing of the impact of opt-ins (of the UK and Ireland) and opt-outs (of Denmark) in the AFSJ 
concerning readmission, which would otherwise require agreements to be adopted subject to separate decisions. 
1258 Broberg and Holdgaard (2015) op.cit. note 1237, 566. 
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The Mauritius Pirate Transfer Agreement case  
Contrary to the long judicial silence on the CFSP prior to the Lisbon Treaty, it took less than two years 
after the targeted sanctions judgment before the Court was again presented with an inter-institutional 
dispute involving the CFSP. Despite the Treaty’s clear message that the CJEU has no “jurisdiction with 
respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with respect to acts 
adopted on the basis of those provisions”,1259 this represents another ironic illustration of how policy-
makers are nonetheless driven towards the judiciary for enlightening the legal nature of that 
competence. The Parliament, aiming at further judicial confirmation of its upgraded external powers, 
brought this case against the Council. At dispute was Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP on the signing 
and conclusion of the agreement between the EU and the Republic of Mauritius regarding the 
conditions of transfer of suspected pirates captured by the CSDP naval operation Atalanta. 1260 
Contesting its lack of involvement, the Parliament plead to annul this Decision.    
Background and context: tying legal to operational deterrence of piracy 
Before going deeper into the details of this ruling, it is interesting to extend a bit more on the 
Agreement and its context. The Transfer Agreement relates to the EU’s first naval operation 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta. The latter was erected in reply to a 2008 UNSC call to tackle the rising human and 
economic costs of piracy in the Indian Ocean by joining forces in protecting international shipping 
(particularly vessels of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and World Food Programme ships 
delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia).1261 The high-profile CSDP operation Atalanta, still running at 
the time of writing, aims to deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali 
coast (cf. infra 6.2.2.). While the exact constellation varies, Atalanta typically consists of four to seven 
combat vessels, two auxiliary ships and three to four military patrol aircraft.  
This security dimension can however not work without legal deterrence of piracy, and thus a well-
functioning law enforcement and judicial component.1262 Article 12 of the Atalanta Joint Action in this 
regard regulates the transfer of persons arrested and detained with a view to their prosecution. On 
the basis of Somalia’s acceptance of their jurisdiction, this can either be to the vessel state which took 
them captive or “if that State cannot, or does not wish to exercise its jurisdiction” to any state 
                                                          
1259 Article 275 TFEU. The exceptions are of course the monitoring of compliance with Article 40 TEU and the review of the 
legality of targeted sanctions.  
1260 Council Decision (2011/640/CFSP) on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the EU and the Republic of 
Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the EU-led naval force to 
the Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of suspected pirates after transfer, OJ L 254/1, 30.09.2011. 
1261 UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1814) 5893rd meeting, 15.05.2008. 
1262 I. Bosse-Platière, 'Le Volet Judiciaire de la Lutte contre la Piraterie Maritime en Somalie: Les Accords de Transfert Conclus 
par l’Union Européenne avec des États Tiers' in V. Cattoir-Jonville and J. Saison (eds), Les Différentes Facettes du Concept 
Juridique de Sécurité — Mélanges en l’Honneur du Professeur Pierre-André Lecocq (Université Nord Lille 2, Lille, 2011) 101. 
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accepting to take on this task. That last option is only allowed if the conditions for transfer have been 
agreed with that third state in a manner consistent with relevant international law, particularly in order 
to guarantee that no one shall be subjected to the death penalty, torture or any cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.1263 For that purpose the EU concludes transfer agreements with third states in 
Somalia’s neighbourhood. Besides Mauritius, these have been concluded with Kenya, the Seychelles 
and Tanzania.1264 Since the start of operation Atalanta, over 130 pirates have been transferred in this 
manner, including 79 to Kenya, 42 to the Seychelles and 12 to Mauritius.1265  
These transfer agreements are an answer to two key EU concerns in the legal deterrence of piracy. 
First, there is a self-interest motivation of EU Member States (or third States participating in Atalanta) 
that are generally reluctant to try suspects and detain convicted pirates themselves due to a range of 
legal and practical difficulties. Even though piracy has for centuries been a crime of universal 
jurisdiction, the fight against it is plagued by uncertainty, inconsistency and legal voids.1266 All relevant 
UNSC resolutions trigger the ‘bazooka’ of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use “all necessary means” 
in countering piracy, but give limited to no guidelines on how to assign jurisdiction and enforce law.1267 
This is further complicated by the multinationality of piracy situations, where the suspected pirates, 
the rescuers, the attacked vessel crew, the ship flag, cargo and destination not seldom belong to as 
many states. In the absence of EU-wide criminal procedures, the prosecution of piracy suspects 
captured by Atalanta necessarily takes place in a national context. Many countries joining this fight 
against piracy did initially not think the complexity hereof through in legal terms. They either lacked 
the appropriate laws to label piracy as a criminal offence or the necessary procedures for 
prosecution.1268 The amalgamation of differing domestic legislation moreover causes considerable 
fragmentation and inconsistency.1269  Denmark and Germany, for instance, can only try suspected 
pirates that threaten their national interests or the safety of their citizens, while a French naval vessel 
                                                          
1263 Article 12(2) Joint Action (2008/581/CFSP) op.cit. note 1169. 
1264  Kenya terminated the agreement after domestic criticism of European neo-colonialism. This decision was partially 
reversed following an EU promise of further financial assistance and currently Kenya accepts suspects on a case-by-case basis.  
1265 R. Gosalbo Bono and S. Boelaert, 'The European Union's Comprehensive Approach to Combating Piracy at Sea: Legal 
Aspects' in P. Koutrakos and A. Skordas (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and International Perspectives 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014) 125. The twelve piracy suspects prosecuted by Mauritius were nota bene released in 
November 2014 due to insufficient evidence. 
1266 For an extensive analysis: T. Treves, 'Piracy and the International Law of the Sea' in D. Guilfoyle (ed), Modern Piracy: Legal 
Challenges and Responses (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013) 152-159. 
1267  At most, they call upon all States involved “to cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in the investigation and 
prosecution of all persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia”; UNSC Resolution 
(S/RES/2184) 7309th meeting, 12.11.2014, para. 17. 
1268 UN Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General (S/2011/30) on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia, 25.01.2011, 18-27. For instance, in 2008 a Danish warship had to release seized piracy suspects after an unsuccessful 
six-day quest for any means to sue them (D. Guilfoyle, 'Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights' (2010) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59(1), 142). 
1269 D. Helly, 'Lessons from Atalanta and EU counter-piracy policies', EUISS Seminar Report (EU Institute for Security Studies, 
Paris, 2011) 14p.; Gosalbo Bono and Boelaert (2014) op.cit. note 1265, 113-116. 
242 
 
can apprehend any suspected pirate but is reliant upon a judicial authority to arrest and detain 
them.1270 Furthermore, navies are generally not well accustomed to the exigencies of law enforcement. 
An especially heavy challenge consists of collecting evidentiary proof for criminal charges at sea,1271 
while simultaneously guaranteeing the safety of seafarers.1272 In spite of these particular intricacies, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in a 2010 ruling, indicated that even the high seas form 
no exception to the legal guarantees of judicial protection, such as access to a lawyer, communication 
with the family and judicial supervision of detention.1273  
This judicial complexity resulted in a catch-and-release practice whereby piracy suspects were 
deprived by the EU’s naval force of their equipment, weapons and vessels, before being “dumped back 
on the beaches of Somalia”.1274 In 2012, former EUNAVFOR Commander Major General Buster Howes, 
noted that 87 % of the suspected pirates arrested by European naval forces were released due to a 
lack of capacity to prosecute them.1275 The European Parliament identified this as the key hitch in 
countering piracy, because impunity undermines deterrence as well as the credibility of patrolling 
nations.1276 Or in the words of Osiro, “[t]he lack of legal preparedness before dispatching the naval 
forces is nothing short of dereliction by the international community and exposes the pirates to human 
rights violations”.1277 
When suspected pirates are eventually prosecuted in and by an EU Member State, obstacles continue 
to arise. These involve the logistical, legal and financial burden of transporting and trying pirate 
suspects, the low chance of conviction (given the difficulty of collecting evidence at sea and in Somalia), 
the suspicion that acquitted Somalis will subsequently claim asylum,1278 linguistic complications and a 
mutual culture shock. This complexity is painfully illustrated by a German trial against 10 Somalis 
caught by the Dutch marine in April 2009 after an attempted hijack of the MV Taipan.1279 This longest 
                                                          
1270 D. Osiro, 'Somali Pirates Have Rights Too: Judicial Consequences and Human Rights Concerns', ISS Paper 224 (Institute for 
Security Studies, Pretoria, 2011) footnote 62. 
1271 This is all the more complex given that pirates constitute a sort of hybrid between criminals and combatants (see further: 
D. Guilfoyle, 'The Laws of War and the Fight against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals' (2010) Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 11(1), 141-153. 
1272 L. McKay, 'Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Towards a Domestic Legal Response to an International Concern' in R. Sharamo 
and B. Mesfin (eds), Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa (Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2011) 227-
229. 
1273 Case Medvedyev and others v France (Application No. 3394/03) European Court of Human Rights, 29.03.2010; annotated 
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captured in Gulf of Aden', ibid., 07.05.2010.  
1275 UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Piracy off the coast of Somalia, Tenth Report of Session 2010–2012, 
05.01.2012, para. 96.  
1276 European Parliament Resolution (2011/2962(RSP)) on Maritime Piracy, 10.05.2012, para. 10. 
1277 Osiro (2011) op.cit. note 1270, 1. 
1278 The UK even instructed its naval vessels to avoid capturing pirates because they could potentially claim asylum once on 
board (Ibid., footnote 64) 
1279 Markedly, even though the shipping company, the ship’s flag as well as it crew were Germans, Germany only accepted to 
issue arrest warrants after the Dutch had threatened to release the would-be kidnappers (M. Gebauer, H. Knaup and M. 
243 
 
trial in German post-war history lasted almost two years, with 105 days of proceedings, and had its 
total price tag estimated at between EUR 7 and 10 million. Lakotta colourfully describes the absurdity 
of this “expensive farce”:  
dark-skinned men in T-shirts … had trouble providing exact answers to the judge's questions, 
replying that they were born "under a tree" or "during the rainy season." They were homesick. One 
pirate hoped for a quick execution; another suffered from depression. There were suicide 
attempts … the public prosecutors in Hamburg called for a total of 81 years in prison divided among 
the 10 defendants. But for what purpose? Deterrence? Resocialization? … And in which society 
would the pirates be resocialized after their prison sentences, in Somalia or Germany? The latter is 
more likely … This April, the court had to release the three youngest defendants since they had 
already been held in custody for two years. They are now attending school [in Germany].1280 
The above enunciation of challenges and obstacles explains the EU’s interest in concluding transfer 
agreements.1281 Trying suspects in countries closer to Somalia contributes to the foreseeability and 
accessibility of law. 1282  However, it raises important concerns as to the often dire human rights 
situation in those justice and penal systems. This is a second key issue that the EU’s transfer 
agreements aim to address. Extensive provisions seek to guarantee the respect for global human rights 
norms regarding the treatment, prosecution and trial of transferred persons. This normative 
dimension covers issues such as adequate accommodation, nourishment, medical treatment and 
judicial protection. In this manner, these agreements “make a notable effort to balance the 
requirements of practical expediency with the perspective of third states while complying with ECtHR 
case law”.1283 EU transfer agreements include a capacity-building component targeted at preventing 
inadequate resources, legislation and capacity from damaging the human rights situation. It provides 
for financial and technical assistance in revising legislation, training investigators and prosecutors, 
investigative and judicial procedures, as well as storing and handing-over evidence. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
Rosenbach, 'Caught Red-Handed: First Trial of Somali Pirates Poses Headache for Germany', spiegel.de International, 
20.04.2010). The argument of the German government that it was acting under the control of Atalanta so that the transfer 
should be attributed to the latter, was notably rejected by the Court (Landgericht Hamburg (Az. 603 KLs 17/10) 19.11.2012). 
1280 B. Lakotta, 'An Expensive Farce: Germany's Somali Pirate Trial Is Pointless', spiegel.de International, 12.09.2012. 
1281 The UNSG proposal to establish an international pirate tribunal was dismissed as too costly and judicially burdensome 
(see: UN Report of the Secretary-General (S/2011/360) on the modalities for the establishment of specialized Somali anti-
piracy courts, 15.06.2011). 
1282 While Somali pirates should certainly be aware of their wrongdoing, they can hardly estimate the judicial consequence 
of their actions under German criminal law. 
1283 D. Thym, 'Transfer Agreements for Pirates Concluded by the EU - a Case Study on the Human Rights Accountability of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy' in P. Koutrakos and A. Skordas (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European 
and International Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014) 174.  
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significant problems remain in these countries and this practice has been criticised as an EU evasion 
strategy for not having to tackle hands-on its human rights obligations.1284  
Turning back to the Mauritius Pirate Transfer Agreement case, it is in no way any of this substance that 
was contested by the Parliament. Rather, it opposed the manner in which it was concluded by the 
Council, submitting two pleas in law. One is mainly semantic and focusses on the procedures for 
concluding international agreements as set out in Article 218(6) TFEU. The second plea contests its lack 
of involvement and claims an infringement of the requirement of parliamentary scrutiny as set out in 
Article 218(10) TFEU.  
The first plea: Article 218 TFEU and the division of external competences 
The wording of Article 218 TFEU is the point of departure in the first plea. Its provisions constitute a 
key Lisbon innovation establishing a single albeit internally differentiated procedure for adopting 
international agreements. Viewed as one of the positive Treaty contributions to external action 
comprehensiveness, this could however only be achieved by glossing over the difficulties resulting 
from the CFSP’s seclusion. Inter-institutional divergences of interpretation were therefore written in 
the stars.1285 In this first plea, the Parliament focussed on the difference in wording between the 3rd 
and 6th paragraph of Article 218 TFEU. With regard to the opening of negotiations this provides that 
the High Representative, instead of the Commission, shall submit recommendations to the Council 
“where the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally to the [CFSP]”.1286 Obtaining the 
consent of the Parliament for its conclusion, on the other hand, is excluded “where agreements relate 
exclusively to the [CFSP]”.1287 Since that last provision is formulated as an exception, it should in the 
Parliament’s view “be interpreted narrowly, so that if an agreement relates not only to the CFSP but 
also to other policies of the European Union, the Parliament should be involved in the procedure for 
concluding that agreement”.1288 
According to the Parliament, the Agreement contains, besides the CFSP, three other components: 
police cooperation, judicial cooperation in criminal matters and development cooperation. In addition 
to listing all elements which it considers to fall under those competences, the Parliament pinpointed 
the provision in the EU-Mauritius Agreement providing that the relevant EUNAVFOR tasks may after 
                                                          
1284 Particularly, Kenya’s justice system falls short on many international human rights indicators. It has been accused of 
extrajudicial killings, torture and partial courts (Osiro (2011) op.cit. note 1270, 1-2). In 2011, a Cologne Court found Germany 
guilty of violating the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment by transferring Somali pirates to Kenya after 
their arrest by a German frigate in the framework of Atalanta (Verwaltungsgericht Köln (25 K 4280/09) 25. Kammer, 
11.11.2011). 
1285 Van Elsuwege (2013) op.cit. note 369, 123-124. 
1286 Article 218(3) TFEU (emphasis added).  
1287 Article 218(6) TFEU (emphasis added). 
1288 Case C-658/11, Parliament v Council (Mauritius Pirate Transfer Agreement), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025, para. 24. 
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the termination of the operation be executed by administrative authorities.1289 This, it held, “rules out 
the possibility that those tasks might be of a military nature”.1290 The Council countered that the 
exclusivity rule of Article 218(3) TFEU must be determined solely in the light of the agreement’s 
substantive legal basis, in this case Article 37 TEU. Sweden and the UK added that the Parliament’s 
interpretation “by which the scope of application of CFSP procedures is restricted, to the benefit of the 
procedures laid down by the FEU Treaty, would fall foul of Article 40 TEU”.1291  
Rather puzzlingly, the Parliament’s arguments on the police, judicial and development components of 
the Agreement, did not lead it to challenge the CFSP legal basis of the implementing Decision.1292 It 
merely argued that “it is sufficient for one of those components to be present in the Agreement, even 
in a secondary or incidental manner, for the obligation to obtain the consent of the Parliament to be 
applicable”.1293 With this arguably ill-considered attempt to stretch its powers, the Parliament pushed 
the Court towards a formalistic clarification of Article 218 TFEU, which cuts the corner of assessing the 
agreement’s content or the legal status of the CFSP. As none of the parties contested the CFSP legal 
basis of the implementing Council Decision, the Court saw no need in verifying its appropriateness. 
Furthermore, the manner in which the Parliament formulated its plea implicitly asked the CJEU to 
overrule some decades of case law on the choice of legal basis.1294 It would result in breaking the link 
between the substantive choice of legal basis and the associated procedures. 1295  Unsurprisingly 
therefore, the Court elucidates that its case law stipulating that it is the substantive legal basis that 
determines the procedure to be followed in adopting a measure, and not vice versa, also applies to the 
conclusion of international agreements.1296  
In elucidating Article 218 TFEU the Court relies on earlier litigation wherein it held that the 
interpretation of EU law provisions not only depends on their wording but also on their objectives and 
the context in which they occur.1297 It argues that the different wording of Article 218(3) and (6) reflects 
different stages in concluding an international agreement, respectively submitting recommendations 
                                                          
1289 Article 11(5) Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates 
and associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force to the Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions 
of suspected pirates after transfer, signed at Port Louis, Mauritius, OJ L254/3 30.09.2011 (hereafter: EU- Mauritius Pirate 
Transfer Agreement). 
1290 Ibid., para. 26. 
1291 Ibid., para. 42. 
1292 The Parliament, rather unconvincingly, adjusted its position at the hearing, after an enquiry of the Court, arguing that the 
contested decision should nonetheless have been founded also on Articles 82, 87 and 209 TFEU (Case C-658/11, Parliament 
v Council, Opinion AG Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2014:41, para. 40).  
1293 Ibid., para. 16. 
1294 C. Matera and R.A. Wessel, 'Context or Content? A CFSP or AFSJ Legal Basis for EU International Agreements' (2014) 
Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 49(4), 1053. 
1295 A.D. Casteleiro, 'Four Cases for 2015 (II). Article 40 TEU and Pirates Transfer Agreements ', Durham European Law Institute 
delilawblog.wordpress.com, 21.01.2015. 
1296 Case C-658/11, op.cit. note 1288, para. 57. 




to open negotiations and adopting a Council decision to conclude such agreements. Precisely because 
of the all-encompassing nature of that Article, the procedure to be followed must take account of the 
institutional balance laid down for each specific competence in the Treaty. The differentiated 
involvement of the Parliament is in this view “designed to reflect externally the division of powers 
between institutions that applies internally”.1298 Reminiscent of the in foro interno, in foro externo 
principle, the Court thus establishes symmetry by equalling the method to determine the procedural 
and substantive legal basis, even if this means limiting the democratic scrutiny of the Parliament. It 
justifies this approach on the basis of legal certainty and consistency. The Parliament’s interpretation 
could imply that two agreements with a substantive CFSP legal basis, have to be concluded following 
different procedural rules based on an unpredictable ‘exclusivity test’. It would moreover leave no 
room for exclusive CFSP agreements nor would the exclusion to the Parliament’s consent ever 
materialise.1299 This leads the Court to the conclusion that the first plea is unfounded as the contested 
decision could be adopted without the consent or consultation of the Parliament.1300  
As typically befits an Advocate-General, Bot did not limit himself to what was strictly necessary in view 
of the Parliament’s plea. He opens his opinion with a number of informative reflections on the post-
Lisbon delimitation of external competences, which are worth citing in the light of the questions raised 
by this research. Bot notes that despite the depillarisation, the delimitation of competences is a 
particularly delicate task when the objective of security is at stake: “the well-recognised 
interrelationship with development and human rights means that it would very often be possible to 
argue that measures taken in one of these three areas will also have some effect on the other two 
areas”.1301 Article 21 TEU “encourages the Council to integrate aspects relating to other Union policies 
into the CFSP measures which it adopts”, but does “not nullify the particularities of each of the Union’s 
policies, just as their complementarity does not nullify the specific nature of each policy”.1302 It stems 
from Article 40 TEU that setting clear criteria to define the scope of the CFSP “represents a certain 
constitutional challenge”.1303 In the light of Article 21 TEU, he argues, it will be “rare that an agreement 
concluded in the field of the CFSP does not concern other Union policies, at least indirectly”.1304 
Consequently a centre of gravity test is essential and Bot goes on to examine whether the appropriate 
legal basis of the implementing Decision is actually and solely Article 37 TEU.1305 Bot’s train of thought 
                                                          
1298 Case C-658/11, op.cit. note 1288, para. 55. 
1299 Editorial, 'Inter-institutional Disputes and Treaty-making' (2014) European Law Review 39(5), 599. 
1300 Case C-658/11, op.cit. note 1288, para. 62. 
1301 Ibid., paras 3 and 23. 
1302 Ibid., para. 24. 
1303 Ibid., para. 5. 
1304 Ibid., para. 22. 
1305 Ibid., para. 35. 
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is instructive and – in the light of the Court’s terseness – interesting to analyse in more detail. While 
the conclusions he draws are reasonable, his arguments fail to convince on a number of points.   
In his view, the aim and content of the Decision and Agreement cannot ignore the broader context in 
which these are adopted.1306 This leads him to emphasise not only the security objectives of the 
Atalanta Joint Action, but also the threat to international peace and security expressed in the various 
UNSC piracy resolutions. While the latter form indeed part of the enabling framework for operation 
Atalanta, the deduction that this empowers the CFSP as such to take all necessary measures is not 
entirely convincing. When turning to the analysis of the content, the Advocate General reiterates that 
the CFSP legal basis of the Atalanta Joint Action was never called into question. He therefore sees no 
reason why the implementation hereof by the EU-Mauritius Agreement, defining the modalities for 
the transfer and the treatment of the persons concerned, should fall outside the scope of the CFSP.1307 
This, he argues, is in line with Article 28(1) TEU enabling the Council to lay down conditions for the 
implementation of CFSP operational action. Bot does not accord much importance to the nature of 
arrangements under the Agreement. It suffices that the Joint Action would be of no practical effect 
without the latter, to conclude that it is intrinsically linked to operation Atalanta.1308 It is indisputable 
that the lack of continuity between operational and legal activity would reduce the deterrent effect of 
the EU naval operation to almost nothing. However, such practical arguments cannot serve to avoid 
analysing whether the Union’s division of competences is respected. This was most clearly 
substantiated by the Court in Opinion 1/94, where it held that problems arising in the implementation 
“cannot modify the answer to the question of competence, that being a prior issue”.1309  
Bot’s analysis of the Agreement’s aim again focalises on the overarching Joint Action and its objective 
of protecting international security off the Somali coast as well as promoting stability and peace in the 
region, while having due regard to human rights. He classifies these as CFSP objectives by reverting to 
his earlier approach in the targeted sanctions case of picking those elements from Article 21(2) TEU 
that fit this claim. Whilst recognising that “none of them are expressly attributed to the CFSP”, he now 
even extends this list of alleged CFSP-specific aims with paragraph (h), namely the promotion of an 
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good governance.1310 The fact 
that this is a newly phrased objective of the Lisbon Treaty does not stop Bot from substantiating this 
view by reference to the old Article 11 TEU.1311 Further, in the absence of much Treaty guidance, the 
                                                          
1306 Ibid., para. 42.  
1307 Ibid., para. 57. 
1308 Ibid., paras 74-75. 
1309 Opinion 1/94, op.cit. note 1020, para. 107. 
1310 Case C-658/11, Opinion AG Bot, op.cit. note 1292, paras 84-87. 
1311 The risk that this path dependency approach sets contra legem precedents is clear from the Council’s argument that 
“[a]ccording to Article 21(2)(b) TEU, the promotion of human rights in third countries is an objective that falls within the 
CFSP” (Case C-658/11, op.cit. note 1288, para. 33). 
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Advocate General finds substantive support in the targeted sanctions case for attaching the objective 
of preserving international peace and security to the CFSP. In addition, reference is again made to the 
Treaty’s CSDP provisions, which is more reasonable here in the light of the evident links with a CSDP 
operation. The Parliament contends that it “does not see how the tasks of the representatives of the 
Union and EUNAVFOR under the Agreement … could fall under any of the specific CSDP tasks referred 
to in Articles 42 TEU and 43 TEU”.1312 The Advocate General simply counters that he thinks those 
provisions are broad enough as “one of the important characteristics of the CSDP … is that it is not 
limited to the use of military means, in that provision is also made for the use of civilian means, in 
particular in crisis management tasks”.1313  This ‘civilian’ label, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, is 
however not further circumscribed, which might give the impression of a blank check for further 
expanding the scope of the CSDP.  
In rejecting the argument that the agreement contains a development cooperation component – 
which was arguably not a particularly steadfast claim –, Advocate General Bot simultaneously confirms 
and contradicts the Philippines PCA case. On the one hand, he approves the view that the Lisbon Treaty 
increases the tolerance for incidental effects that do not alter the choice of legal basis. On the other 
hand, he agrees with the Council that Article 208(1) TFEU “refocused the scope of development 
cooperation with the result that the key element of the Union’s development policy is poverty 
reduction and eradication”.1314 He suggests a narrowing of development cooperation that clashes 
directly with the Court’s confirmation of that policy’s broad scope in Philippines PCA. Strikingly, while 
the CJEU corroborated that wide notion in reference to the integration logic of Article 21 TEU, 
Advocate General Bot now relies on that same duty of consistency to conclude to a narrowing, as it 
implies that “other policies, such as the CFSP, must … take account of the objectives of development 
cooperation and may therefore contribute to those objectives”.1315  
On a final note, the Advocate General’s inclusion of the context in his analysis of the contested Decision 
is a welcome addition to deal with the partly disarmed aim and content test. Yet, this may not relieve 
the judiciary of analysing the measure at issue in full detail. Examining the provisions of the Mauritius 
Agreement more extensively, would arguable have led to the same conclusion that their CFSP basis 
does not trespass against the Union’s division of competences. It is noteworthy in this regard that the 
Parliament might have had better chances at bringing the victory home by contesting the legal basis 
of operation Atalanta itself. It could indeed be argued that the Agreement does not add any new 
                                                          
1312 Case C-658/11, Opinion AG Bot, op.cit. note 1292, para. 96. 
1313 Ibid., para. 98. 
1314 Ibid., para. 126. 
1315 Compare on that point ibid. and Case C-377/12, op.cit. note 1236, paras 36-37. 
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judicial powers to the Atalanta Joint Action. 1316  In successive revisions of the latter, the Council 
progressively handed new powers to the EU’s naval force, including the collection of the suspects’ 
private belongings and personal data such as fingerprints, as well as the transmission hereof to Interpol. 
Contrary to the Advocate General’s claim that Atalanta follows the practice of various CSDP SSR 
missions that were not regarded as relating to the AFSJ, Erkeles therefore argues that the Union has 
never before enjoyed such pervasive judicial and criminal law powers in the CFSP area.1317 This did not 
once lead to a reconsideration of the Joint Action’s legal basis. Contrasting with Atalanta’s pervasive 
powers, the contested Agreement then only defines the conditions of transferring suspects and their 
property and data, and specifies how Mauritius – not the EU – shall treat them. 
Second plea: the Parliamentary right to scrutiny 
By its second plea the Parliament claimed a procedural infringement because the Council had failed to 
inform it “immediately and fully” at all stages of the negotiations and conclusion of the EU-Mauritius 
Agreement, as Article 218(10) TFEU requires. The Council had not send the Parliament the text of the 
contested Decision and the Agreement until three months after their adoption and 17 days after their 
publication in the Official Journal. The Council countered this in two ways. First, it asserted that, since 
the contested Decision falls exclusively under the CFSP, the CJEU does not have jurisdiction to rule on 
its legality. Second, the Council found the period within which the Parliament was informed reasonable, 
given that it included the summer break.  
Not more than six short paragraphs does the Court need to reject the Council’s arguments with regard 
to its jurisdiction.1318 On the one hand, the CJEU stresses that the exclusion of its powers of control 
under Articles 24(1) TEU and 275 TFEU constitutes a derogation from the rule of general jurisdiction, 
which must therefore be interpreted narrowly. On the other hand, the procedure of Article 218 TFEU 
is of general application to all international agreements concluded by the EU in all policy fields, 
including the CFSP. It can therefore not “be argued that the scope of the limitation, goes so far as to 
preclude the Court from having jurisdiction to interpret and apply a provision such as Article 218 TFEU 
which does not fall within the CFSP, even though it lays down the procedure on the basis of which an 
act falling within the CFSP has been adopted”.1319 In its terseness the Court failed to unambiguously 
                                                          
1316 L. Erkelens, 'Institutional and Legal Aspects of the EU's Judicial Policy to Fighting Piracy off the Coast of Somalia', CLEER 
Working Papers 2014/4 (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, The Hague, 2014) 46-47. 
1317 Case C-658/11, Opinion AG Bot, op.cit. note 1292, para. 105; Erkelens (2014) op.cit. note 1316, 40-44. 
1318 Case C-658/11, op.cit. note 1288, paras 69-74. 
1319 Ibid., para. 73. This is corroborated by Article 218(11) establishing the ex ante judicial control of agreements in general 
terms. Contrary to the distinct treatment of the CFSP with regard to procedures and the involvement of the Parliament in the 
remainder of the Article, no exceptions are attached here.  
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specify the limits to its jurisdiction.1320 This is regrettable as its argument has merit, but the line it walks 
is a fine one and deserves clarification. For instance, does this imply that the judiciary is empowered 
to verify whether specific CFSP components of agreements are in line with the Treaty or with other 
international commitments – even when agreements relate exclusively to the CFSP? Whereas the 
exhaustive list of Article 24(1) TEU pleads against this, Article 40 TEU can at the very least be seen as 
authorising the Court to check the compatibility with the EU’s division of competences.1321 The Court’s 
confirmation of its jurisdiction provides preliminary evidence for the prediction that the Lisbon Treaty 
initiated a shift of perspective whereby its exclusion from the CFSP is interpreted ever more 
narrowly.1322 One might indeed wonder whether the finding that the distinct nature of the CFSP does 
not preclude the CJEU a priori from verifying the correct application of general provisions, has 
consequences for other principles of EU law.  
With regard to Parliamentary scrutiny, the Advocate General contends that the Court’s review of an 
exclusive CFSP agreement, as the one at issue, must take account of the specific nature of that 
competence’s rules and procedures. This means that the provision of information to the Parliament 
must differ according to whether or not an agreement relates exclusively to the CFSP. In other words, 
where the Parliament’s consultation or consent is not required, the Council can legitimately be 
expected to provide it less quickly and in less detail with information. This reasoning leads him to the 
objectionable conclusion that even if “it would have been more in keeping with the spirit of Article 
218(10) TFEU if the Parliament had been informed before the publication of the contested decision 
and the Agreement in the Official Journal”, the three-month delay was sufficiently ‘immediate’.1323 The 
Court takes a diametrically opposed approach. It argues that it is precisely because of the exclusion of 
the Parliament’s scrutiny powers over the CFSP, that the information requirement applies to any 
procedure for concluding an international agreement. If the Parliament is not immediately and fully 
informed, it is deprived of its only option “to make known its views as regards, in particular, the correct 
legal basis for the act concerned”.1324 If important questions such as the human rights protection of 
piracy suspects and the judicial track record of the countries where they are likely to be prosecuted, 
                                                          
1320 Also in Opinion 2/13 on the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) the Court kept us 
guessing as regards the exact scope of its jurisdiction under the CFSP. The Court found it suffice to say that it had “not yet 
had the opportunity to define the extent to which its jurisdiction is limited in CFSP matters”. The fact that “certain acts 
adopted in the context of the CFSP fall outside the ambit of judicial review by the Court of Justice … is inherent to the way in 
which the Court’s powers are structured by the Treaties, and, as such, can only be explained by reference to EU law alone”. 
Empowering the ECtHR to rule on the compatibility with the ECHR of such acts would entrust their judicial review exclusively 
to a non-EU body. It had already held in Opinion 1/09 (Patent Court, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, paras 78, 80 and 89) that such a 
construction is inadmissible. Consequently, the EU’s accession agreement was considered incompatible with EU law (Opinion 
2/13, ECHR, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paras 249-257). 
1321 See further: Hillion (2014) op.cit. note 1013, 55-57. 
1322 A. Rosas and L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 264. 
1323 Case C-658/11, Opinion AG Bot, op.cit. note 1292, para. 126. 
1324 Case C-658/11, op.cit. note 1288, para. 86. 
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are due to the EU’s constitutional construction not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, they should at 
least be a matter of timely public debate in the Parliament.  
The Mauritius case, by its very nature of distinguishing CFSP from TFEU aspects of foreign policy, could 
at first sight be seen as a pre-eminent Article 40 TEU scenario. Yet, all those who had therefore been 
rubbing their hands in glee when this case was announced, can be nothing but disappointed with the 
outcome. Again, the judiciary managed to steer around one of the most disputed Treaty provisions. 
This can to a great extent be attributed to the Parliament’s ambiguous challenge. Nonetheless, the 
underlying logic of Article 40 TEU, putting the CFSP on par with TFEU competences, is again latently 
echoed. The Court’s nuanced approach of instituting internal-external symmetry in its interpretation 
of Article 218 TFEU, indeed contrasts sharply with the rigid isolation of the CFSP established in the 
SALW ruling. In line with the language of Article 40 TEU the delimitation is established in purely 
procedural terms. This more normalised position for the CFSP within the EU legal order, is reflected in 
the CJEU’s contention that even exclusive CFSP agreements cannot be entirely exempt from judicial 
and democratic scrutiny.  
Only a more categorical legal action can steer the Court to rule on the merits of CFSP-TFEU 
delimitation, and possibly even verify an infringement of Article 40 TEU. A pending action by the 
Parliament suggests that it has learned its lessons from the Mauritius case. This time, it challenges the 
adoption of a similar Agreement with Tanzania on the transfer of pirates captured by operation 
Atalanta. 1325  In what appears a violation of the principle of sincere cooperation, the High 
Representative signed this agreement while the above case was still pending.1326 While much of this 
challenge seems a déjà-vu, there is one important difference. Rather than simply claiming its consent 
on the basis of the non-exclusive CFSP nature of the Agreement, the Parliament now explicitly holds 
that the latter has full-fledged components of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police 
cooperation. Therefore, it “should have been concluded under the substantive legal bases of Articles 
37 TEU and 82 and 87 TFEU” (hereby dropping its somewhat less realistic assertion to a development 
cooperation dimension).  
5.4. Conclusion 
The navelgazing albeit necessary process of matching different claims to competence and power not 
seldom confuses insiders and alienates outsiders. Confined to interpreting law in the cases brought 
before it, the Court’s choice of legal basis methodology is inevitably ad hoc and legalistic. This resulted 
                                                          
1325 Case C-263/14, Parliament v Council (Tanzania Pirate Transfer Agreement) action brought on 28 May 2014, pending.  
1326 A. Ott, 'The Legal Bases for International Agreements Post-Lisbon: Of Pirates and the Philippines' (2014) Maastricht 
Journal in European and Comparative Law 21(4), 751-752 
252 
 
in a process fraught with uncertainties of which the outcome is often difficult to predict. The Court’s 
clarification of whether and how this methodology applied to former cross-pillar situations was long 
time coming. The 2008 SALW ruling had the advantage of clarity but the considerable downside of 
going against a decade of policy efforts to smoothen divergences across the security-development 
interface. On the one hand, the approach, relying on the so-called hierarchical delimitation clause of 
old Article 47 TEU, was ruthlessly but clearly to prioritise ex Community over CFSP competences. On 
the other hand, this sobering view from Luxembourg revealed a picture that was rather different from 
the political emphasis of the security-development nexus on guaranteeing the most effective policy 
outcome. The judiciary’s eagerness to safeguard the acquis made light of other principles, not the least 
that of consistency, and arguably even conferred powers. In earlier cases on development cooperation, 
that policy had been delimited through a meticulous test verifying the contribution to its objectives 
and the nature of obligations stemming therefrom (Portugal v Council) or the existence of a ‘direct link’ 
to that policy’s socio-economic objectives (Philippines border management). Yet, stated bluntly, in 
interaction with the CFSP the removal of a hypothetical obstacle to development was suddenly 
sufficient to bring a measure under that policy’s remit.  
Whereas a less counterproductive alternative to the Court’s SALW argumentation was conceivable (in 
essence by not disregarding the nature of competences), the outcome would likely have been the same. 
Ex Article 47 TEU clearly obstructed the development of a fully integrated foreign policy. The Lisbon 
Treaty places considerably more emphasis on such integration. Yet, its reinforced rationale of policy 
consistency does not detract from the CFSP’s specific nature. Article 40 TEU now puts the CFSP on an 
equal footing with TFEU external competences, but this does not mean that the delimitation between 
them is just another legal basis question. As long as the CFSP is subject to a special legal regime, special 
rules of delimitation will be necessary. The Council-European Council institutional duopoly over the 
CFSP’s provisions moreover means that the ultimate possibility for the Parliament and the Commission 
to challenge their interpretation is to claim procedural or substantive infringements before the Court. 
Recent practice indeed confirms that “the Lisbon Treaty merely established a new terrain within which 
the Union’s institutions are no less keen to protect their prerogatives than they were under the 
previous constitutional arrangements”.1327 
A key question is thus if and how the Lisbon Treaty changes the judicial approach and whether 
integrated foreign policy-making is any more possible in the reformed constitutional order. Confronted 
with a new SALW scenario, Articles 40 and 21 TEU appear to deprive the CJEU of the two key elements 
of its approach: respectively the single-edged sword of delimitation and the aim-prong of the centre 
                                                          
1327 Editorial (2014) op.cit. note 1299, 560. 
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of gravity test. It therefore becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish CFSP from TFEU components 
in EU legislation, and determine the respective weight these are accorded. Four trajectories out of this 
blind alley were put forth, one more convincing than the other: joining-up CFSP and TFEU legal bases, 
applying a lex specialis/generalis methodology, putting more emphasis on the content-arm of the 
centre of gravity test and operationalising the Court’s new jurisdiction over the duty of consistency. 
Whilst no full-fledged inter-institutional disputes on CFSP-TFEU delimitation – and still less on the 
security-development nexus –, three recent cases allow to draw some preliminary conclusions on how 
this integration-delimitation paradox might be settled along the judicial track. These are the targeted 
sanctions, Philippines PCA and Mauritius Pirate Transfer Agreement cases. 
As regards the first option of combining CFSP and TFEU legal bases, the Court does no longer 
dogmatically shut the door, but at least procedurally significant obstacles still make this an unlikely 
option for unilateral measures (in the light of the unified procedure of Article 218 TFEU, this is arguably 
less so for measures adopting international agreements). Second, the specific competences attached 
by the Court to the CFSP in fighting terrorism (and indirectly in the legal deterrence of piracy) also 
render the – arguably contra legem – option of framing this competence as lex generalis implausible. 
Thirdly, the three rulings indicate that the horizontal external action objectives of Article 21 TEU 
detract less from the traditional aim and content test than often projected in literature. Whereas this 
makes the suggestion of putting more emphasis on the content-prong of the analysis perhaps less 
necessary, the judicial approach towards the absence of specific CFSP objectives remains obscured. In 
this sense, the Portugal v Council test (arguably without its extension in Philippines PCA), focussing on 
both the width and depth of the respective obligations, offers the best prospects for respecting the 
Union’s division of competences. Finally, the duty of consistency appears to receive the strongest 
upgrade in litigation, albeit not (yet) in the form of enforceable rights and obligations. Particularly the 
Philippines PCA ruling indicates that Article 21 TEU indeed raises the threshold of when the Court’s 
centre-of gravity reasoning will conclude that additional objectives of a certain measure are central 
rather than incidental.1328 At first sight, this appears beneficial for integrated foreign policy making. 
However, the argument of consistency was used both to widen the notion of development in 
Philippines PCA as well as to narrow it again in favour of the CFSP by the Advocate General in the 
Mauritius case. One may therefore wonder whether the new jurisdiction over that open-ended duty 
does not allow the judiciary too much room for interpretation.  
The widened notions of development cooperation and CFSP moreover amplify the chances for overlap 
and perhaps new inter-institutional tensions. In Philippines PCA the Court unmistakably confirmed the 
                                                          
1328 Van Vooren (2009b) op.cit. note 1149, 246. 
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broad legal nature of development cooperation, showing itself subservient to the rhythm set by policy 
evolutions and the international context. With regard to the CFSP, the indirect link to its objectives in 
targeted sanctions and the Court’s formalistic approach in the Mauritius case, meant that these rulings 
were rendered in a very specific legal context. This makes it impossible to draw broad lessons on the 
judicial approach to the CFSP in a post-Lisbon setting. Nonetheless, some prudent conclusions are 
possible. The Court’s reasoning in these cases reflects the underlying rationale of Article 40 TEU, in the 
sense that the CFSP is treated less inferior and more normalised. The CFSP is assigned specific 
competences, and the Court no longer submits it to an entirely distinct regime but applies its general 
methodology. Nevertheless, these provisions were not once invoked by the Court and its take on the 
CFSP-TFEU boundary remains unpredictable. The question may therefore be posed whether Article 40 
TEU is not a double-blunt rather than double-edged sword in the hands of the Court. Are its provisions 
of any practical use or do they simply serve to conceptually emphasise how the Lisbon Treaty replaced 
the complete insulation of the CFSP with a more balanced system wherein the constitutional 
differences between the CFSP and TFEU may not undermine each other’s relevance? Hopefully, the 
pending case on the Tanzania Pirate Transfer Agreement will provide more clarity in this regard. 
On a final note, in none of the above cases did the parties disagree on the substance of the measures 
at issue. All agree that targeted sanctions against people associated with Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban are necessary. None of the EU institutions doubts that comprehensive cooperation 
with a developing country like the Philippines is to the benefit of both parties. No one questions that 
piracy must be fought and piracy suspects should be tried in correspondence with international human 
rights obligations. Only the legal bases of these measures were disputed. This plainly illustrates that as 
long as EU institutions cannot sort out their internal differences, this will be to detriment of their 
consensually agreed external objectives and erode their global credibility. The Court has at present not 
managed to curb the appetite for inter-institutional arm-wrestling. The next chapter will examine 
whether recent policy evolutions are more successful in burying the hatchet in the field of the security-
development nexus.   
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6. Making the puzzle fit: recent 
policy evolutions 
  Strategy is a system of expedients; it is more than a mere scholarly discipline. It is 
the translation of knowledge to practical life, the improvement of the original 
leading thought in accordance with continually changing situations. 
 
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, On Strategy, 1871 
 
In Chapter 3 it was discussed how the policy guidance of EU institutions on the security-development 
nexus fell short on effectively aligning the myriad of valuable efforts undertaken by the EU’s separate 
– and internally fragmented – development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP communities. While the 
coherence challenges are of a very practical nature, the policy answer remained principally declaratory 
and generic. The two subsequent chapters demonstrated how many of the policy-making obstacles 
result from the bipolarity of the EU’s institutional and constitutional design. The Treaty of Lisbon 
undertook to cure this ‘borderline personality disorder’ by scaling up efforts and obligations to cohere 
the CFSP with the other strands of EU external action. This brought institutional design and primary 
law more in line with the commitment to enhance the nexus between EU security and development 
policies. However, as the CFSP remains legally secluded, this gave rise to an integration-delimitation 
paradox that essentially requires political craft to be overcome. As noted in the EEAS review “[t]here 
is no shortage of building blocks for comprehensive and effective EU external policies”.1329 Yet, only 
accurate policy backing can put them into place. In this light, the focus of this chapter is on whether 
and how recent policy evolutions fulfil this need and succeed in providing the much-needed strategic 
guidance. 
According to former High Representative Ashton, “[a] central aim of the Lisbon treaty is to strengthen 
the EU’s capacity to develop a long-term EU strategic framework in the area of external relations”.1330 
The European Council in particular is entrusted with the identification of “the strategic interests and 
objectives of the Union”.1331 However, the EU’s track record when it comes to strategy-making is rather 
mixed. Enlargement – arguably the EU’s most successful external strategy – was never labelled or 
devised as such, the CFSP common strategies suffered an inglorious demise, and the European Security 
                                                          
1329 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 7. 
1330 Ibid. 
1331 Article 22 TEU. 
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Strategy has been criticised as overly reactive, declaratory and by now out of date.1332 Following a 
period of teething troubles, the Lisbon Treaty’s institutional novelties appear to start signing up to 
their integrative mandates. This gives rise to a new momentum in which the so-called comprehensive 
approach is the talk of the town. The latter tends to absorb the previous focus on the security-
development nexus within a wider external action methodology. 
The first section will explore what is new about the current endeavour at comprehensiveness and 
whether it has better prospects to succeed (6.1.). A second section will look at the practical translation 
of such a comprehensive approach in the form of regional strategies developed by the EEAS (6.2.). The 
focus will specifically be on the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. These recent evolutions 
illustrate how the Lisbon Treaty has indeed incited strategic thinking, but paradoxically this does not 
occur on the basis of the Treaty article that was specifically designed for this purpose. A final section 
will therefore analyse the unexploited potential of Article 22 TEU (6.3.).  
6.1. The EU’s comprehensive approach: plus ça change, plus c’est la même 
chose? 
No one doubts that more comprehensiveness would benefit the EU’s external efforts. The main 
question is how to put this into practice. In order to understand whether the comprehensive approach 
is more than a new buzz-word, the first section will expound on several recent initiatives on the 
security-development interface that aim to adapt the EU policy machinery to the new institutional 
framework of the Lisbon Treaty (6.1.1.). The initiation of these efforts predates the enforcement of the 
comprehensive approach, but they are embraced by the latter and their success will depend on its 
progress. In the second section it will be studied how this comprehensive approach is designed and 
presented by EU institutions (6.1.2.). The focus will be on its added value, potential and challenges for 
the future of the security-development nexus.  
6.1.1. Run-up: adapting EU policy-making on the security-development 
interface to its new institutional bedding 
The discourse on the comprehensive approach emerged early in the new millennium when military 
circles of the international community started conjuring up ways to deploy peacekeepers in broader 
post-conflict stabilisation and win ‘hearts and minds’ for military action.1333  The notion gradually 
                                                          
1332 The ESS’ outdated design is clear from its first sentence that would be an unlikely opener in the current climate: “Europe 
has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” (ESS (2003) op.cit. note 78). 
1333 One of the first manifestations hereof was the creation by the US government in 2002 of provincial reconstruction teams 
(PRTs) in Afghanistan, consisting of military officers, diplomats and reconstruction experts. 
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broadened and was increasingly directed at the long-term, under diverse labels such as whole-of-
government approach, integrated approach, réponse globale, counterinsurgence (COIN), etc. While 
there is no universally accepted definition, the comprehensive approach generally conveys “the need 
to adjust measures for conflict management and post-conflict recovery to complex security situations 
and fragile environments by bridging policy and institutional gaps, reconciling dilemmas posed by 
involving military and civilian actors, and formulating common objectives and more integrated 
strategies”.1334  
Also in the EU the idea initially gained traction in debates on better fine-tuning the military and civilian 
components of the CSDP (cf. the discussion on CMCO and CIMIC supra 3.1.1.). After the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty the talk on the comprehensive approach got renewed impetus. It was further 
broadened in reply to and incited by the extended mandate of the High Representative and the 
institutional melting pot of the EEAS. Arguably, this also reflected a desire to start with a clean sheet 
in the new constitutional setting. Indeed, for many among the EU staff the concept of a security-
development nexus had become too negatively associated with inter-institutional strive.1335 This partly 
explains the dried up political support for the long-announced Action Plan on Security, Fragility and 
Development (cf. supra 3.1.1.). A first draft hereof was finalised in 2010, and while not revolutionary 
it reportedly contained worthy ideas to increase the effectiveness of aid and simplify procedures.1336 
Its shelving did however not stop EEAS, DEVCO and Delegation officials from applying its spirit and 
even realising the most sensible policy ideas. A first such innovation was the development and 
institutionalisation of an EU early warning system (EWS). By linking up open source analysis and 
internal staff assessments, this new system aims to identify countries at risk of violent conflict and 
monitor EU actions to address this. For this purpose an Early Warning and Conflict Analysis Team has 
been established within the Conflict prevention, Peace building and Mediation Instruments Division of 
the EEAS. EU Delegations take the lead in short and long-term risk assessments, which are currently 
piloted in the Sahel and Central Asia. It holds considerable potential to increase the EU’s preventive 
capacity and is increasing the conflict awareness among EU staff.1337  
A related evolution is the scaling up of conflict analysis across the EEAS and Commission services. An 
interesting EEAS-Commission guidance note, from November 2013, aims to enhance the conflict 
                                                          
1334 V. Hauck and C. Rocca, Gaps Between Comprehensive Approaches of the EU and EU Member States: Scoping Study 
(European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, 2014) 18-19. 
1335 Keukeleire and Raube (2013) op.cit. note 452, 567-568. 
1336 M. Furness, 'Let’s Get Comprehensive: European Union Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries', DIE 
Discussion Paper 5/2014 (German Development Institute, Berlin, 2014) 9-10. 
1337 A. Brown and E. Hefer, Our Collective Interest: Why Europe’s Problems Need Global Solutions and Global Problems Need 
European Action (European Think Tanks Group, London, 2014) 31. 
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sensitivity of staff working in fragile and/or conflict-affected countries. Putting aside criticism of a naive 
‘all good things go together’ notion of the security-development nexus, it departs from:  
the idea that all EU action in a conflict affected setting can, and is likely to, have an impact on the 
conflict. Well-meaning support for reform or infrastructure can increase dependency, power and 
patronage of certain groups, and have a negative impact on coping mechanisms. Similarly, the 
failure to respond with timely political and/or development support to a peace accord due to, for 
example, concerns over fiduciary risk in a still fragile situation or misinterpretation of the situation 
due to lack of political insight could push a country to relapse into conflict that could have been 
prevented.1338  
Outlined as the basis of a comprehensive approach to crises situations, the note sets forth an approach 
to conflict analysis that is context-specific, yet systematic, and jointly owned by all relevant EU actors. 
This can be generated by two frameworks: a light-touch Conflict Analysis Tool currently piloted by the 
EEAS and a conflict sensitive political economy analysis developed by DG DEVCO. The former is a 
collaborative process, including interactive conflict analysis workshops, that enables a broad range of 
EU staff to participate and thus own its results. The second is a more in-depth study of the conflict 
context, causes, actors, dynamics, existing and planned responses as well as key gaps and 
opportunities. These frameworks of analysis should assist the EU in making better-informed strategic 
and operational choices that are goal rather than instrument-driven. They are designed as the basis 
for a continuous adaptation of aid allocations, but also CFSP action and CSDP missions/operations, to 
changing needs and circumstances, and for a reinforced compatibility between them. The note gives a 
concrete and instructive example of how this might look in practice (see Box 13). 
A connected EEAS-Commission note strives to raise staff awareness on how to address conflict 
prevention, peace-building and security issues under external cooperation instruments, “while 
respecting the primary, specific objective of each policy and instrument”. 1339  Similarly, the basic 
assumption is that: 
Some long-term external cooperation projects and programmes, funded by international donors, 
have been entirely lost or their impact has been seriously undercut for having neglected and/or 
underestimated the security-development context. In some cases, goodfaith cooperation projects 
have unintentionally contributed to exacerbate community, ethnic or religious rivalries, leading 
                                                          
1338  EEAS and Commission, Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in Support of EU External Action, 2013, 1 
<http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/guidance-note-conflict-analysis-support-eu-external-action>. 
1339 EEAS and Commission, Addressing Conflict Prevention, Peace-Building and Security Issues under External Cooperation 
instruments, 2013, 2 <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/addressing-conflict-prevention-peace-
building-and-security-issues-under-external-cooperatio>; see also: Commission (2014) op.cit. note 485, 124p. 
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even to violence, simply because basic principles of conflict-sensitivity were not applied in the 
design or the implementation of the project.1340 
Box 13: Examples of linking conflict analysis to comprehensive EU external action 
 
EEAS and Commission, Guidance note on the use of Conflict analysis in support of EU external action, 2013, 10. 
                                                          
1340 Ibid., 2-3. 
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The note takes a bottom-up approach stimulating staff to aspire an optimal mix of EU policies and tools 
and ensure that short-term crisis management activity under the IcSP, APF and civilian CSDP missions 
is not abruptly interrupted when crisis contexts end. The note describes how external assistance can 
contribute to security-related issues such as DDR, mine action, mediation,1341 transitional justice and 
support to parliaments and elections. Markedly, also in the symbolic/problem dossier of SALW it 
appears that the Lisbon Treaty’s inter-institutional bridges start bearing fruit. In line with the 
Commission’s argumentation (as well as the Court’s initial indications) in the SALW case,1342  the 
Commission and EEAS agree on a preliminary division of labour regarding SALW control: “issues having 
a primarily military/security dimension need to be addressed under the CFSP budget; our external 
cooperation instruments can however address all other dimensions of SALW at country level such as 
the legal and regulatory frameworks, institutional capacity-building, including some trade-related 
aspects (e.g. import/export controls, border controls), awareness raising, survey activities, etc.”.1343 
Evidently, grey zones remain and deciding what constitutes a ‘primarily military/security dimension’ 
can arguably only be done on a case-by-case basis, putting the onus on inter-institutional trust and 
cooperation. Noteworthy in this regard is that – contrary to the inter-institutional deadlock in trying 
to amend the IfS Regulation following the SALW case – the die was finally cast on including SALW 
control under the scope of the IcSP (cf. supra 3.2.1. and 5.2.2.). Yet, this is limited to measures “within 
the framework of Union cooperation policies and their objectives”,1344 which still leaves open many 
questions as to the division of labour with the CFSP/CSDP. 
A final evolution relating to the emerging comprehensive approach is the review of the EU’s Crisis 
Management Procedures (CMP). This was requested by the FAC in December 2011 in order to adapt 
the old CSDP procedures to their new institutional bedding.1345 The key substantive innovation of the 
new procedures precedes the adoption of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and consists of 
drafting a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA).1346 In the spirit of the strategic approach 
taken towards the Sahel and the Horn of Africa (cf. infra 6.2.), this serves to deliver a proactive and 
comprehensive policy response articulating the nature of the crisis, whether and how the EU should 
react and through which instruments. This process is guided by the EEAS Crisis Management Board, 
possibly through the activation of a Crisis Platform. Further relevant changes to the CMP involve the 
reduction of political decisions required in the CSDP planning cycle, the better streamlining of civilian 
                                                          
1341 A notable novelty in this regard was the launch, in May 2014, of the European Institute of Peace (EIP) as “a flexible and 
external tool in support of Europe’s peace efforts, complementing the set of instruments at the EU’s disposal in mediation 
and dialogue (EIP Press Release, ‘Launch of the European Institute of Peace’, Brussels, 12.05.2014). 
1342 Respectively, op.cit. note 1207 and 1206. 
1343 EEAS and Commission (2013b) op.cit. note 1339, 7. 
1344 Article 3(2)(j) IcSP Regulation 
1345 Council Conclusions on CSDP, 3130th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 01.12.2011, para. 31. 
1346 Council (7660/2/13) Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations, 18.06.2013.  
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and military processes (which remains however hampered by the different chains of command and 
financial arrangements) and an alignment of strategic and operational planning through the early 
involvement of operational planning teams as well as a force sensing exercise to sound out Member 
States’ interest in participating and contributing. 1347  A related indication of the regained inter-
institutional trust is that all Council Decisions setting up CSDP missions/operations now include a 
standard phrase stating that the High Representative “shall ensure the consistency of the 
implementation of this Decision with the Union’s external action as a whole, including the Union’s 
development programmes”.1348 Such language was not conceivable prior to the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, and certainly not in the aftermath of the SALW ruling.  
The above innovations are still in their early days and need deepening. The early warning system and 
conflict analysis should become more standardised and ingrained in the daily work of Commission and 
EEAS officials at headquarters and Delegation level. The new CMP require an enhanced commitment 
of Member States to exploit their integrative potential. Notably, these changes simultaneously 
precede and form an inherent part of the new focus on the comprehensive approach and their success 
will therefore depend on the progress achieved with the latter.  
6.1.2. The comprehensive approach to what? 
In EU policy debate of the early 2010s, references to the comprehensive approach increasingly became 
the antonym of and remedy against the bogey of ‘silo mentality’.1349 In the course of 2012, when the 
EEAS was fully up and running, the time was considered ripe for establishing an inter-institutional 
working group to draft a joint Commission-High Representative Communication on the comprehensive 
approach. This group was composed of EEAS officials from the Corporate Board, CROC and CSDP 
structures such as CMPD, EUMS and CPCC, as well as Commission staff from DEVCO, ECHO, FPI and the 
General Secretariat.1350 Then High Representative Ashton set the bar high purporting that “[w]e cannot 
succeed without this comprehensive approach – it is simply not enough to chase and deter pirates, not 
enough to try and do development when there is no security, not enough to try and provide economic 
support without a stable government... – and that is what the existence of the EEAS allows us to do – 
uniquely”.1351  
                                                          
1347 See further: A. Mattelaer, 'The Empty Promise of Comprehensive Planning in EU Crisis Management' (2013) European 
Foreign Affairs Review 18(4), 133-136. 
1348 Article 14(1) Council Decision (2012/389/CFSP) op.cit. note 593 
1349 See for instance: High Representative Ashton (SPEECH/13/530) op.cit.note 829, 1. 
1350 Commission officials from Trade and Home Affairs had also been invited but did not show up. ECHO, from its part, mainly 
participated to ensure that humanitarian aid was not politicised (Mattelaer (2013) op.cit. note 1347, 136). 
1351 High Representative Ashton, Speech at the annual meeting with Heads of Delegations, Brussels, 03.09.2012. 
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What followed was a politically charged exchange process, followed by broad inter-service 
consultations and negotiations with Member States. This essentially revolved around three major 
issues.1352 First, the scope of the comprehensive approach: should it be targeted specifically at crisis 
management, the entire conflict cycle or external action as a whole? An excessively wide scope could 
devoid the comprehensive approach of practical meaning, whereas a narrow focus could fail to unlock 
the EU’s full potential. Second, the level of policy integration: should the comprehensive approach be 
limited to improved information exchange or extend to joint programming, implementation and 
monitoring of EU instruments? Third, the extent of formalisation of procedures and structures: should 
this approach follow a standardised process or rely on flexible mechanisms? Detailing out the whole 
system could get the comprehensive approach lost in a bureaucratised straightjacket, while past 
practice with the security-development nexus has shown that an overtly noncommittal approach is 
unlikely to bear much progress. These are all sensitive and complex questions that forestalled a smooth 
decision process.  
The Joint Communication and Council Conclusions on the Comprehensive Approach 
Ultimately, on 11 December 2013, the Joint Communication saw the light of day. It contains the High 
Representative’s and Commission’s common understanding of and full commitment to ‘the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises’. They argue that rising global challenges – 
both in number and complexity – as well as the pressure on economic and financial resources, make 
the case for a comprehensive approach stronger than ever. Their understanding covers “all stages of 
the cycle of conflict or other external crises; through early warning and preparedness, conflict 
prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery, stabilisation and peace-building in 
order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term development”.1353 The 
comprehensive approach is not put forth as an entirely new concept, but one of which the ideas and 
principles have yet to become systematically applied across all areas of EU external action. For this 
purpose the Communication proposes eight central measures – or rather guiding principles – each 
supported by a number of concrete actions, which actually embed many of the above policy evolutions 
on the security-development interface.  
 
                                                          
1352 C.V. Rasmussen, 'Linking Instruments in Development and Foreign Policy: Comprehensive Approaches in the EU', DIIS 
Report 2013:21 (Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2013) 8. 
1353 Commission and High Representative Joint Communication (JOIN(2013) 30 final) The EU’s comprehensive approach to 
external conflicts and crises, 11.12.2013. 
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Box 14: The way forward for a comprehensive approach to conflict and crisis situations – Eight 
measures in the Joint Communication 
1. A shared analysis should set out the EU’s understanding of the causes of a potential conflict, 
its key actors and dynamics, and the risks of EU (non-)action. For this purpose combined 
situational awareness and analysis capacity should be improved by better interlinking the 
dedicated facilities across EU institutions, strengthening anticipatory and transparent 
information-sharing among EU actors in Brussels and in the field, and further developing 
and systematically implementing the conflict analysis methodology.  
2. A common strategic vision on the direction for EU engagement across institutions and with 
Member States should be defined. As much as possible this should be set out in overarching 
strategic documents with regard to a country or region, while EU and Member States 
objectives and priorities should be specified in Joint Framework Documents (JFDs).  
3. A constant and high priority for all EU diplomatic engagement is to focus on prevention. 
This builds upon the new EU early warning system as well as those of the Member States, 
and the translation of conflict analysis into specific preventive measures.  
4. EU crisis response should mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU. In order 
to guarantee the optimal sequencing of available instruments, the Crisis Platform 
mechanism should be used more systematically, the cooperation between the various EU 
emergency response systems improved and the capacity for rapid deployment of joint 
(EEAS, Commission and Member States) field missions scaled up.  
5. A commitment to the long-term is essential to address the root causes of conflict and build 
peaceful, resilient societies. Coordination as well as pooling and sharing systems among EU 
stakeholders should maximise synergies across short and long-term measures. Conflict 
analysis and flexibility mechanisms should be systematically included in all aid programming. 
Stock should therefore be taken of lessons learned and feed back into the comprehensive 
approach cycle.  
6. Positive effects should be maximised and negative effects avoided by better linking EU 
internal and external policies and actions. The High Representative, working closely with 
the Commission President, should ensure strategic and operational coherence across all 
policy fields, including energy security, environmental protection and climate change, 
migration, enlargement, counter-terrorism, organised crime and global economic 
governance. The external effects of internal policies should as much as possible be part of 
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the analytical crisis framework, and awareness should be raised about their impact and 
effect.  
7. As main executive arm of the comprehensive approach better use should be made of EU 
Delegations. Full advantage is to be taken of the role of the Head of Delegation in delivering 
and coordinating EU dialogue, action and support across the full policy spectrum. This 
requires an appropriate breadth of security expertise in Delegations, which should be 
strengthened, including through rapid temporary staff reinforcements in crisis situations.  
8. In responding to complex global challenges the EU should work in partnership with and take 
full account of other international and regional actors as well as major international NGOs, 
civil society, think-tanks, academia and public and private actors.   
While these measures and principles are no complete novelties, the High Representative and 
Commission lay a number of fresh emphases. One is the importance attached to process rather than 
grand rhetoric. Along the model of the Crisis Platforms, shared analysis should inform a comprehensive 
approach that eventually feeds into complementary engagement. The comprehensive approach “is a 
joint undertaking and its success a shared responsibility for the EU institutions as well as for Member 
States”; it should be “based on the full respect of the different competence and respective added value 
of the EU’s institutions, as well as of the Member States, as set out in the Treaties”. 1354 Another key 
element is the attention for context. Acknowledging that there are “no blue-prints or off-the-shelf 
solutions”, the Communication introduces a flexible and informed policy design that leaves more room 
for adaption ‘en route’.1355 This goes along with a shift of the centre of gravity towards EU Delegations, 
which should receive more discretion in influencing policy design and implementation.  
This focus on process and context is key. Comprehensiveness is not an end in itself but aspires the 
greatest possible and most sustainable impact of the EU’s efforts for peace and development. This is 
nothing new, but EU policy-makers have long tried to approach this with predetermined checklists and 
political slogans of coherence writ large. This passes by the fact that change is generally non-linear, 
indirect, multi-dimensional and incremental, making it hard to capture in long-term policy planning.1356 
This is even more so for the complex causal relations between insecurity and poverty in fragile 
situations (cf. supra 1.1.2.). Furthermore, coherence and complementarity are context-specific, 
meaning that they cannot be enforced but must be operationalised.1357 This is all the more true for 
                                                          
1354 Ibid., 12 and 4. Puzzlingly, the Communication subsequently lists policy documents such as the European Consensus on 
Humanitarian Aid and on Development, rather than the relevant Treaty provisions. 
1355 Ibid., 4. 
1356 P. Vernon, 'Blog: How peace gets stronger in society', philvernon.net, 28.01.2015.  
1357 C. de Coning and K. Friis, 'Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach' (2011) Journal of 
International Peacekeeping 15(2), 271-272. 
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interaction with the CSDP, which is a “moving target” with a scope that evolves in parallel with the 
challenges it addresses.1358 Rather than a visionary strategy, a priori detailing all steps and procedures, 
a genuine comprehensive approach therefore constitutes an adaptive and step-by-step policy process 
that constantly assesses its impact and recalculates progress. This can be achieved by putting in place 
processes that enable and stimulate continuous interaction, information exchange and mutual 
learning between all relevant EU stakeholders. Such a design is essential because “[t]here is rarely 
enough information to make decisions and choices with full confidence. It is often necessary to engage 
in a more complex process whereby analysis and assessment is continuous to allow adjustment when 
circumstances change and/or new information and insight comes to light”.1359 This does not imply that 
a general policy framework is irrelevant, it may simply not be seen as a final destination fixating a single 
vision. In this sense it is key that the underlying aim of the Communication is to systematise policy 
processes, mechanisms and attitudes. The strengthened appreciation for EU Delegations moreover 
enables a feedback loop between policy formulation and implementation, which would however have 
benefited from a more explicit mention.  
The Joint Communication thus contains the seeds of a more responsive policy process, but 
insufficiently pins down the comprehensive approach as a concept, or specifies which purpose it serves 
exactly. The High Representative and Commission blow hot and cold over the focus of the 
comprehensive approach. The title suggests that this is on crisis management, but conflict prevention 
is a key component, while it establishes “guiding principles for EU external action across all areas” and 
intends to “make determined progress towards better, stronger and faster EU external action” as a 
whole.1360 The question is therefore when and where the comprehensive approach will and can be 
activated. Political and organisational realism – taking into account the EU’s and Member States’ 
capacity constraints – dictates that its efforts are likely to be hijacked by crises and conflict situations, 
regardless of the focus on prevention.1361  
Another non-negligible shortcoming is that the comprehensive approach is presented as if it emerged 
in a vacuum. The Communication does not sufficiently explain whether and how ‘the’ comprehensive 
approach differs from the need for ‘a’ comprehensive deployment of all its instruments, which the EU 
has put forth as an objective for over a decade. In other words, is the comprehensive approach yet 
another all-purpose word for efforts that increase coherence, a kind of philosophy, or a new and single 
methodology? No mention is made of earlier attempts to gear the different strands of EU external 
                                                          
1358 S. Stroß, One Goal, Many Paths: The Promotion of Policy Coherence for Development in EU Policy Formulation (epubli, 
Berlin, 2014) 164-166. This is confirmed and illustrated by the non-exhaustive list of Petersberg tasks in Article 43(1) TEU. 
1359 Commission (2014) op.cit. note 485, 47. 
1360 Commission and High Representative (JOIN(2013) 30 final) op.cit. note 1353, 2 and 12. 
1361 F. Faria, 'What EU Comprehensive Approach? Challenges for the EU action plan and beyond', ECDPM Briefing Note No. 
71 (European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, 2014) 10. 
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action towards crisis management and conflict prevention. Given that the “EU’s track record in seeking 
agreement and implementing comprehensive approaches is a long history of unfinished business, 
postponed priorities and failed attempts”,1362 it would not have been redundant to explain how the 
focus and why the prospects should be better now. The security-development nexus is established as 
“a key underlying principle”,1363 but it is not clear what this implies and the proposed approach is both 
wider and more confined. On the one hand, reminding of the PCD rationale, the Joint Communication 
advocates a broad message of ‘policy coherence for conflict prevention and crisis management’ by 
ensuring that all internal and external policies support this aim. Yet, in contrast to the rationale of the 
security-development nexus, this comprehensiveness does not serve the objectives of poverty 
eradication themselves. An even more striking absentee is the CSDP, which is only referred to in 
passing. Reportedly, this results from Member States’ pressure not to subdue their control over the 
military dimension to this comprehensive logic.1364 Yet, this void leaves an important scar on the so-
called comprehensiveness. Paradoxically, while the approach emerged out of civil-military 
coordination, efforts to draw in more policy areas for the sake of comprehensiveness resulted in the 
renunciation of these roots. 
The May 2014 FAC Conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach, while significantly more sparing 
in detail, contain a number of relevant clarifications.1365 First, they welcome – not endorse – the Joint 
Communication as an important step in the ongoing process of cohering security and development 
and strengthening conflict prevention.1366 At least implicitly, the Council places the comprehensive 
approach within the context of earlier integrative policy attempts. Moreover, it “stresses that the 
comprehensive approach is both a general working method and a set of concrete measures and 
processes to improve how the EU, based on a common strategic vision and drawing on its wide array 
of existing tools and instruments, collectively can develop, embed and deliver more coherent and more 
effective policies, working practices, actions and results.”1367 The title of the Conclusions ‘on the EU’s 
comprehensive approach’ – and thus in contrast to the Communication not specifically on external 
conflicts and crises – indicates that its principles are relevant for the broad spectrum of EU external 
action. Yet, “[t]he need for such a comprehensive approach is most acute in crisis and conflict 
situations and in fragile states, enabling a rapid and effective EU response, including through conflict 
                                                          
1362 Ibid., 1. 
1363 Commission and High Representative (JOIN(2013) 30 final) op.cit. note 1353, 4. 
1364 Hauck and Rocca (2014) op.cit. note 1334, 44. 
1365  The Conclusions are based on the recommendations provided by five Council preparatory bodies, namely the 
Development Committee, the EUMC, CIVCOM, PMG and the Committee on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) (Faria 
(2014) op.cit. note 1361, footnote 18). 
1366 Council Conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach, 3312th FAC meeting, Brussels 12.05.2014, para. 1.  
1367 Ibid., para. 2. 
267 
 
prevention”.1368 The Council then goes on to pick and stress certain aspects of the Communication, 
particularly the ‘comprehensive analysis-approach-action chain’. It reiterates how early, coordinated 
and shared analysis of conflict dynamics forms the starting point for determining comprehensive 
strategic objectives and a common vision that enables better, earlier and more systematic action as 
well as a smooth transition between the various components of EU external action.  
With their limited attention for the CSDP, these Conclusions latently confirm the Member States’ 
resistance to its full-blown integration. However, a number of policy initiatives indicate that this does 
not prevent more practical initiatives to align this competence area with the comprehensive approach. 
For one thing, the November 2014 Council Conclusions on CSDP adopt a considerably more context-
sensitive penchant.1369 Furthermore, the annual CSDP Lessons Report identifies, as one of the five key 
lessons, that the comprehensive approach improves the efficiency and sustainability of mission 
results.1370 It is drawn up by the recently established Lessons Management Group (LMG) for the CSDP, 
composed of representatives from CMPD, EUMS, CPCC, INTCEN, Security Policy and Conflict 
Prevention, CROC, CivCom, EUMC and PMG, relevant geographic and thematic departments, as well 
as the Commission's DG DEVCO, ECHO and FPI. This broadly owned report calls to increase the CSDP’s 
liaisons with other instruments and policies from the planning to the implementation phase. Building 
on the inclusive approach between EEAS crisis management structures and the Commission in 
adopting CMCs, it calls to scale up institutional integration in the fact-finding/technical assessment 
missions (FFM/TAM). Better coordinated visits would help to end the “unacceptable strain on the 
receiving host nation, causing confusion and some ambiguity of intent. [It] would show the EU in a 
better light, save money and favour more comprehensive planning”.1371 Appraising the EU Delegations 
as key asset in gathering first-hand intelligence and scanning the EU’s activity gamut for overlaps and 
synergies, the report appeals to reinforce informal coordination or formal liaison mechanisms with 
CSDP missions.  
Given that EU coordination is often about deconflicting,1372 the Joint Communication and Council 
Conclusions represent important progress on the politically sensitive dossier of aligning security and 
development. They contain the roots of an innovative methodology that is more in line with the 
Union’s new constitutional and institutional framework as well as the challenges of fine-tuning the 
EU’s fragmented toolbox. However, no concrete or decisive changes to EU decision-making are 
proposed that go the whole way with this comprehensive approach. Painful choices are avoided and 
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1370 The first such report was adopted in 2014: EEAS Deputy Secretary-General (00407/14) op.cit. note 451).  
1371 Ibid., 3. 
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“its shortness and broad orientation could be taken as a meal serving anybody’s taste – or at least one 
that they could all digest”.1373 The Parliament regrets that the Joint Communication “relies more on 
existing processes rather than trying to explore new concrete ways to facilitate institutional and 
practical cooperation”.1374 Arnaud Danjean, former chair of the European Parliament’s subcommittee 
on Security and Defence, is even more critical: “Mme Ashton vend une approche globale où tous les 
instruments sont également utiles et respectables avec une réticence à favoriser l’un d’entre eux de 
façon plastique selon les crises. Il y a un côté non-choix qui est pénalisant à terme”.1375 
The way ahead 
On the positive side, the comprehensive approach leaves room for improvement. The Communication 
does not present itself as a policy bible, but rather provides a starting point, acknowledging that “work 
is not over”. 1376  Also the Council commits itself to reinforcing its efforts and calls on the High 
Representative and Commission  
to immediately commence work to present an action plan to Member States before the end of the 
first quarter of 2015. This action plan should outline how key actions set out in the Joint 
Communication and these Council Conclusions, in close cooperation with EU Member States, and 
based on concrete country and regional cases, will be taken forward, implemented and reported, 
with identified lead structures. This action plan will be regularly reviewed and progress will be 
assessed with a view to regular progress reports, the first one to be delivered in 2015.1377 
Notably, this time, it did not become another ghost action plan haunting EU corridors.1378 The Action 
Plan was published, as announced, in April 2015. Its preparation was guided by important principles, 
reflecting the key dynamics of this approach. First, reiterating the process-prong, it emphasises that 
“the comprehensive approach is first and foremost a general working method and a way of doing 
things more effectively together that should influence and permeate all EU external action”.1379 As 
such, it cannot be a complete list of actions and the focus in the Action Plan is on a selected number 
of key issues. This includes better CSDP-development cooperation transition strategies, rapid 
deployment of joint field missions and capacity-building in support of security and development (cf. 
infra on ‘Train and Equip’). Second, in line with the focus on context, the plan departs from the idea 
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1375 Merelle (2014) op.cit. note 604. 
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ecdpm.org/talking-points, 23.05.2014. 
1379  Commission and High Representative Joint Staff Working Document (SWD(2015) 85 final) Taking forward the EU’s 
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that “the best testing opportunity for a comprehensive approach is on the ground”.1380 Consequently, 
a limited number of country and regional cases are identified that represent the spectrum of conflict 
prevention opportunities, crisis and post-crisis situations. These are the Sahel, Central America, 
Afghanistan and Somalia. Third, the Action Plan stresses that its implementation is a joint responsibility 
of the EEAS, Commission services and Member States.  
While the Plan does not have much bite in terms of concrete measures and commitments, its main 
value lies in focussing and streamlining efforts along both its process and context dimension. As the 
comprehensive approach itself, it is not presented as a final policy blueprint, but rather as a starting 
point for targeting future activity at a number of issues and areas. Notably, it is also portrayed as an 
annual plan, so that priorities can change over the years, enabling a flexible and responsive approach. 
These ongoing efforts should continue the new tendency of going beyond politically correct, yet 
abstract, calls for coherence and take realism as a guiding principle. As former EEAS Chief Operating 
Officer O’Sullivan put it: “[w]e are not going to see a dramatic shift to an integrated foreign policy for 
many decades”.1381 Inordinate expectations might therefore backfire on the whole process. For this 
purpose the right balance should be sought between the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the 
approach.1382 The EU cannot and should not aim at uniformising working cultures, methods and styles 
across EU policy communities into some sort of pensée unique.1383 The delimitation of competences, 
and particularly of the CFSP, is written in the EU’s DNA. Assimilation or full-blown integration can thus 
impossibly be the aim of the comprehensive approach. Rather, the existing diversity should be 
exploited in the best possible manner. This cannot be achieved by means of a top-down master plan 
or more bureaucratisation, but should emerge from a bottom-up ‘networked’ way of working.1384  
This is essentially what the institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty provide and facilitate. The 
High Representative, EEAS and EU Delegations help to take away the blinkers between policy areas 
and actors. Within the Commission this is reflected in the new policy filtering and steering role for High 
Representative Mogherini as Vice-President responsible for external relations (cf. supra 4.2.2.). As part 
of the EEAS, the Crisis Platforms can be seen as the institutional translation of the comprehensive 
approach. By uniting, on an ad hoc basis, all competent EU actors in response to an emerging or 
potential crisis, these form a key network that can determine the appropriate mix of EU instruments 
and responses for any specific situation. If the comprehensive approach is to make a real difference, 
such structures ought to be expanded, systematised and also oriented towards conflict prevention. 
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This will require an intensive process of comprehensive change management, within the overarching 
policy framework of the Joint Communication and Council Conclusions. Made-to-measure 
comprehensive approaches are needed, continuously adapted to the specific needs and requirements 
of the respective country, region or situation. While there is increasing consensus on the need for such 
approaches, their operationalisation still raises numerous questions. Continued efforts should 
therefore translate the comprehensive approach in operational and procedural terms to the intra and 
inter-service functioning at all administrative levels of the Commission, EEAS and EU Delegations. If 
this again founders at the rocks of inter-institutional zero sum games, the comprehensive approach is 
at risk of becoming another rhetorical coherence device. 
A key question in this regard is whether this comprehensive approach offers an appropriate and 
worthy replacement to the EU’s focus on the security-development nexus and its forgotten action 
plans. The nexus is established as a key underlying principle, but it is worrying that the inclusion of 
both development cooperation and the CSDP is only lukewarm in the Joint Communication as well as 
the Council Conclusions. Development policy is solely approached to the extent that it can contribute 
to conflict prevention and particularly crisis management, with no mention of its primary aim of 
eradicating poverty. The CSDP is left largely outside this framework, out of the Member States’ fear to 
defer this competence to the dynamics of the new approach. The candid concerns of the destructive 
vicious cycle of poverty and instability meanwhile remain, and can only be genuinely addressed if both 
policy areas are whole-heartedly embraced by the comprehensive approach. It is in this regard 
promising that the 2015 Action Plan announces to tackle both dimension more thoroughly. 
This is moreover acknowledged in the April 2015 Commission and High Representative Joint 
Communication on ‘Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to 
prevent and manage crises’. It departs from the observation that while the security-development 
nexus underlies the comprehensive approach, key gaps remain in practice and must be addressed by 
strengthening the latter.1385 The specific gap at issue here is the fact that CSDP training is too often 
hampered by a lack of partner country equipment. External financing instruments can and do 
occasionally step in, but face two important shortcomings. A first is related to the scope of this arsenal: 
“there is currently no EU budget instrument designed to provide a comprehensive financing to security 
capacity building in partner countries, in particular its military component”.1386 Under the EU budget, 
expenditure with defence or military implications is explicitly ruled out.1387 Moreover, under the 2014-
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2020 MFF, development instruments should at least count 90% of their spending as ODA.1388 EU 
instruments are not in principle excluded from financing security sector capacity-building, but – 
regardless of whether the beneficiary is civilian or military – this is subject to a case-by-case exception. 
As the APF is not part of the EU budget, it holds considerable potential “to ‘bridge’ the gap between 
CSDP and various development instruments when attempting to comprehensively address security-
development nexus issues”.1389 Nonetheless, it also faces considerable restrictions regarding military 
or defence funding (cf. supra 3.2.1.). An additional shortcoming is its exclusively regional focus, which 
does not allow to provide support at the national level.1390 To tackle these deficiencies, the Commission 
and High Representative come up with a number of concrete proposals under the ‘Train and Equip’ 
header, to be addressed by the June 2015 European Council. These include adapting the APF, 
establishing a key facility to link peace, security and development in the framework of one or more 
existing instruments, considering the extension of the Athena mechanism to address capacity-building 
or creating a dedicated instrument for security sector capacity-building. A second essential 
shortcoming of the EU’s instrumentarium is the insufficient exploitation of common ground with CSDP 
activity, due to limited coordination and interaction. In this regard the Joint Communication calls to 
develop (1) an EU-wide strategic framework for SSR, shared by CSDP and development cooperation 
policy and drawing on lessons learnt in terms of the transition from CSDP to other instruments; (2) a 
shared evaluation, monitoring and results framework for security capacity building, irrespective of the 
policy framework under which they are conducted; (3) and a dedicated risk management methodology.   
The comprehensive approach has been coined a “strategic document in disguise”.1391 A key question 
is therefore whether it represents the proclaimed “long-term EU strategic framework in the area of 
external relations”?1392 After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the call for a new European 
Security Strategy, adapted to the radically changed internal and external context of the EU, rose 
significantly in magnitude. There exists some consensus within EU institutions that the effectiveness 
of EU external action would benefit from more strategic guidance. In this regard it has been argued 
that only a consensual, broadly supported and comprehensive strategy can enable a more proactive 
policy guiding and agenda-setting role for the High Representative and ‘her’ EEAS.1393 However, not 
everyone sees the benefit hereof. The predominant view from the Commission and the EEAS was for 
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some time that the bickering over wording in the light of national sensitivities would cost more energy 
than it adds in value. They perceived the smaller scale, tailor-made and policy-specific design of the 
comprehensive approach as a more promising way ahead.1394 “We don’t need a new European security 
strategy: we have the comprehensive approach”; with these words former High Representative Ashton 
declared the discussions closed at the 2013 EUISS annual conference.1395 Her successor took however 
a diametrically opposed view and lobbied the Member States to launch a process of strategic reflection: 
We need to stop jumping from crisis to crisis, and to start looking at the complete picture. We need 
to start thinking in a strategic way. … Amid the current global chaos, a new strategy will give us 
hopefully a sense of direction, an ability to make choices and to prioritise. … After the Lisbon Treaty 
we have the tools we need. … But our foreign policy can sometimes be disconnected. We need to 
connect the dots.1396 
At their informal Riga gathering in February 2015, EU Defence ministers gave High Representative 
Mogherini a mandate to start preparing this exercise. This inclusive reflection– which was recently 
rebranded as ‘Strategic Review’ in order not to pre-empt the discussions1397 – will undoubtedly be 
instructive for both EU insiders and outsiders. If we see how often the 2003 ESS is still cited in policy 
and academic debate, such a document can provide an important framework of reference for a 
significant time to come. However, its potential importance should not be overestimated either. As 
noted by Gros-Verheyde: “la stratégie européenne de sécurité a rarement servi de base à une action 
ultérieure ni n’a jamais empêché d’ailleurs d’inscrire des orientations nouvelles. Par exemple, le risque 
de piraterie n’est pas inscrit. Il n’a pas empêché le déclenchement d’une opération au large de la 
Somalie”.1398 Biscop accurately counters that  
strategy does not aim to predict anything in the first place. The point of strategy, rather, is to help 
the decision-maker define a course of action when, per definition, unpredictable events occur … 
The first rule of strategy-making therefore could be stated quite simply as: know thyself. Know your 
interests, and know your values … your values will determine which kind of society you want to 
build and preserve, and that will in turn determine which conditions need to be fulfilled for that to 
be possible: your vital interests. Your values will further determine which types of instruments are 
deemed morally acceptable to put to use to that end ... The more straightforward the decision-
making system, the less necessary it is to codify strategy. A state where in the end the strategy is 
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what the president says that it is, can operate on the basis of an implicit strategy. Vice versa, a 
complex multi-layered foreign policy actor such as the EU has much more need of an explicit 
strategy.1399 
The comprehensive approach and a new European Security Strategy can indeed be complementary 
and even mutually reinforcing. As put in the 2015 Action Plan on the comprehensive approach, the 
latter “is not about ‘what to do’, but more about ‘how to do it’ and how to make best use of the EU’s 
collective resources and instruments, with a particular focus on conflict and crisis situations”.1400 A 
Security Strategy could then provide the overarching framework within which this methodology is 
applied, by shedding light on what kind of actor the EU wants to be and where its priorities lay. Notably, 
former EEAS Executive Secretary-General Vimont questions whether such an “overall strategy is well 
suited for the realities of the world we are living in today, with its constant acceleration and increased 
interaction. A strategic approach, more focused on the regions fraught with crisis (Horn of Africa, Sahel, 
etc.) or on the urgent thematic challenges (cyber security, terrorism, etc.), that could also be updated 
on a more regular basis, may be the right way to proceed as we witness an ever-complex global world 
in permanent turmoil”.1401 This will be discussed in the next section, focussing on the specific example 
of the Horn of Africa.  
6.2. Regional translations of the comprehensive approach: the example of 
the EU’s Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa 
EU institutions, and particularly the EEAS in its strive for legitimacy, did not await their colleagues to 
settle on the comprehensive approach, before trying its concrete application with regard to specific 
themes and regions. This resulted in regional strategic frameworks for the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, 
the African Great Lakes and the Gulf of Guinea, as well as thematic strategies on maritime security and 
cybersecurity.1402 This practice does not follow any predetermined template or agenda. Consequently, 
all of them are rather different in form, design and approach. The Council Conclusions on the 
comprehensive approach welcome “the continued proactive preparation of such regional and 
thematic strategies to frame the EU's comprehensive response to new political developments and 
challenges”.1403 Also the Joint Communication holds that its organising principles have already proofed 
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their success in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the Great Lakes region.1404 Oddly therefore these 
regional and thematic translations thus simultaneously precede and give effect to the comprehensive 
approach  
In the light of the remaining uncertainties surrounding the implementation of the latter, it is interesting 
to analyse what these so-called success stories mean for operationalising the EU’s enhanced and 
comprehensive focus on process and context. The Horn of Africa is certainly the most cited example 
by EU officials of the potential and benefits of the comprehensive approach.1405 In what follows the 
EU’s 2011 Strategic Framework for this region will therefore be examined. The aim is not to give a 
complete overview of the EU’s activities in this crisis-torn area, nor to set out a full-fledged empirical 
analysis of the impact and effectiveness of its security and development efforts. Rather, this section 
will analyse how the Strategic Framework impacts on the EU’s policies towards the Horn of Africa and 
what this tells us about the comprehensive approach and its impact on the security-development 
nexus. A first section on the challenges plaguing this region and the emergence of EU strategic thinking 
in this regard (6.2.1.), will be followed by an overview of the main modalities of the 2011 Strategic 
Framework (6.2.2.). Focussing on the specific cases of South Sudan and fighting piracy off the Somali 
coast, a final section will analyse to what extent this enables comprehensive action and coordination 
(6.2.3.). 
6.2.1. The Horn of Africa: a region in need of a comprehensive EU strategy 
The EU defines the Horn of Africa geographically as the member countries of the Intergovernmental 
Authority for Development (IGAD), namely Djibouti, Eritrea (although suspended since 2007), Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. It has been described as “the most conflicted corner 
of the world since the end of the Second World War”, home to some of the poorest countries on earth 
that fill the bottom ranks of all major development indicators.1406 Most regimes have their roots in 
resistance movements and changes of government rarely occur in a peaceful manner. State power in 
these autocracies is generally rooted in ethnic loyalties, implying a winner-takes-all of wealth, 
resources, prestige and prerogatives of office. This raises the stakes of political control dangerously 
high.1407 Using force to achieve political goals is therefore not uncommon, both internally and in the 
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relations among the countries of the region. Decades of conflict have left deep marks on inter-state 
relations, characterised by mutual and deep-ranging rivalry, mistrust and suspicion. Prospects are 
gloomy with Somalia and Sudan hosting some of the deadliest wars in recent history, South-Sudan a 
failed state upon birth wedged in a devastating spiral of violence, Ethiopia and Eritrea caught in 
protracted border conflict, tensions intensifying between Kenya and Somalia, and terrorist attacks on 
the rise against both local and foreign targets. Regional competition over scarce natural resources and 
pasturage moreover imply that countries often prey upon each other’s instability. At worst they 
advance their foreign policy interests through proxy forces. In this manner, Ethiopia and Eritrea have 
played a particularly destructive role in Somalia, pushing it into ever deeper misery. All these complex 
conflicts cut across porous state borders and defy easy analysis. 
The local population obviously suffers most from this history of violence. Around 10 million of them 
are internally displaced or seeking refuge.1408 Malnutrition and diseases are skyrocketing because of 
extreme weather conditions such as droughts, flooding and hurricanes. Schooling is low and economic 
opportunities limited. Many of the Horn’s citizens experience the state as an instrument of power and 
even oppression, rather than a service provider.1409 Despite the unmistakable needs in the education 
and health sector – exacerbated by an unsustainably high birth rate – military spending eats up a 
disproportionally high share of governments’ spending. This militarisation, in turn, heightens the 
threat perception in a region awash with weaponry from past and ongoing conflicts. This lay at the 
basis of an explosive societal security situation, stirred up by the systematic exclusion of large 
communities from resources and representation along ethnic, religious or clan fault-lines. Combined 
with the lack of cross-border transport networks, inadequate infrastructure and the shortage of capital 
and skilled labour, this does not help to make the region an attractive (foreign) investment destination. 
In recent years, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda have nonetheless managed to realise a significant 
economic growth, but this remains on a rather low economic base and vulnerable to shocks.1410  
This short exposition on the tangled stability and development challenges in the Horn Africa, which 
continuously corrode the relevance of state borders, illustrates why many authors approach it as 
ultimate example of what Buzan has famously coined a ‘regional security complex’.1411 This is defined 
as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their 
                                                          
1408 OCHA, Eastern Africa: Displaced Populations Report (Issue 17, 1 April - 30 September 2014) (UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, Nairobi, 2014) 21p. 
1409 S. Healy, 'Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel', Horn of Africa 
Group Report (Chatham House, London, 2008) 38-40. 
1410 Soliman, Vines and Mosley (2012) op.cit. note 552, 11-13. 
1411 See for instance: C.N. Odock, 'Geo-Politics, Security Threats and Regional Integration in the Horn of Africa: A Global 
Security Perspective' (2013) European Journal of Globalization and Development Research 7(1), 402-424; Mesfin (2011) op.cit. 
note 1407.  
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national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”.1412 In the Horn of Africa, 
“[t]he ways in which ‘amity and enmity’ are constructed among the players has a rich history. Without 
grasping this, external players are liable to be baffled by the conflicts that repeatedly erupt and fuel 
one another”.1413 Even though the idea that the Horn of Africa should be approached holistically is 
widely shared among researchers and policy-makers, studies that unravel the regional security and 
development dynamics remain scarce. EU institutions acknowledge these interrelated challenges and 
since long approach the Horn of Africa as a unity, expressing concern regarding its shared humanitarian 
and human rights crises.1414 Initially, this did not result in much concrete guidance of or direction over 
its separate, mainly development and humanitarian, policies towards the individual countries of that 
region. It was only in the mid-2000s that the ball of a more strategic EU approach towards the Horn of 
Africa started rolling. Unsurprisingly, this coincided with a rising threat perception posed to global 
security by the rapid spread of religious extremism and terrorism incited by the region’s instability and 
fragile state structures.1415 The most fertile breeding grounds, or even safe heavens, are Somalia, which 
was plunged into a chaotic internal conflict after the 1991 collapse of the dictatorial Barre regime,1416 
and Sudan where a still ongoing armed onslaught broke out in the Darfur region in 2003.  
In a process that would eventually take over five years, the Commission was the first to take up the 
pen in late 2006 to draft an ‘EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in 
the Horn of Africa’. This portrayed the Horn explicitly as facing “not a series of separate conflicts, but 
a regional system of insecurity in which conflicts and political crisis, feed into and fuel one another”. 
Given that it is both “one of the most conflict-prone regions in the world as well as one of the 
poorest”,1417 the Commission saw the Horn as a test case for the security-development nexus and thus 
the application of the then recently adopted EU-Africa Strategy.1418 It proposed a work programme to 
address the mutually destructive connections between insecurity, poverty and governance, as well as 
a number of initiatives to improve coordination, flexibility and responsiveness of the EU’s policy 
                                                          
1412 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Wheatsheaf Books, New York, 
1983) 106. This does evidently not mean that the Horn of Africa is an isolated security complex, as also other states – and 
particularly Yemen, Libya and Egypt – have an impact on (and are of course affected by) the region’s conflict dynamics.  
1413 Healy (2008) op.cit. note 1409, 41. 
1414 See for instance: EPC Statement (1986) op.cit. note 189; EPC Statement concerning the Horn of Africa, Dublin, 20.02.1990. 
1415 Particularly the fact that some of the perpetrators of the 2005 London bombings originated from the Horn of Africa served 
as wake-up call.  
1416 This chaos was stirred up by the so-called “Somali syndrome”, referring to the withdrawal in 1995 of the international 
community “from involvement in peacekeeping efforts in Somalia owing to the complexity of this conflict as well as the 
‘allergy’ of Somali fighting factions towards external interveners” (M.T. Wakengela, 'Keeping an Elusive Peace: AMISOM and 
the Quest for Peace in Somalia' in R. Sharamo and B. Mesfin (eds), Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa 
(Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2011) 377). 
1417 Commission Communication (COM(2006) 601 final) Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, 
security and development in the Horn of Africa, Brussels, 20.10.2006, 4. 
1418 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Brussels, 15-16.12.2005, para. 7. 
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spectrum.1419 Yet, this all remained rather general, with few specific instruments – let alone potential 
for synergy between them – mentioned. Moreover, as the emphasis was on tools within the 
Commission’s reach, the CFSP and CSDP were not included. One very concrete result of this partnership 
was the launch in 2007, together with the IGAD countries, of the Horn of Africa Initiative (HOIA), 
supporting regional interconnectivity in transport, energy, water and food security.1420  
It took the Council another three years to come up with a first “building block” of an integrative 
strategy, entitled ‘An EU Policy on the Horn of Africa: towards a comprehensive EU strategy’.1421 It 
explicitly built upon and is complementary to the 2006 Commission Communication. Without 
providing a specific timeframe, the Council expressed that both documents “will lay at the basis for an 
operational strategy for EU relations with the Horn of Africa”.1422  It lay out a number of worthy 
principles to facilitate a coherent, holistic, timely and flexible EU response that takes account of the 
unavoidable spillovers between the various countries. Yet, their elaboration was left to the strategic 
framework itself. The Council evidently drew in the CFSP and CSDP, but unfortunately this came at the 
expense of pushing back the aims of development and poverty eradication, which did not even make 
it as one of the four key challenges and priorities for the EU’s approach towards the region.1423   
The protracted call for a comprehensive approach was considerably intensified by the surge in piracy 
attacks off the Somali coast in the late 2000s. Particularly the highjacking of WFP vessels shipping 
humanitarian relief to Somalia caused international outrage. Besides worsening the decay of Somalia, 
the Somali pirates caused considerable damage to the international economy in the form of ransom 
payments, increasing insurance premiums and hazard payments to crew, costs of shipping delays and 
lost revenues, on-board protection teams, etc. In 2010, the annual cost of Somali piracy was estimated 
at between USD 4.9 and 8.3 billion,1424 or – according to former High Representative Ashton – “more 
than 40 times the EU’s annual aid to Somalia”.1425 In addition there is evidently the human cost in terms 
of lost lives, threats to personal safety and traumas for hostages and their families.  
This piracy problem has tightly-knit poverty and instability causes. The insecurity and lack of economic 
opportunities drives young Somalis into piracy. They feel trapped in a do-or-die situation as 
                                                          
1419 The Parliament validated this message and extended it with a number of country-specific measures (European Parliament 
Resolution (2006/2291(INI)) on the Horn of Africa: EU Regional political partnership for peace, security and development, 
10.05.2007). 
1420 Besides funding from the EDF, the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, EIB and the African Development Bank, EUR 165 
million was specifically accorded to the HOAI. 
1421 Council (17383/09) An EU Policy on the Horn of Africa – towards a comprehensive EU strategy, Brussels, 10.12.2009, 2.  
1422 Ibid., 4.  
1423 These consisted of mediation and dialogue for conflict prevention and resolution; monitoring the implementation of 
peace agreements; elections and political process for democratic transformation; economic integration, climate change, 
transboundary waterways and sustainable livelihoods.  
1424 X, The Economic Cost of Piracy: Pirate Ransoms and Livelihoods of the Cost off Somalia (Geopolicity, Dubai, 2010) 21p. 
1425 C. Ashton, 'Stop the pirates, help the Horn of Africa', European Voice, 23.02.2012 
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“[p]ractically all options that might improve their livelihoods carry the risk of death, that is, fleeing as 
refugees to live in overstretched refugee camps; migrating by sea in appalling conditions; being 
recruited into militias, or engaging in piratical acts”.1426 In turn, the fact that they are dragged away 
from the scarce legal economic activities, corrodes local social and political structures, accelerates 
corruption, drives up food prices in pirate strongholds, scales up local violence and leads to the well-
known delays and restraints in the delivery of humanitarian aid. 1427  These complex root causes 
moreover mean that policies addressing them can easily yield counterproductive results. For one thing, 
counter-piracy efforts risk to undermine social cohesion. Pirates were, certainly in the beginning, 
viewed positively by many Somalians because their ransom income fed back into the local economy. 
Furthermore, many of them have their origins in protecting Somali waters from illegal fishing and toxic 
waste dumping by, among others, European companies.1428 For another, post-conflict stabilisation 
efforts can play into the cards of pirates. The growing stability combined with absence of strong state 
structures in coastal areas of, for instance, the Puntland region, has allowed pirates to moor highjacked 
vessels in all tranquillity while awaiting ransom payments.1429  
Piracy is thus a complex and primarily land-based problem requiring a contextual and multi-pronged 
approach. In the words of Jean Ping, the former Chair of the AU Commission, “pirates were not born 
in the ocean and they don’t live there. They come from Somalia. If you want sustainable peace you 
have to go where they came from, which is on land”.1430 Nevertheless, the EU’s initial response was 
limited to the sea. A Naval Coordination Cell (EU NAVCO)1431 managed by the EUMS was soon followed 
by the full-fledged naval force EUNAVFOR – operation Atalanta in late 2008. In its first years of 
operation this largest CSDP military operation outside Europe, with nearly 2000 troops involved and 
cooperating with several multinational maritime coalitions,1432 did not manage to change the tide on 
piracy. The scaled-up naval presence shifted the pirates’ operating territory from the Gulf of Aden to 
the Indian Ocean, an area as large as Europe. Additionally, the militarisation of the seas incited more 
violent behaviour among pirates, putting seafarer’s lives even more at risk. Without tackling the 
                                                          
1426 Osiro (2011) op.cit. note 1270, 4. 
1427 H.-G. Ehrhart and K. Petretto, 'The EU and Somalia: Counter-Piracy and the Question of a Comprehensive Approach', 
Study for The Greens/European Free Alliance (Hamburg, 2012) 9. 
1428 Testament to these origins are the names of various pirates fleets such as ‘National Volunteer Coastguard of Somalia’ or 
‘Somali Marines’ (I. Tharoor, 'How Somalia's Fishermen Became Pirates', Time.com, 18.04.2009). A report by the Marine 
Resources Assessment Group estimates Somalia’s economic loss due to illegal fishing at USD 95 million per year (Review of 
Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries (MRAG, London, 2005) 166-167). 
1429 Q.-T. Do, The Pirates of Somalia : Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation (World Bank, Washington, 2013) 109. 
1430 X, 'Ping Says AU Effectively Tackling Toughest Economic and Political Problems Facing the Continent', allAfrica.com, 
19.10.2009. 
1431 Joint Action (2008/749/CFSP) on the EU military coordination action in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1816 
(2008) (EU NAVCO), OJ L252/39, 20.09.2008. 
1432 Besides Atalanta the main actors are NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and three Combined Task Forces (CTF-150, CTF-151 
and CTF-152) in the context of the global war on terror. These cooperate in Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) and 
are coordinated by the Contact Group on Piracy of the Somali Coast.  
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development as well as security sector dimension of the Somali piracy problem, it became increasingly 
clear that Atalanta could “only reach an ‘end date’ but not an ‘end state’”.1433 The EU aimed to silence 
criticasters1434 regarding its expensive naval presence1435 by scaling up efforts to settle minds on a 
comprehensive approach for the Horn of Africa.  
6.2.2. The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa… 
The then newly established EEAS took the lead in protracted discussions with the Commission, Council 
and Member States. A lengthy and rather academic document in combination with a commitment to 
draft a more concrete action plan could not convince Member States.1436  Five years of strategic 
discussions were consequently thinned out to a nine-page Strategic Framework for the Horn Africa, 
endorsed in an annex to the November 2011 Council Conclusions. It is guided by the ESS, the Joint 
Africa-Europe Strategy and the 2009 Council Policy on the Horn (notably not the 2006 Communication, 
or the ECD to which the latter extensively refers). The Framework – in curiously prudent terms – 
“proposes a number of ways the EU can pursue this strategic approach”.1437 It provides a sort of 
chapeau that can be further developed and implemented through various “action plans”.1438 The EU 
does not attempt to conceal that its long-term commitment not only ensues from a desire to support 
the welfare of the people in the Horn of Africa. It is also rooted in the region’s geo-strategic importance, 
the growing challenge of instability to regional but also global security and the need to protect 
European citizens from emanating threats and risks resulting from terrorism, piracy, arms proliferation 
and migration. The Framework affirms that, in these countries, addressing the interlocked challenges 
of insecurity, poverty, recurrent drought and conflict, as well as their root causes and drivers, 
necessitates a regional perspective.1439 The vast and intricate challenges the region faces are however 
only succinctly analysed and illuminated. The reasons for this are arguably less technical than political, 
and to a great extent result from discord among Member States regarding priorities and wording.1440  
                                                          
1433 A. Weber, 'EU Naval Operation in the Gulf of Aden (EUNAVFOR Atalanta): Problem Unsolved, Piracy Increasing, Causes 
Remain' in M. Asseburg and R. Kempin (eds), The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic 
Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 2009) 70. 
1434 See for instance: P. Heinlein, 'Somali Minister Mocks International Anti-Piracy Efforts', Voice of America, 06.04.2010. 
1435 Given the variable participation of navies and the split between common costs and costs bared by participating Member 
States, it is difficult to get a clear view on Atalanta’s finances. Yet, the total expense of the international naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean has been estimated at around USD 2 billion per year (A. Bowden, 'The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy', 
Working Paper (One Earth Future Foundation, Denver, 2010) 16). 
1436 S. Blockmans, 'The European External Action Service One Year On: First Signs of Strengths and Weaknesses', CLEER 
Working Papers 2012/2 (Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, The Hague, 2012) 24. 
1437 Council (2011b) op.cit. note 88, 4. 
1438 Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 3124th FAC meeting, Brussels, 14.11.2011, para. 1. 
1439 Council (2011b) op.cit. note 88, 4. 
1440 It has been argued that this is the main reason why the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, i.e. “the most important regional fault-
line”, is only mentioned in passing (Soliman, Vines and Mosley (2012) op.cit. note 552, 26). 
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The Strategic Framework sets out five main working areas: (1) assist all countries in the region to build 
robust, democratic and accountable political structures that contribute to human security and 
empowerment; (2) resolve and prevent conflicts, including those that are ongoing particularly in 
Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, latent conflicts between countries such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, as 
well as internal state tensions resulting from impunity or ethnic, clan or regional grievance and/or 
access to power; (3) mitigate the effects of insecurity in the region that ensue from piracy, terrorism, 
organised crime or irregular migration; (4) reduce poverty and support economic growth and prosperity 
of all countries and people in the region; and (5) support political and economic regional cooperation 
by bolstering the role of regional economic communities (RECs). With this outline the Strategic 
Framework thus establishes a better security-development balance than both the 2006 Commission 
Communication and the 2009 Council policy. It moreover assigns Council bodies to conduct regular 
reviews of the implementation of the Framework, a first of which was submitted by the High 
Representative to the PSC in January 2013 (cf. infra). 
The main relevance of this document does not lie in the nature of the activities proposed under those 
five titles, as these largely list ongoing efforts. Its importance emanates from the fact that all these 
elements are brought together in a comprehensive strategy that is directed at making the EU’s 
engagement “more effective through consistent, coherent and complementary use of its instruments, 
reinforcement of its political coordination, and by focusing more clearly on the underlying challenges 
of the region”. 1441  Yet again, the message is clear, the methodology rather less. With regard to 
operationalising the comprehensiveness only two issues are specified. First, the HR, EEAS, EUSR, EU 
Delegations in the region, Commission and Member States are assigned to “work together to 
implement this framework”.1442 Second and more promising is the approval by the Council of the High 
Representative’s proposal to appoint an EUSR for the Horn of Africa to enhance the coherence, quality, 
impact and visibility of the EU’s multifaceted action in the region (cf. infra). 
How then to evaluate this Strategic Framework and its impact on uprooting the interlocked security 
and development challenges in the Horn? This is not straightforward as the Framework itself does not 
stipulate its own role in coordinating, cohering and guiding EU policies. It is clear from its language that 
it does not superimpose a new framework of cooperation laying out objectives, directions and 
restrictions that EU policies and actors ought to respect. Rather, it is a descriptive document explaining 
and communicating the importance the EU attaches to the Horn of Africa and what type of actor the 
                                                          
1441 Council (2011b) op.cit. note 88, 8. 
1442 Ibid., 4. 
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EU wants to be.1443 It represents and reflects a move from empiric, ad hoc and often isolated policy-
making towards a coherent whole-of-EU approach.1444 As explained by an EEAS official its point  
is not to mix all these policies into one minestrone. It is purely to de-compartmentalize 
[decloisonner] these policies, to keep their specificities and their channels of intervention, but to 
try and facilitate horizontal synergies across these instruments so that one policy does not hinder 
another, that a sequential instrument in a crisis does not hamper ulterior interventions of another 
kind, and to free the potential synergies across sectors.1445  
This language clearly frames the Horn Strategy within the philosophy of the comprehensive approach. 
Yet, this is an ex post exercise and the reverse chronological order, whereby the different regional and 
thematic strategies flow from the motherboard of the comprehensive approach, would have been 
more ideal. A key question is therefore to what extent the Strategic Framework corresponds with the 
rationale of the comprehensive approach. When looking at the eight key measures that make up the 
latter (cf. supra 6.1.2.) we see that these are not all present in the Horn Strategy. Only the focus on 
prevention (measure 3), the mobilisation of the different strengths and capacities of the Union (4), the 
commitment to the long-term (5) and working in partnership (8) are at least implicitly included. The 
idea of a shared inter and intra-institutional analysis (1) informing a common strategic vision (2) is 
limited to the genesis of the Strategic Framework itself, but nothing evidences that this should also 
underlie its implementation. Finally, the improved linkage of internal and external policies (6) as well 
as the better use of EU Delegations (7) are completely absent. It is particularly striking how EU 
Delegations, as main executive arm of the comprehensive approach, are only once mentioned in 
passing. What is then the added value of the comprehensive approach for EU policies in the Horn of 
Africa, which are apparently governed by their own framework? A teleological reading of both 
documents makes clear that they serve distinct but complementary purposes. The main focus of the 
Strategic Framework is on the specific security and development challenges, needs and policy 
responses for that region. The comprehensive approach, for its part, is more methodological in nature 
and sets out a sort of check-list that should inform specific regional and thematic strategies (cf. supra 
6.1.2. for the discussion on the complementarity of the comprehensive approach and a possible new 
ESS). The extent to which this translates into comprehensive action in the Horn of Africa forms the 
subject of the next section. 
                                                          
1443 X, ‘The EU Comprehensive Approach towards Somalia’, FOI Memo 4067 (Swedish Defence Research Agency, Helsinki, 
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1444 C. Egger, 'Une "Stratégie Globale"? Atouts et Limites de la Stratégie de l'UE pour la Corne de l'Afrique' in M. de Langlois 
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1445 Quoted in: T. Henökl and C. Webersik, 'The Impact of Institutional Change on Foreign Policy-Making: The Case of the EU 
Horn of Africa Strategy' (2014) European Foreign Affairs Review 19(4), 527-528. 
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6.2.3. … as a basis for comprehensive action? 
In the light of the deep-rooted challenges plaguing this region, it is not surprising that the EU’s long-
term engagement in the Horn of Africa converts in the application of the whole arsenal of EU 
development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP instruments. In the current multiannual financial cycle 
(2014-2020) the EU has already committed around EUR 3 billion in development cooperation to the 
region.1446 The bulk hereof is provided through the 11th EDF, mainly in the form of bilateral funding, 
but also through regional support to IGAD, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Other 
instruments evidently include the IcSP (supporting a wide range of activities in the Horn including early 
recovery after drought, post-electoral stability and capacity-building), the EIDHR (providing assistance 
for transitional justice, election observation, etc.), the APF (funding various African-led PSOs, high-level 
mediation and civil society engagement in peace negotiations) and the DCI (providing thematic support 
in areas such as food security; non-state actors and local authorities in development; sustainable 
management of natural resources; and migration and asylum).  
The region is moreover home to one of the largest concentrations of CSDP activity in the world. In 
addition to the recently closed EUAVSEC South Sudan, advancing aviation security in the country, this 
includes three ‘firsts’: the first CSDP naval operation Atalanta, the first CSDP military training operation 
EUTM Somalia and the first mission with a regional approach EUCAP Nestor. Moreover, no less than 
three EUSRs were deployed to the Horn of Africa in recent years. Besides the still active EUSR for the 
Horn, this comprised the recently ended mandates of the EUSR to Sudan and South Sudan as well as 
to the African Union. All of this emphasises both the daunting security and development challenges 
that this region faces and the EU’s commitment to address them. For the purpose of this research it is 
interesting to analyse to what extent the Strategic Framework affects the coordination and 
comprehensiveness of this instrumentarium. A full-scale analysis of the multitude of EU actions in the 
Horn falls beyond the scope of this exploratory chapter. 1447  Rather, we will scan through EU 
coordination in the two most cited examples by the EU of how it is giving effect to this Strategic 
Framework, namely the comprehensive approaches to South Sudan and fighting piracy. 
The comprehensive approach to South Sudan 
As youngest country in the world, South Sudan provides the most lucid case for starting afresh in 
putting the Strategic Framework in action. Box 6 (cf. supra 3.2.1.) already gave the example of how the 
                                                          
1446 Commission Press Release (IP/14/1203) ‘EU confirms support to Horn of Africa ahead of highlevel visit of international 
organisations to the region’, Brussels, 27.11.2014. 
1447 For a completer overview of EU engagement in the Horn see: Soliman, Vines and Mosley (2012) op.cit. note 552, 16-43. 
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EU deployed its aid in a complementary manner in order to smoothen the birth of the Republic of 
South Sudan. This did not prevent instability from gaining the upper hand, with the eruption of fighting 
in the contested Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states as well as inter-communal clashes, leading to 
large-scale human suffering, civilian casualties, displacement and a refugee exodus.1448 Against this 
background of rising insecurity, the High Representative convened an inter-service task force for 
Sudan, comprising of the EEAS geographic desk, CMPD, CPCC, DG DEVCO and ECHO. This grouping 
introduced the comprehensive approach to Sudan and South Sudan, approved by the Council in June 
2011.1449 This was subsequently reoriented to South Sudan specifically, in a strategic undertaking that 
requires exploiting the diversity of EU instruments.  
To avoid the further pauperisation of an already suffering population, development assistance is 
continued in the areas of agriculture, health and the rule of law (over EUR 300 million for 2011-2014). 
As part of the comprehensive approach, this includes new measures to guarantee rapid, equitable and 
non-discriminatory access and ensure that basic services and food assistance are not diverted to armed 
groups. In this same reasoning, a State Building Contract is suspended and its envelop reallocated to 
immediate educational, health and resilience needs.1450 The IcSP’s short-term component targets crisis 
response capabilities in both Sudans with a total budget of EUR 23.5 million, including efforts to 
improve cross-border conflict prevention and peace-building. Further, over EUR 7 million is mobilised 
from the APF to support IGAD in its mediation efforts, set up a platform for peace talks as well as a 
monitoring and verification mechanism. On the part of the CFSP, the EU decided on an arms embargo 
and targeted sanctions on military leaders that spoil the peace process and commit human rights 
violations. 1451  In cooperation with Member States, it supports the IGAD-led peace process and 
undertakes efforts to refocus the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with a priority 
on the protection of civilians. In June 2012, a CSDP mission, advanced by the EEAS, was launched to 
assist and advise the authorities of South Sudan in establishing an aviation security organisation and 
strengthen security at Juba International Airport. Yet, one year later – even before it achieved full 
operationality – it was closed in all discretion. Essentially, the mission failed to ensure the necessary 
buy-in from EU Member States, with none of them stepping up to defend the otherwise usual 
prolongation of the mission,1452 as well as the South Sudanese authorities. In view of the latter’s 
precarious financial accounts, the finalisation of the new airport terminal and the recruitment of 
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airport staff – at which the EU’s support was targeted – were delayed. This made it impossible for 
EUAVSEC to achieve its objectives.1453   
This unfortunate experience is testament to the fact that even the existence of a comprehensive 
strategic approach is no guarantee to effectiveness. The merit of this specific approach is that it has 
brought together the various EU institutions and bodies and geared their efforts towards a common 
vision. A key challenge, particularly on the ground, remains to coordinate the plethora of actions. A 
central role in this regard was accorded to the meanwhile ended function of the EU Special 
Representative for Sudan and South Sudan, Rosalind Marsden. Although coherence was one of the 
keywords in her mandate, the executive dimension focussed mainly on CFSP tasks such as mediating 
and facilitating the adoption of a comprehensive, inclusive and durable peace agreement between the 
Sudans.1454 This evidently put an important strain on comprehensive coordination. Her functions are 
now taken over by the EUSR for the Horn of Africa (cf. infra).  
The comprehensive approach to fighting piracy 
As discussed above, the counter-piracy band-aid of operation Atalanta can never provide a sustainable 
solution without tackling the root causes of this problem. In this light, the EU first launched EUTM 
Somalia in April 2010.1455 This operation has since trained over 4,000 soldiers from the Somali National 
Army (SNA), initially in Uganda and since January 2014 – when the improved security situation allowed 
it – in a compound at Mogadishu International Airport. Various amendments1456 to its mandate have 
gradually shifted its focus from training towards formation (training the trainers, mentoring, strategic 
counselling) and assistance aimed at strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the 
institutions of Somalia.1457 Important in this regard was the adoption, in Brussels in September 2013, 
of the Somali Compact, based on the principles and objectives of the Busan New Deal for Engagement 
in Fragile States (cf. supra 3.1.1.). Among others, this Compact sets out the foundations of the Somali 
security sector by clarifying the tasks of the Defence, Interior and Justice Ministries.1458 These are 
evidently all crucial efforts in allowing the TFG to gain back control over the whole Somali territory 
from pirates, extremists and terrorists. Yet, EUTM Somalia struggles with issues of oversight over the 
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reintegration and recruitment of soldiers conducted by AMISOM, lack of logistical equipment, 
uniforms and barracks for the SNA in the light of the UN embargo and the EU’s own shortcomings in 
this regard, and the difficulty of training an army that is at war against Al-Shabaab.  
A third CSDP mission, EUCAP Nestor, was launched in July 2012 and is targeted at (1) enhancing the 
capacity of primarily Somalia but also Djibouti, Kenya and the Seychelles to exert effective maritime 
governance over their coastline, internal waters, territorial seas and exclusive economic zones; (2) 
supporting these states in taking ownership of the fight against piracy in accordance with the rule of 
law and human rights standards; (3) strengthening regional cooperation and coordination of maritime 
security; and (4) making a targeted and specific contribution to ongoing international efforts.1459 The 
aim is to allow these countries to cover the whole counter-piracy process, from crime to court. 
Following a rather sluggish start, related to difficulties with guaranteeing local political buy-in, 
safeguarding support structures and reconciling a military leadership style with the exigencies of 
mainly civilian tasks, the mission is now gaining momentum.1460 Its network has been set up and the 
around 100 staff work in close cooperation with the maritime security sector in each host country. The 
main tasks consist of advising, mentoring and training the respective coast guard, navy, civilian coastal 
and maritime police, prosecutors and judges.  
With this design, Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor form a sort of triptych, reflected in the 
parallel extension of their mandates until December 2016.1461 Since 2012, an impressive drop in piracy 
has been realised, but the fear remains that pirates will take over the Indian Ocean as soon as Atalanta 
retreats.1462 In this sense, it is often argued that the other two CSDP missions serve as ‘exit strategy’ 
for their sister mission Atalanta, by empowering Somalia and other coastal states to take the fight 
against piracy in own hands.1463 Yet, to this picture one should add a number of Commission-managed 
projects. Particularly EUCAP Nestor entered an area crowded by various EU development initiatives.  
First, a four-year Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE) was launched in 2013, 
worth EUR 37.5 million funded by the EDF. In general terms, it aims to strengthen the capacity of the 
Eastern and Southern Africa and Western Indian Ocean region (ESA-IO) in the implementation of the 
Regional Strategy and Action Plan against Piracy and for Maritime Security. Second, a number of 
                                                          
1459 Article 3 Council Decision (2014/485/CFSP) op.cit. note 593. 
1460 Tejpar and Zetterlund (2013) op.cit. note 618, 17-28. 
1461 Respectively, Article 16(3) Council Decision (2014/827/CFSP) amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on an EU military 
operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali 
coast, OJ L335/19, 22.11.2014; Article 12(2) Council Decision (2015/441/CFSP) op.cit. note 1456; and Article 16(2) Council 
Decision (2014/485/CFSP) op.cit. note 593. 
1462 The EU’s naval operation is certainly not the only reason for this drop in piracy. Former Operation Commander Potts cites 
the following additional grounds: deployment of armed private security guards on board ships, better management practices 
by shipping companies, pre-emptive action by combined navies in the region and a change of mentality among Somalians 
that are now far less toleratant of pirates (F. Gardner, 'Somali piracy: A broken business model?', bbc.com, 29.11.2012). 
1463 See for instance: Tejpar and Zetterlund (2013) op.cit. note 618, 39-41. 
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related actions are funded by the Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme that forms part of the 
IcSP’s long-term component. These include MARSIC, enhancing Maritime Security and Safety through 
Information-Sharing and Capacity-Building among States in the Horn of Africa/Western Indian Ocean 
(EUR 6 million 2010-2015); CRIMARIO (Critical Maritime Routes in the Indian Ocean – EUR 5.5 million 
2013-2016) with similar objectives as MARSIC but a broader geographic focus; CRIMLEA (Law 
Enforcement Capacity-Building in East Africa – EUR 3.6 million 2011-2017) supporting and assisting law 
enforcement agencies in the region in combatting maritime piracy and robbery through effective 
investigations; and CRIMSON (CMR Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism – EUR 1 million 
2012-2014) coordinating and cohering the EU’s various initiatives on this issue. The DCI, for its part, 
funded a project on responding to migrants’ needs and ensuring maritime security in Yemen, which 
addressed border and migration issues with a maritime dimension in the Gulf of Aden (EUR 2 million 
2010-2011). Finally, in 2010 the Commission launched a Pilot Project on Piracy, Maritime Awareness 
and Risks (PMAR) implemented by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre. It explores the 
use of civilian technical and affordable tools to obtain real-time maritime situational awareness.1464 
This plethora of initiatives is designed to embrace the many aspects of this complex problem, but 
makes it hard to identify a specific set of aims or distinct rationale for EUCAP Nestor.1465 In the spirit of 
the Strategic Framework, the EUCAP Nestor Decision therefore calls on the Head of Mission to 
coordinate closely, not only with EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia, but also with the Maritime 
Security Project and the CMR Programme. 1466  At headquarters-level this resulted in regular 
cooperation meetings between DEVCO and CMPD, but a proper project-level coordination mechanism 
is still to be established. Ad hoc cooperation occurs on various levels, and while generally constructive 
it is rather complicated. Nestor’s Head of Mission admitted “qu’on travaille parfois mieux avec des 
organisations des Nations Unies — comme avec l’UNODC aux Seychelles — qu’avec les collègues de la 
Devco. C’est un paradoxe. Mais il commence à y avoir une prise de conscience”.1467 The difficulties 
most cited by EU officials are the lack of transparency and knowledge of all the numerous projects with 
diverging budget cycles as well as the insufficient capacity of EU Delegations in the region for 
coordination.1468 Furthermore, the ultimate exit strategy for Atalanta evidently lies in tackling the root 
causes of the piracy problem on land. The above complications pale before Somalia’s immense security 
and development harms, which the EU – together with the international community writ large – 
struggles to address.  
                                                          
1464 T. Behr, et al., The Maritime Dimension of CSDP: Geostrategic Maritime Challenges and their Implications for the European 
Union (European Parliament DG for External Policies, Brussels, 2013) 73. 
1465 European Parliament Report (2014/2220(INI)) on the implementation of the CSDP, 19.03.2015, para. 19. 
1466 Article 14(5) Council Decision (2012/389/CFSP) op.cit. note 593. 
1467 N. Gros-Verheyde, 'Objectif : Somalie (Etienne de Poncins/Eucap Nestor)', Bruxelles2.eu Le Club, 24.11.2014. 
1468 Tejpar and Zetterlund (2013) op.cit. note 618, 30-33. 
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Contrary to the comprehensive approach to South Sudan, the above efforts did not result from a clearly 
defined and forward-looking plan. Rather, the EU’s diverse arsenal is being interlaced ex ante to form 
a coherent whole. While this significantly complicates coordination and is all but (cost-) efficient, the 
advantage of this approach is that this is not imposed from the top but results from a bottom-up 
process that takes close account of contextual factors. Notable landmarks herein are the EEAS-
Commission Joint Staff Working Document on an Integrated EU approach to Security and Rule of Law 
in Somalia and the EEAS-Commission Discussion Paper for the EU's approach in post-transition 
Somalia.1469 The 2015 Action Plan on the comprehensive approach includes Somalia as one of the 
geographical target areas and proposes to take this bottom-up process further by focussing on four 
key dimensions. These consist of developing shared analysis among EU actors and Member States 
based on a better common understanding and situational awareness on the ground, launching the 
process of defining a common EU strategic vision, providing ad hoc thematic support to 
conceptualisation, identification and formulation of new interventions and continuing engagement 
with the African Union.1470 
The challenge of regional coordination 
In both of the above cases a comprehensive approach offers EU actors a shared frame of reference to 
steer their policies and positions towards common goals. The High Representative and EEAS provide 
political leadership – or at least guidance – at policy-making level, but a key challenge remains to 
translate this to coordinated action on the ground. While EU officials are generally key experts in their 
specific area, they not seldom lack information and awareness on the complete picture of the EU’s 
instruments and their potential. In this regard, EU Delegations can play a vital coordinating role on the 
national level, but often fall short on (security) expertise and capacity (cf. supra 4.4.). 1471  Most 
importantly, they are not designed for inter-country or regional coordination. Information and 
awareness-sharing occurs on a regular basis between Delegations in the Horn, for instance in the form 
of occasional regional HoDs meetings, but this is certainly not their core business. The EU Delegation 
to Kenya is a bit of an exception because it also hosts the EU Delegation to Somalia, since its closure in 
1993 due to security concerns. The latter’s Head, Michele Cervone d'Urso, is simultaneously EU Special 
                                                          
1469 EEAS-Commission Joint Staff Working Document (SWD(2013) 277 final) on an Integrated EU approach to Security and 
Rule of Law in Somalia, Brussels, 12.07.2013; EEAS-Commission (PSC 03/13) Discussion Paper for the EU's approach in post-
transition Somalia, Brussels, 11.01.2013. 
1470 Commission and High Representative (SWD(2015) 85 final) op.cit. note 1379, 9. 
1471 Alexander Rondos, EUSR for the Horn, therefore pleads to accord EU Delegations more flexibility in managing funds and 
less restrictions by administrative and accounting regulations (Soliman, Vines and Mosley (2012) op.cit. note 552, 25). 
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Envoy to Somalia.1472 Two key EU actors do take a regional perspective to coordination: the EU Special 
Representative for the Horn and the EU Operations Centre (OPCEN).  
First, based on the objectives set out in the 2011 Strategic Framework, the EUSR’s mandate is “to 
contribute actively to regional and international efforts to achieve peaceful co-existence and lasting 
peace, security and development within and among the countries in the region”.1473 The position is 
held by Alexander Rondos, a Greek national with extensive experience in the region and privileged 
points of entry with various governments. He has a team of six people in Brussels and nine co-located 
in the different EU Delegations. Revealing the capacity limits that go along with a regionally 
comprehensive approach, the Council asked the EUSR to give initial priority to Somalia and to the 
regional dimensions of the conflict, as well as to piracy.1474 The underlying idea is also that progress in 
this epicentre of the regional security system is a precondition for realising any other objectives.1475 
This focus was extended in 2013, after the abolishment of a separate EUSR for the Sudans, with 
contributing to “the peaceful coexistence of Sudan and South Sudan as two viable and prosperous 
states with robust and accountable political structures”.1476 There are two other key aspects to his 
mandate, namely the resolution of current and prevention of potential conflicts as well as the support 
of regional political, security and economic cooperation.  
This scope does not fully reflect the various aspects of the Strategic Framework to which the EUSR is 
to give effect. A key void is the dimension of ‘poverty reduction, economic growth and prosperity’, the 
fourth working area under the Framework. The only explicit link to development cooperation in the 
entire mandate is that the EUSR shall report on “the political aspects of relevant Union development 
projects, in coordination with the Union delegations”.1477 Arguably this bias stems from the fact that 
the Special Representative is a de jure CFSP actor (cf. supra 4.2.3). He reports to the High 
Representative, the PSC and, as necessary, to Council working parties, but has no formal links to the 
Commission, EEAS or EU Delegations besides the vague obligation to “work in close coordination”.1478 
It is moreover remarkable that enhancing the quality, intensity, impact and visibility of the Union’s 
                                                          
1472 Three field offices – in Hargeisa (Somaliland), Garowe (Puntland) and Mogadishu – liaise with Somali authorities, civil 
society and business, oversee the implementation of EU-funded projects and keep the Delegation abreast of all political and 
security-related developments. 
1473  Article 2 Article 12(2) Council Decision (2013/527/CFSP) amending and extending the mandate of the EU Special 
Representative for the Horn of Africa, OJ L284/23, 26.10.2013. 
1474 Article 1 Council Decision (2011/819/CFSP) appointing the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, OJ L327/62, 
09.12.2011. 
1475 L. Barry, 'European Security in the 21st Century: the EU's Comprehensive Approach ', IIEA European Security and Defence 
Series (The Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin, 2012) 9.  
1476 Article 2(2)(b) Council Decision (2013/527/CFSP) op.cit. note 1473. Previously there had been some confusion as to the 
precise delimitation of and cooperation between these two separate EUSR mandates, even though they established a 
generally positive working relationship (Soliman, Vines and Mosley (2012) op.cit. note 552, 31-32). 
1477 Article 11 Council Decision (2013/527/CFSP) op.cit. note 1473. 
1478 Articles 4(3) and 11 Ibid. 
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multifaceted engagement in the Horn is part of the EUSR’s key policy objectives, while his ‘contribution’ 
to the strive for unity, consistency and effectiveness is included in a separate Article 12 on coordination. 
This serves as another reminder that the EUSR is primarily a CFSP actor, who is just as any EU body 
bound to ensure coherence, but not specifically empowered for comprehensive coordination. 
The fact that the EUSR coordinates EU activity in parallel with the Heads of EU Delegation, without any 
form of hierarchy or task division between them, is a source of particular confusion. 1479  This is 
highlighted by the mandates of CSDP missions and operations. The Decision on EUCAP Nestor, provides 
that “[t]he Head of Mission shall, without prejudice to the chain of command, receive local political 
guidance from the Head of Union Delegation”, the former EUAVSEC mission assigned this same task to 
“the EUSR, in close coordination with the Head of Union Delegation”,1480  while the Decisions on 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia do not refer to political guidance or coordination of any kind. 
Whereas generally they work well in tandem, there is some antagonism with regard to Rondos’ more 
privileged access to several governments that is occasionally perceived as undermining their own 
diplomatic endeavours. 1481  In the case of Somalia, where the bulk of the EUSR’s efforts are 
concentrated, the regional-national axis of dividing labour does moreover not offer any clarification. 
The mandates of the EUSR and the Special Envoy overlap in their entirety and the fact that these do 
not overtly collide rests solely on their complementary personalities.  
Second, the Brussels-based EU Operation Centre, which had been ready for use since 2007 (cf. supra 
4.1.2.), was activated for the first time in March 2012 to strengthen civil-military synergies, facilitate 
information exchange and improve coordination between the three CSDP missions in the Horn of 
Africa. In addition to providing support to the operational planning and conduct of Operation Atalanta, 
EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor, the OPCEN supports the CMPD in its strategic planning and 
facilitates interaction between CSDP activity and Brussels-based structures. “[I]n the context of the 
Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa and in liaison with the [EUSR]”, this aims at enhancing 
efficiency, coherence and synergies.1482 The Centre has however no command responsibility1483 and 
fulfils these tasks in a purely supporting capacity, “without prejudice to the respective military and 
                                                          
1479 E. Daniel, 'Le Représentant Spécial de l'UE pour la Corne de l'Afrique' in M. de Langlois (ed), Approche Globale et Union 
Européenne: Le Cas de la Corne de l'Afrique (L’Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École Militaire, Paris, 2014) 120. 
1480  Respectively, Article 6(7) Council Decision (2014/485/CFSP) op.cit. note 593; and Article 6(7) Council Decision 
(2012/312/CFSP) on the EU Aviation Security CSDP Mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC-South Sudan), OJ L158/17, 19.06.2012. 
1481 Several interviews with EEAS and Commission staff at the EU Delegations to Ethiopia and the AU, June-July 2013. 
1482 Article 2 Council Decision (2012/173/CFSP) on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the CSDP missions and 
operations in the Horn of Africa, OJ L89/66, 27.03.2012. 
1483 This was considered a step too far for the UK (UK House of Lords EU Committee, European Defence Capabilities: lessons 
from the past, signposts for the future, 31st Report of Session 2010-2012, 04.05.2012, para. 136). 
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civilian chains of command of the missions and operation”.1484 This evidently limits its influence and 
some officials were initially rather sceptic about the added value of this newcomer.1485  
Nonetheless, the EU OPCEN has in two main ways proofed to be of considerable significance in building 
multi-agency awareness of EU actions. First, it supports and establishes several interaction and 
coordination mechanisms. Of key importance is the bi-weekly CSDP Horn of Africa Coordination 
Platform for information exchange, interaction and discussion among the EEAS CSDP structures.1486 
Topics for instance include the possibility of a common CSDP compound or the provision of fused CSDP 
mission intelligence.1487 It also supports more ad hoc mechanisms such as joint planning sessions 
between EUTM Somalia and Operation Atalanta on the development of a contingency plan for 
potential staff evacuation. Second, the EU OPCEN plays an important role in gathering and distributing 
information. The EUOPCEN Weekly Executive HoA CSDP Summary has become a key source of 
evidence – confirmed by its continuously expanding distribution – on executive CSDP activities in the 
Horn and forthcoming interactions between missions/operations. The various coordination 
mechanisms are brought together in a web-based ‘Synergies and Coordination Portal for the Horn of 
Africa’ (SCOPE), where EU institutions, Member States and third parties can register their projects and 
programmes. This allows to minimise the risk of gaps or duplication and maximise synergies. 
Yet, OPCEN struggles with limited capacity. It has only 16 Brussels-based staff positions, of which three 
are not manned. A crucial shortcoming is that the Centre “shall cover all military expertise” but lacks 
civilian know-how, despite the fact that one of the three CSDP deployments it is designed to support 
is civilian.1488 In the light of the Strategic Framework it is evidently not beneficial that linkages with 
Commission-managed projects are not formally covered by OPCEN’s mandate. In practice, the Centre 
nonetheless commits itself to seeking, expanding and exploiting “[o]pportunities to facilitate 
productive interaction through the growing relationships and routine involvement with the 
Commission structures involved in the [Horn]”.1489 This manifests itself in various forms. For one thing, 
OPCEN facilitates an annual workshop of CSDP, EEAS, EU Delegations and Commission services to 
operationalise the comprehensive approach in the Horn of Africa. This has evolved from a rather basic 
acquaintance among the different participants and their areas of activity, through exchanging ideas 
with regard to their various efforts in the areas of maritime security and the rule of law, towards 
                                                          
1484 Article 1(2) Council Decision (2012/173/CFSP) op.cit. note 1482. 
1485 Tejpar and Zetterlund (2013) op.cit. note 618, 34-36. 
1486 Noteworthy is that the OPCEN acts as secretariat of the Capacity Building Coordination Group, which forms part of the 
global Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 
1487 EEAS (01710/14) Six Monthly Report of the EU Operations Centre (EU OPCEN): 18 March 2014-17 September 2014, 
Brussels, 19.03.2014, paras. 4.5-4.12. 
1488 Article 4(2) Council Decision (2012/173/CFSP) op.cit. note 1482. Its only civilian official (a coastguard officer) recently left 
the Centre, seriously diminishing its scope of expertise (Council Note (13424/14) op.cit. note 1487, para.6.1.). 
1489 Council Note (13424/14) op.cit. note 1487, para. 1.5. 
291 
 
coming to coordinated plans in these fields. Further, a liaison officer from DG DEVCO is assigned on a 
permanent basis to work part time at the OPCEN. This creates a mutually beneficial relationship “to 
cultivate a better understanding, grow expertise and to facilitate greater coordinated planning and 
action … with the various units within DEVCO”.1490  
In the light of the above, it is clear that both the EUSR for the Horn of Africa and the Operations Centre 
make important strides in coordinating the implementation of the Strategic Framework on the ground. 
Yet, neither of them is able to cover the full picture as both are essentially targeted at the CFSP and 
CSDP. The development cooperation component is coordinated in the various countries of the Horn 
by the respective Union Delegation, but remains without much comprehensive guidance on a regional 
level. A significant external obstacle to this approach, acknowledged in the Strategic Framework, is 
that “[t]he region lacks a regional organisation effective enough to mediate disputes and foster 
cooperation”.1491 For practical reasons the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, as building 
block of the African Peace and Security Architecture, was chosen as vehicle for cooperation. IGAD is 
developing its role in mediation and conflict prevention, but remains weak in structures, poor in 
capacities and conflicted in organisation. Even in the field of trade, the organisation was unable to take 
the lead and the EU is negotiating EPAs with the IGAD member countries through two different 
regional organisations, namely the East African Community (EAC) and Eastern and Southern Africa 
(ESA). This fragmentation does evidently not benefit a comprehensive approach. Consequently, the EU 
is spearheading efforts “by regular meetings of Horn Ambassadors in Brussels to build effective 
multilateral cooperation without regard for institutional/organisational affiliations and 
differences”.1492  
Strategic Framework or ‘strategic formalism’?1493  
In January 2013, one year on in the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, the High Representative 
submitted a rather positive progress report, prepared jointly by EEAS and Commission services, in 
coordination with the EUSR for the Horn of Africa and the former EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan. 
The report found that it had “improved coherence of tools and instruments in the region”.1494 As its 
analysis of the underlying drivers of conflicts and the risks to development was considered still 
pertinent, the Framework remains relevant “and allows for the necessary adjustment on the policy 
                                                          
1490 Ibid., Annex para. 2(j). 
1491 Council (2011b) op.cit. note 88, 5. 
1492 High Representative Ashton, Implementation Review of the Horn of Africa Strategic Framework, Brussels, 11.01.2013, 16. 
1493  M.G.A. Viceré, 'Strategic Formalism or Formalised Strategy? Features and Limits of the New EU "Process-Oriented 
Comprehensive Approach" to External Conflicts and Crises' (2014) Conflict, Security & Development 14(5), 651-663. 
1494 High Representative (2013) op.cit. note 1492, 6. 
292 
 
action level”.1495 The Council agrees that CSDP missions and operations and Commission-managed 
programmes in the Horn are “seeing the impact of a more effective Comprehensive Approach through 
shared planning and action where it has been possible, and all actors in the region seem to have 
developed a genuine thirst for even greater synergies”.1496 
Other actors are rather more critical and highlight a number of areas for improvement. In the words 
of the Parliament the so-called Strategic Framework for the Horn is “more of an ex-post empirical and 
pragmatic achievement rather than a well-designed and planned strategy”.1497 It insists that regional 
strategies should clearly define EU objectives and priorities and better link these to specific timeframes 
and tasks divisions. In this same light, Pirozzi wonders whether the Strategic Framework is not “more 
a reverse engineering exercise, consisting in the development of a conceptual umbrella aimed at 
providing ex post coherence to a number of different and often non-aligned activities conducted by 
the EU in crisis theatres”.1498 Indeed, as the Commission itself has put it: “coordination must occur 
during the planning stage. If coordination arrangements are not set in advance of the implementation 
stage, it is, at worst, too late or at best, much more difficult to bring disparate processes together”.1499  
The Horn Strategy provides a ‘framework’ for regional action but does not give many clues on how to 
act regionally. For that purpose the Framework relies on the adoption of more specific action plans 
and sub-strategies, such as “the EU Comprehensive Approach to South Sudan, the development of 
Action Plans to counter Terrorism and conduct Counter-Piracy actions, discussion paper for the EU's 
approach in post transition Somalia and the Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience (SHARE) 
initiative to strategically build resilience to food insecurity and malnutrition”.1500 However, this reveals 
a rather eclectic whole, with various disconnected strategies that, taken together, do not substitute 
for a comprehensive approach. 1501  The EEAS in this regard states that it misses an all-inclusive 
campaign plan as well as a political sponsor to take it forward.1502 This is particularly problematic with 
regard to development cooperation, which risks to be left behind in regional strategic thinking. Yet, 
also with regard to the CSDP there is “a whiff of formalism” in the Strategic Framework and more 
                                                          
1495 Ibid., 21. 
1496 Council (13424/14) op.cit. note 1487, para. 3.1. 
1497 European Parliament (2013/2146(INI)) op.cit. note 84, para. 38. 
1498 N. Pirozzi, 'The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management', DCAF EU Crisis Management Papers Series (Centre 
for Security, Development and the Rule of Law, Brussels, 2014) 15. 
1499 Commission (2014) op.cit. note 485, 18. 
1500 High Representative (2013b) op.cit. note 1492, 3. 
1501 B. Van Ginkel, 'EU Governance of the Threat of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia' in I. Govaere and S. Poli (eds), EU 
Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating Threats and Crises (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2014) 348. 
1502 EEAS (00557/13) Six Month Report on the EU Operations Centre (EU OPCEN): 22 September 2012 − 14 March 2013, 
Brussels, 19.03.2013, para. 2.5. 
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efforts need to be made to integrate it from the outset – not just abstractly, but in concrete terms – in 
political analysis and the definition of objectives and priorities.1503  
In order to better incorporate the CSDP and development dimension it is arguably not necessary or 
useful to adopt a new Strategic Framework, particularly because prescriptive approaches have limited 
use in fast-changing contexts of fragility and conflict. Read in combination with the principles of the 
comprehensive approach, the Framework offers a valuable frame of reference to direct the EU’s multi-
pronged policies towards commonly agreed objectives. Rather the context and process-focus of the 
comprehensive approach need to be better translated into action on the ground. This could follow the 
lead of the Regional Action Plan implementing the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the 
Sahel. 1504 This was adopted in March 2013 in order to ensure that the whole EU policy toolbox works 
together to reach the commonly agreed objectives. On a more practical level, this will require, on the 
one hand, an increased capacity of EU Delegations (particularly in the security realm) to better feed 
into policy formulation and steer implementation. On the other hand, the regional linkages between 
Delegations, as well as their fine-tuning with CSDP activity, require a stronger Special Representative 
that draws the whole EU policy spectrum towards the objectives of the Strategic Framework. For this 
purpose the EUSR should be allowed to act less as a strict CFSP actor and more as a regional delegate 
of the triple-hatted High Representative. Only in this manner can upstream action on the security-
development nexus be improved, “operating a policy shift from reactive-centric approaches to a more 
adequate and efficient prevention-focused approach”.1505  
6.3. Legally anchoring comprehensive strategies: the unexploited potential 
of Article 22 TEU 
Whereas the actors and competences that the above comprehensive frameworks aim to cohere are 
clearly rooted in and restricted by primary law, the frameworks themselves have no formal legal basis. 
All are soft-law documents laying down rules of conduct which have not been attributed binding legal 
force. This does however not render them legally irrelevant as they are aimed at instigating practical 
as well as (indirect) legal effects.1506 Soft law documents “are integral to a policy-making process that 
requires ‘written markers’ reflecting policy consensus at a given moment in time, without, however, 
requiring legal-binding effect to ensure compliance as substantive policy work moves forward”.1507 Yet, 
                                                          
1503 Koutrakos (2013) op.cit. note 91, 181. 
1504 Commission and High Representative Joint Staff Working Document (SWD(2015) 61 final) EU Sahel Strategy: Regional 
Action Plan, 13.03.2015. 
1505 European Parliament (2013/2146(INI)) op.cit. note 84, para. 39. 
1506 Senden (2004) op.cit. note 317, 112. A clear example are the multiple references by the CJEU to the European Security 
Strategy and European Consensus on Development to support - and arguably even guide – its rulings (cf. supra Chapter 5). 
1507 Van Vooren (2012) op.cit. note 179, 211. 
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this practice passes by the fact that the Lisbon Treaty introduced a legal basis, specifically designed for 
such comprehensive strategy-making: Article 22 TEU. 
 
Box 15: Article 22 TEU 
1. On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 21, the European Council shall identify 
the strategic interests and objectives of the Union. 
Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union shall relate to 
the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union. Such 
decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a specific country or region or may be thematic 
in approach. They shall define their duration, and the means to be made available by the Union and 
the Member States. 
The European Council shall act unanimously on a recommendation from the Council, adopted by the 
latter under the arrangements laid down for each area. Decisions of the European Council shall be 
implemented in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Treaties. 
2. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, for the area of common 
foreign and security policy, and the Commission, for other areas of external action, may submit joint 
proposals to the Council. 
Article 22 TEU empowers the European Council to adopt decisions on the strategic interests and 
objectives of the Union. These are designed to encompass the entirety of CFSP and TFEU aspects of 
the EU’s relations with regard to a certain country, region or theme. Such European Council decisions 
can subsequently be implemented through various distinct measures according to the procedural 
arrangements provided in the Treaties. Notably, this accords the European Council concrete 
operational competence, beyond its generally declaratory role. The adoption of implementing CFSP 
decisions can moreover be taken by QMV, instead of the general rule of unanimity applicable in this 
policy field. As only EU legal instrument that can – and has an explicit mandate to – encompass both 
CFSP and TFEU aspects of the Union’s external action, Article 22 TEU seems a perfect fit for addressing 
the security-development nexus. Before trying to understand why its potential has not (yet) been 
exploited (6.3.2.), the roots, structure and added value of this instrument will be unravelled (6.3.1.). 
6.3.1. Article 22 TEU: origins, design and relevance 
Whilst not explicit, the lay-out of these European Council decisions irrefutably recycles the concept of 
the former common strategies. This CFSP instrument was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
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order to improve the coherence and effectiveness of EU external action, but soon fell into disuse.1508 
The only three such strategies ever adopted (on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean region)1509 
failed to add value or impact on the development and implementation of EU policies.1510 This mainly 
resulted from two procedural flaws or concerns. On the one hand, the common strategies’ purpose of 
comprehensiveness conflicted with the strictly CFSP legal nature of this instrument as well as the EU’s 
then still pillarised constitutional structure. Consequently, concerns about the intergovernmental 
contamination of the Community were never far away.1511 On the other hand, the fear to be outvoted 
in implementing measures adopted by qualified majority made Member States reluctant to fully 
commit. In the words of then CFSP High Representative Solana this “resulted in a ‘Christmas tree’ 
approach based on the ‘lowest common denominator’”.1512  Common strategies were so carefully 
drafted to stay clear of infringing ex Article 47 TEU and so thoroughly negotiated among Member 
States that they did “not contain real priorities or posteriorities and [became] little more than 
inventories of existing policies and activities”.1513 It proofed vain hope that a single policy instrument 
would be able to iron out all the difficulties of the EU's fragmented external action constellation. 
Koutrakos even argues that the predominant purpose of the common strategies was to enhance the 
appearance of coherence in order “to assuage concerns over the potential undermining implications 
of the functioning of the second pillar alongside the Community legal framework”.1514 
Despite the inglorious demise of the common strategies, Article 22 TEU is not a mere relic of the past, 
but a deliberate endeavour to breathe new life into this old instrument.1515 Rebranded as ‘Decisions of 
the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union’, this refurbished tool now 
firmly draws the card of comprehensiveness. This is clear from a number of changes and additions. 
First, its provisions are taken out of the CFSP chapter and added to the ‘General Provisions on the 
Union’s External Action’. This is no mere cosmetic change but serves to rectify the constitutionally 
                                                          
1508 Ex Art 13(2) TEU. 
1509 Common Strategy (1999/414/CFSP) on Russia, OJ L157/1, 24.06.1999; Common Strategy (1999/877/CFSP) on Ukraine, OJ 
L331/1, 23.12.1999; Common Strategy (2000/458/CFSP) on the Mediterranean region, OJ L183/5, 22.07.2000. 
1510 M. Maresceau, 'EU Enlargement and EU Common Strategies on Russia and Ukraine: an Ambiguous yet Unavoidable 
Connection' in C. Hillion (ed), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach (Hart, Oxford, 2004) 219. 
1511 J. Monar and W. Wessels, The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam (Continuum, London, 2001) 254. The 
preparatory work on the first CS on Russia immediately led to the Commission voicing its opposition against potential legal 
obligations imposed upon it (J.-M. Dumond and P. Setton, La Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune (PESC) (La 
Documentation Française, Paris, 1999) 93) and the Parliament lamenting its lack of involvement (European Parliament (A4-
0219/99) Report containing a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on the common strategy 
towards the Russian Federation, 22.04.1999). 
1512 Secretary-General/High Representative (14871/00) Report on the Common Strategies, 21.12.2000, paras 10. 
1513 Ibid. para. 21. 
1514 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart, Oxford, 2006) 399. 
1515 This appears to be confirmed by the External Action Working Group of the IGC, acknowledging that while it had not lived 
up to expectations, the common strategy instrument was a concrete and operational tool to ensure that all instruments of 
EU external action, regardless of their nature, are used in a manner consistent with that strategy. In this regard, the idea 
surfaced to create a new type of joint initiative by the High Representative and the Commission, aimed at integrating the 
various elements of EU external action (European Convention (CONV 459/02) op.cit. note 371, para. 47). 
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questionable nature of the former common strategies. These changes were done without any 
reference to this predecessor, which may reflect a desire to start with a clean sheet. However, it gives 
rise to confusion and might explain why this curious resurrection has received so limited policy and 
scholarly attention.  
Second, Article 22 TEU takes away all ambiguity regarding the comprehensive nature of these 
European Council decisions and unmistakably states that they shall (not ‘may’) relate to the CFSP and 
to other areas of EU external action. The European Council’s identification and definition of strategic 
interests, objectives and general guidelines for the CFSP specifically, has another legal basis, namely 
Article 26(1) TEU. In other words, decisions on the basis of Article 22 TEU shall be comprehensive or 
shall not be. This is further corroborated by its first paragraph, rooting such decisions firmly in the 
external action principles and objectives of Article 21 TEU.1516 In this manner, these European Council 
decisions serve as a key bridge between that abstract catalogue of principles and objectives and action-
oriented decision-making. The fact that this connection is made at the highest institutional level 
moreover accords these decisions considerable political weight.  
A third key novelty is that Article 22(2) TEU enables the High Representative, for the CFSP, and the 
Commission, for other areas of external action, to submit joint proposals to the Council for such 
strategic decisions. This serves to ensure broader institutional buy-in and encourages them to produce 
a coherent policy plan. Yet, this model procedure is merely a possibility, the only obligation for the 
European Council being to act “unanimously on a recommendation from the Council, adopted by the 
latter under the arrangements laid down for each area”.1517 This could mean that separate initiatives 
linked to different aspects of external policy are only shallowly bound together by the Council, which 
is evidently no guarantee for the goal of improved consistency.1518 The adoption of such high-level 
strategic and legally binding decisions would evidently benefit from wider institutional preparation.  
A fourth and related change is that Article 22 TEU now makes it explicit that these strategic decisions 
of the European Council shall be implemented through various distinct measures in accordance with 
the procedures provided for in the Treaties. This promotes a “cascade-like” sequence of implementing 
measures that all serve the broader strategic interests and objectives defined by the European 
                                                          
1516 A more symbolic but nonetheless significant change is that instead of adopting common strategies “in areas where the 
Member States have important interests in common” (ex Article 13(2) TEU), these European Council decision now focus on 
the interests and objectives ‘of the Union’. 
1517 Article 22(1) TEU. 
1518  S. Oeter, 'Identification of EU Interests and Objectives in the External Action Area: Competent Authorities and 
Instruments' in H.-J. Blanke and S. Mangiameli (eds), The Treaty on European Union (TEU): A Commentary (Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin, 2013) 895-896. 
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Council.1519 As mentioned, the exception to adopt CFSP implementing measures by QMV remains, as 
well as the Member States’ escape clause to block it.1520 Although neither of these provisions was ever 
invoked, it is noteworthy that the restraining potential of the latter is slightly softened. Instead of 
‘important’, Member States now have to cite ‘vital’ and stated reasons of national policy. Furthermore, 
rather than simply referring the contested issue to the European Council for a decision by unanimity, 
the High Representative is accorded a mediating task and shall first try to seek a solution acceptable 
to all Member States.  
Finally and crucially, the Lisbon Treaty provides a considerably more solid constitutional framework 
for strategic European Council decisions that span the legal divide between CFSP and TFEU external 
competences. Attempts at comprehensive policy planning no longer run up against the EU’s pillar walls. 
However, as repeatedly mentioned, the Treaty’s leap towards coherence did not make an end to the 
constitutional delimitation of the CFSP, resulting in an integration-delimitation paradox. The main 
innovation of Article 22 TEU is that it formulates an interesting answer to this paradox. In line with 
Article 21 TEU, these European Council decisions function as high-level policy umbrellas grouping 
together and interlinking the various CFSP and TFEU objectives, principles, competences, instruments 
and actors with relevance to a certain country, region or theme. In the spirit of Article 40 TEU, these 
strategic frameworks can subsequently be broken down in various distinct CFSP and TFEU measures 
that serve the shared objectives and principles, whilst staying clear of ‘the application of the 
procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down’ by the Treaties for the 
TFEU/CFSP. This two-phased construction allows the European Council to cope with the decades-old 
challenge of simultaneously living up to the requirements of consistency and delimitation. It offers an 
alternative to the complexity, or even impossibility, of combining CFSP and TFEU legal bases. The idea 
is to allow general CFSP-TFEU interlinkages at the strategic policy-making level as long as the respective 
implementing measures live up to the requirements of Article 40 TEU and respect the principle of 
conferral. Reminiscent of the Portugal v Council construction, this in a way provides a basis in law for 
the Court’s reasoning in the SALW case to annul the implementing ECOWAS Decision but not the 
encompassing SALW Joint Action (cf. supra 5.2.2.).  
This interpretation of Article 22 TEU is however not explicit in its wording. There is nothing that 
prescribes the European Council how to draft such decisions and the level of detail is left to its 
discretion. Its assignment to define “the means to be made available by the Union and the Member 
States” even suggests a far-going interference with the operationalisation of EU external action. Yet, 
                                                          
1519 H.-J. Cremer, 'Art. 22: Festlegung der Strategischen Interessen und Ziele für das auswärtige Handeln der Union' in C. 
Calliess and M. Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV - Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grundrechtecharta: 
Kommentar (Verlag C.H. Beck, Munich, 2006) para. 5. 
1520 Article 31(2) TEU. 
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an effet utile reading of Article 22 TEU and the broader TEU and TFEU constitutional framework 
indicates that this cannot have been the purpose. If no room of manoeuvre would be left to the other 
EU institutions in implementing these European Council decisions, this would severely encroach on 
their prerogatives under both the TEU and TFEU. 1521  Too much detail would moreover be 
counterproductive as implementing measures can more flexibly capitalise on rapidly changing 
circumstances. Arguably, this provision should therefore be interpreted as emphasising that the 
European Council’s determination of the Union’s strategic interests and objectives should bear in mind 
the (limited) range of means available to the EU and Member States. 1522  In other words, these 
European Council decisions should be no policy prescriptions but rather offer comprehensive 
frameworks of reference gearing the EU’s policy arsenal towards a common purpose.  
6.3.2. The untapped potential of Article 22 TEU 
In the course of 2010, then European Council President Van Rompuy instigated this institution to take 
up its reinforced strategic role. This led the European Council to acknowledge that bringing “Europe's 
true weight to bear internationally […] requires a clear identification of its strategic interests and 
objectives”.1523 It thereby called for “a more integrated approach, ensuring that all relevant EU and 
national instruments and policies are fully and coherently mobilised, consistent with the provisions of 
the Treaties, in support of the European Union's strategic interests”.1524 This did however not lead it 
to consider the use of Article 22 TEU, the legal instrument specifically designed for addressing these 
issues.1525 A short-term recommendation formulated by the High Representative in the EEAS Review is 
for the latter to “present medium-term strategies for specific regions or thematic issues in line with 
the established policy priorities, for discussion in the Council according to an agreed timetable. These 
strategies could also foster more joined-up discussions … at different levels within the Council 
(European Council, Ministerial meetings, PSC, working groups)”.1526 Notably, HR Ashton added that it 
could therefore “be useful to reflect on a new basis for EU strategies or policies to be adopted jointly 
                                                          
1521 Eeckhout notably questions whether these European Council decisions have binding force for EU institutions acting under 
the TFEU and states that this is left to the duty of consistency (Eeckhout (2011) op.cit. note 113, 476). 
1522 Oeter (2013) op.cit. note 1518, 888-889. The old common strategies are indicative of how this might look in practice. One 
standard formula provided that the Council, Commission and Member States shall “review, according to their competencies 
and capacities, existing actions, programmes, instruments, and policies [...] and acts implementing it, to ensure their 
consistency with this Common Strategy, and where there are inconsistencies, make the necessary adjustments at the earliest 
review date”. They were moreover assigned to “make full and appropriate use of existing instruments and means as well as 
all relevant EU and Member States’ programmes, and to this end shall develop and maintain an indicative inventory of the 
resources of the Union, the Community and Member States through which this Common Strategy will be implemented” (see 
for instance: Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region (2000/458/CFSP) op.cit. note 1509, para. 28). 
1523 Presidency Conclusions on Relations with Strategic Partners, European Council, Brussels 12.11.2010, para. 3. 
1524 Ibid., Annex I, para. a. 
1525 Interview with EU official at the Legal Service of the Council, Brussels,February 13.  
1526 EEAS Review (2013) op.cit. note 726, 16. 
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by Member States, the EEAS and the Commission”.1527 The Legal Service of the Council in this regard 
pointed to Article 22 TEU, and particularly the possibility of joint High Representative-Commission 
proposals for such European Council decisions.1528 
Particularly the various thematic and regional strategies adopted since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, fit the Article 22 structure of inclusive documents setting out the EU’s strategic interests 
and objectives as a frame of reference for ongoing and future activity. Nonetheless, in all these cases 
a soft-law trajectory was chosen. At present, not a single European Council decision of this kind has 
yet been adopted. Whereas the curious resurrection of the old common strategies suggests that the 
Treaty drafters saw a future for this instrument in the new external action constellation, this innovative 
piece of constitutional design did apparently not correspond to any pressing political needs. This points 
to a general observation with regard to constitutional reorganisation: it can try to remove existing 
obstacles to effective and coherent action, but the eventual decisions will continue to depend on 
political considerations.  
Adopting such strategic frameworks as European Council decisions pursuant to Article 22 TEU would 
accord them considerably more political weight, authority and durability. There is an important 
difference between policy statements in the conclusions of European Council meetings and these 
Article 22 TEU decisions. The concrete and binding legal status of the latter would incite a completely 
different – and significantly more complex – legal drafting process, in search of language that is less 
prone to ambiguities and more straightforward in setting out markers for EU activity. It could 
streamline the current ad hoc practice of strategy-making and result in more predictability and 
coherence. However, these exact advantages could just as well discourage EU institutions and Member 
States from having recourse to Article 22 TEU. Adopting strategic frameworks in an annex to Council 
Conclusions, a (Joint) Communication or an EEAS paper – as it is currently done – can be more attractive 
for reasons of pragmatism, flexibility, speed and simplicity. It might also lead to a better policy outcome. 
For one thing, the legally binding nature of European Council decisions requires careful drafting in 
order to ensure that it is in line with all legal requirements and does not infringe on any institutional 
prerogatives or conferred powers. In the light of this complexity, policy-makers facing limited staff and 
financial resources might opt to spend these rather on policy implementation. For another, “a choice 
for hard law may lead to ‘soft contents’”.1529 As the experience with the former common strategies 
demonstrated, legal documents may become so thoroughly negotiated that they are nothing more 
than open-ended shopping lists of wishes and desires without concrete added value. In this sense, the 
                                                          
1527 Ibid., 7. 
1528 Council Legal Service (14458/13) op.cit. note 739, 4. 
1529 Van Vooren (2012) op.cit. note 179, 214. 
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current informal strategy-making practice may offer better prospects for transcending the lowest 
common denominator.  
At present the weighing of these various advantages and disadvantages has led policy-makers to opt 
for the soft law track in designing strategic framework documents.1530 In short, the desire for flexibility 
prevails over the need for legal clarity. Yet, the EEAS Review indicates that the need for more joined-
up strategy-making among EU institutions might bring Article 22 TEU to the negotiating table. 
6.4. Conclusion 
After some years of mainly institutional and procedural navelgazing following the reshuffling of the 
EU’s external action cards by the Lisbon Treaty, we are currently witnessing a change of tide with 
revived efforts to clarify and determine the content of the Union’s external role. For one thing, the 
security-development nexus is now approached as part of the broader framework of the 
comprehensive approach, as set out in the 2013 Joint Communication and 2014 Council Conclusions. 
Reconciling the exigencies of integration and delimitation, it is designed as both a general working 
method and a set of concrete measures to improve how the EU moves from shared analysis, to a 
common and comprehensive approach that can finally be turned in complementary all-of-EU action. 
Particularly the new focus on process and context is key. It indicates a tendency to move away from 
pre-determined off-the-shelf solutions or politically correct but vague calls for coherence. This is 
replaced by a gradual systematisation of mechanisms that stimulate continuous interaction between 
all relevant stakeholders in order to arrive at made-to-measure comprehensive approaches 
continuously adapted to the specific needs of any given situation.  
These efforts are still in an early – rather experimental – stage and the following years will be crucial 
to see how EU institutions and Member States carry them through. In essence, the approach needs to 
be better translated in operational and procedural terms to the intra and inter-service functioning at 
all EU administrative levels. In theory, the methodology of the comprehensive approach allows to 
tackle ‘the underlying principle’ of the security-development nexus. However, this is currently 
hampered by the half-hearted inclusion of the aims of development cooperation and particularly the 
CSDP. This is acknowledged by all involved parties,1531 but so far the courage to go the whole way with 
the new approach is still lacking. Essential in this regard is that the Commission and High 
                                                          
1530 The Council’s Public Information Service answered the author’s question as to the untapped potential of Article 22 TEU 
as follows: “[a]t present there is no recommendation from the Council for such a decision to be taken by the European Council. 
The European Council does, however, address the strategic interests and objectives of the Union in its conclusions, as the 
need arises” (correspondence on file with the author). 
1531 See in this regard Commission and High Representative (JOIN(2015) 17 final) op.cit. note 1385; and Council (2014) op.cit. 
note 1369, para. 6. 
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Representative call, in unmistakable terms, on the European Council “to provide further political 
commitment and guidance on better addressing the security-development nexus”.1532 
The EU is testing the operationalisation of its new approach on a regional and thematic level through 
various comprehensive strategies. This chapter focussed on the 2011 EU Strategic Framework for the 
Horn of Africa. Rather confusingly, it simultaneously precedes and gives effect to the comprehensive 
approach. While more fine-tuning is needed, both can form a complementary whole, with the 
comprehensive approach determining the processes and working methods required to give optimal 
effect to the various tools that implement the interests, values and priorities set out in the Strategic 
Framework. The latter has however not (yet) been a game changer for better linking and aligning 
security and development responses. The key challenge remains to translate the context and process-
focus of the comprehensive approach in inclusive action on the ground. On a national level this will 
require an increased (security) capacity of EU Delegations to better feed into policy formulation and 
steer implementation. To interlink this to the regional level, the guidance of the EUSR should 
increasingly expand from only the CFSP to the whole and comprehensive EU policy spectrum, and 
particularly development cooperation.  
Such lessons need to be taken into account in the ongoing debate on a new European Security Strategy. 
Indeed, a lot can be and is done in the name of such frameworks, strategies, the comprehensive 
approach, the security-development nexus or whatever the label attached to it. However, as famously 
put by Michael Porter: “the essence of strategy is choosing what not to do”.1533 Or in the words of the 
Commission: “[a] comprehensive approach does not mean that everything must be done. Critical path 
thinking is needed. This assessment needs to answer the question of ‘what is a priority when 
everything is a priority?’ and resist the temptation to overburden national counterparts with too many 
agendas in the face of limited capacity and narrow political space”.1534 The operation of selecting and 
prioritising interests not only “involves the taking of value-judgments, but – if happening in a 
heterogeneous collective – requires processes of negotiation and compromise-building”.1535  
The Lisbon Treaty offers a model trajectory for such an endeavour in the form of Article 22 TEU. It 
empowers the European Council to adopt umbrella decisions defining the EU’s strategic interests and 
objectives. As only EU legal instrument these can and must cover both the relevant CFSP and TFEU 
dimensions. Such decisions can be based on a joint and integrative proposal from the Commission and 
High Representative, ensuring broad institutional buy-in and more coherent policy planning. In this 
manner, Article 22 TEU formulates a unique answer to the integration-delimitation paradox with 
                                                          
1532 Commission and High Representative (JOIN(2015) 17 final) op.cit. note 1385, 11. 
1533 M.E. Porter, 'What is Strategy?' (1996) Harvard Business Review 89 (November-December), 61-78. 
1534 Commission (2014) op.cit. note 485, 11. 
1535 Oeter (2013) op.cit. note 1518, 883.  
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significant potential for addressing the security-development nexus. The European Council decisions 
interlink CFSP and TFEU competences at strategic level in the spirit of Article 21 TEU, while their 
implementation can follow a ‘cascade-like’ trajectory through various distinct measures that share 
these same interests and objectives whilst respecting the Article 40 TEU exigencies. This new provision, 
inspired by the old common strategies, has however not once been used in practice, as the political 




  While in recent years many countries have moved out of poverty, it is striking that 
one in three of the world’s poor are living in a fragile or conflict-affected situation. 
Consider this: if we fail to act, and act decisively, by 2018 that figure will be one in 
two. The Arab Spring, setbacks in Mali, South Sudan and the Central African 
Republic and, most recently, renewed conflict in the Middle East show that the 
legacy of conflict and fragility cannot be erased over night. Long-term, targeted 
engagement is the only solution in these situations. 
 
European Commission, Operating in Situations of Conflict and Fragility:  
An EU Staff Handbook, 2014 
 
EU development and security competences have travelled long and peculiar roads in the EU’s evolving 
legal order(s). The near complete separation between these two policy areas without legal basis in the 
Rome Treaty framework, evolved into ever rising interaction in the ‘integrated but separate legal 
orders’ of the Maastricht era. This encapsulated both policies in two separate pillars, connected 
through a practically political duty of consistency, as well as the shared/overlapping objective of 
developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law and human rights. It was in this setting that 
the rising awareness about the destructive vicious cycle of poverty and instability in fragile states, led 
EU institutions to progressively commit to enhancing coherence across the so-called security-
development nexus. However, attempts at inter-competence and inter-institutional coherence not 
seldom ran up against the EU’s pillar walls.  
The Lisbon Treaty brings the EU’s constitutional framework significantly more in line with such 
integrative policy design. The unification of the legal order, the judicialised duty of consistency over a 
fused list of external action principles and objectives set out in Article 21 TEU and the new institutional 
bridging functions, all read as a leap towards comprehensive external policy-making. Yet, while it is 
clear that the CFSP no longer forms part of an entirely separate legal system, it is still insulated within 
the new unified legal order, as reflected in the mutual non-affectation clause of Article 40 TEU. This 
presents policy-makers, EU institutions and the judiciary with a genuine integration-delimitation 
paradox. While all the public rhetoric focusses on coherence and comprehensiveness, the underlying 
legal framework is still in delimitation mode. The Treaty gives no indications on how to get out of this 
fix, putting the onus on political, institutional and judicial craftsmanship.  
These gradual constitutional changes followed the rhythm of pragmatics rather than grand design, 
successively adding new layers and subsystems; new dividing lines and bridges across them. The 
complex system that ensued, sets out the legal boundaries within which the rising commitment to the 
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security-development nexus has matured. While the challenges of insecurity, fragility, poverty and 
development are ruthlessly cross-cutting, the Union’s means to cut across the competence boundaries 
between them are regulated and restricted by primary law. This makes efforts to align and integrate 
EU security and development policies legally complex as it requires difficult choices of legal basis 
between divided policy toolboxes. At the same time, it raises administrative challenges as these 
choices have to be made across very distinct policy-making communities. These are moreover 
politically sensitive as they affect the division of competences and balance of power between EU 
institutions. This research held the EU’s discourse on and efforts for enhancing the security-
development nexus up to the reality check of the Union’s evolving constitutional structure. The 
analysis was conducted along the three tracks of policy-making, institutional design and relations and 
the delimitation of competences by the judiciary. This simultaneously served to better understand the 
practical impact of Treaty reform in the area of EU external action and get a more complete picture of 
the scale, usefulness and effectiveness of this particular policy commitment.  
On the policy track, the CFSP-TFEU rift lies at the basis of two separate sets of instruments tackling 
challenges on the security-development interface. These divided development cooperation and 
CFSP/CSDP toolboxes were driven into the grey area between them on tiptoes and gradually converged 
towards the core of the security-development interface. The overall picture reveals an impressive 
amalgam of tools and practices spanning the continuum of development and security encounters. At 
present, both arsenals assuredly address objectives of conflict prevention, crisis management, 
reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction. However, the desultory manner in which they emerged 
has come to blur the logic of what distinguishes development cooperation and CFSP. This gives rise to 
substantial concerns of fragmentation, duplication, voids and inter-institutional competence quarrels.  
For a long time, the EU’s answer to these complications was mainly conceptual. A plethora of concepts 
has been mobilised by EU institutions to try and make sense of the devastating security and 
development challenges in many conflict-affected states. Fragility, conflict prevention, crisis 
management, root causes of conflict, human security, and the overarching security-development 
nexus, all had their go at the destructive vicious cycle of poverty and instability. While the EU is making 
great strides in tempering these destructive forces, such notions fail to systematise good and 
determinately rule out bad practices. Moreover, the proliferation of terminology, definitions and 
classifications incites a conceptual chaos. At its worst, this conceptualisation serves as an instrument 
of power maximisation rather than output optimisation. At the end of the day, considerable faith is 
therefore often put in a rather generic call for more coherence. Even though this is broadly taken into 
account by EU practitioners, it can hardly be said to help them in making concrete policy choices. 
Despite the strong evidence that security and development policies could be just as harmful as 
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supportive to each other’s objectives, this policy rhetoric often reads as an automatic ‘all good things 
go together’ mantra. It relies more on intuition than primary law regulation, thereby underexposing 
the intricacies of this commitment. The result is an under-exploitation of the potential that lays in the 
Union’s diverse foreign policy system.  
Now that the dust of the Lisbon Treaty’s constitutional and institutional reconstruction is gradually 
settling, a notable shift from conceptualising to operationalising the security-development link reveals 
itself. Whilst still in its infancy – and thus defying conclusive analysis – the security-development nexus 
now appears to be approached as part of the wider comprehensive approach to EU external action. 
This is presented as a working method rather than yet another explanatory notion. Particularly 
promising, in both the 2013 Joint Communication and the 2014 Council Conclusions on the 
comprehensive approach, is the focus on systematising inclusive policy-making processes and 
incorporating contextual factors from design to implementation. Concepts are important – particularly 
for a multi-layered actor like the EU – to clarify challenges, objectives and approaches in a consensual 
manner, but they do not provide detailed guidance or instructions. As change is generally non-linear, 
indirect, multi-dimensional and incremental, a coherent approach cannot be enforced through grand 
rhetoric, predetermined checklists or long-term political slogans. It must be operationalised, and this 
is where the comprehensive approach can add important value. Moving away from off-the-shelf 
solutions, this is set to systematise mechanisms and processes that enable a ‘comprehensive analysis-
approach-action chain’. In other words, a scenario is designed wherein shared and inclusive analysis of 
a given situation feeds into a comprehensive policy vision that informs and guides made-to-measure 
comprehensive action continuously adapted to the respective needs and requirements.  
While this working method in theory allows a better targeting of challenges at the security-
development interface, its design falls short on both dimensions. The CSDP is currently shielded by 
Member States from the dynamics of this approach, while development cooperation is mainly 
approached in instrumental terms. The focus is on the contribution the latter can deliver to conflict 
prevention and crisis management, passing by the considerable opportunities of this approach for 
better realising this policy’s socio-economic objectives. Moreover, to capitalise on the full potential of 
this approach, further efforts are needed to translate this focus on process and context to the 
functioning and organisation of EU institutions, as well as the relations between them. 
A rising legislative challenge lays in reconciling this trend of comprehensively approaching security and 
development challenges – as also embodied in the increasing number of regional and thematic 
strategies – with the requirements of CFSP-TFEU delimitation. In other words, how to live up to the 
demands of intertwining policies, while simultaneously ensuring – in line with Article 40 TEU – that the 
‘implementation of CFSP/TFEU competences shall not affect the application of the procedures and the 
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extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of TFEU/CFSP 
competences’. The key to solving this problem lies in the language of this Treaty provision itself. It is 
indeed only in the implementation of policies that this mutual non-affectation clause applies. At 
politico-strategic level, nothing prevents CFSP and development competences from forming part of a 
single external strategy or policy framework. A unique mechanism to live up to these contrasting 
demands of the integration-delimitation paradox is included in Article 22 TEU. This empowers the 
European Council to adopt umbrella decisions interlinking both CFSP and TFEU components of the EU’s 
strategic interests and objectives with regard to any theme, region or country. Like the branches of a 
pedigree, the implementation of these European Council decisions can subsequently take the form of 
various distinct measures that live up to the exigencies of delimitation. This innovative piece of 
constitutional design has however not once been used in practice. Clearly, the benefits of soft law 
flexibility are currently valued higher by EU policy-makers than those of legal clarity.  
On the institutional track, the coherence rationale of the security-development nexus, combined with 
the EU’s bipartite and internally fragmented instrumentarium, condemn EU policy actors to close 
cooperation. Traditionally this applied in essence to the Commission and the Council (between 1999 
and 2009 assisted by a CFSP High Representative), relying respectively on each other’s managerial and 
politico-strategic responsibilities in the day-to-day management of development cooperation and 
CFSP/CSDP. They turn out to be cool lovers and their cooperation simultaneously serves to keep a close 
eye on the other’s foreign policy prerogatives. This evidently relates to the diverging institutional 
balance, which is considerably more in favour of the Council under the CFSP, and more beneficial to 
the Commission in development programming. As on the policy track, this situation resulted in two 
dense structures, with the associated challenges of fragmentation, duplication and overlap. Unified 
leadership over this bipolar architecture or cross-institutional policy guidance regarding the security-
development nexus generally falls short of the expectations raised by the grotesque policy rationale 
of coherence.  
Besides scaling up this rationale as a constitutional principle, the Lisbon Treaty fortifies it through 
institutional bridging functions that span the CFSP-TFEU divide. The triple-hatted High Representative, 
the institutional melting pot of the EEAS and the comprehensive EU Delegations open windows of 
opportunity for pooling, intertwining and directing the EU’s scattered security and development 
resources, actors and policies. This puts them manifestly at the centre of the debate on the security-
development nexus. The HR, with one foot in the Commission, another in the Council and even a seat 
at the European Council’s table, is ideally positioned to provide the much-needed leadership over this 
nexus. The EEAS, as inter-institutional support hub, has an important role to play in gradually breaking 
up silo behaviour and moulding EU minds towards more unified approaches and actions on commonly 
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agreed goals. The Union Delegations, as the EU’s eyes, ears and voice abroad, allow to better inform 
policy design and steer comprehensive implementation – ideally with a feedback loop between both 
contributions. In sum, if working well in tandem, the HR, EEAS and EU Delegations could in principle 
provide unified leadership and policy guidance over the security-development nexus from policy 
assessment through design to implementation.  
Yet, the integration-delimitation paradox on the institutional track implicates that the realisation of 
this potential is all but a given. The traditional institutions fully subscribe to the coherence portfolios 
of these institutional innovations, but simultaneously ensured that they remain at the helm of EU 
external action and even the exercise of their new mandates. This leads to complex lines of authority 
and reporting as well as disjointed, and particularly challenging, loyalty obligations. Consequently, 
these institutional bridging functions are bestowed with the highest of expectations to unify the 
Union’s external voice, but lack the unconditional resources, room of manoeuvre and trust to put this 
into effect. Their quest for coherence across development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP drives them 
into the murky waters of competence rifts and diverging institutional interests. The effectiveness 
hereof depends less on the legal design of their functions – which even though imperfect holds 
considerable potential – than on the political will to proceed. Getting the most out of their mandates 
will require a leap of faith by EU institutions and Member States, away from the often sclerotic 
obsession with prerogatives and entitlements. These new bodies, on their part, will also have to 
overcome internal divergences and sign up unreservedly to their integrative portfolios. That these 
changes are gradually bearing fruit and permeating previously isolated entities across the security-
development divide, is evidenced by the recent advancements with the comprehensive approach.  
On the judicial track, the Court approaches development cooperation – ever since it was accorded a 
Treaty basis – as a broad and multifaceted policy. Central in this regard is its 1996 Portugal v Council 
ruling. Herein the Court established that development cooperation agreements could embrace various 
distinct components as long as these contribute to its central objectives and do not impose extensive 
or concrete obligations beyond that. In the 2007 Philippines border management case it further 
specified that this contribution to socio-economic development objectives should be in the form of a 
direct – non-hypothetical – link. In the light of the security-development nexus, a key question is of 
course how this broad scope of development cooperation affects CFSP competences, and where the 
judiciary draws the line. The SALW ruling, i.e. the first – and pre-Lisbon only – case on the CFSP, at once 
concerned this relationship with development policy, high-lighting simultaneously the fuzzy 
competence boundary and the inter-institutional haggling over it. To its traditional centre-of-gravity 
test, the CJEU added ex Article 47 TEU stating that nothing in the TEU shall affect the TEC. From this it 
deducted two things. On the one hand, a CFSP act infringed this provision if it could, by means of its 
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aim and content, have been adopted on an EC legal basis. On the other hand, a combination of CFSP 
and EC legal bases was principally ruled out. Compared to the often confusing line of legal basis case 
law, the choice here was clearly to prioritise the EC framework over the CFSP. Yet, the manner in which 
the Court reached its conclusion in the SALW case had the effect of discouraging any CFSP-EC policy 
rapprochement, while doing little to clarify the judicial approach towards other activities in the 
security-development grey area.  
This judgment was delivered on the eve of the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification, which immediately casted 
doubt on its remaining relevance. Articles 21 and 40 TEU, the two centre pieces of the new external 
action framework, appear to deprive the CJEU of the two key elements in its SALW approach, namely 
the aim-prong of the centre of gravity test and the single-edged sword of delimitation. An essential 
question is therefore to what extent this methodology still stands and whether integrated foreign 
policy-making is any more possible in the rehashed external action constellation. In the absence of a 
full-fledged inter-institutional case on CFSP-TFEU delimitation, three recent cases were scanned on 
possible indications of how the Court would settle today’s integration-delimitation paradox: the 
targeted sanctions, Philippines PCA and Mauritius Pirate Transfer Agreement rulings.  
With regard to Article 21 TEU, the three rulings indicate that the horizontal external action objectives 
detract less from the centre of gravity test – as well as the pre-Lisbon division of competences – than 
often projected in literature. Philippines PCA clarifies that development cooperation’s primary 
objective of eradicating poverty, as it is now set out in Article 208(1) TFEU, does not diminish the multi-
faceted nature of this policy area. The fused listing of Article 21 TEU arguably even reinforces it. Also 
the absence of specific CFSP objectives in the TEU did not prevent the Court from assigning (at least 
implicitly) concrete powers to this competence in both targeted sanctions and Mauritius. Notably, the 
strengthened duty of consistency in Article 21(3) TEU made a stronger entry into EU litigation. 
Particularly in the Philippines PCA case, the CJEU demonstrated how this increases the tolerance for 
comprehensive measures to incidentally relate to other components of EU external action. This 
message is also embedded in the Court’s rejection, in the Mauritius ruling, of the Parliament’s strict 
interpretation of ‘agreements that relate exclusively to the CFSP’. Such reasoning seems beneficial to 
coherence and could bring case law in line with the comprehensive policy approach towards security 
and development challenges. This should however be carefully balanced with the principle of 
conferred powers. The risks hereof are clear when comparing the Court’s approach in Philippines PCA 
with that of Advocate General Bot in Mauritius. Whereas the former reverted to Article 21 TEU to 
confirm the broad scope of development cooperation, the latter used these same provisions to narrow 
it again in favour of the CFSP. One might therefore wonder whether this open-ended duty of 
consistency does not offer the judiciary too much room for interpretation. 
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With regard to Article 40 TEU, the conclusions of this research are rather more preliminary as the 
targeted sanctions and Mauritius rulings only relate indirectly to CFSP-TFEU delimitation. The Court’s 
reasoning in these cases reflects the rationale of these Treaty provisions, in the sense that the CFSP is 
approached as both less inferior and more normalised compared to the pre-Lisbon situation. For one 
thing, the CFSP is bestowed with specific competences in fighting piracy (although only latently) and 
terrorism, making it rather unlikely that this policy area will in future cases be interpreted restrictively 
as lex generalis. For another, the Court no longer submits the CFSP to a special regime of delimitation 
but applies its general methodology with regard to procedural compatibility as well as determining the 
procedure to be followed in concluding international agreements. In spite of this, its delimitation 
provisions were not once invoked by the EU judiciary, posing the question whether Article 40 TEU is 
not a double-blunt rather than a double-edged sword. In other words, can these provisions guide the 
Court in making concrete judicial choices or does their main purpose lay in putting constitutional 
emphasis on the need to respect the essentially different inter-institutional balance between the CFSP 
and TFEU legal regimes? A pending case on the Tanzania Pirate Transfer Agreement may help to 
answer this question. In the light of the above, it seems that both the duty of consistency and the scope 
of the CFSP, which were in peril in the aftermath of the SALW ruling, are scaled-up in EU litigation. The 
judicial approach towards specific activities across the security-development nexus remains however 
unpredictable.  
In sum, the EU’s commitment to enhance the security-development nexus has incited an impressive 
activation of instruments, expansion of institutions and unceasing embracement of new spheres of 
action. However, largely due to the decades-old constitutional insulation of the CFSP, this is not the 
result of a unified endeavour, but of separate and often independent development cooperation and 
CFSP/CSDP efforts. Both are treated very differently on the policy, institutional and judicial tracks, 
leading to considerable fragmentation, duplication and inter-institutional tensions, in turn, causing 
missed opportunities for exploiting cross-competence synergies. Little by little, the Lisbon Treaty’s 
changes to the EU’s external action architecture are bringing the three tracks more in line with the 
coherence exigencies of the security-development nexus, whilst ensuring that the CFSP remains a 
separate category of EU cooperation. The comprehensive mandates of the High Representative, EEAS 
and EU Delegations over CFSP/CSDP and development cooperation are steadily giving rise to more 
comprehensive policy frameworks and guidance. Also the respective development and security 
instruments are gradually becoming more sensitive to security and development challenges, allowing 
for a better mix of the available tools. While it is still too early to confidently assess whether and how 
this affects the security-development interface on the judicial track, the Court continues to show itself 
susceptible to policy evolutions and contextual factors. In essence, the integration-delimitation 
310 
 
paradox implies that the last word with regard to the enhancement of coherence between 
development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP was not said with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Its drafters ensured that the balance with delimitation would develop on its own pace, instigated by 
interwoven evolutions along the three above tracks. If the current trends endure, this could gradually 
flatten out many differences between the policy, institutional and legal regimes of CFSP and 
development cooperation. This will however change nothing to the Treaty-rooted delimitation itself, 
which will continue to challenge EU policy-makers and the judiciary, and require them to come up with 
innovative solutions.  
The remaining challenges and sore spots of the security-development nexus are well-known, also by 
EU institutions, and were illustrated in this research through the focus on the Union’s policy approach 
towards the Horn of Africa. These include an unsatisfactory understanding of security-development 
connections and the context-specific means to address them; the insufficient in-house circulation of 
information, assessments, intelligence and expertise; the need for more training of CFSP/CSDP and 
development actors on respectively development and security challenges, as well as the EU’s policy 
arsenal to tackle them; the rigidity of procedures that collides with the need for creativity and speed 
in crisis situations; the underperformance with regard to joint situation and risk assessment, 
programming and reporting; and the need to strengthen coordination mechanisms in Brussel as well 
as to reinforce in-country coordination by EU Delegations and Special Representatives. Whilst anything 
but perfect, the current constitutional framework holds sufficient untapped potential to tackle these 
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The long-standing commitment of the European Union to integrate and fine-tune its policies across 
the security-development nexus, aims to end the devastating vicious cycle of insecurity and poverty in 
fragile states. This research holds this pledge up to the mirror of the EU’s underlying constitutional 
framework. Ever since its creation, the EU Treaty system submits the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) – which includes the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – to special rules of 
delimitation. These essentially serve to shield the CFSP from the general dynamic of European 
integration. The result is a line of fracture that cuts across the EU’s efforts, instruments and policy 
communities striving to enhance the security-development nexus, thereby complicating a coherent 
and unified approach. The Lisbon Treaty (i.e. the most recent round of EU constitutional engineering) 
brings this constitutional architecture significantly more in line with such an integrative policy 
commitment. It strongly draws the coherence card and includes the sovereignty-sensitive CFSP in an 
undoubtedly unified legal order. However, it does not make an end to its special treatment. The 
Treaty’s strongest ever call for cohering the CFSP with the EU’s other external policies, combined with 
this continued legal delimitation, therefore poses a genuine integration-delimitation paradox. The 
Treaty stays clear of establishing, or even suggesting, coping mechanisms, thereby putting the onus on 
decision-makers, EU institutions and the judiciary.  
By comparing and contrasting the EU’s political discourse and efforts to enhance the security-
development nexus, with the limits and possibilities of its evolving constitutional structure, this 
research aims to get a clearer picture of both dimensions. On the one hand, this is targeted at better 
understanding the practical implications of Treaty reform in EU external action. On the other hand, 
this approach is necessary to unravel the full scope, effectiveness and challenges of this policy 
commitment. This analysis is conducted along three main tracks: the policy track of formulating 
political approaches and the legislative design of legal instruments, the institutional track of 
cooperation and coordination across policy communities, and the judicial track of delineating 
competences by the EU Court of Justice. Along each of these three tracks four key questions are posed: 
(1) what are the differences between development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP in policy/legislative, 
institutional and judicial terms; (2) what obstacles and challenges result from these differences; (3) 
which efforts are taken to transcend them and maximise positive connections between both policy 
fields; and (4) how effective are these efforts in getting the maximum out of the EU’s machinery?  
This analysis found that the EU’s commitment to the security-development nexus is more than mere 
rhetoric and has incited an impressive activation of instruments, expansion of institutions and 
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unceasing embracement of new spheres of action. Largely resulting from the decades-old seclusion of 
the CFSP, this is however not the result of a unified endeavour, but of separate and often independent 
development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP efforts. These are treated very differently on the policy, 
institutional and judicial tracks, leading to considerable fragmentation, duplication, inter-institutional 
tensions and missed opportunities for cross-competence synergies. The Lisbon Treaty’s changes to the 
EU’s external action architecture are clearly more than mere window dressing and steadily bring the 
three tracks in line with the coherence exigencies of the security-development nexus. The integration-
delimitation paradox poses significant challenges for EU policy-makers, institutions and the CJEU, but 
also leaves them considerable discretion to come up with innovative solutions, adapted to the peculiar 
EU external action architecture. While a truly unified Treaty system would evidently make the 
implementation of the security-development nexus more straightforward, the Lisbon Treaty proffers 
sufficient unexploited potential to address the remaining challenges of fragmentation, duplication, 





Sinds eind de jaren negentig verbindt de Europese Unie zich er in toenemende mate toe om haar 
activiteiten die de ‘nexus’ tussen veiligheid en ontwikkeling omspannen beter te integreren en op 
elkaar af te stemmen. Dit is er op gericht een einde te maken aan de alles vernielende vicieuze cirkel 
van onveiligheid en armoede in fragiele landen. Dit onderzoek houdt deze verbintenis de spiegel voor 
van het onderliggende EU constitutionele kader. Dit laatste onderwerpt ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
en het Gemeenschappelijk Buitenlands- en Veiligheidsbeleid (GBVB) – inclusief het Gemeenschappelijk 
Veiligheids- en Defensiebeleid (GVDB) – aan in wezen verschillende juridische regimes. In essentie is 
dit erop gericht het GBVB af te schermen van de algemene Europese integratiedynamiek. Het gevolg 
is een juridische breuklijn die snijdt doorheen de inspanningen, instrumenten en beleidsmakers die 
deze ‘nexus’ benaderen, en bijgevolg een eengemaakte en coherente aanpak bemoeilijkt. Het Verdrag 
van Lissabon (i.e. de meest recente constitutionele hervorming van de Unie) brengt dit systeem meer 
in lijn met een dergelijk pleidooi voor beleidsintegratie. Het stroomlijnt het verdragskader voor externe 
betrekkingen met een sterk leidmotief van coherentie. Hoewel het soevereiniteits-gevoelige GBVB 
wordt opgenomen in deze overduidelijk eengemaakte rechtsorde, blijft het onderworpen aan 
bijzondere afbakeningsregels en specifieke procedures. Het Lissabon Verdrag, met haar gelijktijdige 
pleidooien voor de integratie en afbakening van het GBVB in het externe beleid van de EU, creëert zo 
een inherente paradox. Zelf formuleert het geen indicaties of mechanismen om hiermee om te gaan 
en legt zo de verantwoordelijkheid bij EU beleidsmakers, instellingen en het rechtswezen.  
Door de politieke retoriek en de inspanningen van de EU betreffende de ‘veiligheids-
ontwikkelingsnexus’ te vergelijken en contrasteren met de beperkingen en mogelijkheden van haar 
evoluerende constitutionele structuur, tracht dit onderzoek een beter beeld te krijgen van beide 
dimensies. Aan de ene kant is dit erop gericht de praktische implicaties van verdragshervormingen met 
betrekking tot het externe optreden van de Unie beter te begrijpen. Aan de andere kant is dit 
noodzakelijk om complete inzichten te verwerven in de omvang, doeltreffendheid en uitdagingen van 
deze beleidsverbintenis. Deze analyse gebeurt op drie sporen: het beleidsspoor van politieke retoriek 
en het wetgevende ontwerp van financiële en juridische instrumenten, het institutionele spoor van 
samenwerking en coördinatie tussen de relevante EU instellingen, en het rechterlijke spoor van 
bevoegdheidsverdeling door het EU Hof van Justitie. Op elk van deze drie sporen worden vier vragen 
onderzocht: (1) wat zijn de verschillen tussen ontwikkelingssamenwerking en GBVB/GVDB in termen 
van beleid, instituties en rechtspraak; (2) welke obstakels en uitdagingen vloeien hieruit voort; (3) 
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welke inspanningen worden ondernomen om deze te overstijgen en synergiën te creëren; en (4) hoe 
doeltreffend zijn deze inspanningen om het onderste uit het diverse EU beleidsarsenaal te halen? 
Hieruit werd geconcludeerd dat het engagement van de EU om de ‘veiligheids-ontwikkelingsnexus’ te 
optimaliseren meer is dan goede retoriek. Het leidde tot een indrukwekkende ontplooiing van 
instrumenten, expansie van instellingen en een onophoudend aanboren van nieuwe actiedomeinen. 
De constitutionele breuklijn zorgt er echter voor dat dit niet het resultaat is van een eengemaakte 
inspanning, maar eerder van gescheiden en vaak onafhankelijke initiatieven binnen respectievelijk 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking en GBVB/GVDB. Deze worden bijzonder verschillend behandeld op het 
beleids-, institutionele en judiciële spoor, wat leidt tot fragmentatie, duplicatie, inter-institutionele 
spanningen en gemiste kansen om onderling versterkende effecten te genereren. De veranderingen 
van het Lissabon Verdrag zijn in dit verband meer dan een pleister op een houten been. Ze brengen de 
drie sporen stelselmatig tot een grotere samenhang tussen veiligheids- en ontwikkelingsbeleid. De 
constitutionele ‘integratie-afscheidingsparadox’ betekent dat de wijdverspreide boodschap van 
coherentie halfslachtig blijft, maar laat EU beleidsmakers, instituties en het Hof ook voldoende ruimte 
om met creatieve oplossingen voor de dag te komen. Hoewel een volledig eengemaakt kader voor EU 
extern optreden de implementatie van dit beleidsengagement vanzelfsprekend meer rechtlijnig zou 
maken, biedt het Verdrag van Lissabon voldoende potentieel om de blijvende uitdagingen van 
fragmentatie, duplicatie, samenwerking en coördinatie aan te pakken. 
 
